Special Powers Act, 1974

Section 2(1) and 3—
Section 3 if authorises detention for protective purpose. It confers on the Government the power to detain an individual for the purpose of preventing him from doing one or other or the 8 prejudicial acts mentioned in section 2(t) (i) to (viii) of the Act and for no Other purpose To keep a particular individual in detention for the purpose of protecting him front the onslaught of others is not contemplated within the four corners of the provision of law. The detenu might have a capability to create problem to public safety and public order, but that by itself cannot be the basis for passing an order of detention so long as he does not indulge himself in any prejudicial act and the members of the public, are not affected. (Per BB Roy Chowdhury J).
M Mahmood Vs. Bangladesh 43 DLR 372.

Section 2(f)(i)—
Detention order when void ab initio— Since the District Magistrate has no jurisdiction to pass an order of detention on the grounds enumerated in section 2(f)(i) the present Order of detention is void ab initio.
Moazzem Hossain Chowdhury Vs. Bangladesh 43 DLR 186.

Section 2(f) (i)—
A District Magistrate is not competent to make an order of preventive detention within the meaning of section 2(t) (1)—As it has been found that the initial order of detention passed by the District Magistrate On 31.:1 .89 and the detention of the detenu on the basis of it were illegal, the continuation of this illegal detention by the order of extension passed by the Government on 30.289 (sic) must also be deemed to be illegal. Initial order of detention was extended by a further order of detention with effect from an absurd date 30.2. 1989 whereas the month of February expired on 28.2.1989—Detention order being vague and indefinite is not lawful.
Khokan Kumar Saha Vs. Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs 42 DLR 164.

Sections 2(1) & 16—
Where the subject matter of theft belongs to the citizen or any other organization or institution theft ipso facto of such property does not become prejudicial t6the economic and financial interest of the State. In the instant case as the motors in question belonged to the Project for irrigation of land of different individuals there is no scope to hold that the theft of the motors was prejudicial to the financial and economic interest of the State.
Anisuzzaman Vs. State 43 DLR 35.

Sections 2(1) and 3(2)—
Detention— Ground NO. 4 relates to a specific criminal case—All other grounds are vague, Indefinite and lack in material particulars—Detenu’s release ordered by Court.
AKM Azizul Haque Vs. Bangladesh 42 DLR 189.

Sections 2(1), 3 & 8—
Jurisdictlonal facts for detaining a person—Since the detaining authority is curtailing the liberty of a citizen by detaining him on preventive detention, it is exercising a quasi—judicial authority. To curtail fundamental rights of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution it is essential that the detaining authority must have reports and materials, that is, jurisdictional facts for exercising power to detain the detenu under the special Powers Act.
Anisul Islam Mahmood Vs. Bangladesh 44 DLR 1.

Sections 2(f) (i), (ii) (viii) and 8—
Mandatory provision of section 8 of the Act has been violated by the Government by not serving the ground on the detenu that was mentioned in the detention order.
Rama Rani Bashak Vs. Bangladesh 40 DLR 364.

Section 2(f)(i), (iii), (v), (vii), (viii),—
Five different kinds of prejudicial acts were mentioned in the order without being sure as to which exact kind of prejudicial act the detenu was sought to be fastened with.
Rama Rani Bashak Vs. Bangladesh 40 DLR 364.

Sections 2(f) (iii) & 3(i)—
The Government which passed an independent detention order omitted all other grounds of prejudicial acts except the one defined in section 2(f)(iii) of the Act in the original detention order passed by the ADM—This shows non-application of mind.
Rama Rani Bashak Vs. Bangladesh 40 DLR 364.

Sections 2(f) and 3(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)—
Authority vested by Special Powers Act in the detaining authority—Detaining Authority’s power to detain a person for preventing him from doing prejudicial acts—Prompt must be taken to prevent the detenu  from committing prejudicial acts any further—No explanation furnished by the detaining I authority as to the fact which prevents the detaining authority from taking prompt action.
Detention order served after a delay of more than 2 years and 6 months after the incidents of prejudicial activities—No rational nexus between the grounds and the passing of detention order.
Mahabuba Wahed Vs. Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs 42 DLR 153.

Section 2(f)(viii)—
Prejudicial act—Mortgaged machineries attached to the bank— Accused appellant did not commit any act, prejudicial to the economic or financial interest of the Shilpa Bank which comes within the ambit of State by legal fictions as defined in Article 152 of the Constitution.
Anwar Ali Vs. State 41 DLR 450.

Sections 2(f) (VIII) and 16 read with Constitution of Bangladesh 1972 (as amended) Article 152(1) Bangladesh Shilpa Bank Order, 1972 (P0 No. 129 of 1972) Articles 33, 34 and 35—Interpretation of Statute—Bangladesh Shilpa Bank is a statutory public authority within the meaning of Article 152(1) of the Constitution—The liability of the loanee to repay the secured loan being civil in nature, he did not commit any prejudicial act and cannot be convicted under section 16 read with section 2(1) (viii) of Special Powers Act for default in payment of loan.—The Bank is a State by legal fiction. Appropriate remedy for the bank is for action under Articles 33—35 of ‘P0 No. 129 of 1972.
Anwar Ali Vs. State 41 DLR 450.

Section 2(g)—
Report or statement— Whether it is a prejudicial act—A report or a statement which is or likely to be an incitement to the commission of a prejudicial act is a prejudicial act. The legislature made a report or statement whether true or false made by the reporter or the speaker which had the effect or likely to be an incitement to the commission of a prejudicial act not by the maker of the speech, but by his audience being incited by that speech is itself a prejudicial act.
Mostafizur Rahman Vs. Bangladesh 44 DLR 312.

Section 3—
Detaining a person—Extent of satisfaction of the executive authority—The detaining authority is required to be very careful in examining the materials before passing the order of detention. Subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority can be looked into objectively by the High Court Division. The initial order of detention if found illegal the subsequent order of detention also suffers from infirmities.
Pearu Md. Ferdous Alam Khan for Serajul alam Khan Vs. State 44 DLR 603.

Section 3—
The detention order, Annexure ‘A’, did not mention anywhere that the detention of the detenu was considered necessary to prevent him from doing any prejudicial act. Thus on the face of the order itself it is without any legal authority in view of the provision of section 3of the Act.
Tahera Islam Vs. Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs 4O DLR 193.

Section 3—
The purpose for, which the petitioner was taken into detention appears to be realisation of the bank loan.  Such detention was not contemplated in the Act. If anything is payable to the bank as unpaid loan, there are other modes of recovery of the dues as—the loan was obtained under bilateral agreement creating a civil liability. For default in this regard provision of preventive detention under the Special Powers Act cannot be resorted to.
Mirza Ali Ashraf Vs. State 43 DLR 144.

Section 3—
Ground of detention— Capability to create problem cannot be, ground—A capability to create problems to public safety and public order by itself cannot be the basis for passing an order of detention so long as the detenu does not indulge himself in any prejudicial act endangering public safety and public order and the members of the public are not affected by his activities.
M Mahmood Vs. Bangladesh 43 DLR 372.

Section 3—
There is no nexus between the grounds mentioned in the order of detention and the grounds that were subsequently served on the detenu. For this reason also the detention order is liable to be held illegal.
Tahera Islam Vs. Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs 40 DLR 193.

Sections 3 & 8—
Purpose of detention and grounds—Nexus—In the initial order of detention nothing has been stated about any act of the detenu to be prejudicial to the economic interest of the State which appears to be the ground No. I in the list of grounds supplied to him. There is therefore no nexus between the purpose of detention and the grounds thereof and as such the detention is unauthorised being based on no proper grounds.
Aminuzzaman Vs. Bangladesh 45 DLR 242.

Sections 3 and 8 read with Constitution of Bangladesh (as amended upto date) Article 33 (5)—
Grounds in the initial order of detention cannot be substituted for separate grounds to be communicated to the detenu.
Chunnu Chowdhury Vs. District Magistrate 41 DLR 156.

Section 3(1)—
When specific case has been stared in relation to the alleged activity of the detent,, the same activity could not in fairness be taken as a reasonable basis for making an order of detention.
Tahera Islam Vs. Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs 40 DLR 193.

Section 3(1)—
No order of detention from 23.8.87 to 26.8.87—illegal order of detention was sought to be legalized by an order of extension with retrospective effect which is not permiissible in law.
Tahera Islam Vs. Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs 40 DLR 193.

Section 3(1)—
Detention—detention to make one inactive to keep the even tempo of life—The Court in an examination of the ground upon which the detaining authority had acted would examine whether in a given case, in the light of the attending facts and circumstances, the authority could be satisfied that a person should be detained in order to make him inactive or rather neutralized so that greater public interest can be ensured. The criterion is the potentiality of his act, its impact on the members of the society.
Mostafizur Rahman Vs. Bangladesh 44 DLR 312.

Section 3(1)—
Detention—Detention with the apprehension that somebody else (students) may endanger public order due to some utterance of the detent, — There is no warrant for the view that for the action or programme of the students (that of proceeding towards the cantonment where the ousted President was then residing) should not be held responsible and that he had been detained not for doing any prejudicial act. A prejudicial act has been defined in section 2of the Special Powers Act to be “any act”. Here the law did not mention the act but made any act to be prejudicial which is intended by the doer of the act or likely to prejudice, which means the reasonable standard of likelihood or possibility to prejudice public order, etc.
Mostafizur Rahman Vs. Bangladesh 44 DLR 312.

Section 3(1) (a)—
Preventive detention— When it is colourable exercise of power—The detention has been based on self—same grounds as were communicated to the detenu on earlier Occasion and declared to be illegal. Repeated recourse to illegal grounds knowing them to be so speaks of a bad mind. In the facts of this case, the preventive 8ctibn of the respondent is nothing but a colourable exercise of power.
Fazana Huq Vs. Bangladesh 43 DLR 501.

Section 3(1) (a)—
There being no nexus between the initial order of detention and the, ground served, the order of detention is without lawful authority.
Mansur Moazzem Vs. Bangladesh 40 DLR 439.

Section 3(1) (a)—
Custody on the plea of conviction—where a prisoner is in custody on the basis of an order of conviction the onus of the respondent is discharged as soon as the return relating to the appellant’s custody ‘shows that there is an order of conviction justifying the custody. But the conviction is to N placed before the court for its satisfaction whether the irregularity in It can be overlooked. The warrant of commitment issued by one not authorized under the law can hardly prove the conviction.
Nasrin Kader Siddiqui Vs Bangladesh 44 DLR (AD) 16.

Section 3(1)(a)—
Detention—Simultaneous proceeding of criminal trial whether permissible—The jurisdiction under the detention law may be invoked when the available evidence does not come up to the standard of judicial proof but is otherwise cogent enough to give rise to a suspicion in the mind of the authority concerned. A preventive dent ion is to prevent a person on mere suspicion that some crime had been done and the same would be repeated and is not a question of proving an allegation by evidence which must be done when a proceeding is drawn under the Penal Code.
Where a criminal proceeding is essentially on the same subject matter and no other matter than the criminal proceeding, then the proceeding under the normal law of the land would b allowed to be continued and the specific case would negative the necessity of any detention order except it could be shown on evidence or from records that the proceeding would come to a fiasco because there s no possibility of evidence to be produced in court in spite Of attempts made by the prosecution for him tube punished eventually and there is a possibility of has Immediately repeating the same activity an similar manner A criminal proceeding thus would not bar a detention order but there are limitations.
Salim Hasan Vs Bangladesh 45 DLR 318

Section 3 (1) (a)—
Where allegations are of serious nature the detaining authority may consider them, and despite pendency of a criminal case, can make an order of detention if it is satisfied that the detenu is to be prevented from indulging in prejudicial activities.
Habiba Mahmud Vs. Bangtodesh 45 DLR (AD) 89.

Section 3(1) (a)—
Government’s passing of order of detention on 23.2.1987 after expiry of 30 days cannot be treated as extending the previous order of detention.
Khair Ahmed Vs. Ministry of Home Affairs 40 DLR 353.

Section 3(1) (a)—
The detenu is not released on receipt of the order of the Court and is continued in detention without any order whatsoever, then a fresh order of detention passed.
Held—by this order the Government merely continued an illegal detention and cannot be sustained.
Alam Ara Huq Vs. Government of Bangladesh 42 DLR 98.

Section 3(1) (a)—
The Government if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from doing any prejudicial act at is necessary to do so make an order directing that such person be detained This satisfaction is to precede the order of detention which means that all the materials are to be placed before the Government for forming an opinion that the detention is necessary.
Faisal Mahbub Vs Bangladesh 44 DLR 168.

Section 3(1) (a)—
Preventive detention— Nexus between the incident and the order of detention—The alleged offending acts of the detenu prior to his arrest in September 1987 formed the basis of the satisfaction of the detaining authority as to the necessity of the detention and those had a close link with the passing of the order of detention. The detenu has been in custody since 13.9.87 and there has been a long gap 2—1/2 years between the alleged prejudicial activities and the order of detention when there could legitimately be no material in possession of the detaining authority to show that there was any likelihood of the same being repeated. The detaining authority had, therefore, no material basis to form an opinion of satisfaction for passing the order of detention.
Farzana Huq Vs. Banladesh 43 DLR 501.

Section 3(1)(a)—
Detention order, nature and scope of—This provision requires that before the Government can pass an order of detention it must be satisfied with respect to the individual person that his activities are directed against the object mentioned in the section and that it is necessary to prevent him from acting against it. While empowering the Government to pass a preventive order the section appears to have expressly made it a part of its duty to satisfy itself about the existence of what the law makers regard as condition precedent to the exercise of that power. An order being indicative of the Stale of the mind of the authority making it, the concerned order of detention must expressly state that the Government is at it is necessary to make the Order to prevent the individual from doing any prejudicial act. If the order is silent in this respect the detention will be not in terms of the section.
M Mahmood Vs. Bangladesh 43 DLR 372.

Sections 3(1)(a) & 8—
Grounds—Wht, good grounds cannot be saved from impeachment When good grounds and bad grounds are mixed up and it cannot be ascertained which grounds actually led to satisfaction as to the necessity of the detention, good grounds cannot be saved from impeachment.
Hasina Karim Vs Bangladesh 44 DLR 366.

Sections 3(1)(a), 3(2)(3) and 3(3)—
The Government has two alternative powers, either to approve of the order passed by the DM or , the ADM under section 3(3); or to pass an independent order under section 3(1)(a) of the Act.
Khair Ahmed Vs. Ministry of Home I Affairs 40 DLR 353.

Sections 3(1) (a) .& 3(3)—
Government did not supply any fresh grounds of detention a required in every case of detention under the law.
Khair Ahmed Vs Ministry of Home Affairs 40 DLR 353.

Sections 3(I) (a), (2),(3), 8(2) and 10—
The order of detention must co—exist with the fact and materials of detention contained in the gro.ds’ of detention. There is no nexus between order of detention and the facts and reasons disclosed in the detention order.
Khair Ahmed Vs Ministry of Home Affairs 40 DLR 353.

sections 3(1)(a)(2)(3), 10, 11 & 12—
This decision deals with the implication of section 10, 11 and 12 of the Special Powers Act read with Article 3 3(4) of the Constitution regarding the placing of the case of the detenu within the statutory period of 120 days (as I section 10) before the Advisory  Board, sending of the report of the Advisory Board containing Its opinion to the Government within 170 days as per section 11— and the legal necessity of the Government to confirm or revoke the order of detention (arid in case of confirmation pass further order for continuation of detention serving the same on the detenu) which in effect means that continuation of an order —of detention for indefinite period, even if initially otherwise va1id becomes illegal either on 120th day due to contravention of section 10, or on 170th day due to the contravention of the provisions of sections 11 and 12 of the Special Powers Act or on 180th day if the provision of section 12 of the said Act read with Art. 33(4) of the Constitution is not complied wish.
Md. Mansur Vs. Secretaiy, Ministry of Home Affairs 42 DLR 272.

Section (3)(1)(b)—
Preventive detention of a foreign citizen is uncalled for in the present case as the Government under section 3(l)(b) of the Act, may direct such person—to remove himself from this country.
In the case of a citizen of a foreign country in a case like the present one preventive detention is uncalled for as the legislature has provided in section 3(1) (b) of the Special Powers Act that the Govt. may direct him to remove himself from this country the manner specified in the order.
Dr. Md. Habibullah Vs. Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs 41DLR 160.

Sections 3(2) and 8—
Detentio —Criminal case pending against the detenu The authority cannot take resort to the prov1sIos of the Special Powers Act on the self—same ground and fact for making an order Of detention.
Mrs. Nabila Chowdhury Vs. Government of Bangladesh 41 DLR 345.

Section 3(2)(3)—
Habeas Corpus— Extension of detention after expiry of initial period of detention—Order dated 2.5.1989 by the Ministry of Home Affairs was made after the expiry— of 30 days from the date of first order of detention by the Additional District Magistrate. The Government have not been authorised to— extend the period of detention with retrospective effect. The detenu is therefore detained under—an illegal order of detention and is directed to be released forthwith.
Momtaz Sultana Vs. Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs 42 DLR 457.

Section 3 (2)(3)—
Detention order under section 3(2) remains in force for 30 days after the making thereof unless in the meantime it is approved by the Government. After the expiry of 30 days on 174 1987, the detention order is without any lawful authority as it was not extended within 30 days.
Saleha Chowdhury Vs. Government of Bangladesh 40 DLR 207.

Section 3 (2)(3)—
Computation of the time—limit of detention order—Whether the time of limitation of 30 days should be computed from the date of passing of the detention order or from the date of service of the order upon the detenu.
Saleha Chowdhury Vs. Government of Bangladesh 40 DLR 207.

Sections 3, 3(2) and 8(1)—
Detenu cannot be detained under section 3(2) of the Act on vague and indefinite ground served under section 8 of the Act as it does not enable him to make an effective presentation against his detention. [Relied on 31 DLR (AD) 1]
Pendency of a specific criminal case against detenu cannot be the ground for detaining him under section 3 of the Special Powers Act. 40 DLR 193 relied on.
Abdul Hakim Miah Vs. Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs 42 DLR 219.

Section 3(3)—
Fourth and last order of detention was dated 8.7.89—This was passed in confirmation of order of detention dated 11.3.89 which was found to be illegal—Thus the order dated 8.7.89 which was in confirmation of an illegal order was also patently illegal.
The last order was passed under section 3 (3) of the Act. An order under this provision of the Act is passed by the Government in approval of an order passed by the District Magistrate/Additional District Magistrate. In the instant case no order of detention was passed by either District Magistrate—Additional District Magistrate detaining the detenu. It was an order where the detaining authority has not applied its, mind and has acted mindlessly, nervously and desperately.
Alam Ara Huq Vs. Government of Bangladesh 42 DLR 98.

Section 3(3)—
Non—application of mind in the matter of detention makes the order of detention illegal—Any order of detention not ‘a signed by a competent officer cannot be treated as a valid order of detention.
Abdul Hakim Miah Vs. Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs 42 DLR 219.

Section 3(3)—
the period of limitation of 30 days occurring in sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act will begin to run from the date of making of the order.
Saleha Chowdhury Vs Government Bangladesh 40 DLR 207.

Section 3(3)—
Detention of the detenu  after the expiry of 30 days (From 18.3.1987 to 17.4.1987) cannot be extended  by an order— dated 5.10.1987 when the said detention was not legally in existence on and from 18.4.1987—Detention order Is illegal—Detenu is entitled to be released.
Saleha Chowdhury. Vs Government of Bangladesh 40 DLR 207.

Section 7(b)—
Direction upon absconding — person following order of his detention— Validity of such direction —When the order of detention is a nullity and — subsequent notification under section 7(b) ot the Special Powers Act also becomes a nullity and  void ab initio and the consequential proceeding before the Special Tribunal under the  said section 7(b) for non—compliance such null and void order becomes illegal and without lawful authority. In the instant case the order of detention is void ab initio because the detaining authority did not at all have before it “the junsdactional facts” to enable it to form its opinion that the person concerned should be detained for preventing him from acting in pre judicial manner and also because the involvement grounds given for preventive detention do not come within the meaning of the expression “prejudicial act” as define under section 2(f) of the Act.
Anisul Islam Mahmood Vs. Bangladesh 44 DLR 1.

Section 7(1)(b)—
Indictment proceeding against a detenu— question of its legality or otherwise at the time when It was initiated and  at subsequent time—An order would be deemed to be a warrant of arrest from the Court of Magistrate; if the detenu would  violate the warrant he would be a  fugitive from justice. His failure to comply with direction to surrender would immediately attract the mischief of prosecution and consequent punishment. The offence would be complete on failure to surrender, subject however, to the defence of impossibility of performance which is a matter of fact to be decided on evidence. Section 7(l)(b) is a punitive provision to come into play immediately after the lapse of time, for surrender. The contention that the detentions order being illegal the detenu had not rightly surrendered has little substance. It is not the order of detention but it is the fact of detention itself that matters. At the time it was initiated the proceeding was not prohibited by any law nor was it taken in violation of any law. It need not therefore be quashed at the present stage.
Anwar Hossain Monju Vs. State 43 DLR 447.

Section 8—
Detention—It is now an established principle of law that the allegations out of which specific case is started are not proper grounds for preventive detention.
Aminuzzaman Vs. Bangladesh 45 DLR 242.

Section 8—
Grounds of detention—The detaining authority is under an obligation to furnish definite grounds as well as adequate particulars to the detenu so as to enable him to make a meaningful, representation against the detention. This obligation stems from the statutory right of the detenu embodying the constitutional mandate of Article 33 5). No detenu should suffer because of vagueness of grounds or of the fact that the evidence against him is not brought to his notice. The grounds in this case being extremely vague and indefinite the detenu was denied the opportunity to make an effective representation and consequently his detention has been rendered illegal.
Farzana Huq Vs. Bangladesh 43 DLR 501.

Section 8—
Communication of grounds— Its importance—When a ground is not specifically stated in the document communicated to the detenu under section 8 of the Special Powers Act the same cannot be used by the detaining authority to defend its preventive action as the detenu gets no opportunity to make any representation in respect thereof.
M Mahmood Vs. Bangladesh 43 DLR 372.

Section 8—
Grounds of detention— Whether the detention order would fall to the ground if the second ground of detention, out of two grounds, is found to be  a malafide addition—The contention that the entire detention order would suffer from illegality as the second ground of detention could not be a pre—existing material at the time the impugned order was passed is of no substance because this ground was not before the detaining authority at the time the detention order was made and cannot thus be availed of by the detaining authority and the same must be left out of consideration. The first ground itself is a self—sufficient ground and good enough for the satisfaction of the detaining authority to pass the order of detention.
Mostafizur Rahman Vs. Bangladesh 44 DLR 312.

Section 8—
Every citizen has an inalienable right to be treated in accordance with law—Mere insertion of a section of some law In the order of detention is not enough. The provision of law must be strictly followed. Under Article 102(2) (b) of the Constitution the Court is to be satisfied that the detenu is not being held in custody without lawful authority—the Court is t see whether the grounds of detention supplied to the detenu are supported by materials.
Faisal Mahbub Vs. Bangladesh 44 DLR 168.

Section 8—
It is thus amply clear from the reasons stated in the order made under section 8 the Special Powers Act, 1974 containing the grounds of detention that no reasonable person could be satisfied about the necessity to detain the detenu.
Dr. Habibullah Vs. Secretary MO Home Affairs 41 DLR 160.

Section 8—Fresh grounds not having been served within 15 days on the detenu, the respondents had no legal capability of adding or substituting any more grounds—Detention of the detenu illegal.
Alam Ara Huq Vs. Government of Bangladesh 42 DLR 98.

Section 8—
‘Grounds’ must include facts as well. Grounds are not only necessary to enable the defence to make representation— they are the starting points both for Advisory Board and the High Court Division for discharging their obligations.
If the detenu asks for further particulars the Government may refuse to disclose a more facts on the ground of public interest. Section 8 of the Act requires that all grounds are to be given to the detenu and under the proviso to that section no ground can be withheld and only those fats may be disclosed whose disclosure is considered not to be against the public interest.
Habiba Mahmud Vs. Bangladesh 45 DLR (AD) 89.

Section 8(1)—
Ground Nos. 3, 4, 5 and7 being vague, indefinite and lacking In necessary particulars as to date, time and manner of detenu’s involvement in the activities, no effective representation could be made under section 8(1).
Khokan Kumar Saha Vs. Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs 42 DLR 164

Section 8(2)—
Grounds of detention to be served within 15 days from the date of order of detention—Order of detention passed and. served on 24.1.87 and grounds of detention I served on 14.2.87 after 21 days from the date1 of detention—Order of detention suffers from legal infirmity.
Khair Ahmed Vs. Ministry of Home 40 DLR 353.

Section 8(2)—
Interpretation of Statute— Expression “not later than fifteen days from the date of detention”—Meaning of—Detenu’s valuable legal right to make representation or to move the Court at once involved.
The said extraordinary provision adding the expression “but not later than fifteen days from the date of detention” does not give a general licence to the Ministry of Home Affairs or to the District Magistrate, Additional District Magistrate to cause service of the order containing the grounds of detention in a. leisurely way within 15 days in every case deliberately to deprive the detenu of his. Valuable legal right to make effective representation at the earliest possible opportunity to the appropriate authority or to, move the Court at once.
Dr. Md. Habibullah Vs. Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs 41 DLR160.

Section 8(2)—
Preventive detention— Detaining authority must keep in view Article 33(5) of the Constitution—Grounds to be communicated at the earliest to the detenu regarding the order of detention.
The detaining authority must always keep in view Article 33(5) of the Constitution which provides that the authority making the order for preventive detention shall, as soon as may be, communicate to the detained person the grounds on which the order of detention has been made and the Legislature in section 8(2) of Special Powers Act has taken pains to specifically direct the detaining authority to cause service of the. order containing the detailed grounds of detention at the time of detention, that is, at the very moment he is detained under the order of preventive detention.
Dr. Md. Habibullah Vs. Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs4l DLR 160.

Sections 9 and 10—
Grounds of detention have been not placed within 120 days before the Advisory Board from the date of order of detention, the mandatory provision of law has been violated.
Sirin Begum vs. District Magistrate 41 DLR 235.

Section 10—
Grounds of detention having been not placed before the Advisory Board within 120 days, the mandatory provision of law under section 10 of the Special Powers Act, 1974 was violated.
Iftekhar Ahmed Vs. Bangladesh 40 DLR 18.

Section 10—
Requirements provided for preventive detention to be strictly followed. Failure of the detaining authority to comply with the mandatory provision of law renders the detention illegal.
Iftekhar Ahmed Vs. Bangladesh 40 DLR 18.

Section 10—
Grounds of detention to be placed mandatorily before the Advisory Board within 120 days from the date of detention on failure of which the detention will be an illegal one after the expiry of 120 days from the date of detention. Detenu directed to be released.
Birendra Chandra Pal Vs. State 40 DLR 319.

Section 10—
The case of detenu having been not sent to the Advisory Board within 120 days from date of detention, his detention after 120 days is without lawful authority.
Khair Ahmed Vs. Ministry of Home 40 DLR 353.

Section 11(1)—
whether the High Court should pronounce its decision or has to wait till the Advisory Board reports its opinion to the Govt within the period provided in section 11(1).
In case of preventive detention where ordôr containing grounds of detention have been served on the detenu within the prescribed time, a question arises whether this Court should pronounce its decision or has to wait till the Advisory Board reports its opinion to the Govt. within the period provided in section 11(1) of the Special Powers Act.
Dr. Md. Habibullah Vs. Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs 41 DLR 160.

Section 16—
where the subject matter of theft belongs to the citizen or any other organisation or institution theft ipso facto of such property does not become prejudicial to the economic and financial interest of the State. In the instant case as the motors in question belonged to the Project for irrigation of land of different individuals there is no scope to hold that the theft of the motors was prejudicial to the financial and economic interest of the State.
Anisuzzaman Vs. State 43 DLR 35.

Section 25—
Whether the arrest of the detenu who occasionally visits Bangladesh has any rational nexus with the increase of prices of smuggled cigarettes or with the suspicion that he has a role in the smuggling of cigarettes.
Dr. Md. Habibullah Vs. Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs 41 DLR 160.

Section 25 and 25(b)—
Smuggling of rationed goods is an offence triable under section 25B of the Special Powers Act—Accusation under section 25 of the Act which does not relate to smuggling has prejudiced the defence—Conviction on this score is unsustainable.
Siddiqur Rahman Vs. State 41 DLR 173.

Section 258—
Smuggling—that the seized articles are contraband goods must be proved by. the prosecution—That the goods were of Indian origin have to be established for convicting the appellants—Individual liability of each of the appellants ought to have been considered—seized articles were donated to the Relief Fund without the Court’s permission, which prejudiced the prosecution case—the practice of disposal of the seized articles (alamats) pending trial of the case disapproved.
Rouf Mia Vs. State 40 DLR 348.

Section 25B—
since no offence was committed as found by the Special Tribunal in respect of the goods seized from the petitioner, the petitioner’s possession of the property must be deemed to be lawful. The Special Tribunal’s failure to make an order for return of the property has resulted in a miscarriage justice.
Sree Monoranjan Das Vs. State 40 DLR 485.

Section 25B & 27—
taking of cognizance of the case by the Special Tribunal on the basis of a prosecution report submitted by Inspection of Narcotics and Liquor under the Dangerous Drugs Act is bad in law. The Special Tribunal has no jurisdiction to take cognizance or t proceed with trial in such a position.
Shahidullah Vs. State 45 DLR 640.

Sections 258, 26 & 29—
Cognizance— Scheduled and non—scheduled offences— When the very taking of cognizance of an offence, the framing of accusation and the trial upon charges of both scheduled and non scheduled offences together suffered from complete lack of jurisdiction, this could not at all be considered to be a mere defect in the framing of charges which by aid of section 537 of the CrPC can be cured if prejudice is not caused to the accused. A mere defect in framing of charge by the Court having jurisdiction is one thing while framing of charge without having any jurisdiction is a completely different thing.
Mozammel (Md) Huq Vs. State 43 DLR 614.

Sections 26(2)—
The Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to try the case under the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure IV of 1898].
State Vs. Khalilur Rahman 41 DLR 1.

Sections 26 and 27—
Section 27 of the Special Powers Act is a departure from the provision of section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Special Tribunal alone is empowered to take cognizance of the offence on the report of a Police Officer of the rank of Sub—Inspector and hold trial on the same—Sections 26 and 27 of the Special Powers Act provide for special machinery for investigation and trial by Special Tribunal.
Taslima Begum Vs. State 42 DLR 136.

Section 26—
Plea of misjoinder of offences when not sustainable—Offences which are made punishable both under the general law and the special law exciusivery triable by the Special Tribunal cannot be said to be different offences or non—schedule offences as those offences have been made exclusively triable by the Special Tribunal. As such it cannot be said that the present trial is vitiated by misjoinder of charges and the Special Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make charges of schedule and non—schedule offences. Cases reported in 31, 33 & 35 DLR pages 174, 203, & 127 respectively held not applicable.
Abul Kashem Vs. State 43 DLR 420.

Section 27—
Bail—Inordinate delay in trial has been found to be a good ground for enlarging the accused on bail even in a case of murder and the same principle equally applies in a case under the Special Powers Act.
Dulal Mia Vs. State 44 DLR 209.

Sections 27 and 30—
The informant has no locus standi to file appeal before the Special Tribunal. Only the Government and the accused can do so against any order of conviction and sentence.
Firoza Begum Vs. Hormuz Ali 40 DLR 161.

Section 27(1)—
Quashing of proceeding under Special Powers Act—In matters of cognizance of offences triable exclusively by the Special Tribunal under the Special Powers Act initial cognizance of offence by a Magistrate in the manner provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure has no application.
In an application for quashment of proceeding on the ground of expiry of period of limitation for investigation, the provisions of section 167(5) of the Code applies only to cases in which the Magistrate can take initial cognizance and does not apply to cases exclusively triable by the Tribunal. On this ground the application for quashing is summarily rejected.
Mahbubur Rahman Vs. State 42 DLR 375.

Section 27(1)—
It has been asserted that the impugned order of the learned Upzila Magistrate is palpably illegal as he had no authority to take cognizance of the offence under the Special Powers Act and as such he was not competent to accept the final report submitted by the police and to discharge the accused opposite party and to direct return of the goods.
Held—As the Magistrate was not competent to take cognizance of the offence under section 27(1) of the Special Powers Act, the impugned order appears to have been passed by the learned Magistrate illegally and without lawful authority.
State Vs. Satya Narayi, Sarada 43 DLR 529.

Section 27(l) (4)—
Power conferred on Special Tribunal by section 27(1) to take cognizance of any case relating to the Act on police report and also under section 27(4) to direct the Police Officer to make further investigation cannot be exercised by the Session Judge in the revisional jurisdiction under sections 435 and 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Satya Ranjan Sarda Vs. State 42 DLR 142.

Section 27(6)—
Trial in absentia without proper notification—As the trial was held under provision of the Special Powers Act, the notification of the trial regarding abscondence of the accused persons should have been made by the Special Tribunal. The notification done by the Magistrate who had transferred the case before the Special Tribunal for trial suffers from gross irregularity, if not illegality as well, in the matter. In such circumstances the accused did not get the opportunity of cross—examining the witnesses. The case should therefore go on remand to the Special Tribunal for retrial, especially in view of the irregularity in the notification regarding abscondence of the accused. The impugned judgment and conviction is, therefore, set aside and the case is sent back on remand for retrial.
Khokan Vs. State 43 DLR 387.

Section 27(6)—
it was still obligatory to publish in official Gazette a direction on the accused to appear before the Court before taking up the trial if the accused was considered absconding because of their absence.
Md. Sabuj vs. State 40 DLR 150.

Section 27(6)—
Both the accuseds could not be regarded as having absconded as they were granted bail and summonses and warrants were directed to be issued.
Md. Sabuj Vs. State 40 DLR 150.

Section 27(6)—
The entire trial of the two accused persons held in their absence was illegal, in addition to the non—compliance of provision of section 27(6).
Md. Sauj Vs State 40 DLR 150.

Section 29—
Section 29 of the Special  Powers Act makes the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable to the proceeding of the Special Tribunal—The time—limit imposed by section 339C CrPC will also apply to the proceedings of Special Tribunal.
Chand Miah Vs. State 42 DLR 97.

Section 29—
Applicability of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the proceeding of the Special Tribunal does not empower the Special Tribunal to act as revisional court.
Satya Ranjan Sarda Vs. State 42 DLR 142.

Section 29—
Applicability of the Code to proceedings before Special Tribunals: The Act provides that the provisions of the Code shall apply to a case under the Act if they are not inconsistent with its own provisions. Section 339C of the Code being not inconsistent with any provisions of the Act shall apply to the proceedings before Special Tribunals constituted under the Act. Section 339C is intended for expeditious trial; the special statute is intended for “more speedy trial.” If the provision for speedy trial is not applied to trial under the Act, it will bring a situation not intended by the law—makers.
Kamruzzaman Vs. State 42 DLR (AD) 219.

Section 30—
Application for condonation of delay in filing an appeal under the Special Powers Act is not maintainable. And such an appeal when time—barred cannot be treated as a revisional application under CrPC.
Shamsul Haque Vs. State 43 DLR 247.

Section 30—
An appellant is not entitled to the benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act when his appeal under section 30 of the Special Powers Act is barred by limitation.
Bashi Vs. State 43 DLR 209.

Section 30—
Appeal by informant against acquittal, competence of—The appellant is the father of the victim. He lodged the FIR and he is PW I in the case. He is an aggrieved person and competent to prefer the appeal against acquittal.
Monindra Kumar Malaker Vs. State 42 DLR 349.

Section 30—
Time to take appeal—Considering the express provision of law for filing appeal within 30 days from the date of judgment by the Special Tribunal, the prayer for registering the appeal  for hearing on merits is rejected notwithstanding the fact that the accused had no opportunity to appear before the Tribunal and face trial.
Siddique Vs. State 45 DLR 214.

Section 32—
Bail—The bar of granting bail in Special Powers. Act case is not absolute. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Dulal Miah Vs. State 44 DLR2O9.

Section 32—
The High Court Division summarily rejected the appellant’s prayer for bail on an erroneous view of section 32 of the Special Powers Act which does not provide for absolute bar on ball. Under section 32 even when the prosecution opposes the prayer for bail the court can release an accused on ball when it is satisfied that there are reaso4lalhie grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence alleged.
Madar Chandra Basu Vs. State 44 DLR (AD) 151.

Section 34—
The bar of proceeding in any Cowl as contemplated in this section does not include the Supreme Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 102 of the Constitution. The protection given in this section is only for anything done or intended to be done in good faith.
Mirza Ali Ashraf Vs. State 43 DLR 144.

Section 34—
Maintainability of writ petition challenging legality of the order of detention after release of the detenu—the petitioner being an aggrieved person along with others challenged the validity of the transaction made during his detention period touching the transfer of the mill of the Company of which he was the Managing Director. If the order of detention remained unchallenged it may be used against him which may create obstacle in the way of his getting proper remedy. No other Court other than this Court under Article 102 of the Constitution has jurisdiction in the matter. And suit or other proceeding may be taken in any appropriate Court for anything done not in good faith. The impugned order has net therefore become infructuous and the relief prayed for is not for academic purpose; in t view the writ petition is quite maintainable and the petitioner is entitled to the declaration prayed for.
Mirza Ali Ashraf Vs. State 43 DLR 144.