Penal Code
[XLV of 1860]
Sections 29, 361-365—
A careful reading of sections 29, 463 and 464 of the Penal
Code together would clearly show that a false document must have been actually
made and that mere taking of a signature on a blank paper without writing
anything on that paper does not make it a document. Since the complainant
petitioner did not disclose the nature of the document allegedly created the
allegations made do not constitute the offence under section 465 of the Penal
Code and as such the impugned proceeding is liable to be quashed.
Syed Khalilulla Salik alias Juned vs Haji Md Rahmat Ullah vs State 49
DLR 16
Section 34—
The essence of joint liability is to be found in the
existence of a common intention animating the accused in the doing of a
criminal act in furtherance of such intention.
Before application of section 34 of the Penal Code to a
case, it must be shown that (1) a criminal act was done by several persons, (2)
all of them intended the commission of the criminal act and (3) the criminal
act was done in furtherance of the common intention. In the instant case it is
not clear that except accused appellant Abul Kalam Azad, the other accused had
the intention of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause the death of
Abdul Wadud and even the participation of the other accused in causing death of
the deceased is not free from doubt.
Abdul Kalam Azad vs State 47 DLR 317.
Section 34—
This section does not create any distinct offence. It is
intended to meet a case where the members of a party acted in furtherance of
the common intention of all but it was difficult to prove exactly the part
played by each of them.
In means that if two or more persons intentionally do a
thing jointly, it is just the same as if each of them had done it individually,
common intention within the meaning of this section pre-supposes a prior
concert. There must be a prior meeting of the minds leading to a pre-arranged
plan to commit an offence. The common intention to commit the offence invites
the application of section 34 of the Penal Code. In offences involving physical
violence, the presence of the accused at the scene of the occurrence renders
him liable on the principle of joint liability but where the offence consists
of diverse acts and it may be committed at different times, the presence of the
accused at the scene of the occurrence is not necessary.
State vs Tajul Islam 48 DLR 305.
Section 34—
Unless there is meeting of minds between the accused as to
the commission of crime of common intention, the application of section 34 of
the Penal Code is improper.
Abdul Khaleque and others vs State 48 DLR 446.
Section 34, 109 &
149—
For application of section 34 some overt act by each of the
accused is necessary in the commission of the crime by two or more persons but
in the case of application of section 149, if one is found to be a member of
the unlawful assembly for the commission of the crime, whether he takes active
part in it or not, he comes within its mischief, and so far as section 109 is
concerned, it is simply for abetment of the offence committed.
Now, in the instant case, according to the prosecution, all
the accused planned to commit the murder of the victim and towards that end
they started acting and then all together in a joint action with common
intention caused the murder of the victim. So, in such circumstances, it is not
understood why section 34 will not be attracted in this case, when allegation
is to the effect that each one of the accused persons took part in the
commission of the alleged crime of murder of the victim Kalam. The question is
whether the prosecution has been able to prove the allegation by evidence is a
different one. We, therefore find no illegality in framing the charge against
the accused under sections 302/34 of the Penal Code apart from other sections
of law.
Abdul Khayer and 3 others vs State 46 DLR 212.
Sections 34 and 149—
Section 34 of the Penal Code involves a direct overt act on
the part of the accused sharing “a common intention” with others for
the commission of an offence while section 149 is essentially a vicarious
liability for being a member of an unlawful assembly with the “common
object” of committing the offence. These two offences are of different
nature.
Abu Talukder vs State 51 DLR 188
Section 96—
The possession for exercising right of private defence must
be a settled possession a peaceful possession for a pretty long time without
any resistance.
Sarwar Kamal and others vs State 48 DLR 61.
Sections 96-104—
The onus of proving right of private defence lies on the
accused claiming exercise of such right.
Sarwar Kamal and others vs State 48 DLR 61.
Sections 96-106—
The right of private defence of the body extends to the
voluntary causing of death if the offence which occasions the exercise of the
right is an assault which may reasonably cause the apprehension of either death
or grievous hurt.
Khandoker Saiful Islam vs State 50 DLR (AD) 126
Section 100—
Right of private defence—When the accused had scuffles with
the deceased and the fear of retaliation from the deceased party overpowers the
mind, it is not possible for him to weigh the position in golden scales. In
such a situation when he is faced with assaults from his rival party it is not
unnatural that he would strike a decisive blow to defend himself and to free
himself from the clutches of his adversaries.
In the instant case, accused Ruhul Amin gave only one knife
blow to deceased Moktar Ali and then ran away. The attending circumstances
indicate that he gave the knife blow only to free himself from the grip of
deceased Moktar Ali and ran away for safety. This conduct of the accused
satisfies the legal requirement of the right of private defence. The accused
cannot be said to have exceeded the right of self-defence.
Ruhul Amin Mondal vs State 49 DLR 250
Section 120B—
Jobaida’s jubilation might be the result of her moral
support to the activities of her husband (leading to bloodshed and political
change) but for that it cannot be said that she was in the conspiracy.
Jobaida Rashid vs State, represented by the Deputy Commissioner, Dhaka
49 DLR 373.
Section 147—
All the accused persons assembled to attack the informant.
Though only one accused Abdul Khaleque attacked the informant, other accused
are also guilty under section 147 because every member of an unlawful assembly
is guilty irrespective of whether he had any overt act or not.
Bazlur Rahman Howlader alias Jilu and 3 others vs State, represented by
the Deputy Commissioner 51 DLR 457.
Section 148—
If both parties are found to have committed offence under
section 148 of the Penal Code none of them is entitled to be acquitted on the
ground that the other is the aggressor and in this respect law spares none.
Bachu Miah vs Samad Miah and others 50 DLR 564
Section 149—
The two accused had no premeditation to kill the victim and
as such the application of section 149 for tagging them to face trial on murder
charge appears to/be illegal.
State vs Khalilur Rahman 48 DLR 184.
Section 149—
When a particular offence is committed by an individual
member of the unlawful assembly, which was neither done in prosecution of
common object of the assembly nor other members of the assembly lenew that the
offence would be committed, other members of the assembly/cannot be held liable
for the offence.
The word “likely”, in the later part of section
149 of the Code means some clear evidence that an unlawful assembly had such a
knowledge. In view of other offenses committed, such as criminal trespass and
assault, it is difficult to hold that all the appellants are consecutively liable
under section 149 of the Code when Appellant No.l Abdus Sattar alone struck a
Katra blow on the right side of the chest of deceased which proved fatal and,
strictly speaking, section 149 of the Penal Code is not attracted in this case.
There being overwhelming evidence of inflicting Katra blow on deceased Aminul
Huq by Appellant No.l, the appeal in respect of Appellant No.l Abdus Sattar is
dismissed and his conviction and sentence under sections 302/149 of the Penal
Code is altered to section 302 of the Penal Code and his sentence of
imprisonment for life is maintained.
Abdus Sattar and others vs State 46 DLR (AD) 239.
Section 193—
If a court finds that any witness committed an offence under
section 193, the court is to proceed in accordance with the provisions of
section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure because the offence under section
193 is included in section 195(l)(b) of the Code.
Idris Miah (Md) vs State 50 DLR 629
Section 201—
Since both the condemned prisoners are sentenced to
imprisonment for life there is no necessity for a separate sentence to be
passed against them under section 201 of the Penal Code.
State vs Hamida Khatun and another 50 DLR 547
Sections 202—
The accused committed an offence punishable under section
202 of the Penal Code for not giving the information about the offence either
to the nearest Magistrate or to the police station.
State vs Md Bachchu Miah @ Abdul Mannan and 5 others 51 DLR 355
Sections 299 &
300—
When death is probable it is culpable homicide and when death
is most probable it is murder. Mere killing of a person is not murder or
culpable homicide, but it is so when caused with certain guilty intention.
State, represented by the Solicitor to the Governemnt of the People’s
Republic of Bangladesh vs Ashraf Ali and others 46 DLR (AD) 241.
Section 300—
When the victim went to bed with her husband and was found
subsequently dead there, he bears a serious obligation to account for her
death.
Abdus Sukur Mia vs State 48 DLR 228.
Section 300—
When all that the accused intended was to strike his wife
and the strike by mistake hit their newly born baby which had led to the
killing, such of the accused falls within the purview of exception I of section
300.
State vs Abdul Howlader 48 DLR 257.
Sections 300 &
302—
As there is a possibility that before the occurrence there
might have been some sort of altercation between the accused and the deceased
or loss of temper by the accused, it cannot be held that it was a premeditated
murder.
State vs Abdul Khaleque 46 DLR
353.
Sections 300 &
396—
The word murder appearing in section 396 of the Penal Code
and the word murder appearing in section 300 of the” Penal Code is not the
same thing. In section 396 the liability of commission of murder is conjoint
while commission of murder as defined under section 300 is absolutely an
individual liability.
Arzan @ Iman Ali vs State 48 DLR 287.
Section 302—
Motive is not a necessary ingredient of an offence under
section 302 of the Code. The Court will see if sufficient direct evidence is
there or not. If not, motive may be a matter for consideration, especially when
the case is based on circumstantial evidence.
State, represented by the Solicitor, Government of the People’s
Republic of Bangladesh vs Giasuddin and others 51 DLR (AD) 103
Sections 302 &
302/149—
The High Court Division affirmed the order of conviction and
sentence as passed by the trial Court forgetting altogether that the conviction
of the appellant was recorded by the trial Court under section 302/149 of the
Penal Code which is a completely different kind of conviction from one under
section 302 directly where the liability is personal and in the former case the
liability is vicarious.
Altaf Hossain vs State 50 DLR (AD) 120.
Section 300
Explanation 4—
Accused Abdul Aziz Mina has acted in a cruel and unusual
manner and also took undue advantage in inflicting 4 knife blows on the person
of victim Jalal which ultimately caused his death. Therefore, the offence as
committed by accused Abdul Aziz Mina does not in any way attract the provision
of Exception 4 of section 300 but attracts the provision of section 300 that it
is a voluntary infliction of knife blows with the intention of causing death
and as such accused Abdul Aziz Mina cannot escape the liability of causing
homicide amounting to murder.
Abdul Aziz Mina and others vs State 48 DLR 382.
Sections 302/34—
Though the appellate Court including this court may enlarge
a convict on bail for reasons to be recorded by it such a convict is not
entitled to be released on bail if he is sentenced to suffer imprisonment for
life.
Appellate Division in some cases opined /mat a convict may
be enlarged on bail if there is no chance of disposal of the appeal within the
period of his sentence. A convict who is sentenced to imprisonment for life
does not fall within the pronouncement of the Appellate Division. Bail granted
to appellant-opposite-party Abdul Momin Sarder on 11-1-96 is cancelled and he
is directed to surrender to his bail bond forthwith.
State vs Abdul Momin Sardar 50 DLR 588.
Sections 302/149—
Without a proper finding that the accused had a common
object conviction with the aid of section 149 of the Penal Code is illegal.
State vs Raisuddin and others 48 DLR 517.
Sections 302/34—
Though the appellate Court including this court may enlarge
a convict on bail for reasons to be recorded by it such a convict is not
entitled to be released on bail if he is sentenced to suffer imprisonment for
life.
State vs Abdul Momin Sardar 50 DLR 588
Section 304 Part I—
The accused was free to inflict as many blows as he
liked—That he dealt merely one blow shows that he did not intend to kill the
victim. The killing cannot be termed murder.
State vs Khalilur Rahman 48 DLR 184.
Section 304 Part II—
There was none to stop Rashid to deal repeated blows if he
had the intention to kill—he merely had struck one blow which eliminates the
intention to kill. Therefore, the intention to kill is lacking—It is not a case
of culpable homicide amounting to murder but a culpable homicide not amounting
to murder.
Abdul Khaleque and otherrs vs State 48 DLR 446.
Sections 302 &
304—
By inclusion of the offence of the above ordinance in the
schedule to the Special Powers Act the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court has
been ousted. Now, as the death is proved but not for demand of dowry, the
present case is sent back to the Sessions Court for trial.
Firoz Miah vs State 51 DLR 37
Sections 302 &
304 Part II—
The accused persons might have given the deceased a serious
beating to effect divorce of his second wife and this resulted in his death.
The offence committed by them does not attract sections 302/109, it attracts
provision of section 304 Part II of the Penal Code.
Shahajahan Talukder @ Manik and others vs State 47 DLR 198.
Sections 302/34—
Though the appellate Court including this court may enlarge
a convict on bail for reasons to be recorded by it such a convict is not
entitled to be released on bail if he is sentenced to suffer imprisonment for
life.
State vs Abdul Momin Sardar 50 DLR 588.
Sections 302 &
326—
The injury inflicted did not cause instant death. The victim
was alive for about 11/2 months at the hospital. This shows the injury
inflicted was not likely to cause death, but it endangered the life and
ultimately resulted in death. The appellant therefore is guilty under section
326 of the Penal Code.
Humayun Matubbar vs State 51 DLR 433
Sections 320, 325
& 326—
There is no evidence that any of the injuries endangered the
life of any of the victim. There was no fracture, the victims were discharged
from the hospital after treatment of several days. There is no evidence to show
that any of the victim suffered severe bodily pain for a period of 20 days or
unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. So the conviction under sections 326
and 325 of the Penal Code is not proper and legal.
Bazlur Rahman Howlader alias Jilu and 3 others vs State, represented by
the Deputy Commissioner 51 DLR 457
Section 326A—
The offence of gouging out eyes falls with section 326A of
the Penal Code.
Dilu alias Delwar Hossain vs State, represented by the Deputy
Commissioner, 48 DLR 529.
Section 342—
An offence under section 342 of the Penal Code which is not
included in the schedule of the Special Powers Act cannot be the basis of
conviction as the same is a non-schedule offence.
Had the original offence charged been one under Penal Code
then the learned Judges by application of section 238 of the Penal Code could
come to a finding that the offence constitutes a minor offence and in that view
could have convicted the appellant under a minor offence, but here the original
offence charged was exclusively triable by the Special Tribunal and in that
view the alteration of the conviction from a schedule offence to an offence
which is only referable under Penal Code is not legally permissible.
Abdur Rahman and others vs State 51 DLR (AD) 33
Sections 361, 363
& 366A—
Age of majority and guardianship—Decision as to custody of a
minor pending criminal proceedings—Neither personal law nor Majority Act is
relevant for the purpose. The statute that holds good is the Penal Code. If the
allegations are that of kidnapping of a minor girl, then for the purpose of her
custody, the court has to proceed on the basis that she is a minor if she is
under 16. If however the allegations are that of procuration of a minor girl,
the court has to proceed on the basis that a girl is a minor who is under 18.
Wahed Ali Dewan vs State and another 46 DLR (AD) 10.
Sections 363 &
366A—
A minor to be taken out of the lawful custody of her
guardian as under section 363 must be a minor under 16. A minor under 18 would
be referable to section 366A. She cannot be allowed to go whether she attains
the age of 18 years.
Dr Bimal Kanti Roy vs State and othrs 46 DLR 541.
Section 366A—
The FIR was lodged under section 366A of the Penal Code. The
offence under section 366A is related to a girl under the age of 18 years and
not under the age of 16 years.
Nurunnahar Khatun vs State 46 DLR 112.
Section 366A—
In an interlocutory matter concerning custody of a girl, to
give a final judgment on her age is to decide an aspect of the merit of the
case which is decisive of the case itself. After the decision has been given
that the girl is quite major above 18 years, can there be any purpose for a
trial which is still pending?
The learned Judges should have made it very clear that the
finding made by them as to the age of the girl was only for the purpose of
deciding the present custody of the victim girl and the trial Court was free to
take its own decision upon considering the evidence to be led in the case. That
having not been done, it must be said that the impugned judgment suffers from
at least impropriety having usurped the powers of the trial Court in a pending
criminal case.
Khairunnessa vs Illy Begum & another 48 DLR (AD) 67.
Section 366A—Age of
girl—Physical appearance—Physical appearance
may not always provide a correct guide for ascertaining the
age of a girl child who is growing up. In some cases physical development may
take place which may be regarded as precocious while in some other cases there
may not be as much development as is natural with the passage of time.
Having regard to the fact that the available materials
supported the claim of the mother that the girl was aged about 15/16 years
except the statement of the girl herself, the High Court Division cannot be
said to have acted judiciously in ingnoring the materials and relying on the
statement of the girl and their own observation of the girl. The mother has a
reasonable grievance to make against the judgment which does not seem to have
been passed upon a proper appreciation of the materials on record and far less
keeping in view the welfare of the victim girl alleged to be a minor.
Khairunnessa vs Illy Begum and another 48 DLR (AD) 67.
Sections 379 &
447—
When growing of the case crops by the complainant and the
cutting and taking away of the same dishonestly by the accused are proved, the
accused is guilty of theft.
When theft of the case crops by the accused by cutting and
taking away of the same and damaging some crops in the process necessarily
involves their entry into the case land and the accused are punished for theft
and mischief, a separate conviction under section 447 Penal Code is
unwarranted.
Motaleb Sardar (Md) and others vs State and another 51 DLR 278.
Sections 386, 387
& 390—
The distinguishing element between extortion and robbery or
dacoity is not the presence of the offender but the presence of imminent fear
and also the delivery of possession of goods to the offender, the actual
delivery or possession of property by the person put in fear is the essence of
the offence of extortion. Where a person through fear passively allows, his
property to be taken away the offence committed will be robbery or dacoity and
not extortion. The Special Tribunal had no jurisdiction to try this case as the
offence alleged against does not come either under section 386 or section 387
of the Penal Code, but it is more in the nature of a robbery or a dacoity.
Dulal Howlader and others vs State 48 DLR 269.
Section 396—
Dacoity with murder—When a murder is not committed in the
course of committing dacoity there can be no conviction under section 396 of
the Penal Code. Since the prosecution has failed to prove the commission of
dacoity and murder of victim Tajul by the condemned-prisoner and his associates
by any cogent and reliable evidence the order of conviction is not sustainable
in law.
State vs Mesbahuddin 49 DLR 245.
Sections 406/420—
Nothing was stated in the FIR that the accused denied that
he would not pay the balance amount. No allegation of initial deception has
also been alleged. The High Court Division rightly quashed the proceeding.
Rafique (Md) vs Syed Morshed Hossain and another 50 DLR (AD) 163
Section 409—
The accused having withdrawn money of the account holder PW2
upon a previous understanding between them, the trial Court misdirected itself
in assessing evidence in the case in its true perspective and thereby wrongly
convicted him.
AKM Mohiuddin vs State 50 DLR 447.
Section 415—
The initial intention to deceive must be established to
justify a conviction of cheating and the intention is to be gathered from the
surrounding circumstances.
Arifur Rahman alias Bablu vs Shantosh Kumar Sadhu and another 46 DLR
(AD) 180.
Section 420—
Where a prima facie case of criminal offence has been
clearly made out, the High Court Division in a proceeding under section 561A
CrPC has little scope to scrutinize the truth or otherwise of any document or
other evidence, which may be used as a defence in a criminal proceeding.
Kamrul Islam (Md) vs Atikuzzaman 49 DLR 258.
Section 420—
The first information report having made out an allegation
that the informant was persuaded by the petitioner to part with his money
through a clever device and was ultimately threatened with murder for demanding
repayment of the money, the initial intention to deceive appears on the face of
the First Information Report.
Nurul Islam vs State and another 49 DLR 464
Section 420—
An offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act is for dishonour of a cheque simpliciter for insufficiency of fund, etc.
whereas an offence under section 420 of the Penal Code for cheating is a
distinct offence. The rule of law about the peremptory application of the
special law in place of the general law for trial of an offence hardly applies
when the offences are distinct under the two laws.
Nurul Islam vs State and another 49 DLR 464
Section 420—
Transaction based on contract ordinarily gives rise to civil
liabilities but that does not preclude implications of a criminal nature in a
particular case and a party to the contract may also be liable for a criminal
charge or charges if elements of any particular offence are found to be
present. The distinction between a case of mere breach of contract and one of
cheating depends upon the intention of the accused at the time as alleged which
may be judged by his subsequent act.
State vs Md Iqbal Hossain and others 48 DLR (AD) 100.
Sections 420 &
406—
From reading of section 48 of the Act we do not find that
institution of this case under Penal Code is barred under section 48 of the Act
by an explicit provision of this Act.
Salahuddin (Md) and others vs State 51 DLR 299
Sections 447 &
379—
When growing of the case crops by the complainant and the
cutting and taking away of the same dishonestly by the accused are proved, the
accused is guilty of theft.
When theft of the case crops by the accused by cutting and
taking away of the same and damaging some crops in the process necessarily
involves their entry into the case land and the accused are punished for theft
and mischief, a separate conviction under section 447 Penal Code is unwarranted.
Motaleb Sardar (Md) and others vs State and another 51 DLR 278.
Section 463—
To find one guilty of forgery there must be an original
document first. In the absence of the original one, it cannot be said that the
resolution by the Bar Association dated in question is a forged resolution.
SA Alim vs Dr Md Golam Nabi and another 48 DLR 98.
Sections 463 &
464—
Ante-dating of a document with any of the intentions such as
causing damage or injury to a person by way of depriving him of his right
already acquired by a kabala constitutes forgery.
Amatutnnessa transferred her entire interest to the
appellant by the kabala executed and registered by herself of 18-7-75 (Ext. l)
and was thereafter left with nothing for subsequent transfer to anybody, but
she executed the subsequent kabala (Ext.4) in favour of her brother accused
Syeduzzaman conveying the same land by ante-dating the kabala showing that it
had been executed earlier than the appellant’s kabala. Execution of the
subsequent kabala shows her intention to deprive the appellant of his right
already acquired by his kabala which was found to be genuine.
“Forgery” means making of a false document with certain intentions,
such as to cause damage or injury to a person, to support any claim or title,
to commit fraud.
Amjad Molla vs Syeduzzaman Molla and others 46 DLR (AD) 17.
Section 464—
Unless there is an element of fraud or intention to cause
damage or injury to the public or any person the document or part thereof cannot
be called as forged document.
Mere signing of the petitioner in another’s name who did not
give authority to sign without any intention to cause damage or injury to the
public or any person and actually causing no injury or damage does not come
within the definition of forgery.
Abul Kashem Bhuiyan vs State 50 DLR 631
Section 467—
To secure a conviction for forgery in this case it must be
specifically proved that the executant by reason of unsoundness of mind or
intoxication or by reason of deception practiced upon him did not know the
contents of the document and in such state he was made to execute the document
by the accused.
Showkat Hossain Akanda Chowdhury vs State 50 DLR (AD) 128
Section 471—
For the offence under section 471 of the Penal Code an
accused can be punished as provided in section 465 of the Penal Code up to 2
years rigorous imprisonment or with fine or with both. The imposition of 4
years rigorous imprisonment under section 471 of the Penal Code is not
sustainable in law.
Abul Hossain Mollah alias Abu Mollah vs State 50 DLR (AD) 96
Section 471—
The High Court Division is palpably wrong in holding that
when an accused is convicted and sentenced under section 466 he cannot again be
convicted and sentenced under section 471 of the Penal Code. In the present
case it has been proved that the recall order was used by Nurun Nahar Begum in
getting Khijiruddin released from the Thana. The accused-petitioner was
certainly an abettor in so far as section 471 of the Penal Code is concerned.
Azizul Hoque (Md) vs State 51 DLR (AD) 216
Section 493—
The prosecution is required to prove that some form of
marriage or an apology for conducting a marriage took place and as a result of
which the woman had a belief in her mind that she was the lawfully married wife
of the accused.
In the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence
on record, it is difficult to comprehend how such a grown up woman with
sufficient worldly knowledge would bonafide believe that she was the legally
married wife of accused Hanif on his mere promise to marry her in the future
and on such fond belief she surrendered herself to the carnal desire of the
accused petitioner, which eventually led to her conception.
Hanif Sheikh (Md) vs Asia Begum 51 DLR 129
Section 494—
Marrying again during lifetime of wife—framing of charge
under this section was wrong because the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance or any
other law does not render second marriage, during the subsistence of the
earlier marriage, void. A person can be charged under section 494 Penal Code
only when such marriage is void. In is apparent that the Magistrate committed
error of law in framing charge under section 494 of the Penal Code instead of
under section 6(5) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. No doubt the
accused petitioner pleaded guilty and the conviction is based upon that plea
only. But the guilty pleading of an accused person cannot cure the inherent
defect in the charge or in the conviction.
Masud Ahmed vs Khushnehara Begum and another 46 DLR 664.
Section 499,
8th Exception—
Complaint made by the petitioners in good faith to the
Hon’ble Chief Justice regarding the conduct of the complainant judicial officer
is not defamation as the same is covered by exception.
Abdur Noor and others vs State and another 50 DLR 456
Section 500—
Had the complainant sent a rejoinder to the petitioner and
the same was not published then it could be said that the petitioner did not
act in good faith and for public good.
Shahadat Chowdhury vs Md Ataur Rahman 48 DLR 176.
Section 500—
Further prolongation of the case against the accused, for
publishing the alleged report which has not even been claimed to be entirely
baseless in the petition of complaint will be an abuse of the process of the
court.
Shahadat Chowdhury vs Md Ataur Rahman 48 DLR 176.