Sea Customs
Act (VIII of 1878)

S. 19 : ‘Across any customs frontier’ —Apply to goods taken from West
Pakistan to East Pakistan by air.

Fakir Mohd. Panjabi Vs. Faderation of Pak. (1958) 10 DLR (SC) 122.

 

S. 19 : “Across any customs frontier”—

Indian
film when taken from East Pakistan to West Pakistan, whether is taken out of
Pakistan across any customs frontier.

Having
regard to the (decision of the Supreme Court precisely on this question in the case
of Fakir Muhammad Punjabi Vs. Federation of Pakistan (1958) 10 DLR(SC) 122 it
must be held that under section 19 of the Sea Customs Act any one by taking
anything from East Pakistan to West Pakistan by air takes it out of Pakistan
across any customs frontier as defined by the Central Government.

M/s. Salimar Pictures Vs. Assessing Officer (1965) 17 DLR 146.

 

Ss. 19, 167 (8) : Unless prohibition or restriction in regard
to importation of any particular goods is notified under sec. 19 of the Sea
Customs Act importation of such goods cannot be held illegal merely by virtue
of a prohibition contained in a circular issued by a Government Department.

Nabil Hossain V. Collector of Customs (1974) 26 DLR 224.

 

S. 20: Liability to pay import duty under the provisions of the Sea
Customs Act depends upon the inward entry, i.e., on the goods entering the port
and the rates of duty shall be those that arc in force on the date of landing.

The
word ‘final’ in ‘final inward entry’ in paragraph 6 of the General Manual connotes
that such entry should be for fulfilling the purpose for which the ship came to
the port, that is, for (discharge of the cargo. (In the present case, the final
entry of the ship was effected on 19-849 and not on 29-7-49 and therefore,
import duty on cotton yarn having been lifted on 17-8-49, the plaintiff’s goods
are not liable to assessment of import duty).

Federation of Pak Vs. Dawood Corporation (1958) 10 DLR 258.

 

S. 23A (2)(b) : Failure to apply for repayment of customs-duties within the
period specified by the customs authority in terms of section 23(A)(2)(b)
operates as a forfeiture of the right to claim the repayment.

After
the Customs Authority has issued a clearance order, there is nothing further to
be done by the Customs Authority. 11 after that the petitioner does not remove
the goods from the warehouse of the jetty which belongs i.e. the Port
Authorities and chooses to pay demurrage or makes some other arrangement with
the Port Authorities for stocking the consignment in the Port’s warehouse the
Customs Authorities cannot be held liable.

The
expression “within three months from the clearance of the materials”, occurring
in clause(iv) of the impugned S.R.O. relates to the physical clearance of the
goods from the customs warehouse. The clause, relates to the date on which the
customs duty was paid and the clearance order was given by the Customs
Authorities. The three months period mentioned in clause (iv) of the impugned
S.R.O. means within three months from the date the customs duty was paid and
clearance order was given by the Customs Authority for the consignment.

E. P. Lamps Ltd. Vs. Pakistan represented by the Secretary,
Ministry of Finance. (1968) 20 DLR 1136.

 

S. 30 : Net price ascertained in this country cannot be the basis of
the conviction on a charge of filing untrue statement-The price prevailing in
the country of origin shall have to be established for such a conviction.

The
order of parties under sections 167 (913) and 167 (8) was sought to be
justified on the basis of materials obtained after enquiry under section 30 of
the Sea Customs Act. It has been said that enquiries revealed that identical
goods were sold by the said supplier at the rate of 1.51 dollars per pound and
therefore the statement of the petitioner in the declaration that he purchased
the disputed consignment at the rate of 51 cents per pound was fraudulent and
therefore attracted the provisions of section 167(9B) and 167(8).

Held: The petitioner did not get any opportunity to controvert the
materials on which reliance was placed for holding that he was guilty of untrue
statement in regard to the value of the imported goods; in other words, he was
denied a fair hearing.

The
normal price ascertained on the basis of the prevailing price in this country
at the relevant time, though sufficient for assessing the amount of customs
duties, cannot furnish proof sufficient to bring home a charge of untrue
statement under section 30 so as to justify conviction under section 167(9B)or
prove that the invoice had been deliberately undervalued so as to bring the
petitioner within the mischief of section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. Such
charge cannot be established otherwise than by furnishing proof of the correct
or prevailing commercial price in the country of origin at the time of import.

OKM Bawaney Vs. Assist. Collector of Customs (1962) 14 DLR 565.

 

S. 30: Mis-statement of price in his invoice by an importer can only be
established by showing the actual price in the country of origin and not
otherwise—Charge for untrue statement cannot be established of the basis of
‘normal price’ under section 30.

M/s. Eastern Rice Syndicate Vs. Central Board of Revenue (1959) 11
DLR (SC) 384.

 

S. 39 : customs officers under section 39 cannot realise rehabilitation
tax.

Usmania Glass Sheet Factory Vs. Asstt. Collector of Customs (1967)
19 DLR 592.

 

—S. 39 : Untrue—what
the word really means. The word ‘untrue’ in section 39 of the Sea Customs
Act carries the sense of falsity to the knowledge of the person concerned.
Thus, upon a point of mere valuation, if a declaration is made by such a person
which on enquiry the customs authorities find to be too low, that will not be
by itself sufficient to prove that the declaration was false to the knowledge
of the maker, but it would be necessary also to establish that at the time when
he made the declaration he was in possession of facts from which the necessary
inference would be that the value declared by him was too low and that the
value which be ought to declare was the same as that subsequently ascertained  by the customs authorities.

M/s. Eastern Rice Syndicate Vs. Central Board of Revenue (1959) 11
DLR (SC) 384.

 

— Recording a finding about guilty knowledge, not mandatory.

S. A. Rahman, J. (Cornelius, C.J. agreeing) The High Court,
in the present case seems to have thought that unless the Customs Collector had
recorded an express finding that the person concerned bed guilty knowledge of
the false declarations made i the relevant documents, no penal action could be
taken against them.

The
Collector need not have stated in so many words that the false statements were
made in the relevant documents, consciously and deliberately by the
respondents. It is sufficient if the Collector recorded findings of fact, from
which such an inference necessarily followed.

Pakistan Vs. Hardcastle Waud (Pak.) Ltd. (1907) 19 DLR (SC) 157.

 

S. 39: Customs Officers under section 39 cannot realise
rehabilitation tax—

The
Rehabilitation Rules, 1964 provides that rehabilitation tax shall be assessed
and collected by the officers empowered to assess and collect sales tax. Rule 4
provides that the provision of Sales Tax Act, and the Sales Tax Rules will
apply to the assessment and collection of rehabilitation tax in the same way as
is applicable in the case of sales tax. Therefore if in the absence of a
notification under section (5)(2) of the Sale Tax Act a Customs Officer could
not resort to the proceedings for rectification of mistaken or escaped
assessment for the levy of sales tax under section 39 of the Sea Customs Act, he
could not do the same for the realization of the rehabilitation tax as well.

M/s. Usmania Glass Sheet Factory Ltd. Vs. Asst. Collector of
Customs (1967) 19 DLR 592.

 

S. 39(2) : Declaring a consign of imported goods a defaulter with attendant
penal consequences without giving him an opportunity of being heard offends
against the principle of natural justice—Conditions which need be fulfilled
under section 39(2).

In
order to proceed under section 39(2) of the Sea Customs Act the following four
essential conditions must be fulfilled:

(i)
A person delivers declaration or other document to an officer of Customs in
connection with any matter of customs;

(ii)
Such document, etc., is untrue in any material particulars;

(iii)
By reason of such document or by reason of collusion, the full amount of
customs or charge payable is not paid; and

The
demand of the said duty or charge payable must be made within three years from
the relevant date.

The
contention on behalf of the Customs Authority that they were not obliged under
the Sea Customs Act to afford such opportunity to the petitioner is untenable.

Md. Sona Mea Vs. Collector of Customs, (1968) 20 DLR 549.

 

S. 39(3): Customs Officers power exercisable in regard to matters mentioned
in section 3(5) in Act—Customs officers have no power for reassessment of tax
by way of rectification of mistakes under section 3(5) of the Sales Tax Act.

Usmania Glass Sheet Factory Vs. Assit. Collector of Customs (1967)
19 DLR 592.

 

—Ss. 39 & 40 Customs Authorities realised extra duty from
the importer not within months as required by section 39(2) but long after
months was over—Importer applied for refund also not within 3 months as
required by section 40 but after that period—Importers suit held barred by law.

Extra
duty paid in this case was really assessable and the importer paying it even
without any demand from customs authorities, cannot get refund of

M/s Mia Brothers Vs. Pakistan (1967)19 DLR 1.

 

—Customs
authority demanded payment of furthe duty on imported paper from the importer—Section
39 authorized such demand where due to in advertence, error or misconstruction
full customs duty was not originally charged—Such demand has to be made within
3 months’ time from the date of original assessment—Demand in the present case
was made (and also paid by the importer) long after the expiry of 3 months.
Extra-duty paid was actally payable under the Customs law, but the importer
(plaintiff) took the plea that the demand for payment not having been made
within 3 months’ time limit the extra amount paid was refundable.

Held: Plaintiff’s suit is barred by section 40, since it requires that
such claim must be made within 3 months from the date of payment and since the
plaintiff’s claim is not made within 3 months, it is barred.

M/s. Mia Brothers Vs. Pakistan (1967) 19 DLR 1.

 

S. 64(c)(d) : Any steps by a Ships agent in a suit for damages against the’
Ship’s owner not only binds the agent but also the owner of the ship under
clauses (c) and (d) of section 64 of the Sea Customs Act.

Seafarers Inc. Vs. Province of East Pakistan (1968)
20 DLR (SC) 225.

 

S. 64(d) : Liability for damage on short delivery of goods—ship’s agent,
liable—Voyage charter, when charter is a voyage charter.

The
voyage charter differs from a time charter primarily in that it is a contract
to carry specified goods on a defined voyage, the remuneration of the
ship-owner being freight.

Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co.Vs. M/S Abdul Rahman, Abdul Gani
(1956) 8 DLR 349.

—If
the charter is a voyage charter ownership of ship remains with the owner
thereof and full possession, control and responsibilities of carrier lies with
him and not with charterer. Ibid.

—In
a voyage charter the ownership of the vessel remains with the owner of the ship
and all responsibilities as a carrier lies with him. When the agent of the
ship’s owner signs a declaration under section 64(d) of the Sea Customs Act and
there is a short delivery and loss of goods to the consignor the liability for
the loss is that of the owner of the ship and as such of his agent.   Ibid

—The
liability under a declaration made under section 64(d) of the Sea Customs Act
does not arise from the fact of declaration itself but from the fact the
declarant is the ship’s agent. Ibid

 

Agent’s liability to be sued for damages limited

It
was argued that the second portion of 64(d) of Sea Customs Act casts a
statutory duty upon the agent to meet the liability and as such the suit is maintainable
against at least the agent of the Shipping Company.

Held: Before the
agent can be made liable for any claim the owner must establish the claim, that
is to say, there must be adjudication on the claim, where the claim is not
admitted. Here obviously the claim is not admitted. And for the purpose of
adjudication the owner of the goods must obtain a decree from a Court in
England. Let the owner do so then the question of maintainability of the suit
would be considered as against the agent.

British India Steam Navigation Vs. M.A. Wadud (1968) 20 DLR 367.

 

 

Sea Customs
Act (VIII of 1878)

 

S. 167 : Whenever a
duty is cast upon any Tribunal to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial function,
it becomes incumbent upon such Tribunal or body to t in accordance with well
recognized principles of natural justice which also postulates that, if a
penalty imposed upon a person or his rights are invaded upon. he should be
given a fair hearing. It becomes incumbent upon such Tribunal or body to confer
a proper opportunity to such a person in order to enable him to meet the case
against him.

Osman Abdul
Karim Bawaney Vs. Collector of Customs (1962) 14 DLR 297.

 

—Power of
confiscation under the Act vests in the Custom Authorities and not in a
Magistrate -Magistrate’s power is derived from section 523, Cr.P.Code.

Assistant
Director of Customs Vs. Muhd. Afzal Khan (1964) 16 DLR (WP) 165.

 

—S. 167 of S.C. Act
allows confiscation while 5.523 of the Cr. P. Code empower return of goods to
the rightful owner.

Jogesh
Chandra Vs. Bangladesh (1978) 30 DLR 219.

 

S. 167 (8): Customs
authorities’ enormous power of imposing penalties deserves careful and fair
exercise of the same.

M/s. Eastern
Rice Syndicate Vs.. Central Board of Revenue (1959) 11 DLR (SC) 384.

 

—Possession
simpliciter not an offence.

Item (8) of
section 167 was aimed at the suppression of illegal import or export or
attempts to commit such an offence or to evade payment of the duty leviable on
the goods in question. The words “such goods shall be liable to confiscation”
in the penalties column could only refer to goods which had been the subject of
an offence of that character by an importer or exporter or his abetter or
agent. The mere finding of goods that may have been initially brought into the
country against a prohibition or restriction without paying the necessary duty,
in the hands of an innocent transferee, was within the mischief of section
167(8).

Federation
of Pakistan Vs. Sardar Ali (1959)11 DLR (SC) 59.

—Ss.167(8)
& 167(9B). [See under section 30 in the case. of AKM Bawaney Vs. Assistant
Collector of Customs, in 14 DLR 565 above.]

—S.
167(8)(81). Gold in Pakistan existed from ancient times—A conclusion by the
Assayer that gold seized being of higher fineness must be held to be smuggled
is wrong.

Messers S.
A. Haroon Vs. Collector of Customs, Karachi (1967) 19 DLR (SC) 472.

—Allegation
that gold had been imported is not sufficient—Party is entitled to rebut the
report of the Assayer. Ibid

 

—S.167(8)(36)
and (81)
: Laws which were in operation before independence in Tribal Areas did not
lapse with the Independence Act of 1947 but continued even after that.

The laws of
a State or territory do not disappear by a change in its sovereignty. Laws
governing or regulating the relations, the rights and obligations of the
residents of a ceding or acceding territory do not lapse by a mere change in
the sovereignty but continue to remain operative until changed by a competent
authority.

Under the
Constitution of 1956, by sub-article (2) of Article I the tribal areas which in
1955 were incorporated in the territories of Pakistan but the nomenclature was
altered and they were to be known as ‘special areas’.

The tribal
areas, therefore, became part of the territories of Pakistan. The Sea Customs
Act, the Land Customs Act and section 5 of the Tariff Act, which had been made
applicable to the tribal areas therefore, continued to apply in those areas and
never lapsed.

Tribal areas
were never a part of British-India nevertheless the Crown had acquired
jurisdiction therein by grants, usages, sufferances, etc., in the same manner
as if the Crown had acquired that jurisdiction by the cession or conquest of
territory.

Superintendent
Vs. Zewar Khan, (1969) 21 DLR (SC) 408.

 

S.167(8)(b)—In violation
of the permit giving the license-holder authority to import various items of
goods of different description for setting up a cold storage and Ice plant
mentioning the amount as against each item to be imported when the importer
imported two items for Rs.2 19,000/- whereas under the license- permit the
amount allocated for import of these item was Rs.6000/- the license holder was
guilty under section 167(8)(b) and the confiscation of these items valid in
law.

Collector of
Customs Vs. Shamsur Rahman (1979) 31 DLR (AD) 60.

 

S.167
(37-B).
The language of section 167(37 B) suggests that this is a case of absolute
statutory liability —unlike the provision of section 39 which requires that the
statement should be untrue with knowledge.

Pakistan Vs.
Hardcastle Waud (Pak.) Ltd. (1967) 19 DLR (SC) 157.

—Item 37-B
of the section does not create an offence of absolute liability—Mens rea
essential. (H. Rahman, J. disagreeing.) Ibid

 

S.167 (9B)—Such goods in
section 167(9B) mean goods which are liable to be confiscated u/s. 39 of the
Act when they have arrived at the port.

Collector of
Customs Vs. Shafiullah (1978) 30 DLR (SC) 226.

 

Ss. 167(17)—Nothing in
the section to support the view that goods found on board a vessel must be
measured on the ship itself.

In first
part of the section the words “found on board” means goods actually and
physically existing on board the vessel. This part refers to the cases where
the goods shown in the import manifest are lost or are none existing. But so
far as the second part is concerned, the section does not refer to any place of
measurement and there is nothing in the section to indicate that measurement
must Sc taken on board only and nowhere else.

The proper
time and place of actual measurement according to common sense should be place
where the oil is finally discharged.

Hegge &
Co. Vs. Assistant Collector of Customs (1979) 31 DLR 306.

—No duty
cast on the customs authority to serve notice on the consignee or shipping agent
before measurement of the goods. Ibid

 

S.167 (81):
Presumption as to payment of custom duty—When foreign goods are sold in open
market.

The ordinary
method of import of goods from outside into Pakistan is that they come through
the customs barrier and the duty payable is in fact paid. The presumption,
therefore, with respect to any goods which may be sold in the open market, in
the absence of an indication to the contrary, would be that the duty has been
paid on them.

Pakistan Vs.
Kazi Zinuddin (1962) 14 DLR (SC) 244.

 

Possession
of banned goods is an offence—Date of import not relevant.

Collector
taking action under section 167(81), even though not a judicial tribunal, and
not bound by rules of evidence and not authorized to administer oath to witnesses,
yet should not act arbitrarily, the proceedings in such cases being of judicial
or quasi- judicial character.

Collector of
Customs, Karachi Vs. Haji Usman, Haji Gani (1959) 11 DLR (SC) 200 (217-218)

—The phrase
‘for the time being’, occurring in item (81), mean that at the time of the
seizure of the articles in question, the relevant notification was in force.   Ibid.

—There is no
duty cast on the prosecution to prove not merely that the goods seized were
covered by a notification restricting or prohibiting import but also that the
particular goods had actually been imported. Ibid.

 

—Liability
arising out of debt.

The date of
acquisition of goods is relevant to the question of culpability under the
amended section 167. The words of items (81) arc unambiguous and expressly make
goods of the relevant kind liable to confiscation and their possession an
offence from the date of the amendment. No question of giving retrospective
effect to such a provision arises. From the date of promulgation of the Ordinance,
anyone, who retained possession of such goods, however or whenever they might
have been acquired could do so at his peril.

Federation
of Pak. Vs. Sardar Ali (1959) 11 DLR (SC) 59 (62-63)

 

Ss.167 (S1)
& 177-A: No offence committed when Government gives permission.

If goods are
allowed to be brought into Pakistan without payment of duty on account of
instructions issued by the Government it is hardly possible to allege that the
Government has been defrauded of the duty payable on the goods by the person
who brought the goods into Pakistan.

Pakistan Vs.
Kazi Ziauddin (1962) 14 DLR (SC) 245.

—Plea that
there was an alternative remedy by way of appeal not having been raised in High
Court, cannot be entertained in the Supreme Court— Constitution of Pakistan,
1956, Art. 170.

Conviction
under section 167(81) liable to be set aside by issue of certiorari.   Ibid

 

S.177-A.
Onus on the defense that the duty had been paid.

Item (81) to
section 167 and section 177-An are be read together to avoid an absurd result.
Prosecutions duty under section 167, item (81) is to show  the goods are chargeable with duty which has
not been paid or their importation is prohibited. Under section 177-A, the onus
is on the defense to prove that the duty on the goods seized had been paid or
they had been imported before the imposition or restriction.

Collector of
Customs, Karachi Vs. Haji Usman, Haji Gani (1959) 11 DLR (SC) 200.

 

—Under
section 177-A, if any question arises in respect of goods covered by section
167(8) as to whether duty has been paid or secured in respect of them or
whether they had been lawfully imported, the burden of proof would lie upon the
person in whose possession the goods were found or from whose premises they
were recovered or who claimed their ownership.

Federation
of Pak. Vs. Sardar Ali (1959) 11 DLR (SC) 59.

—In view of
the new section 177-A placing a definite onus on the possessor of the relevant
goods, covered by item (81) of section 167, a person proceeded against is
entitled to an opportunity of not only being heard hut of adducing evidence, if
necessary, to discharge that onus. Ibid.

—The section
lays down a procedural rule and it is, well-settled that any change in
procedure would affect pending actions or proceedings. Ibid.

 

—S.177-A.
Presumption rose under section 177-A. Presumption raised under section 177-A is
only with respect to the goods and no presumption as to the person who
committed the act.

The
presumption raised by virtue of section 177- A is only as to an act having been
committed, and there is no presumption as to the person who committed the act.
Even if the first part of section 177-A were applicable, yet the person from
whose possession the goods were seized could not have been found guilty on the
basis of that presumption alone. For there will be no presumption that it was
he who committed an act to defraud the Government. So far as the second part of
section 177- A is concerned, this too raises a presumption only as to the
commission of the act to evade a prohibition or restriction and not with
respect to the person who committed the act.

Further the
presumption under section 117-A even if it is raised with respect to a
particular person is not sufficient for holding that person guilty inasmuch as
an act may be committed in violation of a prohibition or restriction and yet it
may not be committed “knowingly and with intent to evade” the prohibition or
restriction and unless this element of “knowingly and with intent to evade” is
found to exist no offence can be said to have been committed.

Presumption
under section 177-A which arises as to an act would not be sufficient proof of
guilt as against the person in possession. And that being so the proper
procedure for application of section 177-A would be that the officer who seizes
the goods states the grounds of his belief in order that the reasonableness of
the belief may be tested.

Pakistan Vs.
Kazi Ziauddin (1962)14 DLR (SC) 244.

 

—Customs
Collector while conducting enquiry is to act in conformity with natural
justice.

In
conducting an enquiry under the Sea Customs Act, the Collector does not act as
a Court, but he undoubtedly exercises a judicial or quasi-judicial function in
this respect. He is not bound to conform to the provisions of the Evidence Act.
But in exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function, he decides in a
judicial spirit and manner in conformity to well recognized principles of
natural justice.

Osman Abdul
Karim Bawaney Vs. Collector of Customs (1962) 14 DLR 296.

 

—Customs
authority bound to disclose the identity of the informant who supplied the
information.

Customs
authorities may be bound not to disclose the identity of the informant upon
whose information certain investigations are started; but if in a judicial or
quasi judicial proceeding they have received any information as evidence and
have relied upon such evidence, they cannot conceal the identity of the
deponent and thereby deprive the petitioner of the opportunity of challenging
his veracity. Ibid

[See under
section 167 in the case of Osman Abdul Karim Bawaney Vs. Collector of Customs,
in 14 DLR 296 above.]

[See under
section 167(81) in case of Pakistan Vs. Kazi Ziauddin, in 14 DLR (S.C) 244
above]

S. 178: The
appellant’s shop was raided by the Custom Officials and certain imported goods
were seized there from. The appellant moved the High Court in its writ
jurisdiction and the two Judges of the High Court took two different views.

Due to
difference of opinion between the learned Judges the matter was referred to a
3rd Judge who expressed his agreement with the judgment of Faruqui, J.

Thereupon on
an appeal preferred before the Supreme Court it was contended that the
conditions imposed for return of goods to the appellant was illegal and
unauthorized in law.

Held: There is no escape from the position that the High Court can give
only such direction for which provisions are made in law. If the High Court was
of the view that the goods seized were smuggled in contravention of the Sea
Customs Act then no order for their restoration should ever have been passed.

In the
present case, it having been found that the goods were illegally seized there
is no warrant in law for the conditions imposed by the High Court on the
restoration of the goods seized by the Custom Authorities from the appellant.

Mohammad
Yousuf Vs. The Collector of Sea Customs, Karachi, (1969) 21 DLR (SC) 118.

 

S. 187. [See
under section 167 in the case of Assistant Director of Customs Vs. Muhd. Afzal
Khan, in 16 DLR (WP) 165 above.]

 

S. 188—Appeal
implies right of audience and an appeal cannot be disposed of on perusing the
departmental report.

Federation
of Pak. Vs. Sardar Ali (1959) 11 DLR (SC) 59

 

S. 189—Not
applicable to a person who disclaims ownership of goods for which duty or
penalty was levied.

Akbar Adil
Vs. Republic of Pak. (1958) 10 DLR (WP) 49

 

S. 188—Remedy has
been provided under section 188 of the Customs Act and as such it creates an
implied bar to a proceeding under the Code of Civil Procedure before the civil
court.

Jogesh
Chandra Vs. Bangladesh (1978) 30 DLR 219.

 

—Limitation : For filing
an appeal against the order of the Collector of Customs—Time of 3 months runs
from the date on which the person affected by the order comes to know of it and
not from the date on which it passed.

If the
proposition is sought to be established that the period of limitation would run
from the date on which the order was passed or is claimed to have been passed,
it must be proved that the person who will be affected by such order had actual
or constructive notice that the order was going to be passed on a particular
date or that the order has been passed.

New Cycle
Mart Vs. Collector of Customs (1974) 26 DLR 104.

—Concerned
party’s case should receive a due consideration at the hand of the Collector.

When
deciding upon somebody’s rights in a quasi-judicial proceeding like the one
before the Collector of Customs: the officer must independently arrive at the
conclusion upon a consideration of the materials, both of fact and law, placed
before him and he must give an opportunity to the party concerned to see or inspect
any document upon which he may be fond of placing his reliance. Ibid.

 

S.198. Notice
served on the clearing agent cannot bind the importer of the goods —proceeding
leading to imposition of fine in such a case not sustainable in law.

The notice
under section 198 in this case to show cause why higher assessment of custom
duties should not be levied and a penalty imposed was served not on the
petitioner i.e. the owner who imported the goods, but upon his Clearing Agent
who  as such on his behalf.

Held: The
petitioner was not personally served with any notice and therefore it cannot be
held that the notice served on the Clearing Agent can bind the petitioner.

AKM Bawaney
Vs. Assistant Collector of Customs (1962) 14 DLR 565.

 

—General
jurisdiction of the Civil Courts cannot be ousted by the conferment of special
jurisdiction on Custom Authorities.

Although the
special jurisdiction of the Customs Authorities to deal with the question of
assessment of sales tax cannot be doubted and the machinery provided for the
purpose by the Sea Customs Act is elaborate and is expressed so as to achieve
finality, yet that finality is only to be understood within the limits of the
statute, and those special provisions cannot by implication have the effect of
excluding the general jurisdiction of the Civil Courts.

M/S Habib
Industries Ltd. Vs. Pakistan (1962) 14 DLR (SC) 60.

 

Limitation
imposed by the section—The provision in section 198 of the Sea Customs Act dealing with
Civil Courts jurisdiction in matters decided under the Act merely subjects a
proceeding commenced under the section against a person for something done in
pursuance of the Act to the requirement of month’s notice in writing and of
three month’s limitation from the accrual of the cause of such notice. Ibid

 

S. 198—Provisions
of S. 198 are intended to afford protection to the Customs officers from any
vexations or frivolous proceeding.

Hegge &
Co. Vs. Assistant Collector of Customs (1979) 31 DLR 306.

 

S. 203B—The
question for Court’s consideration is whether the provision of “reward” as
contained in rule 7 of the Resolution of the Ministry of Finance dated 18.8.58,
confers a right which can be enforced by a writ petition.

Govt. of
Bangladesh Vs. Md. Arshad Ali (1982) 34 DLR (AD) 348.

 

—Read with
rule 7 of the Resolution of Ministry of Finance.

Rules framed
under section 203B of the Sea Customs Act are office instructions for
regulating grant of reward to Customs employees and other persons who are
instrumental in detecting evasions of the provision of the statute. Ibid.

—The word
“token” in rule 7 sufficiently shows that rewards cannot be claimed as of
right.   Ibid.