Act (VIII of 1878)
S. 19 : ‘Across any customs frontier’ —Apply to goods taken from West
Pakistan to East Pakistan by air.
Fakir Mohd. Panjabi Vs. Faderation of Pak. (1958) 10 DLR (SC) 122.
S. 19 : “Across any customs frontier”—
film when taken from East Pakistan to West Pakistan, whether is taken out of
Pakistan across any customs frontier.
regard to the (decision of the Supreme Court precisely on this question in the case
of Fakir Muhammad Punjabi Vs. Federation of Pakistan (1958) 10 DLR(SC) 122 it
must be held that under section 19 of the Sea Customs Act any one by taking
anything from East Pakistan to West Pakistan by air takes it out of Pakistan
across any customs frontier as defined by the Central Government.
M/s. Salimar Pictures Vs. Assessing Officer (1965) 17 DLR 146.
Ss. 19, 167 (8) : Unless prohibition or restriction in regard
to importation of any particular goods is notified under sec. 19 of the Sea
Customs Act importation of such goods cannot be held illegal merely by virtue
of a prohibition contained in a circular issued by a Government Department.
Nabil Hossain V. Collector of Customs (1974) 26 DLR 224.
S. 20: Liability to pay import duty under the provisions of the Sea
Customs Act depends upon the inward entry, i.e., on the goods entering the port
and the rates of duty shall be those that arc in force on the date of landing.
word ‘final’ in ‘final inward entry’ in paragraph 6 of the General Manual connotes
that such entry should be for fulfilling the purpose for which the ship came to
the port, that is, for (discharge of the cargo. (In the present case, the final
entry of the ship was effected on 19-849 and not on 29-7-49 and therefore,
import duty on cotton yarn having been lifted on 17-8-49, the plaintiff’s goods
are not liable to assessment of import duty).
Federation of Pak Vs. Dawood Corporation (1958) 10 DLR 258.
S. 23A (2)(b) : Failure to apply for repayment of customs-duties within the
period specified by the customs authority in terms of section 23(A)(2)(b)
operates as a forfeiture of the right to claim the repayment.
the Customs Authority has issued a clearance order, there is nothing further to
be done by the Customs Authority. 11 after that the petitioner does not remove
the goods from the warehouse of the jetty which belongs i.e. the Port
Authorities and chooses to pay demurrage or makes some other arrangement with
the Port Authorities for stocking the consignment in the Port’s warehouse the
Customs Authorities cannot be held liable.
expression “within three months from the clearance of the materials”, occurring
in clause(iv) of the impugned S.R.O. relates to the physical clearance of the
goods from the customs warehouse. The clause, relates to the date on which the
customs duty was paid and the clearance order was given by the Customs
Authorities. The three months period mentioned in clause (iv) of the impugned
S.R.O. means within three months from the date the customs duty was paid and
clearance order was given by the Customs Authority for the consignment.
E. P. Lamps Ltd. Vs. Pakistan represented by the Secretary,
Ministry of Finance. (1968) 20 DLR 1136.
S. 30 : Net price ascertained in this country cannot be the basis of
the conviction on a charge of filing untrue statement-The price prevailing in
the country of origin shall have to be established for such a conviction.
order of parties under sections 167 (913) and 167 (8) was sought to be
justified on the basis of materials obtained after enquiry under section 30 of
the Sea Customs Act. It has been said that enquiries revealed that identical
goods were sold by the said supplier at the rate of 1.51 dollars per pound and
therefore the statement of the petitioner in the declaration that he purchased
the disputed consignment at the rate of 51 cents per pound was fraudulent and
therefore attracted the provisions of section 167(9B) and 167(8).
Held: The petitioner did not get any opportunity to controvert the
materials on which reliance was placed for holding that he was guilty of untrue
statement in regard to the value of the imported goods; in other words, he was
denied a fair hearing.
normal price ascertained on the basis of the prevailing price in this country
at the relevant time, though sufficient for assessing the amount of customs
duties, cannot furnish proof sufficient to bring home a charge of untrue
statement under section 30 so as to justify conviction under section 167(9B)or
prove that the invoice had been deliberately undervalued so as to bring the
petitioner within the mischief of section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. Such
charge cannot be established otherwise than by furnishing proof of the correct
or prevailing commercial price in the country of origin at the time of import.
OKM Bawaney Vs. Assist. Collector of Customs (1962) 14 DLR 565.
S. 30: Mis-statement of price in his invoice by an importer can only be
established by showing the actual price in the country of origin and not
otherwise—Charge for untrue statement cannot be established of the basis of
‘normal price’ under section 30.
M/s. Eastern Rice Syndicate Vs. Central Board of Revenue (1959) 11
DLR (SC) 384.
S. 39 : customs officers under section 39 cannot realise rehabilitation
Usmania Glass Sheet Factory Vs. Asstt. Collector of Customs (1967)
19 DLR 592.
—S. 39 : Untrue—what
the word really means. The word ‘untrue’ in section 39 of the Sea Customs
Act carries the sense of falsity to the knowledge of the person concerned.
Thus, upon a point of mere valuation, if a declaration is made by such a person
which on enquiry the customs authorities find to be too low, that will not be
by itself sufficient to prove that the declaration was false to the knowledge
of the maker, but it would be necessary also to establish that at the time when
he made the declaration he was in possession of facts from which the necessary
inference would be that the value declared by him was too low and that the
value which be ought to declare was the same as that subsequently ascertained by the customs authorities.
M/s. Eastern Rice Syndicate Vs. Central Board of Revenue (1959) 11
DLR (SC) 384.
— Recording a finding about guilty knowledge, not mandatory.
S. A. Rahman, J. (Cornelius, C.J. agreeing) The High Court,
in the present case seems to have thought that unless the Customs Collector had
recorded an express finding that the person concerned bed guilty knowledge of
the false declarations made i the relevant documents, no penal action could be
taken against them.
Collector need not have stated in so many words that the false statements were
made in the relevant documents, consciously and deliberately by the
respondents. It is sufficient if the Collector recorded findings of fact, from
which such an inference necessarily followed.
Pakistan Vs. Hardcastle Waud (Pak.) Ltd. (1907) 19 DLR (SC) 157.
S. 39: Customs Officers under section 39 cannot realise
Rehabilitation Rules, 1964 provides that rehabilitation tax shall be assessed
and collected by the officers empowered to assess and collect sales tax. Rule 4
provides that the provision of Sales Tax Act, and the Sales Tax Rules will
apply to the assessment and collection of rehabilitation tax in the same way as
is applicable in the case of sales tax. Therefore if in the absence of a
notification under section (5)(2) of the Sale Tax Act a Customs Officer could
not resort to the proceedings for rectification of mistaken or escaped
assessment for the levy of sales tax under section 39 of the Sea Customs Act, he
could not do the same for the realization of the rehabilitation tax as well.
M/s. Usmania Glass Sheet Factory Ltd. Vs. Asst. Collector of
Customs (1967) 19 DLR 592.
S. 39(2) : Declaring a consign of imported goods a defaulter with attendant
penal consequences without giving him an opportunity of being heard offends
against the principle of natural justice—Conditions which need be fulfilled
under section 39(2).
order to proceed under section 39(2) of the Sea Customs Act the following four
essential conditions must be fulfilled:
A person delivers declaration or other document to an officer of Customs in
connection with any matter of customs;
Such document, etc., is untrue in any material particulars;
By reason of such document or by reason of collusion, the full amount of
customs or charge payable is not paid; and
demand of the said duty or charge payable must be made within three years from
the relevant date.
contention on behalf of the Customs Authority that they were not obliged under
the Sea Customs Act to afford such opportunity to the petitioner is untenable.
Md. Sona Mea Vs. Collector of Customs, (1968) 20 DLR 549.
S. 39(3): Customs Officers power exercisable in regard to matters mentioned
in section 3(5) in Act—Customs officers have no power for reassessment of tax
by way of rectification of mistakes under section 3(5) of the Sales Tax Act.
Usmania Glass Sheet Factory Vs. Assit. Collector of Customs (1967)
19 DLR 592.
—Ss. 39 & 40 Customs Authorities realised extra duty from
the importer not within months as required by section 39(2) but long after
months was over—Importer applied for refund also not within 3 months as
required by section 40 but after that period—Importers suit held barred by law.
duty paid in this case was really assessable and the importer paying it even
without any demand from customs authorities, cannot get refund of
M/s Mia Brothers Vs. Pakistan (1967)19 DLR 1.
authority demanded payment of furthe duty on imported paper from the importer—Section
39 authorized such demand where due to in advertence, error or misconstruction
full customs duty was not originally charged—Such demand has to be made within
3 months’ time from the date of original assessment—Demand in the present case
was made (and also paid by the importer) long after the expiry of 3 months.
Extra-duty paid was actally payable under the Customs law, but the importer
(plaintiff) took the plea that the demand for payment not having been made
within 3 months’ time limit the extra amount paid was refundable.
Held: Plaintiff’s suit is barred by section 40, since it requires that
such claim must be made within 3 months from the date of payment and since the
plaintiff’s claim is not made within 3 months, it is barred.
M/s. Mia Brothers Vs. Pakistan (1967) 19 DLR 1.
S. 64(c)(d) : Any steps by a Ships agent in a suit for damages against the’
Ship’s owner not only binds the agent but also the owner of the ship under
clauses (c) and (d) of section 64 of the Sea Customs Act.
Seafarers Inc. Vs. Province of East Pakistan (1968)
20 DLR (SC) 225.
S. 64(d) : Liability for damage on short delivery of goods—ship’s agent,
liable—Voyage charter, when charter is a voyage charter.
voyage charter differs from a time charter primarily in that it is a contract
to carry specified goods on a defined voyage, the remuneration of the
ship-owner being freight.
Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co.Vs. M/S Abdul Rahman, Abdul Gani
(1956) 8 DLR 349.
the charter is a voyage charter ownership of ship remains with the owner
thereof and full possession, control and responsibilities of carrier lies with
him and not with charterer. Ibid.
a voyage charter the ownership of the vessel remains with the owner of the ship
and all responsibilities as a carrier lies with him. When the agent of the
ship’s owner signs a declaration under section 64(d) of the Sea Customs Act and
there is a short delivery and loss of goods to the consignor the liability for
the loss is that of the owner of the ship and as such of his agent. Ibid
liability under a declaration made under section 64(d) of the Sea Customs Act
does not arise from the fact of declaration itself but from the fact the
declarant is the ship’s agent. Ibid
Agent’s liability to be sued for damages limited
was argued that the second portion of 64(d) of Sea Customs Act casts a
statutory duty upon the agent to meet the liability and as such the suit is maintainable
against at least the agent of the Shipping Company.
Held: Before the
agent can be made liable for any claim the owner must establish the claim, that
is to say, there must be adjudication on the claim, where the claim is not
admitted. Here obviously the claim is not admitted. And for the purpose of
adjudication the owner of the goods must obtain a decree from a Court in
England. Let the owner do so then the question of maintainability of the suit
would be considered as against the agent.
British India Steam Navigation Vs. M.A. Wadud (1968) 20 DLR 367.