Abdul Kader and others Vs. A. K. Noor Moham­mad and others, 36 DLR (AD) (1984) 261

Case No: Civil Appeal No. 3 of 1983

Judge: F.K.M.A. Munim,

Court: Appellate Division ,,

Advocate: Mr. Khandaker Mahbuhuddin Ahmed,Mr. Rafique-ul-Huq,Mr. Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan,Mr. M.H. Khondkar,,

Citation: 36 DLR (AD) (1984) 261

Case Year: 1984

Appellant: Abdul Kader and others

Respondent: A. K. Noor Moham­mad and others

Subject: Land Law, Property Law,

Delivery Date: 1984-1-10

Supreme Court
Appellate Division
Badrul Haider Chowdhury J
Shahabuddin Ahmed J
Chowdhury ATM Masud J
Syed Md. Mohsen Ali J
Abdul Kader and others
....................... Appellants
A. K. Noor Moham­mad and others
January 10, 1984
Adverse possession
The Trial Court as well as the High Court Division found that the plaintiff appellants were aware of the fact that the suit land has been acquisitioned long before by the Government for accommodation of government employees. No paper whatsoever has been produced to show that the land has been de-requisitioned. No claim of hostile title was ever made before in the various civil suits filed earlier. In such circumstance it cannot be said that the plaintiff appellants have acquired title in the suit premises by adverse possession……..(16)
The appellants entered into the premises with the permission of the owner who allowed it to be requisitioned by the government. The property is still under acquisition. The suit is for the declaration that the impugned compromise decree is void but not for declaration of plaintiff’s title by adverse possession. So the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. 
Cases Referred to-
Pandit Ram Chander vs. Pandit Maharaj, AIR 1939 All 611; Mrs. June Ferguson vs. Ameenur Rasheed (1973) 22 DLR 1; Manjural Hoque vs. Newajan Bibi (1955-56) 60 714; Aditya Kumar Ray vs. Dhirendra Nath (1948-49) 53 CWN 879; Sadak Ali vs. Suruj Ali (1955) 7 DLR 94; Ejaz Ali Qidwai vs. Spe­cial Manager, Court of Wards AIR 1935 PC 53; Munnalal vs. Mst. Kashibai (1916-17) 51 CWN 175; Hafiz Md. Fateh vs.  Sir Swarup Chand (1947) 52 CWN 182.
Lawyers Involved:
M.H. Khondker, Senior Advocate instructed by Abu Backkar, Advocate-on-Record—For the Appellants.
Khondker Mahbuddin Ahmed, Senior Advo­cate, instructed by Zinnur Ahmed, Advocate-on-Record—For the respondent No. 1.
Rafique-ul Huq, Senior Advocate instructed by Md. Sajjadul Huq, Advocate-on-Record- For Respondent Nos. 3-5.
A.W. Bhuiyan, Additional Attorney General, instructed by B Hossain, Advocate-on-Record —For Respondent Nos. 6-8.
Civil Appeal No. 3 of 1983.
(Form the Judgment and Decree dated 11 8.82 passed by the High Court Division, in First Appeal No. 32 of 1978.)
Fazle Munim CJ.
This appeal arises from First Appeal No. 32 of 1974 passed by the High Court Division on 11 August, 1982.
Appellants instituted Title Suit No. 36 of 1975 in the 4th Court of Subordinate Judge, Dhaka and was renumbered as Title Suit No. 1 of 1978 after being transferred to 5th Court of the Subordinate Judge, Dhaka. Appellants prayed for declaration of their title and possession to the suit properties and also for declaration that the compromise decree obtained in Title Suit No. 107 of 1966 in the 4th court of Subordinate Judge, Dhaka on 20 August, 1966 was fraudulent, void and not binding upon them. Prayer for perma­nent injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing the appellants from the suit premises was also made. Facts stated in the plaint are that the suit premises belonged to one Noor Mohammad Bepari who gave permission to the plaintiff appellants to enter into and live in the suit premises. While in possession the plaintiff-appellants entered into an agreement with the owner is the Bepari for selling title suit premises to them at a price of Tk. 20,000/-. On 20 September, 1950 a bainapatra was executed and on the same day 30 amount of Tk. 18,000/- was paid to Noor Mohammad Bepari as earnest money. The owner was to execute the sale deed within 3 months from the date of agreement. Plaintiff-appellants came to know that suit property was requisitioned by the Government of East Pakistan as it then was but it could not lake possession of the suit premises by evicting the plaintiff appellants there from. Noor Mohammad Bepari did not, however per­form his part of the contract in spite of tender of the balance consideration money and requests of the plaintiff appellants. No suit for specific performance within time could, there­fore, be filed due to the dilatory tactics of the owner to perform his part of the contract Plaintiff-appellants' possession extended over a period of more than 12 years. In 1973 defendant No. 6, the Government of Bangladesh issued a notice upon the plaintiff-appellants to vacate the premises who institu­ted Title Suit No. 47 of 1973 in the 1st Court of Munsif, Dhaka for permanent injunction restraining the Government from interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs. On 27th February, 1975 they, however, withdrew the suit and filed the present suit.
2. Their further case was that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 tiled Title Suit No. 107 of 1966 in the 4th court of Subordinate Judge, Dhaka against one Syed Abdul Latif defendant No. 12 and another and obtained a com­promise decree in collusion with each other on 22 August, 1966. The predecessor of defendant Nos. 3,5 filed Title Suit No. 90 of 1967 in the same court for cancellation of the compromise decree but the plaint was rejected for non-payment of court fee. De­fendant No. 1 filed Title Suit No. 56 of 1967 in the said court against the Government but withdrew the same. The predecessor of defen­dant Nos. 3,5 also filed title Suit No. 105 of 1974 in the same court for cancellation of the compromise decree dated 23.8.66 but the same abated. The cause of action of the suit arose on 1st March, 1973 when the plaintiff-appellants received a notice of eviction from defendant No. 6 and also on October 31, 1974 when defendant No 3 threatened them with dispossession. By filing three different written statements, three sets of defendants, namely, defendant No. 1, defendants Nos. 3-5 and defendant No. 6 contested the suit. The case of defendant No. 1 was that Noor Mohammad Bepari settled the suit property to Syed Abdul Latif, defendant No. 12 who, in 1951, settled it with him and his sister, defendant No. 2 by executing an unregistered amalnama on receiving a selami of Tk. 40,000/-. On the basis of compromise decree obtained by him in Title Suit No. 107 of 1966 defendant No. 1 got his name muta­ted in the S. A. record. The predecessor of defendant Nos. 3-5 filed Title Suit No. 19 of 1967 for canceling the compromise decree, but the suit was dismissed. Plaintiff No 2 and two others filed Title Suit No. 82 of 1968 against defendant Nos-1 and 2 predecessors of defendant Nos. 3-5 and defendant No 6 but the same was dismissed for default, the prede­cessor of defendant Nos. 3-5 filed Title Suit No. 307 of 1970 which was also dismissed for default. Plaintiffs filed Suit No. 47 of 1937 in the 1st court of Munsif Dhaka against the defendants but ultimately withdrew the same. The plaintiffs also filed Title Suit No. 622 of 1973 against the same but this suit was also withdrawn. The predecessor of defendant Nos. 3-5 filed Title Suit No 104 of 1974 for cancellation of the compromise decree dated August 23, 1966 but it abated. Miscellaneous case filed for setting aside the order of ab­atement was also dismissed. The present suit has been filed by the plaintiff appellants in collusion with defendant Nos. 3-5. The case of defendant Nos. 3-5 is that Noor Mohammad Bepari transferred the suit premises in favor of Nazrul Islam and Aminul Islam, defendant Nos. 10 and 11, who transferred their interest in the suit property to them on 27 October 1974 by executing a kabala. Defendant No. 6, the Government of Bangladesh, contends that the suit premises was requisitioned on 23.7.47 by the then Government of Bengal and the same was allotted to Class IV employees of P.W.D who were in possession On receiving a notice of eviction plaintiff-appellants who were in unauthorized occupation of a portion of the house instituted Title Suit No. 47 of 1973 which they subsequently withdrew. The suit premises has been recorded in the name of defendant Nos. 1 and 2, in the record of the De­puty Commissioner, Dhaka. Defendant Nos. 10 and 11 challenged the compromise decree in Title Suit No. 105 of 1974 but the same abated. Plaintiff-appellants were in unauthorized occupation of the suit premises and are, therefore, liable to be evicted under section 12A of the Emergency Requisition of Pro­perty Act. On March 14, 1978 the suit was dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Dhaka. Plaintiff-appellants preferred First Ap­peal No. 32 of 1978 before the High Court Division. Cross-objections were filed by defen­dant no. 1 and defendant Nos. 3-5. On 11 August, 1982 the High Court Division dis­missed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court "with modifi­cation to the effect that the findings of the court below so far as the claim of the defendant No 1 and defendants Nos. 3-5 are concerned will be of no legal effect are set aside".
3. Being aggrieved plaintiff-appellants moved this Court and obtain leave to consider whether the learned judges of the High Court Division had incorrectly applied the law of part performance as contained in section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.
4. Mr. M. H. Khondker, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellants, while challenging the correctness of the decision of the High Court Division and also that of the trial court con­centrated his efforts mainly on two points, namely (1) appellants being in possession of the suit premises in part performance of the contract is entitled to the decree; and (2) appellants' possession being adverse has conferred upon him title to the suit premises.
5. In order to substantiate his conten­tions the learned Counsel tried his utmost to prove that the bainapatra, Ext. 1, was a genuine document. This document has been considered by learned Judges of the High Court Division and the trial court at home great length. In this connection the history of possession of the suit premises by the Government after it was requisi­tioned in 1947, the continued litigation by the appellants as well as the different sets of defendants since 1966, the oral and documentary evidence relating to the respective claim of each of these parties in those cases and the results thereof were fully considered by the Courts. Mr. Khondker referred to grounds Nos. 7 and 9 on the application of section 53A  of the Transfer of Property Act to the facts and circum­stances of the case. These grounds are as follows: 
"VII. For that in view of the fact that no questions of non-joinder of any party to the suit was raised by any of the contesting defendants and that Noor Mohammad Bepari had left no heir or that his only son died without leaving any heir behind him, the learned Judges of the High Court Division erred, in making out a new and untenable case hold that "it further appears that Noor Mohammad Bepari died in 1956 leaving some heirs. His heirs have not been impleaded is this suit, to claim hos­tile title against him or his heirs. In that view of the matter this claim of part performance on the part of Noor Mohammad Bepari cannot be sustained and that the finding is based on a misconception of the law of part perfor­mance as contained in section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act." 
"IX. For that the suit as framed for declaration of title and not by way of defense for protection of possession under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and the First appeal being open on facts, the learned Judges of the High Court Division misdirected themselves in deciding the appeal on the wrong findings of the learned Subor­dinate Judge based on misconception of law facts and evidence on record assuming the suit as one for protec­tion of possession under Section 53A of the T.P. Act." 
6. A part from invoking the doctrine of part performance as embodied in the aforesaid section, appellant’s Counsel vehemently argued that the appellants’ prayer declara­tion of title in the suit on the basis of adverse possession should have been granted. He asserted that the appellants’ possession over 12 years preceding the filing of the suit has been found by the Court.
7. Before dealing with the contentions raised by the learned Counsel it may be use­ful to refer to the findings arrived at by the trial court which has been upheld by the High Court Division. Ext. 1, the bainapatra, which was alleged to have been executed by Noor Mohammad Bepari, owner of the suit pre­mise, on 20.9.50 for settling it for a con­sideration of Tk. 20,000/- has been found to be a spurious document. This document re­cites that on receiving Tk. 18,000/- as earnest money Noor Mohammad Bepari promised to execute and register the sale deed within 3 months after obtaining income tax clear­ance certificate. In so far as no suit has ever been filled by the appellants for specific performance of contract and there has been no mention to the bainapatra in the several civil suits previously filled by the appellants in respect of the suit premises and unsatis­factory evidence regarding its execution by Noor Mohammad Bepari and interpolations as to the amount the trial court found that the bainapatra was "created for the pur­pose of this suit only to get the benefit of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act." It was, therefore, found not to be a genuine document. These civil suits are: Title Suit No. 182 of 1968 filled by the plaintiff No. 2 and others in the 1st Court of Munsif, Dhaka for permanent injunction in respect of the suit premises. Plaintiff Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7-9 filed Titled Suit No. 3o7 of 1979 in the 1st court of Munsif, Dhaka for permanent injunction. These-two suits were dismissed for default. Plaintiff No. 7 filed Titled Suit No. 622 of 1974 in the 1st court of Munsif, Dhaka. This suit was withdrawn with op­portunity to sue afresh.
8. As to the appellants claim regarding the genuineness of the bainapatra, Mr. Khondker submitted that since there has been no challenge to the genuineness of the signa­ture of Noor Mohammad Bepari on the document the finding arrived at by the Courts were wrong. Mr. Khondker has referred to a few cases in support of his contentions as to part performance of the contract. One who places reliance on the doctrine of part performance succeeds only where one has been able to prove a contract. This is clear from the provisions of the section itself which is as follows: 
"53A. Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has, in part perfor­mance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in posses­sion, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the con­tract, and the transferee has, performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that the con­tract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transferor has not been completed in the manner prescribed, therefore by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in res­pect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract: 
Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part perfor­mance thereof." 
9. Mr. Khondker next contend that since the appellants have been in possession of the suit premises since 1950, asserting their independent title, the Courts should have found that they acquired title to the suit premises by adverse possession. In support, the learned Counsel referred to Ext. 2, the identity card issued by the Camp-in-charge. Mohajereen Relief Camp, Dhaka in favour of Sk. Azhar Ali showing that he was living in the suit premises and that he arrived in East Pakistan on 18.3.50, Ext, 3 series which are electric bills paid by plaintiff No. 2 during the period 1974 to 1977. Ext. 4 series, municipal tax receipts showing that plaintiff No. 2 have been paying municipal rents for the suits premises through Marfardars since 1975, Ext- 5 series show that plaintiff No. 4 paid water and sewerage charges for the suit premises in 1968 learned Counsel also referred to a few other Exhibits to show that the appellants have been living in the suit premises. Of these Ext. 6 series are of year 1967 and 1968. Ext. 7 is dated 10.9.75, Ext. 10 is dated 15.11.62, Ext. 10 (a) is dated 7.3.63. Besides, he referred also to the evidence of P Ws. 3, 4, 5-7 and 9 in sup­port of the appellants' possession.
10. It however, appears that the suit premises was requisitioned by the Government on 23 July 1947 and was allotted to emplo­yees of Central P.W.D for the purposes of residential accommodation. It also appears that Noor Mohammad Bepari the owner of the premises, applied to the authority for enhancement of rent of the suit premises on 10.4.48. A formal agreement dated 23.2.51, Ext. 8, was made between him and the Estate Officer, C & B Department, Dhaka. The emp­loyees to whom allotment was made occu­pied the suit premises on and from 1.9.47. The fact that some Government employees were in possession of a portion of the suit premises was admitted by Sk Azhar Ali, plaintiff No. 2, On considering these docu­mentary evidence and the perfunctory manner in which the appellants have filed civil suits one after another and either allowed them to be dismissed for default or withdrew them, the trial court found that the appellants could not establish adverse possession of the suit premises by them. As to the motive for filing the civil suits the trial court observed as follow: 
"It is evident from filing of as many as 4 title suits by the plaintiffs previous to this suit that whenever they apprehen­ded their eviction by the Government agency they used to rush to the civil court with prayer for injunction When their purpose was served they did not proceed with the suit. So taking recourse to litigation the plaintiffs appear to have been continuing in their unlawful poss­ession in the suit premises. As such the plea of acquisition of title by adverse possession is of no avail. They have no right, title and interest in the suit pro­perty and they are merely trespasser therein”. 
11. Some cases on the doctrine of part performance may now be considered. In Pandit Ram Chander Vs. Pandit Maharaj Kunwar AIR. 1939 All. 611 facts were that the plaintiff was a lessee of certain proper­ties under a deed of lessee which was duly registered but was not signed by either the lassoer or lessee in accordance with the provi­sions of Section 107. Nevertheless, plaintiff had ob­tained possession of the subjects leased. While the plaintiff was thus enjoying the possession defendants demolished part of the property, Plaintiff brought a suit for injunction restra­ining the defendant from interfering with any of the rights of the plaintiff as lessee of those properties. It was contended by the plaintiff that as he had entered into possession of the properties in terms of the lease executed in his favour and was willing to perform his part of the contract of the lease though it was not entitled to eject him by process of law or otherwise. Upon a question whe­ther plaintiff could rely upon the provisions of Section 53A, it was held that: 
"It was defendants who were seeking to enforce their rights under the contract of lease. The plaintiff was only seeking to debar them from doing so and was thus merely protecting his rights. There was therefore nothing in the terms of section 53A which disentitled the plaintiff from maintaining the suit." 
12. In the instant case before us facts are distinguishable inasmuch as the plaintiff-appellants here did not bring this suit to protect their possession as against Noor Mohammad who, according to them, entered into the agreement for sale on 20.9.50 but filed the suit for declaration that the com­promise decree obtained by some of the defendants in Title Suit No. 107 of 1966 was fraudulently obtained and, therefore, void.
13. In Mrs. June Ferguson Vs. Ameenur Rasheed Chaudhury (1973) 25 DLR 1, the learned Judges of the Dhaka High Court had to consider the scope of the provisions of section 53 A of the Transfer of Property Act in a suit for possession of immovable pro­perty. Here, the question arose whether the plaintiff in defending his possession of the property can successfully invoke such pro­visions, the contention of the defendant being that the provisions of the aforesaid section in such a suit were available only to defendant and not to a plaintiff. It was held that such a suit could not be said to be not maintain­able on the ground that the benefit of sec­tion 53A was not available to the plaintiff.
14. The principle laid down in this case is also not available to the plaintiff-appellants as the suit was not against the ori­ginal owner of the suit premises. Moreover, as it appears from the facts of this case, the plaintiff-appellant did not succeed in proving the alleged agreement between him and the owner of the suit premises. In view of the finding by the High Court Division as well as the trial court that the agreement for sale, Ext. 1, was not a genuine document the plaintiff appellant's possession is not referable to it.
15. In another case cited by the learned Counsel for the appellants it was held that the registration of a contract to transfer immovable property is not required in law and is admissible in evidence to prove the contract to transfer or the terms thereof for the pur­poses of section 53A of the Transfer of Pro­perty Act. As the plaintiff-appellant's pos­session of the suit premises is not referable to the contract they were not entitled to the benefit of section 53A of the Transfer of Pro­perty Act, vide, Manjural Hoque Vs. Newajan Bibi (1955-56) 60 CWN 714.
16. As regards the plaintiff-appellants, claim of title to the property on the basis of adverse  possession for 12 years preceding the institution of the suit, the finding of the trial court as well as High Court Division is that they were aware that the suit premises was requisitioned by the Government for the accommodation of Government employees. They could not produce any papers whatso­ever to show that the same had been derequ­isitioned and that they had been possessing the suit property since then  claiming hostile title Noor Mohammed Bepari who is alleged to have executed the bainapatra died some time in 1656 long before the institution of the present suit by the plaintiff appellants. No claim of hostile title was ever made by them, nor in the various civil suits filed before the present one out of which this appeal has arisen any mention regarding the bainapatra was made. In such circumstances it cannot be said that the plaintiff-appellants have acq­uired title to the suit premises by adverse possession.
17. Yet their learned Counsel, Mr. Khondker, submitted that plaintiff appellants have been able to prove their adverse possession for over 12 years prior in the filing of the present suit, though he failed to show agai­nst whom the assertion of hostile title was made and when or whether such assertion was ever made. The only thing which appe­ars from the conduct of the plaintiff-appe­llants in that whenever any notice was served by the Government upon them to vacate the suit premises they rushed to the Court and prayed for injunction but, as already observed, in none of those suits they ever claimed hostile title on the basis of their alle­ged adverse possession nor referred to the bainapatra. In addition, it appears from Ext U that some of the plaintiff-appellants submi­tted a joint application for allotment of the suit premises.
18. From these facts and circumstances which have been fully discussed and consider­ed by the trial court and the High Court Division, it appears that the plaintiff appel­lants are not entitled to any declaration of their title by adverse possession for over 12 years. The principles defining the acquisition of title by adverse possession have been con­sidered in numerous cases, but judging by the principles enunciated therein, the plaintiff-appellants case for adverse possession does not seem to have been made out.
19. In Aditya Kumar Ray vs. Dhirendra Nath Mondal, (1948-49) 53 CWN 879, prin­ciples regarding adverse possession have been referred to the facts concerned show when the Possession of the mortgagor’s tenant be­came adverse to the mortgagee. It became adverse to the mortgagee when he was entitl­ed to possession after purchasing the property in execution of the mortgage-decree, and the suit having been brought within 12 years, there from was within time. Facts of this case are, therefore, distinguishable from those of the present case. However, in referring to the term "adverse possession" the court quo­ted with approval the following  observations of Sanderson CJ in another case, "the term adverse possession' implies that the person against whom adverse possession is exercised, is a person who is entitled to demand posses­sion at the moment adverse possession begins.
20. Sadat Ali vs. Suruj Ali, (1955) 7 DLR 94, a Single Bench of the Dhaka High Court in considering the provisions of Articles 28 and 142 of the Limitation Act, noted the differences between the two sections. It was observed that: 
"Possession under a mistaken or invalid title is as effective as that of a trespasser, and, if sufficient in length of time and continuity, gives the hol­der a title."  
Further, it was observed- 
“Under Article 143 of the Limitation Act time begins to run against the rig­htful owner from the date of disconti­nuance of possession or dispossession, as the case may be, and under section 28 of the Limitation Act the right is extinguished, if no suit for recovery is instituted by him within the statutory period." 
21. In Ejaz Ali Qidwai vs. Special Man­ager, Court of Wards, Balrampur Estate, AIR 1935 PC 53, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, while referring to the prin­ciple of law regarding adverse possession, observed that: 
"a person, who bases his title on adverse possession, must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed. This onus the appellants have failed to discharge." 
In Munnalal, minor vs. Mst. Kashibai (1916-17) 51 CWN 175, the Privy Council observed that: 
"The general principle that the Court will always attribute possession to a lawful title applies where that is possible. Where the circumstances under which possession was assumed are known there is no room for drawing any presump­tion." 
In another case, Hafiz Mohammed Fateh Nasib vs. Sir Swarup Chand Hukum Chand, (1947) 52 CWN 382. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council referred to principles regarding adverse possession: 
“It is no doubt true that the claim of a mere trespasser to title by adverse possession will be confined strictly to property of which he has been in actual possession. But this principle has no ap­plication where the person is not a mere trespasser but was put into possession by an order of a Court, whether or not such, order was rightly made”. 
Further, it was observed: 
''The correct test to be applied in a case of this nature is, whether the claimant exercised such dominion over the pro­perty as to justify the inference that he was in possession of the whole. It is not necessary for him to prove that he was in physical possession of every square inch”.  
22. In the present case there is no evide­nce to show that the plaintiff-appellants ever claimed any title to the suit property on adverse possession, nor when their possession became hostile to Noor Mohammad Bepari, the owner of the suit property. Also, they never asserted hostile title against him. On the contrary, it is admitted by the appellants that they entered the suit premises with the permission of the owner who, however, allo­wed it be requisitioned by the government for the accommodation of government employees. From the government papers produced by the learned Additional Attorney General, it is seen that the suit premises are still under requi­sition. Moreover, the present suit is not for declaration of plaintiffs' title on adverse possession, but for the declaration that the compromise decree obtained by some of the respondents in Title Suit No. 107 of 1966 in 4th Court of Subordinate Judge, Dhaka is fraudulent, void and not binding upon them. In this suit, therefore, plaintiff-appell­ants are not entitled to any relieves whatsoever.
None of the three sets of defendants namely, defendant Nos. 1 and 2, defendant Nos. 3-5 and defendant No. 6 is entitled to any relief.
The appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.