Bikash Ranjan Das Vs. The Chairman, Second Labour Court, Dacca and others, 29 DLR (AD) (1977) 280

Case No: Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 123 of 1977

Judge: Kemaluddin Hossain,

Court: Appellate Division ,,

Citation: 29 DLR (AD) (1977) 280

Case Year: 1977

Appellant: Bikash Ranjan Das

Respondent: Chairman, Labour Court

Subject: Labour Law, Law of Evidence, Words and Phrases,

Delivery Date: 1977-6-14

Supreme Court
Appellate Division
A.B.M. Hussain CJ
A. Chowdhury J
K. Hossain J
D.C. Bhattacharya J
Fazal Munim J
Bikash Ranjan Das
…………............ Petitioner.
The Chairman, Second Labour Court, Dacca and others
June 14, 1977.
Words or Phrases
Domestic Tribunal— Order passed by a domestic tribunal to what extent subject to scrutiny— A domestic tribunal not bound by the provisions of Evidence Act.
Lawyers Involved:
B.N. Chowdhury, Advocate, with Md. Ismail Khan, Advocate, instructed by S. M.   Huq Advocate-on-record—For the petitioner.
Not represented—Respondents.
Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 123 of 1977
(From the Judgment and order dated the 28th January, 1977 passed by the High Court of Bangladesh in Writ Petition No. 355 of 1975)
K. Hossain J:
The petitioner is a dismis­sed employee of Public Jute Mills Ltd. He was an Office Assistant in the Labour Office of the Company. He was charged on two co­unts and dismissed after holding a domestic enquiry. His petition before the Labour Court and thereafter a writ petition to the High Court have failed.
2. Two charges were framed against the employee, one relating to his inducting a wrong person in the mills by changing the name and address of a Badli worker Serajul Huq, and the other was his issuing a false leave order to a worker, Abdul Hamid. Mr. Chowdhury argues that the employee was not given an opportunity to examine his witnesses and that the employer called no witnesses before the Enquiry Committee. Before the Labour Court evidence was led and the Lab­our Officer of the company said that the em­ployee only examined himself before the En­quiry Committee and called no other witnesses. The Labour Court considered the evidence along with the enquiry report. It appears, from the enquiry report that the relevant papers of the office were placed before the Commit­tee and therefore there were materials before the Committee to come to a conclusion. When an order of a domestic tribunal is challenged all that the court is to see, is that whether the char­ge framed against the delinquent was such as constituted an offence or default which calls for a penal action, and that the employee was gi­ven an opportunity to defend himself in allow­ing him to cross examine the witnesses, and to call evidence in his support and that the tribunal was constituted by impartial persons and that there were materials before the domes­tic tribunal to come to a finding.
3. Of all the requirements, Mr. Chowdhury's grievance is, that the Company called on oral witnesses. But we find from the enquiry report that relevant papers were placed before the Committee. Therefore, the question is one of adequacy and not absence of evidence, and this cannot be a ground to impugn the decision of a domestic tribunal.
4. Mr. Chowdhury next submits, with some vehemence, that on the second    charge, the Enquiry Committee upon a wrong view of the statement of the employee, has treated it as confession of guilt, which does not either amo­unt to confession or admission. A domestic tribunal is not bound by the Evidence Act and the expression used by it cannot be attribu­ted to it as if it were a Civil Court. It is only to be seen whether the employee did make any statement and if from that statement a conclu­sion could be drawn by the domestic tribunal or not. That a different conclusion is possible is no ground for interference.
We therefore do not find any good reason to grant leave. This petition is dismissed.