Marzia Tauhida Rahman and others Vs. Biman Bangladesh Airlines and others, 1 LNJ (2012) 57

Case No: Writ Petition No. 5157 of 2010

Judge: Hasan Foez Siddique,

Court: High Court Division,,

Advocate: Mr. Mahbubey Alam,TH Khan,,

Citation: 1 LNJ (2012) 57

Case Year: 2012

Appellant: Marzia Tauhida Rahman and others

Respondent: Biman Bangladesh Airlines and others

Subject: Locus Standi,

Delivery Date: 2011-11-28

HIGH COURT DIVISION
(SPECIAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION)
 
Hasan Foez Siddique, J.
Md. Jahangir Hossain, J.

Judgment
28.11.2011
Marzia Tauhida Rahman and others
……Petitioner
-Versus-
Managing Director and CEO, Biman Bangladesh Airlines Private Limited and others
……Respondents
 
Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972
Article 27, 28 and 102(2)
Bangladesh Biman Corporation Employees (Service) Regulation, 1979
Regulation No. 11(3)
It is duty of the legislature to legislate such law which are not oppressive, unjust and one sided and discriminatory. The discrimination between person similarly situated and possibility of such discrimination makes a legislation ultra vires in view of Article 27 and 28 of the Constitution.  Here the impugned provision has made discrimination between the male and female cabin crews and in between the female cabin crews as well. This discrimination has been made between female cabin crews  having two surviving children and female cabin crews having two  surviving children and thereafter upon her becoming pregnant for third child. But provision of stand termination due to pregnancy for third child is a practice derogatory to women. The pregnancy disability, exclusion amounted to down grade in the women whole in the labour force. By making pregnancy bar third time to be the continue in service of female cabin crew, the Biman Bangladesh Airlines seems to have made a clear discrimination in betwen the female cabin crews having two surviving children and cabin crews having two children and her becoming pregnant for third time which is undoubtedly arbitrary unreasonable and utter selfishness at the cause of all human values. The provision of Regulation No. 11(3) of Bangladesh Biman Corporation Employees (Service) Regulations, 1979 is discriminatory and inconsistent with the provisions of Article 28 of the Constitution. ...... (17, 21, 22 and 24).
 
Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972
Articles 102(2)
The impugned Regulation may affect the petitioners any time as a result of which the petitioners have locus-standi to challenge the legality and propriety of the amended provisions of law, that is, the instant Writ Petition at the instance of the petitioners is maintainable. ….(27)
 
Dalia Parveen Vs. Bangladesh Biman Corporation reported in 48 DLR page 132, Air India Vs. Nergesh Meerza reported in AIR 1981 (SC) 1829,    Air India Cabin Crew Association Vs. Yishawinee Marchant  reported in AIR 2004 (SC) 87,  Pathomma Vs. State of Kerala reported in AIR 1978 S.C Mackenzia Vs. Andreg D Casta reported in AIR 1987 S.C. 1281, 52 DLR (HCD)  308, Sharran A.    Frontieroy Vs.  Elliot. L. Richardson, (1973) 36 L. Ed. 2nd 583 U.S., Mary Aun Turher Vs. Department of Employment Security (1975) 46 L ed 2nd 181, Department of Water and Pover Vs. Marle Manhart, (1978) 55 L Ed.2nd 657, Maneka Gaudhi Vs. Union of India ( AIR 1978 S.C. 597), Hai Chand Sardar Vs. Mizo District Council reported AIR 1967 (S.C.)  page 829, S.P. Gupta Vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1982 SC 149, Regina Vs. Liverpool Corporation (1972) 2 QB 299.
 
Mr. T.H Khan with Mr. Moinuddin,  Mr. Kabirul Islam Fakir, Mrs.  Anjuman Ara Begum, Mr. Abu Bakker Siddique
---For the petitioner.
Mr. Mahbubey Alam, with Mr. Biswojit Roy, DAG, Mr. Mejbahur Rahman, Mr. Khondoker Reza-E- Raquib, Mr. Immamul Kabir
---For the respondent no. 2.
 
Writ Petition No. 5157 of 2010
 
JUDGMENT
Hasan Foez Siddique, J:
 
1.         This Rule Nisi was issued calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why the impugned amendment of Bangladesh Biman Corporation Employees (Service) Regulation, 1979 published in Bangladesh Gazette, Extraordinary dated 5th February, 1984 at Regulation 11 (3) regarding ceasing of service of the Female Cabin Crew of Biman Bangladesh Airlines should not be declared to have been done without lawful authority and is of no legal effect.
 
2.     The three writ petitioners are Female Cabin Crews of Biman Bangladesh Airlines. They got appointment in 1994 and joined in the respective posts. They have been performing their duties with utmost sincerity, and unquestionable integrity. The amended Bangladesh Biman Corporation Employees (Service) Regulations 1979 has been published in the Bangladesh Gazette on 5th February, 1984. The impugned provision has been incorporated as Regulation No. 11(3) which is as follows: “Notwithstanding anything contained in this regulations a Female Cabin Crew having two surviving children shall, upon her becoming pregnant for third child, cease to be an employee of the corporation". It has been stated that the said provision is discriminatory and inconsistent with the Bangladesh Biman Corporation Ordinance, 1977 as well as Constitution. Challenging the said provision the petitioners obtained the present Rule.
 
3.    Respondent No. 1 contested the Rule by filing an affidavit-in-opposition contending, inter alia, that the petitioners are not persons aggrieved and they do not have the locus standi to seek relief to file the Writ Petition. No action has yet been taken against the petitioners by the respondents  that has infringed the fundamental rights of the petitioners  and/or give rise to any cause for grievance as claimed by the Writ Petition. The amended law as published in the gazette is not discriminatory and inconsistent with any provisions of the Constitution or the same has not been promulgated in violation of the human rights. It has further been stated that the whole country is going to establish the philosophy of two children for a family which is enough and one healthy child whether girl or boy is the best policy. The Rules and Regulations have been provided for the betterment and enhancement of the service of   Biman. The female employees have been enjoying the maternity benefit as provided by the Biman Corporation. The Biman is a service oriented commercial organization and at present a Company. It is a profit making establishment. The nature of job of a cabin crew is such that their physical attractiveness is one of the important factors for their service. Being a service oriented organization Biman has to ensure that it endows with the best possible service to its customers. In such view of the matter the instant provision has been provided in the Service Regulation which is not inconsistent with the Articles 27 and 28 of the Constitution.
 
4.     Mr. T.H. Khan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submits that the impugned legislation is inconsistent with  the provisions of Article 27 and 28 of the Constitution. He submits that the Ordinance authorised the Board of Directors of the Biman Corporation to make regulation and the Board of Directors made the impugned provision which  is inconsistent with the Ordinance itself. He submits that by the impugned Regulation of the respondents have made discrimination between male cabin crew and female cabin crew  which is barred under Article 28 of the Constitution.
 
5.     Mr. Mahbubey Alam, the learned Attorney General appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that the Bangladesh Biman is  a  commercial service  oriented  institution and the impugned provision has been enacted considering the physical capability and attractiveness of the female cabin crew after giving birth of third child. He submits that the classification made between female cabin crew and male cabin crew is justified and permissible and cannot be said to be discriminatory within the meaning of Article 27 and 28 of the Constitution in view of the  nature of service render to Biman. He submits that the petitioners, knowing about the terms and conditions of their service as provided in the Regulation, took their job in Bangladesh Biman Corporation so they are bound by the Regulations. He submits that it is not the case of the petitioners that any of the three petitioners became pregnant for the third time so they are not persons aggrieved within the meaning of Article 102 of the Constitution. The instant Writ Petition of the petitioners is not maintainable.
 
6.   We have heard the learned Advocates for the petitioners and  the respondents, perused the Writ Petition, affidavit-in-opposition and other materials on record.
 
7.     The petitioners have obtained the present Rule challenging the virus of Regulation No.11(3) of the Bangladesh Biman Corporation Employees (Service) Regulations, 1979 (hereinafter referred as Regulations). The original provision as provided in the Regulation No. 11 was as follows:
 
“11. Retirement.- An employee other than cabin crew, shall retire from service of the Corporation on the completion of the fifty-seventh years of his age or the age of superannuation as may be changed  for the Government employee.”
Provided that  the Corporation may extend the service of a medical officer (physician) beyond the date of his retirement for a period not exceeding three years and as such extension shall be in accordance with the provisions of Public Servant (Retirement) Act 1974 (XII of 1974).”
 
8.      In exercise of power conferred by Section 30 of the Bangladesh Biman Corporation Ordinance 1977 the Board of Directors of the  Bangladesh Biman Corporation , with previous  sanction of the  Government, made the impugned amendment in the Bangladesh Biman Corporation Employees (Service) Regulation which runs as follows:
 
"11. Retirement-(1) An employee, other than a cabin crew,   shall     retire from service of the corporation on the completion of the fifty seventh years of his age:
Provided that the Corporation may extend the service of a medical officer (physician) beyond the date of his retirement for a  period not exceeding three years and such extension shall be subject  to such conditions, if any as may be determined by the Corporation.
 (2) The age of retirement of the following cabin crew shall be as  specified below, namely:-
(i) Fight Steward (Male)                      .....  45 years
(ii) Flight Stewardess                          ....... 35 "
(iii) Purser and Chief Purser (Male)    ....  50 "
(iv)  Purser and Chief Purser ( Female)  ....40 "
(v) Junior Purser (Male)                          ....45 "
(vi) Junior Purser (Female)          ..... 35"
Provided that the retirement age of all cabin crew who are in the employment of the Corporation prior to 31st December, 1980, shall be governed by the terms and conditions under which they were employed.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in these  regulations a female cabin crew having two surviving children shall, upon her becoming pregnant for third child, cease to be an employee of the Corporation."
 
9.        Earlier challenging the provision of  Regulation No.  11(2) of the said Regulations Writ Petition No.89 of 1993  was filed in the High Court Division   (Dalia Parveen Vs. Bangladesh Biman Corporation reported in 48 DLR page 132). In the said Writ Petition the High Court Division inter alia, observed:
 
“Therefore, I do not entertain any doubt that the reduction of age limit from 57 years to 35 years of the petitioner on the strength of amended Regulation 11 does not stand on any sanction of any law rather the same is violative of Article 28 of the Constitution. Article 28 reads-“28(1) The state shall not discriminate against any citizen on the ground of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Thus, reading all the aforesaid provisions of laws referred to earlier I do not find that the contention of Mr. Khondker Amir Hossain that on smartness of the stewardesses  to secure more effective service from them the age limit is so curtailed has any force. On reference to the amended Regulation No. 11 I do not find that the age limit has been curtailed on the ground of decreasing efficiency or smartness on the part of the stewardesses.  Therefore, I am of the opinion that Article 28 has all force in the case of the petitioner and the amended Regulation 11 of Regulations, 1979 has made a sharp discrimination between the persons rendering the similar service in violation of Article 28 to the deprivation of the right of  the petitioner to remain in service till expiry of age of 57 years.”
 
10.     It was further observed:
 
“Therefore, it seems that although Regulation No. 11 was amended on the strength of Section 30 it is inconsistent with Rule 3 of the Bangladesh Biman Corporation Employees (Pension and Gratuity) Rules, 1988 which has been framed by the Government on the strength of section 29 of the Ordinance.
Therefore, Regulation No. 11 as amended is inconsistent with Rules 3 of the aforesaid Rules, 1988 framed by the Government on the strength of Section 29 of the Ordinance, 1977.”
 
11.      From the above quoted decision  it appears to us that this court, in facts, held that the amended provision of Regulation No. 11 is inconsistent with the Rule 3 of the Bangladesh Biman Corporation Employees (Pension and Gratuity) Rules, 1988.
 
12.   By the said amendment Regulation Nos. 11(2) and 11(3) were incorporated but the petitioner of that petition only challenged Regulation No. 11(2) of the Regulations. So no specific order was made in respect of Regulation No. 11(3).
 
13.   Challenging the judgment and order passed in Writ Petition No. 89 of 1993 the Bangladesh Biman Corporation preferred Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal in the Appellate Division which was ultimately dismissed. 
 
14.     In the case of Air India Vs. Nergesh Meerza reported in AIR 1981 (SC) 1829 this issue, for the first time, was  placed for  judicial review . In the said case along with pregnancy of a female cabin crew, the question regarding retirement age of the cabin crew  was placed for adjudication. It was observed by the Supreme Court of India:
 
“A perusal of the Regulations shows that the normal age of retirement of an AH (Air Hostesses)  is 35 years, or on marriage, if it takes place within four years of service , or on first pregnancy whichever occurs  earlier. Leaving the age of retirement for the time being, let us examine the constitutional  validity of the other two conditions, viz., termination  if marriage takes place within four years or on first pregnancy. So far as the question of marriage within four years is concerned, we do not think that the provisions  suffer from any constitutional infirmity. According to the regulations an AH starts her career between the age of 19 to 20 years. Most of the   AHs are not only SSC which is the minimum qualification but possess even  higher qualifications and there are very few who decide to marry immediately after entering the service. Thus, the Regulations permits in AH to marry at the age of 23 if she has joined the service at the age of 19 which is by all standards a very sound and  salutary provision. Apart from improving the health of the employees, it helps a good deal in the promotion and boosting up of our family planning programme. Secondly, if a woman marries near about the age of 20 to 23 years, she becomes fully mature and there is every chance of such a marriage proving a success, all things being equal. Thirdly, it has been rightly pointed out to us by the Corporation that if the bar of marriage within four years of service is removed then the Corporation will have to incur huge, expenditure in recruiting additional AHs either on a  temporary or on ad hoc basis to replace the working AHs if they conceive and any period short of four-years would be too little a time for the Corporation to phase out such an ambitious plan. 
Coming now to the second limb of the provisions according to which the services of AHs would stand terminated on first pregnancy, we find ourselves in complete  agreement with the argument of Mr. Setalvad that this is a most unreasonable and arbitrary provision which shocks the conscience of the court. The Regulation does not prohibit  marriage after four years and if an AH after having fulfilled the first condition becomes pregnant, there is no reason why pregnancy should stand  in the way of her continuing in service. The Corporations represented to us that pregnancy leads to a number of complications and to medical disabilities which may stand in the efficient discharge of the duties  by the AHs. It was said that even in the early stage of pregnancy some ladies are prone to get sick due to air pressure, nausea in long flights and such other technical factors. This, however, appears to be purely an artificial argument because once a married woman is allowed to continue in service then under the provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 and The Maharashtra Maternity Rules, 1965 (these apply to both the Corporations as their Head offices are at  Bombay) she is entitled to certain benefits  including maternity leave. In case , however, the Corporations feel that pregnancy from the very beginning may come in the way of the discharge of the duties by some of the AHs, they could be  given maternity leave for a period of 14 to 16 months and in the meanwhile there could be no difficulty in Management making arrangements on a temporary or ad hoc basis by employing additional AHs. We are also unable to understand the argument of the Corporation that a woman after bearing children becomes weak in physique or in her constitution. There is neither  any legal nor medical authority for this bald proposition. Having taken the AH in service and after having utilized her services for four years, to terminate her service by the  Management  if she becomes pregnant amounts to compelling the poor AH not to have any children and thus interfere with an divert the ordinary course of human nature. It seems to us that the termination of the services of an AH under such circumstances is not only a callous and  cruel act but an open insult to Indian womanhood-the most sacrosanct and cherished institution. We are constrained to observe that such a course of action is extremely detestable and abhorrent to the notions of a civilized society. Apart from being grossly unethical, it smacks of a deep rooted sense of utter selfishness at the cost of all human values. Such a provision, therefore,  is not only manifestly unreasonable and arbitrary but contains the quality of unfairness and exhibits naked despotism and is, therefore, clearly violaltive of Article 14 of the Constitution.”
 
15.     After so determination of the Supreme Court of India in Nergesh Meerza case this issue was again placed before the Supreme Court of India in the case of  Air India Cabin Crew Association Vs. Yishawinee Marchant  reported in AIR 2004 (SC) 87. In the said case it was further observed by the Supreme Court of India:
 
“For air hostesses in the Indian Air lines, Government of India Notification dated 12.4.1980 fixed minimum retirement age as 35 years. It was provided that air hostesses will retire on attaining the age of 35 years or on marriage if it takes place within four years of joining service or on first pregnancy whichever occurs earlier. In line with Indian Air lines. Air India also carried out similar  amendments in their regulations. The male cabin crew  members, known as Assistant Flight Pursers, Flight Pursers and Flight Supervisors were to continue on flight duties until the age of 58 years. Ms. Negesh Meerza together with her fellow Air hostesses filed a Writ Petition in the Bombay High Court challenging the retirement and other conditions of service applicable to Air hostesses on the ground that they were discriminatory under Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution. The petition was transferred to the Supreme Court  and by its decision in the case of Air India v. Nergesh Meerza  (1981 (4) SCC 335) the provision of retirement of Air hostesses on the pregnancy was struck down  as arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The regulation , which provided for extension of service of the air hostesses beyond 35 years  and up to the age of 45 years  at the sole discretion of Managing Director, was also found to be arbitrary being without any guidelines. This court in Nergesh Meerza’s case, therefore, came to the conclusion that the service regulations insofar as they provided for termination of service  on first pregnancy and extension of service beyond 35 years, only at the discretion of Managing Director, were arbitrary hence unconstitutional under Article 14 of the Constitution.”      
 
It would be necessary to take note that the decision of  Neregesh Meerza’s decision  (supra) rendered  by three Judges Bench  of this Court as according to the appellants  some of the legal premises are already covered and certain legal questions are already settled by the aforesaid judgment, which are binding on the High Court and also on this Bench of two Judges.”
 
16.    The learned Attorney General submits that equality before law means that among the equals the law should be equal and should be equally administered and that the likes should be treated alike. In case of female cabin crew of Biman slight discrimination has been made considering the nature of service and physical attractiveness  and capability of performance  of service after giving birth of third child which is permissible. In  the case  of Pathomma Vs. State of Kerala reported in AIR 1978 S.C. page 771 India Supreme Court held that it is for the State to make  reasonable classification which must fulfil two conditions:
(1) The  classification must be found on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes person or things that are grouped together from other left out of the group; and
(2)  The differentia  must have a reasonable nexus to the object sought  to be achieved  by the statute. In the case of Mackenzia Vs. Andreg D Casta reported in AIR 1987 S.C. 1281 Indian Supreme Court deprecated  the discrimination between the male stenographers and the confidential  lady  stenographers only on the ground of sex where there was a deference  between the work which the confidential lady stenographers  were doing and the work of their male counterpart.
 
17.      It is well-established that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a statute burden in upon the person who attacks  it to show that there has been a clear transgression of constitutional principles. This court  can go into the issue as to whether a particular legislation is within  legislative competence of the legislature on the provision of the constitution or not. It is duty of the legislature to legislate such law which are  not oppressive,  unjust and one sided  and discriminatory. The  discrimination between person similarly situated and possibility of such discrimination makes a legislation ultravires in view of Article 27 and 28 of the Constitution.  Here the impugned provision has made discrimination between the male and female  cabin crews and in between the female cabin crews as well. This discrimination has been made between female cabin crews  having two surviving children and female cabin crews having two  surviving children and thereafter upon her becoming pregnant for third child.
 
18.     “In English Law ‘but for sex’ test has been developed to mean that no less favourable treatment  is to be given to women on gender based criteria which would favour the opposite sex and women will not be deliberately selected for less favourable treatment because of their sex It is on this ‘but for sex’ test.”
 
19.     In the case of Rabia Bashri Irene and another Vs. Bangladesh Biman Corporation represented by Managing Director and another reported in 52 DLR (HCD)  308, it has been observed  by the High Court Division that:
 
“Gender discrimination –The SRO published  in the Bangladesh Gazette on February 5th 1984 which provides that the retirement of Flight Steward (male) 45 years and Flight Stewardess  (female) 35 years are violative of Articles 28 of the Constitution.”
 
20.       Biman Bangladesh Airlines is a travel industry pleasing  appearance, manners and physical fitness are required for members of  the crew  of both sexes. For the services on board of an Aircraft are expected  to be smart, alert and agile. 
 
21.       But provision of stand termination due to pregnancy for third child is a practice derogatory to women. In case Nergish Meerza's case it was  further observed that what is said about the fair sex by the Judges fully applies to a pregnant woman because pregnancy also is not a disability but one of the natural consequences of marriage and is an immutable characteristic of married life. Any distinction, therefore, made on the ground of pregnancy cannot but be held to extremely arbitrary. In Sharran A.    Frontieroy Vs.  Elliot. L. Richardson, (1973) 36 L. Ed. 2nd 583 U.S. Supreme Court made following observation:
 
"Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility. In Mary Aun Turher Vs. Department of Employment Security (1975) 46 L ed 2nd 181 the U.S. Supreme Court  observed- "It cannot be doubted that a substantial member of women are fully capable of working well into their last  trimester of pregnancy and of resuming employment shortly after  child birth. We conclude that the Utah unemployment compensation   statute's incorporation of a conclusive presumption of incapacity during so long a period before and after child birth is constitutionally invalid under the principles of the La  Fleur Case". In the case of City of  Los Angeles, Department of Water and Pover Vs. Marle Manhart, (1978) 55 L Ed.2nd 657  U.S. Supreme Court further observed:  "It is now well recognized that employment decisions cannot be predicated on mere "stereotyped" impression about the  characteristics of males or females. Myths and purely habitual  assumptions about a woman's  inability to perform certain kinds of work are no longer acceptable reason for refusing to employ qualified individuals, or for paying then less....... .The question, therefore, is whether the existence or non-existence of "discrimination"  is to be determined by comparison of class characteristics or individual characteristics.  A "stereotyped"  answer to that question may not be the same as the answer  that the language and purpose of the statute command". Considering authorities as quoted above in Nargesh Meerza's case it was further  held that by making pregnancy a bar to continuance in service of an Air Hostess the Corporation seems to have made an individualized approach to a woman's physical capacity to continue her employment even after pregnancies which undoubtedly is a most unreasonable approach.
 
22.      In view of the discussion as made above, our considered opinion is that the pregnancy disability, exclusion amounted to down grade in the women whole in the labour force. By making pregnancy bar third time to be the continue in service of female cabin crew, the Biman Bangladesh Airlines seems to have made a clear  discrimination in betwen the female cabin crews having two surviving children and cabin crews having two children and her becoming pregnant for third time which is undoubtedly arbitrary unreasonable and utter selfishness at the cause of all human values.  Bhagwati J in the case of Maneka Gaudhi Vs. Union of India ( AIR 1978 S.C. 597)  said, "Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire limits --------. It must be  "right and just and fair" and not  arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive",  Indian Supreme Court in the case of Hai Chand Sardar Vs. Mizo District Council reported AIR 1967 (S.C.)  page 829 highlighted that where a  Regulation does not contain any principles  or standard for the exercise of the executive power, it was a bad regulation.
 
23.      Our considered view is that in the case of Dalia Parveen the High Court Division consciously observed that the amended Regulations 11 is inconsistent with the parent law which clearly indicated that the provisions of Regulations No. 11(2) and 11(3) that is, amended provisions of Regulations 11 are inconsistent with the Bangladesh Biman Corporation Ordinance and Article 28 of the Constitution.  In the Appellate Division  in Leave Petition filed against the judgment of Dalia Parveen's Case referred to above it was argued on behalf of the Bangladesh Biman Corporation that the High Court Division wrongly  held that the amendment of Regulation 11 is violative of Article 28 of the Constitution in that there is a discrimination in the retirement age of Cabin Crews on the ground of sex. Their Lordships of the Appellate Division dismissed the submissions by disallowing the Leave Petition thereby affirmed the decision of the High Court Division. Where law is discriminatory it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative the Article 27 and 28 of the Constitution.
 
24.      Considering the submissions of the learned Advocates of both the parties and the connecting laws and interpretations above, we are of the view that the provision of Regulation No. 11(3) of Bangladesh Biman Corporation Employees (Service) Regulations, 1979 is discriminatory and inconsistent with the provisions of Article 28 of the Constitution.
 
25.         The learned Attorney General submits that the petitioners are not the persons aggrieved so they have no locus standi to institute the instant Writ Petition. It appears that the petitioners being an employees of Bangladesh Biman Corporation have challenged  their amended Service Regulation. So, it is difficult for us to except the submission of the learned Attorney General that they have got no locus standi to challenge their service Regulations. The expression aggrieved person as used in Article 102 of the Constitution has not been defined anywhere. From the judicial pronouncement it appears to us that the attitude of the courts on the question of locus-standi does not appear to be uniform. They vary from country to country, court to court and case to case.  In the case of S.P. Gupta Vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1982 SC 149 it has been observed by the Supreme Court of India that:
 
“A person who has a genuine grievance on account of an action which affects him prejudicially is ordinarily considered to be eligible to move the court.”
 
26.        In the case of Regina Vs. Liverpool Corporation (1972) 2 QB 299, Lord Denning M.R. held that –

“The expression ‘person aggrieved’ would include any person whole interests may be prejudicially affected by what taking place.
It does not include a mere busy body who is interfering in things which do not concern him, but it includes any person who has a genuine grievance because something has been done or may be done which affects him.”
 
27.     The impugned Regulation may affect the petitioners any time. We are of the view that the petitioners have locus-standi to challenge the legality and propriety of the amended provisions of law, that is, the instant Writ Petition at the instance of the petitioners is maintainable.
 
28.     Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, we find substance in this Rule.

            In the result, the Rule is made absolute. The impugned Regulation, that is, Regulation 11(3) of the Bangladesh Biman Corporation Employees (Service) Regulations, 1979 is declared to have been made without lawful authority and the same is inconsistent of the Article 28 of the Constitution. The said provision is hereby declared void  abinitio.
 
            Ed.