S. M. Deen Islam and another Vs. Government of Bangladesh and others, 3 LNJ (2014) 727

Case No: Writ Petition No. 10166 of 2013

Judge: Farah Mahmub,

Court: High Court Division,,

Advocate: Mr. A. M. Amin Uddin,Ms. Nusrat Jahan,Mr. Nakib Saiful Islam,Mr. M. Ashraf Ali,,

Citation: 3 LNJ (2014) 727

Case Year: 2014

Appellant: S. M. Deen Islam and another

Respondent: Government of Bangladesh and others

Subject: Local Government,

Delivery Date: 2014-03-04


HIGH COURT DIVISION
(SPECIAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION)
 
Farah Mahbub, J
And
Kazi Md. Ejarul Haque Akondo, J.


Judgment on
04.03.2014
  S. M. Deen Islam
. . .Petitioner
(in W.P. No. 10166  of 2013)
Md. Azizul Islam Sana
. . .Petitioner
(in W. P. No. 3705 of 2013)
-Versus-
Government of Bangladesh and others.
. . .Respondents
 

Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972
Article -102
Local Government (Union Parishad) Act (LXI of 2009)
Sections 34(1)(2)(4)(5)(6), 96
The Government has the power to suspend a Chairman or a member of a Union Parishad in accordance with the provision of section 34(1) subject to a pending proceeding for removal of a Chairman or member. A Chairman or member of the Union Parishad may be suspended if his act is prejudicial to the interest of the Union or undesirable from the administrative point of view.
The government is authorized to suspend a Chairman or a Member when “ ঊপ-ধারা (৪ এ বর্ণিত) অপরাধে অপসারনের জন্য কার্যএুম আরম্ভ করা হইয়াছে” means, suspension in a pending proceeding for removal and that the said procedures for removal have been enunciated in Rules, 1984( para-27) for suspension there has to be a pending proceeding for removal of a Chairman or a member in exercise power under section 34(1), which is absent in the present cases. . . .(27)
If there is some indication in the order of suspension itself that the allegation so brought against the Chairman/Members is likely to be prejudicial to the interest of the union parishad or undesirable from the administrative point of view it will suffice the requirement, for the Court will only see that there is a causal connection in both the materials and the opinion.. . . (29)
Without initiating proceeding a chairman or member cannot be suspended. There is nexus in between the materials so placed before the respondent government and its opinion but since orders of suspension have been passed against the respective petitioners without intiating proceedings, as are required under the Rules of 1984 hence, issuance of the impugned orders are liable to be knocked down for having been issued without  any lawful authority and thus have no legal effect. . . . (29)

Union Parishad Chairman and Members (Resignation, Removal and Vacation of Office) Rules, 1984
Rules 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12
On perusal of Rule 4 of the Union Parishad Chairman and Members (Resignation, Removal and Vacation of Office) Rules, 1984 it appears that while requisition is being taken in the respective meeting stating the grounds for removal either of the Chairman or the Members it must be endorsed with the signature of the Chairman, whereas the whole proceeding is being initiated for his removal, which is absurd and works against his own interest. . . . (30)

Bangladesh Vs. Lokman Patwari and another reported in 46 DLR (AD)163 ref.

Mr. A. M. Amin Uddin, Advocate with
Mr. Nakib Saiful Islam, Advocate
. . . For the petitioner
(In Writ Petition No. 10166  of 2013)

Mr. M. Ashraf Ali, Advocate
. . . For the petitioner
(In Writ Petition No. 3705 of 2013)

Ms. Nusrat Jahan, A.A.G.
...For the respondent-government

Writ Petition No. 10166 of 2013 with Writ Petition No. 3705 of 2013
 
JUDGMENT
Farah Mahbub, J:

Since common question of law and facts are involved in both the Rules Nisi and as such, those have been heard together and are being disposed of by this single judgment.

In writ Petition No.10166 of 2013, a Rule Nisi has been issued under Article 102 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, calling upon the respondents concern to show cause as to why the impugned Memo No. issued under the signature of respondent No.2, suspending the petitioner from the post of Chairman of Chagladaha Union Parishad, Terokhada, Khulna (Annexure-E) should not be declared to have been passed without lawful any authority and hence, of no legal effect.

In writ Petition No.3705 of 2013, vide Rule Nisi so issued under Article 102 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh the respondents have been called upon to show cause as to why the impugned Memo No. ¯nvmwe/Bc/BEwc-44/2008/154 dated 28.03.2013 issued under the signature of respondent No. 3, temporarily suspending the petitioner from the post of Chairman of No.5 Borodal Union Parishad, Ashashuni, Satkhira (Annexure-F) should not be declared to have been made without lawful any authority and hence, of no legal effect.

In writ Petition No.3705 of 2013 facts, in brief, are that the petitioner was elected as Chairman of No.5 Borodal Union Parishad, Ashashuni, Satkhira; however, the result of the election was duly published in gazette on 17.04.2011. On taking oath on 06.05.2011 he entered into the office of the said union parishad. It has been contended that the petitioner had been discharging his duties as Chairman of the said union parishad for near about 2(two) years and that no complain whatsoever had ever been raised against him during this period.

On 08.02.2012 one Abdul Alim Molla, Member, Ward Nos.6 and 5, Borodal Union Parishad, Ashashuni, Sathkira made a complaint to the respondent No.1 bringing allegations of corruption and misappropriation of public fund against the petitioner (Annexure-B). Pursuent thereto the respondent No.4 had been directed to enquire into the matter and to submit a report thereof. The said respondent after due inquiry submitted report to the authority concern on 12.08.2012 for consideration (Annexure-C). However, pursuant to the inquiry report the respondent No.4 had directed the petitioner to submit his reply. Accordingly, on 01.10.2012 he replied to the allegations so made against him (Annexure-D). On receipt thereof the respondent No.4 vide Memo No. LG/46.44.87.00.007.27.004 (ashashuni). 12-45 dated 28.01.2013 had forwarded the enquiry report along with the reply of the petitioner to the respondent No.1 for taking necessary action (Annexure-E). Considering those materials the respondent No. 3 vide the impugned Memo dated 28.01.2013 had suspended the petitioner from the post of Chairman of No.5 Borodal Union Parishad, Ashashuni, Sathkira under section 34(4) of the Ain, 2009 on the allegation of corruption and misappropriation of public fund(Annexure-F).

In writ petition No. 10166 of 2013 it has been stated that the petitioner is the elected Chairman of No. 3 ছাগলাদহ ইউনিয়ন পরিষদ, তেরখাদা, খুলনা, who had been discharging his duties and functions without any objection from any quarter whatsoever. It has been contended that 6(six) other elected members of Chagladha Union Parishad under Terokhadha Upazila made an allegation to the respondent No. 3 against the petitioner for corruption and mismanagement in the respective development project. Pursuent thereto the respondent No. 3 had directed the respondent No. 4 to enquire into the matter and submit a report. Accordingly, respondent No. 5 inquired into the allegation and submitted a report to the respondent No.3 on 17.07.2013 for consideration. Pending inquiry process the Union Parishad Members who made the allegations had subsequently withdrawn his complaint vide application dated 06.06.2013 stating, inter-alia, that they made allegations out of their personal grudge but the inquiry officer i.e. the respondent No.4 without taking into consideration of the said withdrawal letter had submitted an inquiry report against the petitioner. The respondent No. 4, however, during the course of inquiry had asked the petitioner to show cause in respect of the allegations as brought against him. On 26.02.2013 the petitioner categorically explained denying the allegations so made against him. But without taking personal hearing of the petitioner and without proper inquiry and investigation as well as without hearing to the complainants who made the allegations the Inquiry Officer had submitted an inquiry report. On receipt thereof the respondent No. 3 vide Memo No. 40.46.4700.024.02.00.13 dated 18.07.2013 had forwarded the same to the respondent No. 1 to take necessary steps in the matter. Pursuent thereto the respondent No. 2 vide the impugned Memo No. ¯nvmwe/Bc/BEwc-39/99/722 dated 23.09.2013 had suspended the petitioner from his office and communicated the same to the respondent No.4 asking him to arrange appointment of a Chairman from the elected panel Chairman.

Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the petitioners concern have preferred the instant applications and obtained the present Rules Nisi.

Mr. A.M. Amin Uddin, the learned Advocate appearing with Mr. Nakib Saiful Islam, the learned Advocate for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 10166 of 2013 and Mr. M. Ashraf Ali the learned Advocate for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 3705 of 2013 co-jointly  submit that from the impugned order(Annexure-F) it appears that the respondent No.3 has suspended the petitioner sexercising his power as provided under section 34(4)(gha) of the Local Government(Union Parishad) Ain, 2009(in short, the Ain, 2009). In this regard referring to section 34(4)(gha) of the said Ain it has been argued that the same does not confer any such power to suspend the petitioners rather aforesaid section only prescribes a disqualification of a Chairman for which he can be removed from his post; Consequently, suspending the petitioner under the said provision of law is without jurisdiction.
Further, it has been submitted that a Chairman of a union parishad can be suspended under section 34(1) of the Ain,2009, but in such a case a proceeding for removal of the said Chairman has be started. In the instant case, it is evident from record that the respondents have suspended the respective petitioners without initiating any proceeding for removal. In such view of the matter, it has been contended that the impugned order is illegal. Again, it is submitted that section 34(1) of the said Ain has prescribed the circumstances under which a Chairman of a union parishad may be suspended from his respective post, but before such suspension the government must also form an opinion, as required under the said provision of law. However, the impugned orders do not disclose as to how the government was satisfied that continuation of the Chairmanship by the petitioners would be prejudicial to the interest of union parishad or undesirable on the count of public interest. Accordingly, it has been submitted that upon making both the Rules absolute declaring the impugned orders to have been passed without any lawful authority those need to be struck down.

Ms. Nusrat Jahan, the learned Assistant Attorney General, appearing on behalf of respondent-government submits that pursuant to the complaint so have been received from the respective quarters both the contending parties i.e., the petitioners and the complainant, were duly notified to attend the hearing. However, on the date and time so fixed for hearing of the parties, both of them were present with their respective witnesses and that the hearing was duly and properly concluded in the presence of the authority concern. The inquiry committee so had been constituted to that effect ultimately opined that the allegations so had been brought against the petitioners were found correct. Accordingly, the same was duly forwarded with all relevant records to the Ministry concern to take appropriate steps in the matter. Being satisfied the respondent No.1, the concern Ministry issued the order of suspension being duly empowered under section 34(1) of the “সহানীয় সরকার (ইঊনিয়ন পরিষদ) আইন, ২০০৯”  (Act No. 61 of 2009) (in short, the Ain). As such, she goes to submit that before issuance of the impugned orders due procedures have been initiated against the respective petitioners, for no other procedures have been prescribed or referred to or mentioned within the four corners of the said Ain, 2009 and that according to section 34(2) of the Ain,2009 the penal Chairman will now discharge the functions as the acting Chairman till temporary suspension is withdrawn or till re-election of the Chairman has been held after the said removal.

So far the opinion of the respondent-government is concerned Ms. Nusrat goes to submit that in Bangladesh Vs. Lokman Patwari and another reported in 46 DLR (AD) 163 the Appellate Division has clearly expresed their observations contending, inter-alia, “the High Court Division completely failed to consider that this is not a case where there was no formation of opinion at all. The impugned order clearly shown that an opinion was formed and was expressed, definitely and decisively. Considerable materials were there before the government for formation of opinion in the way it has been formed”. In the said case the Appellate Division accordingly found “we have decided not to interfere with the judgment and order of the High Court Division not because the reasonings given by the learned Judges were correct but because the basis on which the government based its action no longer exists.” In the instant cases, she submits that the opinion was duly and properly formed by the respondent government, for it has been clearly spelt out in the temporary suspension orders that because of the allegation of corruption, holding the office of Chairman of the concerned union parishad by the petitioners should not continue in the interest of public. Accordingly, she submits that both Rules Nisi being devoid of any substance are liable to be discharged.

Previously with a view to provide for the constitution of union parishad for the union in rural areas and for matters incidental or ancillary thereto the Chief Martial Law Administrator had promulgated the Local Government(Union Parishad Ordinance,1983)( in short, the Ordinance).

Section 65 of the said Ordinance, however, has authorized the government to suspend the Chairman in certain circumstances mainly 1. where any proceeding has been initiated for the removal of the Chairman under section 12; or 2. where any criminal proceedings of any law have been started against the Chairman; or 3. where on an inquiry by the government, he is found to be guilty of any misconduct within the meaning of section 12(1) and that in the opinion of the government the exercise of power by him as Chairman is either likely to be prejudicial to the interest of the union parishad or undesirable from the point of view of public interest. Accordingly, the government may, by order in writing, place such Chairman under suspension.

The said Ordinance has subsequently been repealed with the promulgation of a new statute under the name and style সহানীয় সরকার(ইঊনিয়ন পরিষদ) আইন, ২০০৯ (Act No. 61 of 2009)(in short, the Ain).

Section 34 of the said Ain provides power to the government to suspend the Chairman or the Members of a union parishad a) where proceedings have been initiated for removal of a Chairman or the Members for the offence as described in section 34(4) of the Ain; b) where police report in connection with a criminal case has been accepted by the Adalat concern; or c) where the Adalat has taken cognizance of the offence; and that in the opinion of the the designated authority “নির্ধারিত কর্তৃপক্ষ” the exercise of power by the said Chairman or the Members is likely to be prejudicial to the interest of the respective union parishad or undesirable from the administrative point of view; the government may, by order in writing, place such Chairman or the Members under suspension.

Section 34(1) of the Ain, 2009 is accordingly quoted herein below:-
“৩৪। চেয়ারম্যান বা সদস্যগণের সাময়িক বরখাস্তকরণ ও অপসারণ।-
যে ক্ষেত্রে কোন পরিষদের চেয়ারম্যান বা সদস্যের বিরুদ্ধে ঊপ-ধারা (৪) এ বর্ণিত অপরাধে অপসারণের জন্য কার্যএুম আরম্ভ করা হইয়াছে অথবা তাঁহার বিরুদ্ধে ফৌজদারী মামলায় অভিযোগপত্র আদালত কর্তৃক গৃহীত হইয়াছে অথবা অপরাধ আদালত কর্তৃক আমলে নেওয়া হইয়াছে, সেইক্ষেত্রে নির্ধারিত কর্তৃপক্ষের মতে চেয়ারম্যান অথবা সদস্য কর্তৃক ক্ষমতা প্রয়োগ পরিষদের স্বার্থের পরিপন্থী অথবা প্রশাসনিক দৃষিটকোণে সমীচীন না হইলে, সরকার লিখিত আদেশের মাধ্যমে চেয়ারম্যান অথবা সদস্যকে সাময়িকভাবে বরখাস্ত করিতে পারিবে| ”

So far the present case is concerned the petitioners, the Chairmen of the respective union parishad, have been suspended under section 34(4)(gha) of the Ain,2009 vide Memo No. সহাসবি/ইপ/ইঊপি-৪৪/২০০৮/১৫৪ dated 28.03.2013 (Annexure-F) of writ petition No. 3705 of 2013 and Memo No. সহাসবি/ইপ/ইঊপি-৩৯/৯৯/৭২২ dated 23.09.2013 dated (Annexure-E) of the writ petition No. 3705 of 2013. The contents of Memo dated 28.03.2013 (Annexure-F), however, are quoted below:-

A Chairman or Member of the respective union parishad is liable to be removed on the allegation, inter alia-
“ ৩৪(৪)(ঘ) অসদাচরণ বা ক্ষমতার অপব্যবহারের দোষে দোষী হন অথবা পরিষদের কোন অর্থ বা সম্পত্তির কোন ক্ষতি সাধন বা ঊহার আত্মসাতের বা অপপ্রয়োগের জনা দায়ী হন ;  ”

In other words, if he is found guilty of misconduct or causes abuse of power or loss to any property of the union parishad or is found to have misappropriated fund or property of the respective union parishad he may be suspended under section 34(1) of the Ain,2009.

However, in the explanation “e¨vL¨v” under section 34(4) the word “Am`vPiY” has further been defined as-
“ব্যাখ্যাঃ এই ঊপ-ধারায় 'অসদাচরণ' বলিতে ক্ষমতার অপব্যবহার, কর্তব্যে অবহেলা, দুর্নীতি, স্বজনপ্রীতি ও ইচ্ছাকৃত কুশাসনও বুঝাইবে| ”

Vide section 34(5) the government or the government nominated designated authority may remove the Chairman or the respective members of the concerned union parishad upon publishing in gazette. However, before finalization of the order of removal there has to be an inquiry following the procedures as prescribed in the Rules and that the incumbent has to be provided an opportunity to  represent his case. Under section 34(6) on obtaining approval of the respondent government on the proposal for the said removal the incumbent concerned shall be removed ipso facto.

Section 34(5) and (6) are accordingly quoted below:-
“৩৪(৫) সরকার বা সরকার কর্তৃক নির্ধারিত কর্তৃপক্ষ সরকারি গেজেটে আদেশ দ্বারা, উপ-ধারা (৪) এ উল্লেখিত এক বা একাদিক কারণে চেয়ারম্যান বা সদস্যকে অপসারণ করিতে পারিবেঃ
তবে শর্ত থাকে যে, অপসারণের সিদ্ধান্ত চুড়ান্ত করিবার পূর্বে বিধি মোতাবেক তদন্ত করিতে হইবে ও অভিযুক্তকে আত্নপক্ষ সমর্থনের সুযোগ দিতে হইবে।
(৬) কোন চেয়ারম্যান বা সদস্য এর অপসারণের প্রস্তাব, সরকার বা সরকার কর্তৃক নির্ধারিত কর্তৃপক্ষ কর্তৃক অনুমোদন লাভের পর তিনি তাৎক্ষণিকভাবে অপসারিত হইবেন। ”

The combined effect of section 34(1),(4),(5) and (6) of the Ain is that if there be any allegation as prescribed in section 34(4) the authority concern has to make an inquiry on the same, following the procedures as prescribed in the Rules so made thereunder. In other words, pending proceedings so initiated for removal of the Chairman or the Member the inquiry under section 34(5) has to be made following the Rules so framed in this regard.

However, the fact remains that no Rule as yet has been framed by the government in exercise of power as provided under section 96 of the Ain. Though section 108 (1) and (2)(kha) of the Ain provides that –
“রহিতকরণ এবং হেফাজত।-(১) এই আইন বলবৎ হইবার সংগে সংগে Local Government (Union Parishads) Ordinance, 1983 (Ord. No. LI of 1983) অতঃপর বিলুপ্ত অধ্যাদেশ বলিয়া উল্লিখিত, রহিত হইবে।
(২)উপধারা (১) এর অধীন বিলুপ্ত অধ্যাদেশ রহিত হইবার পর-
(খ) বিলুপ্ত অধ্যাদেশের অধীন প্রনীত সকল বিধি, প্রবিধান ও আদেশ, জারিকৃত বিজ্ঞপ্তি বা নোটিশ বা মঞ্জুরীকৃত সকল লাইসেন্স ও অনুমতি এই আইনের বিধানবলীর সহিত সামঞ্জস্যপূর্ন হওয়া সাপেক্ষে, রহিত ও সংশোধিত না হওয়া পর্যন্ত বলবৎ থাকিবে এবং এই আইনের অধীন  প্রনীত, প্রদত্ত, জারিকৃত বা মঞ্জরীকৃত হইয়াছে বলিয়া গন্য হইবে। ”

In view of the said savings clause the Union Parishad Chairman and Members (Resignation, Removal and Vacation of Office) Rules, 1984 being still in operation is applicable in the present case. On perusal of the said Rules it appears that rules 4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 and 12 of the said Rules have prescribed the procedures to be followed in this regard. In the instant case, the said procedures do no appear to have been followed.
At this juncture, the learned Assistant Attorney General appearing for the respondent-government submits that proceedings for suspension and the proceedings for removal are disjunctive. Since prior to issuance of the impugned order due inquiry was made with the issuance of show cause notice upon the petitioners concern and that both of them replied to the same; as such, it is apparent that in due compliance of law the orders of suspension have been issued.

The said contention of the respondent-government is a misconceived one, for the government is authorized to suspend a Chairman or a Member when “Ec-aviv (4 G ewY©Z) Aciv‡a Acmvi‡bi Rb¨ Kvh©G“g Avi¤¢ Kiv nBqv‡Q” means, suspension in a pending proceeding for removal and that the said procedures for removal have been enunciated in Rules,1984, for till date no Rules have been framed by the government under section 96 of the Ain, 2009, as observed earlier. In this regard, the respondent-government has failed to show that it has duly initiated proceedings for removal of the concerned Chairman or the Members, as the case may be, in compliance of Rules, 1984 and that the pending proceedings for removal of the petitioners they have been suspended. However, previously section 65 of the Ordinance provided that a Chairman might be suspended “where on an inquiry by the government he is found to be guilty of any misconduct within the meaning of section 12(1)”; whereas under section 34(1) of the Ain, 2009 he may be suspended by the government in exercise of power as provided therein when “Ec-aviv 4 G ewY©Z Aciv‡a Acmvi‡bi Rb¨ Kvh©G“g Avi¤¢ Kiv nBqv‡Q| ” From the using of those words the intention of the legislature can clearly be gathered that for suspension there has to be a pending proceeding for removal of a Chairman or a member in exercise power under section 34(1), which is absent in the present cases.

So far the opinion of the respondent government is concerned, it appears on a plain reading of section 34(1) of the Ain that exercise of such power by the government is conditional so far formation of opinion is concerned. The said issue has earlier been agitated in Bangladesh Vs. Lokman Patwari and another reported in 46 DLR (AD)163. The Appellate Division while making observations to that effect categorically found, inter-alia,
“Whenever in any statute the exercise of power by any authority is made conditional upon the formation of opinion of such authority, the formation of opinion is a sine qua non for the exercise of such power. Mere existence of any of the three circumstances mentioned in section 65(1) will not be enough. The Government also must form an opinion in terms of the language mentioned in section 65(1). The opinion is formed by the Government after considering the materials before it and after being satisfied that the materials have a causal connection with the kind of opinion that it is required to form. If there are no materials at all on which to form an opinion or if the materials that exist are totally unconnected with the kind of opinion that the Government is required to form then the order of suspension will fall through.”

In the light of the observations of the Appellate Division, so made, in   particular at paragraph 10, if there is some indication in the order of suspension itself that the allegation so brought against the Chairman/Members is likely to be prejudicial to the interest of the union parishad or undesirable from the administrative point of view it will suffice the requirement, for the Court will only see that there is a causal connection in both the materials and the opinion. In the present case, on the count of “অর্থ আত্মসাৎ ও দুর্নীতির অভিযোগ প্রমাণিত হওয়ায়........”  the respondent-government has duly suspended the petitioners under section 34(4)(Gha), but without considering the position of law that there has to be a pending proceeding for removal, which has not been initiated in the present case. Accordingly, we have no manner of doubt to find that though there is nexus in between the materials so placed before the respondent government and its opinion but since orders of suspension have been passed against the respective petitioners without intiating proceedings, as are required under the Rules of 1984 hence, issuance of the impugned orders are liable to be knocked down for having been issued without any lawful authority and thus, have no legal effect.

In this regard, it will not be out of place to observe that on perusal of rule 4 of the Rules, 1984 it appears that while requisition is being taken in the respective meeting stating the grounds for removal either of the Chairman or the Members it must be endorsed with the signature of the Chairman, whereas the whole proceeding is being initiated for his removal, which is absurd and works against his own interest.

In view of the said position of law, we are of the opinion that since admittedly the respondent-government has not yet framed any Rules under the Ain, 2009 a proper Rule ‘‘বিধিমালা’’ should be framed highlighting the said lacuna, as has been observed and fill up the same in accordance with law.

In view of the above facts and circumstances, observations and findings we find substance in both the Rules and accordingly both the impugned Memo Nos. সহাসবি/ইপ/ইঊপি-৪৪/২০০৮/১৫৪ dated 28.03.2013 and সহাসবি/ইপ/ইঊপি-৩৯/৯৯/৭২২ dated 28.09.2013  are liable to be declared to have issued been issued without lawful authority for having been issued without complying the requirements of law as prescribed in the statute i.e., the Ain, 2009 and the Rules, 1984.

In the result, both the Rules are made absolute.

The impugned Memo Nos. সহাসবি/ইপ /ইঊপি-৪৪/২০০৮/১৫৪ dated 28.03.2013 and সহাসবি /ইপ/ইঊপি-৩৯/৯৯/৭২২ dated 28.09.2013 issued under the signature of respondent Nos.2 and 3, temporarily suspending the petitioners from the post of elected Chairman of Chagladaha Union Parishad, Terokhada, Khulna and No.5 Borodal Union Parishad, Ashashuni, Satkhira (Annexure-E and F respectively) are hereby declared to have been passed without lawful any authority and hence, are of no legal effect.

However, since the impugned order has been knocked down by this Court for non-compliance of law as such, the respondent-government will be at liberty to issue a fresh order in strict compliance of law, if so desires.
There will be no order as to costs.

        Ed.