Acquisition & Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance 1982 Explained

ACQUISITION AND REQUISITION OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY ORDINANCE,
1982

 

Sections—2(b)
and 3

Acquisition of property—Authority to issue
notice for acquisition of property—It is the Deputy Commissioner who has to
,cause a notice to be published under the Ordinance—In 4he absence of any
authorisation, the order passed and notice signed by the Land Acquisition
Officer are unauthorised and are without our jurisdiction.

Sankar Gopal
Chatterjee and others Vs. Additional Commissioner, Dhaka Division and others, 9
BLD (HCD) 546.

 

Sections—3
and 15

Acquisition
of property
—Pre-condition for notice to sue acquire–Before the Deputy
Commissioner acquires jurisdiction to publish .i notice of acquisition of
property an agreement with the non-government requiring body i sine qua non for
the exercise of such power—It cannot be accepted that an acquisition proceeding
may be started without any agreement, but if a subsequent agreement is reached,
then it amounts to validation—The “principle of subsequent validation cannot’
be entertained in a matter where the property rights of the citizen is involved

Sankar Gopal
Chatterjee and others Vs. Additional Commissioner, Dhaka Division and others, 9
BLD (HCD) 546.

 

Section—3

Acquisition
of property
—Power to acquire when to be exercised—The law of acquisition
gives the Deputy Commissioner the power to acquire in the likelihood of two
situations, first, if the property is needed or, it is likely to be needed—A
property is either needed or it is likely to be needed, but while acquiring a
property the Deputy Commissioner cannot keep both the alternatives in his
pocket—The use of both these alternative expressions in the notice is
indicative of a lack of application of mind and the notice is liable to be
struck down on that ground.

Sankar Gopal
Chatterjee and others Vs. Additional Commissioner, Dhaka Division and others, 9
BLD (HCD) 546.

 

Section—3

Acquisition
of property
—Acquisition for a co-operative society whether public
purpose—Acquisition for a co-operative society per see is not a public
purpose—The purpose for which the co-operative society proposes to use the
acquired land is the ultimate test for a decision as to whether the acquisition
is for a public purpose or not.

Sankar Gopal
Ckatterjee and others Vs. Additional Commissioner, Dhaka Division and others, 9
BLD (HCD) 546.

 

Sections—3,
4 and 17

Acquisition
of property—Need to state the precise public purpose in the notice—There is a
total lack of disclosure in the notice as to for what purpose. The co-operative
society needs the acquired land—the need to state the precise public purpose in
the body of the notice is imperative—If no specific public purpose is stated
then the right given to object to the acquisition challenging the public
purpose stated is rendered nugatory and illusory—Sinceno property acquired
under the Ordinance shall be used for any purpose other than the purpose for
which it is acquired, without the prior approval of the Government, if the
public purpose is left completely vague and unspecified, then this will give a
handle to the requiring body to use the acquired property in any manner it
deems fit.

Sankar Gopal
Chatterjee and others Vs. Additional Commissioner, Dhaka Division and others, 9
BLD (HCD) 546.

 

Sections—10,
27, 32 and 36

Arbitrator—Whether an
Arbitrator appointed under Ordinance II of 1982 is a Court—Such an Arbitrator
essentially conducts an inquiry into the amount of compensation that a person
may reasonably receive in respect of his acquired land and structures—This is a
limited inquiry investigative in nature—He does not exercise a judicial
function in course of such an inquiry, although he is expected to act within
judicial norms—The provision deeming his award to be a decree and his statement
of grounds to be a judgment does not elevate him to the status of a civil
Court— Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Ss. 2(2)(9), 34, Or. 39 Rs 1
and 2; East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, 1948 (XIII of
1948), S. 7(b);

Begum Lutfunnessa
Vs. Nizamuddin Ahmed and others, 8 BLD (HCD) 357.

Ref:
38 DLR (AD) 172; 20 DLR 599 (SB.); 25 DLR44O; 26 DLR265; —Cited.

 

Section—44

The
suit comes within the mischief of section 44 of the Ordinance. Although it is
true that the plaint contains some general allegations of malafide, it cannot
be held that the Courts below committed any illegality in rejecting the plaint
of the suit.

Din Mohammad
Molla and another Vs. Chairman, Khulna Development Authority and others, 12 BLD
(HCD) 362.

Ref:
39 DLR (AD) 1.