Corruption it has spread its tentacles to every sphere of national life. It is one of the biggest threats to development. It can tear the very fabric of the society and, infract, it is doing so. Corruption benefits Corruption is not a new phenomenon. What is new and worrying is the magnitude and size of the rich and the well-to-do. It enriches the rich and disproportionably affects the poor, unprotected and the underprivileged and thereby it deepens their deprivation. Unless it is checked, the governments and people will have to pay a very heavy price in the consequent result of lower incomes, lower investments and lower developments resulting in volatile economic swings.
In recent years, the subject of corruption has received considerable attention. Work on governance has brought it into the light and it is no longer taboo. Corruption is being addressed by financial institutions, government agencies, bilateral donors, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and development professionals. Its causes have been measured empirically, as have its impacts on human development Institutions and administrative procedures have been overhauled. Countries have negotiated and signed international anti-corruption conventions Good governance.
If we want to avoid corruption that time we should apply good governance and should ensure human rights for every person. Because, if we do not reduce the Corruption that time the Human Rights will be violated. If we want to reduce Corruption that time we should ensure Good Governance.
Corruption is the main obstacle to the socio-economic development of the country. Nowadays, the developing countries of the world are emerging as newly industrialized and economically developed. But after 39 years of the Bangladeshi independence, the harmful phenomenon of corruption is gradually increasing in every sphere of the state. ACC is working towards a corruption- free Bangladesh by advocating transparency and accountability in administration for stronger economic growth. An investigative program to resist corruption has been undertaken by ACC, under a three-year-long National Integrity Programmed (NIP), reviewing the country’s legal and institutional structure and analyzing the endorsed rules of the government in the service-oriented sector. One of the watchdog agencies, the Bureau of Anti-Corruption (BAC), has been dissolved by the constitution of ACC. The then investigative report on the BAC is implemented under the NIP, with the financial support of USAID. TIB conveys its appreciation to USAID for their assistance. TIB is also grateful to the Director General, BAC, for help in data collection and giving permission to visit a district office, to observe field-level activities. Gratitude is also due to the former Director of the BAC, Md. Momenul Haque, and all other staff and officials of the BAC at the main office and at field-level, for their generous support in data collection.
1.2 Aims & Objectives of the Study
It is very important to identify the aims and objectives of any research. I shall describe all the goal of this research on Corruption, Good Governance and Human Rights Nexus.
My Aims and Objectives of the study are as follows;
- To define the Corruption in different perspective.
- To explore the present situation of Corruption in Bangladesh.
- To explore the conditions of corruption in Bangladesh.
- To find out the procedure how we can ensure a society without corruption.
- Procedure how we to find out the can implement Anti-Corruption laws.
- Causes of corruption in Bangladesh.
- Corruption related cases and conviction.
- To find out the effect of Corruption and recommendation how Anti-Corruption law can be effective.
Then I shall try to discuss Law and Practice which exists in Bangladesh. But the law enforce is not appropriate law in Bangladesh for the protection of corruption. For that reason I will try to prescribe which law is appropriate for reducing Corruption.
Methodology is very important for any research. Without adopting any methods, it is difficult to contribution. As it is a necessary to optimum methods to create anything. The optimum outcome of the research depends largely on the adopting of the proper methods related to the topics in the field of the proper investigation and sufficient care. When I prepared this research I followed the some methods i.e. the Imperial Methods, sufficient care method etc. respectively where it is applicable. The techniques of data collection followed in this research are interviewing, questionnaire, uses of documents sources. I also helped in my teachers, friends and different website collecting the topic related information and statistic.
Though there is nothing codified about Corruption, Good i any academic book or magazines so it was very much tough for me to collect the information ita. For this work, I need to go in many welfare organizations. For complication of this study, I id been also following the historical, analytical and imperial method.
1.4 Limitation of the Study
Every research study has some limitations in true sense. So this research monograph is not the exception of this limitation and limitations reduced the scope of the study hi some changes. The main limitation of the study is the time binding’s work. The time is not enough for the study. To create any good research on any topics and subject, that time prerequisites sufficient instrument and enhance more books hi university library but our library is not sufficient for making this research on Corruption. There is no study that done on this topic before, so there was no perfect guideline. That is another important limitation of this study.
1.5 Importance of the Study:
The study is the great importance; the study will help to know about Corruption and causes of corruption and anti-corruption law in Bangladesh perspective
No study on this topic has ever been done before, so a lot of new ideas have come in front of my eyes, I have got good knowledge about the corruption and good governance in Bangladesh, which will help us hi different ways.
I have seen that many times debates arise on the role of the Societies for reducing of the Corruption. This study will help to solve the reason of debate by some new ideas.
1.6 Scope of the Study:
The scope of this study includes the area of information required to collect and analyze regarding, the determination of the Corruption, Good Governance and Human Rights Nexus. The entire study will focus on the information of Corruption and Good Governance in Bangladesh
1.7. Shadow of the whole research
The title of the study denotes the subject matter of the study. As the title of the research monograph is corruption. It is very difficult to read to the matters relating to the corruption which is necessary for discussion of the topic maintaining the sequence of discussion and come to the conclusion. So the subject matter being corruption the definition and meaning of the term the legal instruments about it according to national and international level and find out the loopholes of the existing laws.
Historical development of Anti-Corruption Commission
2.1 Historical Background
A historical view of Bangladesh is useful for understanding its current political and social environment as a Context for thinking about. Its bureaucratic tradition descends from the administration of British imperial India which ended in 1947 with the partition of India into Hindu and Muslim parts or in nation terms India and Pakistan.
The architects of the separation assigned North West and north east of corners of India and Pakistan calling them west and East Pakistan respectively
From the historic sheikh Mujibur Rahaman returned in Bangladesh to resume leadership and establishment of a secular democratic state in the face of economic and political difficulties. He took greatly increased power reduced polity to one party rule of Awemelague. He was killed with his most of the family in military coup in august 1975.
Ziaur Rahaman the then major general founded the Bangladesh nationalist party bnp and assuming the presidency after a coup in1977 gain public support by establishing the free market economic policy and amends the constitution in Bangladesh from then corruption in Bangladesh has grown. He has assassinated in1982in a failed coup and lieutenant colonel was in power and ruled up to 1990
Thenceforth the AL and BNP are distrust and almost single minded in the development of Bangladesh.
In the years of 2001to2004 transparency international assessed Bangladesh as having the highest level of corruption of 170 countries that it surveys.
Historically corruption has long plagued the civil service and bedeviled attempts to curtail it. The Pakistan government responded to proliferation of corrupt practices during the Second World War with the Prevention of Corruption Act (1957) which established an anti-corruption branch in the Police Directorate at the provincial level. The East Pakistan Anti-Corruption Act 1957) provided a framework for a Bureau of Anti-Corruption (BAC) independent of the Provincial police administration, but still supervised by the district police administration. In 1964 the Government formed anti-corruption commissions at the district and divisional levels, chaired by the Deputy Commissioner and Divisional Commissioners respectively and controlled by the President’s Secretariat and Prime Minister’s Office with the changes in the system of the Government , to provide a second stage “check and Balance” scrutiny of corruption cases. In spite of these measures, BAC remained a submissive institution hobbled by weak political will, self-serving direction from high levels, ineffective regulatory instruments and internal corruption
During the end of WW II an organization by the name “Enforcement Branch” was created in 1943 under the Food Department to monitor and check pervasive corruption in the food rationing system that was about to create famine like situation in the Sub-Continent. When the measure subsequently proved to be futile the branch was placed under the CID and Anti-Corruption Act 1947 was enacted .
In the year 1957 the branch was reorganized as Bureau of Anti- Corruption duly enacting Anti-Corruption Act 1957.
Since its inception in 1943 until 1983 the organization functioned as a branch of the Police although the control of the organization passed hands between President’s Secretariat and Prime Minister’s Office with the changes in the system of the Government. However, through a notification issued by the Chief Martial Law Administrator’s Office on 19 October 1983 a separate employment charter was provided to the Bureau curtailing its dependency on the police for manpower. But the organization continued to function under the bureaucratic control.
The Anti Corruption Commission (ACC) Bangladesh was created through an act promulgated on 23 February 2004 that into force on 09 May 2004. The first set of office bearers were appointed on 21 November 2004. The following day, it commenced its journey with a mission, a vow to make a difference to the Nation’s anti corruption initiatives and a fresh mandate. While its predecessor the Bureau of Anti Corruption was abolished on the same day. Although initially, it could not make the desired impact, but immediately following its reconstitution in February 2007, the ACC began working with renewed vigor and impetus duly acceding to the United Nation’s convention against corruption that was adopted by the General Assembly way back on 31 October 2003.
2.3 Development of anti corruption commission in Bangladesh
The Anti-Corruption Commission Act (2004), introduced by the BNP-led Bangladesh Parliament, legislated its replacement by the ACC. The Act improved on previous law by making the ACC nominally independent and financially autonomous, providing for Special Judges for corruption prosecutions and enabling prosecution of members of the Government without the permission of the Government. However, throughout the remainder of the BNP-led government term, the ACC achieved little in the face of pervasive high-level obstruction and continuing weak political will for practical results.
This most recently-elected government, from October 2002 to October 2006, was a coalition led by the BNP, supported by Jamaat-e-Islam, Jatiya (Ershad’s party) and Islami Oikya Jote, and led by the Prime Minister, Khalida Zia. Conventionally when a government completes its constitutional four year term, the mainly ceremonial President appoints a non-partisan caretaker government to administer the country during the election period. However the BNP’s politicization of the civil service, puppet caretakers and suborned Election Commission strongly favored their return to power and continuing kept autocratic rule. In August 2006 months before the end of the Government’s term an analysis of the voter list by The Daily Star showed that it contained several million voters than could be reasonably expected to existed.
On January 11 2007, 11 days before the scheduled election when the advisors constituting the caretaker government and functionaries of the election commission had completely lost the confidence of everyone. The Chief Adviser ordered the re constitution of anti corruption commission launching the radical anti corruption campaign described in section 3 of Anti-Corruption Law 2004.
2.3.1. Anti corruption commission in Pakistan
International anti-corruption agencies are involved in local stakeholder. All pillars of National Integrity System were studied in detail. After identifying the causes of corruption in each pillar, a comprehensive strategy and a detail action plan was recommended. Breaking The National Accountability Bureau is Pakistan’s apex anti-corruption organization. It is charged with the responsibility of elimination of corruption through a holistic approach of awareness, prevention and enforcement. It operates under the National Accountability Ordinance-1999, with it’s headquarter at Islamabad. It has four regional offices in the provincial capitals and one at Rawalpindi. It takes cognizance of all offences falling within the National Accountability Ordinance (NAO) .
For the initial three years, the focus of its functions was directed only at detection, investigation and prosecution of white-collar crime. Those prosecuted include politicians, public service officials and other citizens who were either guilty of gross abuse of powers, or through corruption had deprived the national exchequer of millions or resorted to other corrupt practices. In February 2002, NAB launched the National Anticorruption Strategy (NACS) project. The NACS team conducted broad based surveys, studied external models of away from traditional enforcement based routines NACS has recommended a comprehensive process. Relevant amendments have been made in NAO and now NAB is empowered to undertake prevention and awareness in addition to its enforcement functions
2.5 Anti-Corruption Commission in Zimbabwe
The Anti-Corruption Commission of Zimbabwe (ACCZ) is young, having come into being on 8 September 2005 when the first Commissioners were sworn in. The Commission was established in terms of the Constitution of Zimbabwe and reports to Parliament through a Minister of State in the President’s Office. As such, the Commission is well placed to discharge its mandate as provided for in the Anti-Corruption Commission Act Chapter 9:22 of the same Act.
The Commission consists of 9 Commissioners who are employed full time and have executive powers. A Chairperson who is assisted by a Deputy Chairperson heads the Commission. Below the Commissioners is the Secretariat, which consists of 3 operating arms namely Corruption Prevention and Corporate Governance; Investigation and Prosecution; and lastly Publicity and Education
3.4 Purpose of Anti-Corruption commission
- Prevent petty Corruption- Though it is used on a smaller scale, defined or the use of public office for private benefit in the course of delivering public service. There involves relatively small amount of money. Including bribery grease money speed payments, the public servant abuses his power by accepting benefit. For the benefit of the citizen Anti-Corruption Commission was established.
- Prevent Grand Corruption- This is the most dangerous and covert type of Corruption. Instances where policy making its design and implementation are compromised by corrupt practices. Found where public officers and in high positions (such or councilors) in the process of making decisions.
- Prevent Political Corruption – the politicians have started to do politics with corruption the ruling party published a white paper. The opposition has done likewise in
Our country the political parties seldom indulge in self criticism. Whichever goes the power it jumps on the state resources and devours with both the hands the political parties are not connect with this. if the party goes to power the good people fall back while the good elements go forward. The corrupt people are not tried. They find escape through the loopholes of law courts. Politics is resorted to on the issue of corruption. Effective measures should be considered on how to get rid of it . This kind of corruption occurs predominately in developing and loss developed countries usually Bangladesh and Pakistan and other countries.
Usually associated with the electoral process-Includes-
- Voting Irregularities.
- Nepotism and
- Rule of few
- False political promises
- Paying Journalist for favorable coverage of candidates and parties
- Influencing voters by distribution of money food and
- Holding on to power against the will of the people.
- Prevent Business Corruption- Often not regarded as a crime the, as a means to accelerate. For the purpose of carry out business in the country properly corruption shall be stopped as well as anti corruption commission was established.
- Corruption in the banking – The banking sector in Bangladesh is no less corrupt. various kinds anomalies exist here such as obtaining loans through influence peddling non execution of the conditions on which loans are sanctioned and embezzlement money
though fraud. The financial sector cannot be developed if the banking sector is not reformed through the instruction of ACC.
Concept and status of corruption
3.1. Definition of corruption
3.1.1. Corruption is operationally defined as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain .
3.1.2. Corruption sabotages policies and programs that aim to reduce poverty, so attacking Corruption is critical to poverty reduction .
3.1.3. Corruption occurs when organizations or individuals profit improperly through their position in an activity and thereby cause damage or lose
3.1.4. The community trusts public officials to perform their duties with honesty and in the best interest of the public. Corruption involves breaching public trust .
3.1.5 Corruption involves the dishonest or preferential use of power being position which has the result of one person or organization being advantaged over another .
Corruption can be found in all countries but is particularly widespread in societies where the legal system, mass media and the public administration are weak and undeveloped. Corruption thrives where…
- Temptation coexists with permissiveness.
- Institutional checks on power are missing.
- Decision making remains obscure.
- Civil society is thin on the ground.
- Great inequalities in the distribution of wealth condemn people to live in poverty.
- Concepts like public procurement procedures are ignored.
Gift-giving is part of negotiating and relationship building. Fighting corruption is not just law enforcement. Rather it is a reappraisal of the way we think and the way we act. No anti-corruption drive can succeed or survive without active support or participation of the people. And that means an awareness of rights and remedies against violation of rights, an attitude of not participating in or tolerating in or tolerating corruption in any form, and practice of standing against corruption in every way.
3.3. In Global Context
Defining corruption is important in the context of global efforts to reduce its influence in public life. But is not an easy task to define corruption. Webster Dictionary describes corruption as morality, state of being corrupted and according to the dictionary corruption means a state of decomposition, dishonest, rotten, pollute, immoral and bad. A definition has been found in a publication of the World Bank headed “VIETNAM-Combating Corruption” as “Corruption practice refers to the act of offering, giving, receiving or soliciting anything of value with the aim of influencing the action of a public official in the procurement process or the contract execution. The easy and artistic meaning of corruption may be an act against ethics. In a great sense, corruption means the disobedience of a virtue or sanctity. In the administrative view, corruption has a specific meaning. If a public servant abuses power or designation or does a wrong or refrains from doing justified act with a view to fulfilling his desires or giving undue privileges to his relatives, friends or any person, such act will be considered as corruption. Professor Robert Cligaurd of South Africa gave the following equation regarding corruption .
3.4. The Causes of Corruption
Why corruption develops varies from one country to the next and there is seldom a single identifiable cause. Some of the causes which have been suggested are: poverty; poor administrative structures; weak judicial, legislative and regulatory frameworks; inadequate education; and cultural and social value systems that condone corrupt practices. Other possible causes are inadequate civil servants remuneration; too broad discretionary powers of civil servants and a lack of accountability, monitoring and transparency. It has also been argued that planned economies, where many prices are below market-clearing levels provide incentives to payoffs and so does the presence of organized crime.
It is often claimed that poverty is a very important factor in the development of corruption and that can true. It is for example, obvious that the risk of corruption in the public sector increases if the civil-service wages are so low that they do not allow public workers to support their families. If poverty was, however, the only cause of corruption it would be hard to explain the fact that most of those involved in “grand corruption” have much more than they and their families will ever need. It can therefore been argued mat corruption “can emerge from wealth and abundance, or it can emerge from the lack if it”.
Other factors that may not be causes of corruption but can certainly encourage it are a low educational level which keeps the population passive and ignorant of its rights and the lack of political will to fight corruption. The motivation to remain honest may be further weakened if senior officials and political leaders use public office for private gain or of those who resist corruption lack protection.
3.5. The Consequences of Corruption:
Corruption adversely affects economic performance, undermines employment opportunities and poverty reduction. Petty corruption raises the cost of engaging in productive activities. Its burden falls disproportionately on poor people. For those without money or connections, petty corruption in public health or police services can have serious consequences. Corruption affects the lives of poor people through many other channels as well. It diverts public resources away from socially valuable areas, such as education and infrastructure investments that could benefit poor people like health clinics, roads etc. It lowers the quality of infrastructure, since kickbacks, are more lucrative on equipment purchases. The way funds are allocated gets distorted, foreign aid gets reduced and productive capacity gets further weakened. Where corruption involves the transfer of funds outside the country, it seriously undermines economic development. Corruption also undermines delivery of public services.
Corruption flourishes because there are people in power who benefit from the present system. Unfortunately those who benefits from power are also those who have to initiate changes to check corruption. It is, therefore, important for people to play and active role in this regard. The public interest litigation and electronic and print media can be used effectively in shaping public opinion. NGOs can play an active role hi taking up individual cases for fighting corruption or bringing about systemic changes. Children in schools may be mobilized to create a social climate for making corruption unacceptable. Schools can reach large numbers of children, and through them, their parents and the community at large.
Corruption is socially unjust. In legal sense it is abuse of power and hi economic sense, it implies plundering of state resources. Corruption violates trust and confidence bestowed upon public bodies by the public. Corruption has two main impacts on the society: firstly, it has distributional impact as it promotes inequality hi society by the unjust enrichment of some of the people at the expense of wellbeing of vast majority of people, hi most cases, poor and most vulnerable people are the direct victims of corruption.
Secondly, it undermines the credibility and legitimacy in the public institutions and governments. Corruption hinders economic growth and development, and undermines democratic processes. Corruption diminishes the legitimacy of the governmental institutions by shaking public confidence hi dealing with the government. Corruption lowers the flow of foreign investment by increasing the cost of doing business. Corruption creates societal instability by sowing the seeds of social and political tensions. It deepens social inequalities, causes unequal distribution of resources, erodes popular confidence hi the public institutions, and creates a climate of secrecy. Corruption contributes to the inefficiency to the public administration since main motivation behind corruption is illegal enrichment through abuse of power rather than serving public interest. In this way, corruption impoverishes and degrades the quality of life of mass people. Apart from economic impact of corruption, corruption threatens social value.
Corruptions in judiciary and law enforcing agencies have emerged as a stumbling block to realization of human rights and threat to rule of law, democracy and administration of justice.
3.6. Recommendations for Minimizing Corruption:
Corruption is criminal activities; it taints the giver and the taker in equal measure. Corruption has permeated the entire social system in our country. So, alleviating corruption is the prime concern for not only the government but also the nation as a whole. A single measure is not sufficient to remove existing corruption and prevent corruption. So the following measure can be adopted in this regard:
- Political commitment is the sine qua non to prevent corruption. Democracy is the basic requirement of good governance. At present, democracy is passing miserable days. Long practices confrontational politics and political repression have made democracy paralyzed. But elected and effective parliament can play effective role in preventing and removing corruption. For that reason national consensus and restoration of democracy is needed without making any delay.
- Independent and strong judiciary is the most effective safeguard against corruption. Independent judiciary is the indispensable requisite of a free society under rule of law. As per the directions of Masdar Hossain case, the present government is trying to ensure judicial independence but seeing the role of lower judiciary as well as the higher judiciary in upholding government’s executive will it seems that judiciary is being influenced at its birth stage. However, impartial altitude of judiciary can prove its independence and for ensuring rule of law it should go in this way.
- Sometimes the National Human Rights Commission can play a role on the work of government officials with its watch dog mechanism. But for the last one decade, the bill relating to establishing NHRC has been pending with the hand of government high ups.
- Departmental accountability of the government servant must be ensured. Corruption technology should be quickly introduced in public administration to assist in efforts for ensuring transparency and accountability and reduce red-tapes. Coordination between different departments at the district level should be strengthened. Attendance at the district coordination meetings should be made compulsory for all departmental heads. The local governments should be made stronger and the power of the administration should be effectively decentralized.
- Effective parliament can be the vital mechanism against corruption. A special parliamentary standing committee on corruption can be formed headed by an MP from the opposition so that parliamentary control can be effectively ensured against the corruption activities of government officials.
3.7. Global Programmers against Corruption
The Global Programmers contributes through programmed and projects that identify disseminate and apply good practices in preventing and controlling corruption and have produced multiple technical and policy guides, including the Anti-Corruption
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) creates the opportunity to develop a global language about corruption and a coherent implementation strategy. A multitude of international anti-corruption agreements exist, however their implementation has been uneven and only moderately successful. The UNCAC gives the global community the opportunity to address both of these weaknesses and begin establishing an effective set of benchmarks for effective anti-corruption strategies. The Global Programme against Corruption (GPAC) is a catalyst and a resource to help countries effectively implement the provision of the UN Convention against Corruption.
There are a rapidly growing number of countries that have become parties to the Convention. The primary goal of the Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU)/Global Programme against Corruption (GPAC) is to provide practical assistance and build technical capacity to implement the UNCAC and efforts will concentrate on supporting Member States in the development of anti-corruption policies and institutions. This will include the establishment of preventive anti-corruption frameworks.
3.8. Measures for Reducing Corruption
Reducing corruption and improving governance requires a system of checks and balances in societies that restrain arbitrary action by politicians and bureaucrats and foster the rule of law.
Institutional arrangements that diffuse power and promote accountability and transparency are the key to a system of checks and balances. Furthermore, the recent work on ‘state capture’ highlights the need to place checks and balances on the ‘elite* corporate sector through promoting a competitive market economy. Another salient feature of a strategy would include a meritocratic and service-oriented public administration.
Civil society oversight and participation in the decision-making and functioning of the public sector have been a crucial counterweight and instrument to combating corruption and improving governance. This involves making the state transparent to the public and empowering the citizenry to play an active role. Countries such as the Nordics have been in the forefront in I transparency reforms. But public -sector culture in many transition and developing countries fosters secrecy of decision-making. In much of the CIS, for example, parliamentary votes are not publicly disclosed; public access to government information is not assured; and judicial decisions are typically not available to the public. Moreover, despite a growing civil society, the government typically does not involve NGOs in the monitoring of its decision-making process or performance. Concentrated media ownership and recent restrictions on reporting have weakened the ability of the media to ensure accountability of the public sector.
Addressing the challenge of corruption needs to be understood within a broader context of improving governance and institutional change. Misgovernance distorts policy-making and misallocates the human and physical resources, in turn slowing income growth and increasing poverty. Many failed capacity-building approaches and investments in the past did not pay enough attention to fostering good governance, to controlling corruption, or to the understanding of the political economy of institution
Power and functions of Anti-Corruption commission
4.1 Vision of Anti-Corruption Commission
To create a strong anti-corruption culture that permeates throughout the whole society.
The Commission has formulated some indicators of the vision so that every member of the society can easily recognize if this vision has been attained in the next five years these are as follows;
- No bribery in business.
- No bribery to escape from the reach of the law or to any government official.
- No bribery to enjoy basic amenities such as health and education etc.
- No bribery to jump the queue.
- No bribery, period!
- Merit matters, not greasing of palm.
Public perception survey indicates presence of a feel good factor in the citizens who perceived that there is a reduction in the level of corruption in the country. An abhorrence of corrupted amongst the people, manifested by the social stigma placed on them and a strong displeasure exerted through peer pressure.
TI ratings placed Bangladesh in the top half in the league of least corrupt nations in the world. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) encompassing
- Completion rate or the percentage of cases completed against the number assigned in the year. Cycle time or time taken for an investigation in a case to be completed. Prosecution rate or the percentage of cases prosecuted against the number completed in a year.
- Conviction rate or the percentage of cases convicted in court against the number prosecuted in a year.
4.2 Mission of Anti-Corruption commission in Bangladesh
To relentlessly combat, control, suppress and prevent corruption.
Guided by the mission ACC sets for itself the following tasks and functions:
- It controls corruption by identifying hot spots and areas of vulnerabilities for targeted investigative and prosecution action, prevention and curative treatment beside preventive education and advocacy.
The Strategic Plan consists of three strategic objects:
- Combating Corruption through Punitive Action.
- Pre-empt Corruption through Systems Review.
- Prevent Corruption through Education and Advocacy.
These are supported by four supporting objectives:
Designing Organizational Structure:
- Designing Operating Mechanisms.
- Providing Human Resource Support and Good Internal Governance.
- Providing Sound Financial and Logistical Support
4.3. Power of the Anti-Corruption Commission in respect of inquiry or Investigation
(1)In respect of any query of investigation
(a) Summons witnesses, ensure their appearance and interrogate them under oath.
(b)Discover and present any document.
(c)Take evidence under oath.
(d) Call for public records or its certified copies from any court office.
(e) Issue warrants for the interrogation of witnesses and the examination of documents.
(f) Any other matter required for realizing and fulfilling the aims and objectives of this law.
(2)The commission may require any person to furnish information in matters relating to any inquiry or investigation and any person so directed is obliged to furnish information available to him.
(3) Any person obstructing an official legally empowered by the commission in the exercise of his powers under this sub-section (1) or any person deliberately violating any order given under that sub-section commits a punishable offence is liable to a term of imprisonment of mot more than three(3)years or a fine or both.
Power of Investigation
(1) Notwithstanding anything in the code of Criminal procedure, corruption shall be the subject matter of investigation by the commission alone.
(2) The commission may through an official gazette notification empower a subordinate officer of the commission the power to investigate corruption under sub-section (1)
(3) For the purpose of investigation into officer empowered under subsection (2) shall have the power of an officer-in-charge of a police station.
(4)Besides the provisions of Sub-section (2) and (3), the commissions shall also have the power to investigate any offence under this law.
4.4 Functions of Anti-Corruption commission
4.4.1 .Chairman & commissioners
The commission is mandated as independent, self-governed and neutral entity. It consists of three Commissioners; of them one as the chairman and all appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Selection Committee for a period of four years from the date of their appointment. While the commissioners function on full time basis loses eligibility for reappointment on expiry of the term in their office.
- To enquire into and conduct investigation of offences mentioned in the schedule
- To file cases on the basis of enquiry or investigation and conduct cases
- To hold enquiry into allegations of corruption on its own motion or on the application of aggrieved person or any person on his behalf
- To perform any function assigned to Commission by any Act in respect of corruption
- To review any recognized provisions of any law for prevention of corruption and submit recommendation to the President for their effective implementation
- To undertake research, prepare plan for prevention of corruption and submit to the President, recommendation for action based on the result of such research
- To raise awareness and create feeling of honesty and integrity among people with a view to preventing corruption
- To organize seminar, symposium, workshop etc. on the subjects falling within the functions and duties of the Commission
- To identify various causes of corruption in the context of socio-economic conditions of Bangladesh and make recommendation to the President for taking necessary steps
- To determine the procedure of enquiry, investigation, filing of cases and also the procedure of according sanction of the Commission for filing case against corruption and to perform any other duty as may be considered necessary for prevention of corruption
Shortcomings and Reformation
5.1. Role of Government and Others
When the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) was set up in November 2004, Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), as the organization that spearheaded the demand for it considered it as a good opportunity. Although most observers including the author of this paper had no illusion even at that stage that the decision could be prompted By a conviction of the then Government for an effective Commission, it was at least viewed as an example that raising demand by stakeholders outside the government, especially the media, donors, and indeed citizens at large, could lead to a significant legal and institutional reform. However, it did not take long for disillusionment to grow over the prospect of its effective functioning. For over two years since the Commission came into being, it failed to demonstrate the kind of strategic vision, a seriousness of purpose and sense of direction expected of an organization that was mandated with the highly challenging task of fighting corruption. The then ACC indeed invited for itself a credibility gap and got bogged down over differences of opinion among the Commissioners on key issues such as division of powers and responsibilities, and a bitter interpersonal relationship between them. The Commission also allowed itself to take on the baggage of the infamous Bureau of Anticorruption (BAC) when it sweepingly absorbed without the due scrutiny of the track record and credibility of the staff of the BAC, and embraced the inefficiency and lack of integrity on the one hand and paved the way for further Government control on the other .
The Government’s lack of commitment to let the Commission function independently was by then evident. The Government imposed an organ gram of its own choice upon the Commission. A powerful Minister of the then Government declared that the ACC was a part of the executive wing and therefore it should work within the framework of the government . The reconstitution of the Commission by the post 1/11 Caretaker Government and amendments made to the Anti-Corruption Act 2004 provided it some degree of dynamism and vibrancy aiming at making corruption a punishable offence, and challenging the culture of impunity. A large number of high-profile individuals suspected of involvement in corruption were arrested. Special tribunals were set up for speedy trial. On the other hand, a high-powered and controversial anti-corruption task force worked parallel with the ACC. While the fate of most of the cases remain open, the anti-corruption drive by the then ACC, though debatable, remains the strongest signal yet in Bangladesh’s history against corruption in a manner that the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina acknowledged in her statement on February 4, 2009 to the Parliament as a necessary shake-up .
The role of the ACC during the Caretaker Government has been widely debated in and outside the Parliament, especially with regard to the question of political bias, due process and accountability. The fact remains that there were more than one power centre that shaped the policies and actions during the period of Caretaker Government, more so in terms of the anti-corruption drive. Equally debatable in this context was the creation of the so-called Truth and Accountability Commission that not only demonstrated the lack of consistency and strategic thinking in the corridors of power, but also added to the question of credibility of ultimate intentions of the then Government with regard to fighting corruption . Questions may be raised whether the ACC had the full operational independence even under the Caretaker Government, and whether all that happened in the name of the then anti-corruption drive can be attributed to the ACC . To say the least, the way the high-profile individuals were taken to custody and denied bails, and then subsequently awarded the same in a record-speed did not leave positive commentary about a government that took the most important step towards separation of the Judiciary. It did tarnish the image of the then Government’s commitment to the rule of law, and more importantly, as was widely suspected , and subsequent events showed, it turned out to be Counterproductive to the cause of anti-corruption in general and came as a challenge to the image of the ACC in particular. Subsequent upon the resignation of the former Chairman and appointment of his successor, the debate over the Commission’s effectiveness has further intensified. The Government did not ratify the Ordinances of 18 April and 22 November, 2007 that brought amendments to the Anti-corruption Act 2004. Instead, in view of a set of proposals for legal reform proposed by the Committee formed to review the Anticorruption Act with the stated objective of making it accountable, the prospect of the Commission’s independent and effective functioning has come under threat. The new Chairman of the Commission Ghulam Rahman was quoted to have told the media that the ACC was in any case a toothless tiger, whereas the nails that it could use were now being chopped off. He added that recommendations of the Committee were not consistent with the commitment made by the Prime Minister in the Parliament in which she spoke about her intention to strengthen the Commission . Before moving further to discuss what could be done to prevent this state of disillusionment to further exacerbate, we now move to analyze why we need an effective ACC, and why now.
5.2. Addressing the weaknesses in the ACC Act 2004
In addition to the above, there are a number of provisions in the Act of 2004 which in any case make the Commission liable to the Government in terms of financial and administrative control.
- Section 25 clearly makes room for dependence of the Commission on the Government for its budget and financial power to use the same, when it says that the Government shall make an annual financial allocation to cover expenses of the Commission; and the Commission would not require prior permission of the Government for expenses in approved and identified items. There are two aspects of the provision – first that the Government will make the annual allocation which would in practice make the Commission dependent on the Government for its budget. Secondly, for all practical purposes even within the given annual budget the Commission’s financial authority is also restricted in the limits of the “approved and specified” items. The intention clearly is to retain financial control of the Commission in the hands of the Government; otherwise it is not understandable why the Commission shouldn’t have the authority to determine itemized allocation of the funds at its disposal. At present the Commission has no authority to spend any amount of money for purposes other than those “approved and specified” by the Government.
- The administrative authority of the Commission is also restricted. Article 30 clearly states that the Commission’s organizational structure and budget will be determined by the Government. This provision can obviously have a crippling effect on an organization that is supposed to have the jurisdiction to fight corruption originating in the Government departments.
- A number of vital areas having high propensity to corruption and linkages with processes and actors in grand corruption in the scheduled areas have been left out of the schedule. Money laundering was one such vital area which was included under the Ordinance of 18 April 2007, and will reportedly be retained when the Government adopts its own amendment . Other related areas of financial crimes like the banking and financial sector, foreign companies, foreign exchange regulations, etc., should also be included in the schedule.
- The Law under Article 36 gives the Government the authority to provide “guidance of direction” through clarifications or explanation, in cases of vagueness in the provisions of the law regarding the Commission’s authority and responsibility. This implies an omnibus authorization of the Government to intervene in the affairs of the Commission.
- Another major flaw in the Act is its opacity in relation to the status of the Chairman and other Members of the Commission. Section 13 of the Act simply provides that the Government shall determine the honorarium, allowances and other benefits of the Chairman and the Commissioners. The only reference regarding their status can be found in section 10(3) which provides that the Commissioners cannot be removed under any circumstances other than those applicable for the removal of a judge of the Supreme Court. Such lack of clarity must be removed and the revised law should clearly define the status and entitlements of Chairman and Members of the Commission at the same level as that of the judges of the Supreme Court.
The Anti-corruption Act 2004, should therefore, be amended along the above lines. Without conducive legal reform the Commission would remain hamstrung.
5.3. Accountability, Efficiency, Credibility
A significant part of the debate about ACC effectiveness has been devoted quite logically to the issue of accountability and possible abuse of power. Independence does not mean absence of accountability for any institution. The Anti-corruption Law 2004 provides no accountability or self-regulatory mechanism except under Section 29 which only stipulates that within March every year the Commission shall submit to the President a report on activities completed in the previous calendar year, following which the President will take measures to place it in the Parliament. The law stops short of indicating any follow-up, nor does it indicate any other accountability mechanism. The above-mentioned Committee has recommended that the Commissioners will be accountable to the President. In a context where except in case of the appointment of the Prime Minister and Chief Justice the President will act in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister , making the ACC accountable to the President is quite likely to make it accountable to the Prime Minister with potentials for executive control with partisan considerations. A watchdog body created in public interest by public money must be accountable, for which rigorous self-regulatory system as well as an external accountability mechanism must be in place. Among the best-known models of such commissions is one where external oversight and accountability rest with the Courts. In case of Bangladesh too it could be a Judicial Committee of the Supreme Court to which the ACC could be accountable. To complement judicial oversight what has worked extremely well in East Asia, especially Hong Kong, are the Citizens Advisory Committees who monitor the Commission. These outside oversight committees consisting of prominent citizens of high integrity, credibility and acceptability from both civil society and private sector have been established and sufficiently empowered to work with the Commission in monitoring and evaluation of key aspects of its work , which have added very significantly to the public trust and confidence of the Commission. A Citizens Oversight Committee can be set up for the benefit of the Commission’s accountability with several subcommittees on such specific areas as policy advice, prevention work, and citizen’s engagement, etc., depending on how the Commission organizes its work.
Accountability of the Anti-Corruption Commission is much more than external accountability. The Commission must, for instance, publish for public information detailed statements on income, assets and liabilities of its employees, especially Commissioners and the senior staff, in print and web version, which should be regularly updated.
ACC has a challenge of meeting sky-high expectations. Among many reasons for this including the government commitment to make it effective is that three highly respected and credible persons are at the helm of the Commission. But the Commission has to function through collective efforts of all members of its staff. The Commission cannot be expected to succeed without addressing the question of integrity, transparency and capacity of the officials. This remains a key concern of the Commission, especially for the legacy it has inherited as the staff of the former Bureau of Anti-Corruption (BAC) was sweepingly absorbed earlier into the Commission. This apparently is a legacy that the ACC has decided to live with. Though it means a sizeable wastage of resources, and continued credibility risk the present leadership of the ACC like its predecessor seems to have taken baggage of the BAC staff at various levels as the bitter pill until they retire in about five years .There is also a challenge of capacity building of the remaining staff, motivation and incentive. It has to be acknowledged in the corridors of the government that those who are full-time staff of the ACC cannot be expected to deliver unless their salaries and benefits are consistent not only with the cost of living, but also commensurate with the risks involved. The benefits of the ACC staff should include risk and rewards allowances and other positive incentives including protection against various threats of insecurities involved in the discharge of professional duty Positive incentives must also be matched with equally strong and effective negative incentives to enforce zero tolerance against corruption and abuse of power. The ACC must set for itself clear-cut performance measurement indicators in accord with a realistically drawn up strategy consistent with resources at its disposal authority, money and manpower. If the Commission is not itself accountable in appropriate ways, it can become an outlet for corruption and a tool for persecuting government critics the way the former BAC was used. There is a need for clearer understanding in the Commission that for an institution like this internal self-regulation is the best means of checks and balances. The Commission should adopt and strictly enforce a code of ethics for its staff and a manual for internal governance.
5.4. HOW TO MAKE THE ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION EFFECTIVE?
5.4.1. The International Experience
Although the experience of specialized institutions to fight corruption is relatively new, independent anti-corruption commissions (IACC) are increasingly recognized in many countries of the world as one of the key pillars of the national integrity system (NIS) . Created often in response to public demand for fighting corruption, the IACCs have in many countries become permanent important bodies not only against corruption but also as vital element of the institutional set up to establish a democratic, accountable and transparent governance. The Asian experimentation with IACCs is over half a century old. The first Asia- Pacific country to establish an IACC was Singapore which in October 1952 set up the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), followed by Hong Kong in 1974 when it set up the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC). Since then 28 Asia pacific countries including Bangladesh have established formal and specialized anticorruption institutions. These have taken various forms. In some cases, as in Singapore, it specializes in investigation. Elsewhere, as in Hong Kong it performs wider range of functions – investigation, prevention and communications. IACCs can also vary in legal structure. While in some countries they have been established as autonomous agencies, in others with parliamentary systems, they can take the form of commissions that report to parliamentary committees. And rather than having just one organization there may actually be a cluster of them. Inspire of the rather robust growth of the number of such institutions, their success has been quite limited at the best. In fact in most cases the impact has been doubtful, attributed most often to lack of the necessary political commitment to tackle the root causes of the problem. In the wider global context too, there are strong evidences that the setting up of a specialized institution is not necessarily a successful solution to the scourge of corruption. There are actually very few examples of successful anti-corruption institutions. The most cited success stories, apart from those of Hong Kong and Singapore are Botswana’s Directorate for Economic Crime and Corruption and New South Wales’ Independent Commission against Corruption. The fact that success stories of ACIs are so few, those who have succeeded do not necessarily provide easily replicable examples because of the specific contexts in which they operate. In countries where they have been quite effective, like in Singapore and Hong Kong, the most important factor for success is the fact that they have enjoyed high level of political and public support. The contribution of Lee Kuan Yew towards fighting corruption in Singapore is widely known. In case of Hong Kong, the IACC was placed in the office of the Governor, but at the same time it has been reportable to the Legislature. In addition Hong Kong IACC’s separateness from the public service and its autonomy of operation were crucial. The contribution of Lee Kuan Yew towards fighting corruption in Singapore is widely known. In case of Hong Kong, the IACC was placed in the office of the Governor, but at the same time it has been reportable to the Legislature. In addition Hong Kong IACC’s separateness from the public service and its autonomy of operation were crucial. In both cases they are also endowed with highly motivated and skilled manpower, adequate research capabilities, and have adopted a strategy that combines rigorous investigative methods with aggressive programmers of prevention and public education. What follows here is an attempt to take a few important lessons that are necessary for the Anti-corruption Commission of Bangladesh to be effective.
5.4.2. Political commitment
An anti-corruption commission will be as successful and effective as the political and top Government leaders want it to be. As earlier mentioned, the present Government has put anti-corruption at a high level in its policy pronouncements. To compliment and carry forward the election manifesto, the Government at the very top level has continued to remind the nation about this priority. The Prime Minister has been using strong words against corruption and pledged on many occasions not to allow it in her government. In one such most recent statement she said, “The Government will take any measures necessary to build a corruption free society. The anti-corruption drive will continue until corruption is eliminated”. If such political commitment will yield positive result only if it be transformed into an effective national strategy against corruption that will criminalize corruption without fear or favor to any one. A key component of this strategy has to be a strong, independent and effective Anti-corruption Commission. The political backing must be strong enough across the partisan divide, to make it effective regardless of political and personal consequences. The reason that political commitment becomes an absolutely necessary precondition is the linkage of power with corruption However, the “political commitment” may turn out to be no more than eyewash when political leaders and executives perceive themselves or their group interests as potential targets of any effective anti-corruption measure that may be adopted by the commission, in which case the commission will be crippled by provisions imposed to diminish the powers of the institution. Weak political will demonstrated by vested interests in positions of power can overwhelm and even undermine the leadership. The fragility of political will to allow an effective ACC is located in most cases in a continuum that begins with the prospect of political mileage by pronouncements that are not necessarily backed up by a genuine commitment to enforce without fear or favor at the one end, and a perceived sense of insecurity at the other arising from the possibility of being counterproductive to corporate self interest. That the present Government, soon after assuming power, formed a committee to review “politically motivated” cases in an administrative process, and the fact that those recommended for cancellation are so far invariably individuals having links with the ruling alliance is an evidence of such corporate interest. Political interference from the people in positions of power may become the order, meaning that the Commission would be unable to discharge its functions without being subjected to a “don’t touch us” syndrome. It would then become increasingly difficult investigate people in positions of power in the Government of the day. Politics being about investment which necessitates return, political interference in most cases also has to do with a culture that tolerates and indeed promotes “it’s our turn” practice, by which election as a zero-sum-game brings the winner the opportunities to abuse power for private gain. The failure to ensure structural independence makes the ACC dependent on the support of its political and bureaucratic patrons, who would in most cases be biased in favor of those in, or having links with, the Government of the day. And normally they are powerful simply for the fact that they hold the key to the appointments, promotions, benefits and incentives of the ACC personnel too. Impact of low structural independence may be partially overcome if there is strong media and public support, but that is not as substantive as needed to operate without inhibitions.
5.4.3. Proposed legal changes – curtailing independence
The preamble and Section 3(2) of the Anti-Corruption Act 2004 provide that the Commission will be “independent and neutral”. Under the Caretaker Government, to respond to the felt need to ensure operational flexibility, the Act was amended by an Ordinance on November 22, 2007 to insert the word “self-governed”(shoshashito) in addition to independent and neutral. In an earlier similar ordinance the Commission’s jurisdiction was expanded by inclusion of the Money Laundering Act 2002 into its schedule. The ordinances were not approved by the Parliament on account of “specialist opinion, public interest and importance and continuity of the government”. A set of proposals prepared on October 10, 2009, by the Committee of the Cabinet Division of the Government formed to review the ACC Act states that the provision of “self-governance” cannot be allowed on the ground that the ACC does not have its “own source” of funds. This is exactly the example of the type of transformation of mindset that is needed if the ACC has to be granted true independence. The budget for the ACC comes and will come from the Government. But it has to be acknowledged that once the Commission gets the budget, it must be in the discretion of the Commission on how it wants to use it subject to its own internal financial control and external audit by Comptroller and Auditor General, as applicable. Another important area of proposed reform of the ACC legal framework is to reintroduce the necessity of prior government approval for taking up cases of corruption against government officials, which will not only curtail the jurisdiction and authority of the ACC, but will also practically make the public sector corruption outside the jurisdiction of the ACC. The main logic apparently behind this proposal is a slow-down in the administration for fear of being harassed by getting implicated in corruption cases, which cannot be a good enough argument for such blanket removal of deterrence against corruption in the public sector. As the Chairman of the Commission said, instead of such measures to undermine the authority of the Commission, efforts should be taken to improve the level of integrity and dynamism in the administration. The Committee has made a good suggestion to undertake a comparative analysis of the relevant laws in some other countries as means to strengthen the ACC Act and update the Rules. However, disappointingly enough, the sub-committee that has been formed is composed of exclusively government officials. Work of the sub-committee could be substantially benefited by inclusion of relevant independent experts. Another recommendation of the Committee is to deprive the commission of the authority to appoint its own Secretary. Section 16 of the ACC Act 2004 provides that the Secretary of the Commission shall be appointed by the Commission whereas the Committee proposes that the Secretary would be appointed by the Government. It also proposes to upgrade the status of the Secretary to the level of Chief Accounts Officer, which in all likelihood will undermine the authority of Chairman, who is the Chief Executive. The logic put forward for bestowing the authority of appointing the Secretary in the hands of the Government is that the post of the Secretary is very important, and that the incumbent must have legal expertise and the knowledge of how the Government functions. This can be interpreted as undermining the capacity of the Commission to assess its own needs as well as make such provision as to retain the operational control in the hands of the government officials.
5.5. Assessment of corruption
Whatever way corruption is interpreted, it is a key obstacle to human security and social justice. Corruption is also a formidable impediment to poverty reduction. On the other hand, the Corruption Perceptions Index 2009 released by Transparency International showed that inspite of being listed among nine out of the 180 countries that have achieved “notable improvements”, Bangladesh remains in the category of those where corruption is pervasive. In a scale of 0-10 Bangladesh has scored 2.4 in 2009, compared to 2.1 last year. In terms of ranking Bangladesh has become 13th from below which is 139th among 180 whereas in 2008 it was 10th from below or 147th among 180. It may be recalled that Bangladesh was earlier placed at the very bottom of the list for five successive years from 2001-2005. In 2006 Bangladesh was ranked in no 3, in 2007 in number 7 and in 2008 November .
Bangladesh’s gain this year is notable as all its South Asian peers except India have received lower than previous year. India has remained steady with 3.4; Afghanistan declined from 1.5 in 2008 to 1.3; Bhutan from 5.2 to 5.0; Maldives from 2.8 to 2.5; Nepal from 2.7 to 2.3; Pakistan from 2.5 to 2.4; and Sri Lanka from 3.2 to 3.1. However, except Afghanistan, Nepal and Pakistan all other South Asian countries remain in higher positions than Bangladesh. More importantly, with the score remaining below 3, according to the index, we continue to be among countries where corruption is pervasive with deep and wide impacts. A key contributing factor to the index is the political and institutional capacity to prevent and control corruption. Therefore, whether or not the improvement achieved by Bangladesh would be sustainable and whether further progress would be achieved, will depend on the government’s will and capacity to deliver, especially in ensuring integrity, independence, impartiality and effectiveness of key institutions like the Anti-corruption Commission and other watchdog bodies.
5.5. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
From the above discussion, we propose the following recommendations that are crucial for making the ACC effective.
- A) Political will
- Sustain and enforce the political will, without any fear or favour, to create conditions in which the ACC can function independently and effectively;
- Political backing must be across the partisan divide;
- Do away with “don’t touch us” syndrome, and abandon “its our turn” culture in politics;
- B) Legal & Institutional strengthening for operational & financial independence
- Grant the ACC the status of Shoshashito (self-governed) institution;
- The Sub-committee for analyzing international experiences for legal review must include relevant experts from outside the Government as members;
- The Secretary of the Commission must be appointed by the Commission, not by the Government, and the status of the Secretary must not be upgraded;
- Section 25 of the ACC Act 2004 must be reviewed to provide full authority to the Commission to be able to use its budget independently without interference from the government. The ACC’s financial accountability should be ensured through statutory audit;
- Review the Article 36 of the ACC Act 2004 to prevent possible omnibus intervention by the Government in the affairs of the Commission;
- Enact a Whistleblower Protection Act to ensure legal protection of individuals reporting and disclosing information on corruption within and outside the public sector and those involved in other initiatives against corruption;
- Corruption in public service must remain within the jurisdiction of the ACC with no need for prior permission from the executive;
- Expand the jurisdiction of the ACC to include crimes under Money Laundering Act 2002, and other crimes in the banking and financial sector, foreign companies, and those involving foreign exchange;
- C) Accountability, Efficiency, Credibility
- Make the Commission accountable to a Judicial Committee of the Supreme Court;
- Create Citizens Advisory Committee composed of non-partisan prominent citizens of high integrity and credibility to advise and evaluate the work of the ACC. Citizens’ Subcommittees can be created to advise ACC on specific areas of work in the field of prevention like education, awareness and civic engagement;
- Proactively disclose and regularly update asset and liabilities statements of all employees of ACC;
- Undertake specific programmers of capacity building of the ACC professional staff on the basis of needs assessment;
- Salary and benefits of the ACC staff must be commensurate with cost of living as well as with the risks involved. Positive incentives must be matched with strong negative incentives to enforce zero tolerance against corruption;
17.The ACC must adopt its own Code of Ethics for its staff and a Governance Manual to ensure efficient management, internal self-regulation and checks and balances;
- d) Strategies & Priorities
18.ACC should develop its own anti-corruption strategy setting out prioritization of jobs at hand as provided by the law, particularly to develop a strategic balance between functions of investigation, prosecution and prevention;
- ACC needs to develop a policy to be able to deploy its resources and capacity for effectively handling the huge number of pending cases against new ones; and
- E) Strengthen the national integrity system
- ACC is one of the many institutions in a comprehensive national integrity system (NIS) that collectively builds capacities for effective control of corruption. ACC cannot deliver effective corruption control all by itself. The higher is the level of integrity, efficiency and professionalism of institutions like the judiciary, police and other law-enforcement institutions, public service, private sector, public procurement system and media the better will be the effectiveness of the ACC.
In the last decade there has been an increasing recognition in the international community of the damage corruption can cause, not only to economic development but also to human rights and governance. A vast number of corruption scandals in western democracies and in respected international organizations show conclusively that corruption knows no boundaries. Globalization and the ever-growing volume of international business
Transaction makes it increasingly difficult for individual countries to isolate themselves from global corruption. Therefore, there is a growing understanding of the need for international cooperation in the fight against corruption.
There is a strong connection between corruption and human rights violations. Both flourish best under similar condition, notably where secrecy and lack of accountability prevail. There are those who claim that human rights cannot thrive where corruption is rampant and argue that there should be a defined human right called freedom from corruption, hi any case, freedom of expression and other civil and political rights are without any doubt, extremely powerful tools to combat corruption.
Corruption cases are notorious to prove, as the victim, usually being the general public, is typically invisible. Therefore it is important to find ways to facilitate investigations, proofs and convictions, hi this regard there is, however, cause for great care. There is an implicit risk that the process may interest and the human rights of individuals.
Addressing the challenge of corruption needs to be understood within a broader context of improving governance and human rights. Many failed capacity-building approaches and investments in the past did not pay enough attention to fostering good governance, to controlling corruption, or to the understanding of the human rights development Problems in governance occur when a government is not only corrupt, but also when it is inefficient, unresponsive, or secretive. Essentially, when a government is ineffectual, it is considered to be corrupt. As this unit explained, corruption is fundamentally caused by low wages, poor incentive structures and inefficient systems, hi addition; it is also caused by the desire.