Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1987

 

Criminal Law
Amendment Ordinance [III of 1987] 

 

Section 6—Section 339C and 339D(b) of the Code are inconsistent with the
provision of section 8 of the Ordinance and due to this inconsistency these two
provisions 339C and 339D(b) are not applicable in the cases revived under the
Ordinance.

“Working
days” of the Court as provided in section 339D(b) cannot be brought into
the ambit of section 8 of the Ordinance. The provisions of section 8 provided
that trial of such cases must be concluded within two years from the date of
commencement of the Ordinance. In the present case it appears that the case was
revived on 17-2-87 and in view of the provision of section 8 the trial ought to
have been concluded within 20-1-87. But the trial Court failed to conclude the
trial within that period and when the petitioner approached the court for
stopping the proceeding his prayer was rejected applying the section 339D(b).
But in view of the above the provision of section 339D(b) has no manner of
application. Abdul Nur Mehedi vs State 46
DLR 303.

 

Section 8—The High Court Division rightly acquitted the accused in view of
the provision of section 8 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act as the trial
having not been concluded within the period of 2 years it was without
jurisdiction. State vs Md Minhazuddin
Khan 51 DLR (AD) 142.

 

Section 8(a)—The proceeding before the Divisional Special Judge having not
been concluded within the statutory period of 2 years from the date of
commencement of the Act (20-1-87) further proceeding of the case be stopped and
the petitioner released. Sardar Abdul
Haque vs The State 46 DLR 515.

 

Section 8(a)—When trial of the case did not commence as no charge was framed
against the accused persons. There was no question of concluding the trial
within 270 working days by the Special Judge.

Proceedings
of a Special case cannot be stopped under the provisions of section 8(a) of the
Criminal Law Amendment (Amendment) Act 1987 after the expiry of two years from
the date of coming into force of that Act on 20-1-87 in a case in which trial
did not commence by framing charge against the accused or 270 working days did
not expire after framing of the charge and before coming into force of the said
Act. Mozibul Huque vs State & others
48 DLR 146.

 

Section 8(a)—As the language of the section speaks, not about conclusion of
trial but about conclusion of the proceeding, the Special Judge had no option
but to conclude the proceedings within 2 years. Yunus Molla (Md) vs State 48 DLR 273.