By Pinkeshwar Gangwar
A. Definition of Property:
Clause (36) of Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, clause (9) of Section 2 of the Registration Act, 1908 define property. Section 3 of the General Clauses Act provides as follows: (36) “movable property” shall mean property of every description, except immovable property. The Transfer of Property Act does not give any exhaustive definition of ‘immovable property’. The only definition given therein is in Section 3 which states: “immovable property” does not include standing timber, growing crops or grass. This is strictly speaking not a definition of the term ‘immovable property’ for it does not tell us what immovable property is but merely tells us what it does not include. We must, therefore, turn to other Acts where that term is defined. Clause (26) of Section 3 of the General Clauses Act defines ‘immovable property’ as follows: (26) “immovable property” shall include land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. A more elaborate definition is given in clause (6) of Section 2 of the Registration Act which states: (6) “immovable property” includes land, buildings, hereditary allowances, rights to ways, lights, ferries, fisheries or any other benefit to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth, but not standing timber, growing crops nor grass. What is pertinent to note about these definitions is that things attached to the earth are immovable property. What is pertinent to note about these definitions is that things attached to the earth are immovable property. The expression “attached to the earth” is defined in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act as follows: “attached to the earth” means—(a) rooted in the earth, as in the case of trees and shrubs;
(b) imbedded in the earth, as in the case of walls or buildings; or (c) attached to what is so imbedded for the permanent beneficial enjoyment of that to which it is attached.
- Property: Property can be classified in many categories such as tangible and intangible, real and personal, corporeal and incorporeal, movable and immovable
For the The Transfer of Property Act, 1882, it is categorisation in movable and immovable.
- Immovable Property: (i) Things Rooted in Earth and Standing Timber, Growing Crops and grass; (ii) Trees; (iii) Timber trees and standing timber;
(iv) Land; (v) Benefits arising out of land; (vi) Things attached to Earth; and
(vii) Attached to what is Embedded.
D. Movable Property
The trees rooted in the earth are immovable property as being things attached to the earth by reason of the definition of the term ‘immovable property’ given in the General Clauses Act, and the Registration Act, read with the definition of the expression “attached to the earth” given in the Transfer of Property Act, standing timber is moveable property by reason of it being excluded from the definition of ‘immovable property’ in the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act and by being expressly included within the meaning of the term ‘moveable property’ given in the Registration Act. The distinction between a tree and standing timber has been pointed out by Vivian Bose, J., in his separate but concurring judgment in the case of Smt Shantabai v. State of Bombay1 as follows: “Now, what is the difference between standing timber and a tree? It is clear that there must be a distinction because the Transfer of Property Act draws one in the definitions of “immovable properly” and “attached to the earth”; and it seems to me that the distinction must lie in the difference between a tree and timber. It is to be noted that the exclusion is only of “standing timber” and not of “timber trees” Timber is well enough known to be- “wood suitable for building houses, bridges, ships, etc., whether on the tree or cut and seasoned.” {Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary). Therefore, “standing timber” must be a tree that is in a state fit for these purposes and, further, a tree that is meant to be converted into timber so shortly that it can already be looked upon as timber for all practical purposes even though it is still standing. If not, it is still a tree because, unlike timber, it will continue to draw sustenance from the soil.
Now, of course, a tree will continue to draw sustenance from the soil so long as it continues to stand and live; and that physical fact of life cannot be altered by giving it another name and calling it “standing timber”. But the amount of nourishment it takes, if it is felled at a reasonably early date, is so negligible that it can be ignored for all practical purposes and though, theoretically, there is no distinction between one class of tree and another, if the drawing of 1 [AIR 1958 SC 532 ]
nourishment from the soil is the basis of the rule, as I hold it to be, the law is grounded, not so much on logical abstractions as on sound and practical commonsense. It grew empirically from instance to instance and decision to decision until a recognisable and workable pattern emerged; and here, this is the shape it has taken.”
As pointed out in Mahadeo v. State of Bombay2 the distinction which prevailed in English law between fructus naturales and fructus industriales does not exist in Indian law, and the only question which would ‘fall to be considered in India is whether a transaction concerns ‘goods’ or ‘movable property’ or ‘immovable property’. The importance of this question is twofold: (1) in the case of immovable property, a document of the kind specified in Section 17 of the Registration Act requires to be compulsorily registered and if it is not so registered, the consequences mentioned in ‘ Sections 49 and 50 of that Act follow, while a document relating to goods or moveable property is not required to be registered; and (2) by reason of the interpretation placed on Entry 54 in List II in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India by this Court a State cannot levy a tax on the sale or purchase of any property other than ‘goods’.
2 [AIR 1959 SC 735]
Clause (26) of Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, defines “immovable property” as including inter alia “benefit to arise out of land”. The definition of “immovable property” in clause (f) of Section 2 of the Registration Act, 1908, illustrates a benefit to arise out of land by stating that immovable property “includes … rights to ways, lights, ferries, fisheries or any other benefit to arise out of land”. As we have seen earlier, the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, does not give any definition of “immovable property” except negatively by stating that immovable property does not include standing timber, growing crops, or grass. The Transfer of Property Act was enacted about fifteen years prior to the General Clauses Act. However, by Section 4 of the General Clauses Act, the definitions of certain words and expressions, including “immovable property” and “movable property”, given in Section 3 of that Act are directed to apply also, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, to all Central Acts made after January 3, 1968, and the definitions of these two terms, therefore, apply when they occur in the Transfer of Property Act. In Ananda Behera v. State of Orissa3 this Court has held that a
3 [AIR 1956 SC 17]
profit a prendre is a benefit arising out of land and that in view of clause (26) of Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, it is immovable property within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act. “A ‘benefit to arise out of land’ is an interest in land and therefore immovable property. The earlier decisions showing what constitutes benefits arising out of land have been summarized in Mulla on the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and it would be pertinent to reproduce the whole of that passage. That passage (at pages 16-17 of the Fifth Edition) is as follows: The first Indian Law Commissioners in their report of 1879 said that they had ‘abstained from the almost impracticable task of defining the various kinds of interests in immovable things which are considered immovable property’. The Registration Act, however, expressly includes as immovable property benefits to arise out of land, hereditary allowances, rights of way, lights, ferries and fisheries. The definition of immovable property in the General Clauses Act applies to this Act. The following have been held to be immovable property: a varashasan or annual allowance charged on land, a right to collect dues at a fair held on a plot of land; a hat or market; a right to possession and management of a saranjam; a malikana; a right to collect rent or jana; a life interest in the income of immovable property; a right of way; a ferry; and a fishery; a lease of land.”So far as the decisions of this Court are concerned, the one which requires consideration first is Firm Chhotabhai Jethabai Patel & Co. v. State of M.P4. This was one of the two cases strongly relied upon by the appellant, the other being State of M.P. v. Orient Paper Mills Ltd5. The facts in Chhotabhai case were that the petitioners had entered into contracts with the proprietors of certain estates and mahals in the State of Madhya Pradesh under which they acquired the right to pluck, collect and carry away tendu leaves; to cultivate, culture and acquire lac; and to cut and carry away teak and timber and miscellaneous species of trees called hardwood and bamboos. On January 26, 1951, the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 came into force and on the very next day a notification was issued under the said Act putting an end to all proprietary rights in estates, mahals and alienated villages and vesting
4 [AIR 1953 SC 108]
5 [AIR 1977 SC 687]
the same in the State for the purposes of the State free of all encumbrances with effect from March 31, 1952. The petitioners thereupon approached this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India praying for a writ prohibiting the State of Madhya Pradesh from interfering with the rights which they had acquired under the contracts with the former proprietors. It was averred in the petitions that not only had the petitioners paid the consideration under the said contracts but had also spent large sums of money in the exercise of their rights under the said contracts. This Court held that the contracts appeared to be in essence and effect licences granted to the petitioners to cut, gather and carry away the produce in the shape of tendu leaves, lac, timber or wood and did not create any interest either in the land or in the trees or plants. In arriving at this conclusion the Court relied upon a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Mohanlal Hargovind of Jubbulpore v. CIT, C.P. & Berar, Nagpur6. In that case the assessees carried on business as manufacturers and vendors of bidis composed of tobacco contained or rolled in tendu leaves.
The contracts entered into by the assessees were short term contracts under which in consideration of a sum payable by instalments the assessees were granted the exclusive right to collect and remove tendu leaves from specified areas. Some of the contracts also granted to the assessees a small ancillary right of cultivation. The Judicial Committee held that the amounts paid by the assessees under the said contracts constituted expenditure in order to secure raw materials for their business and, therefore, such expenditure was allowable as being on revenue account.
The distinction, set out above, has been made in a series of Indian cases that are collected in Mulla’s Transfer of Property Act, 4th Edn. at pp. 16 and 21. At p. 16, the learned author says — “Standing timber are trees fit for use for building or repairing houses. This is an exception to the general Rule that growing trees are immoveable property.”6 [AIR 1949 PC 311]
At p. 21 he says – “Trees and shrubs may be sold apart from the land, to be cut and removed as wood, and in that case they are moveable property. But if the transfer includes the right to fell the trees for a term of years, so that the transferee derives a benefit from further growth, the transfer is treated as one of immoveable property.” In English law and says at page 21 – “In English law an unconditional sale of growing trees to be cut by the
purchaser, has been held to be a sale of an interest in land; but not so if it is stipulated that they are to be removed as soon as possible.”
In this connection it may be mentioned that in English law there exists (or rather existed) a difference between fructus naturales and fructus industriales. Fructus naturales are natural growth of the soil, such as, grass, timber and fruit on trees, which were regarded at common law as part of the soil. Fructus industrials are fruits or crops produced “in the year, by the labour of the year” in sowing and reaping, planting, and gathering, e.g., corn and potatoes. Fructus industriales are traditionally chattels being considered the ‘representative’ of the labour and expense of the occupier and thing independent of the land in which they are growing and were not treated as an interest in land. Fructus naturales are regarded until severance as part of the soil and an agreement conferring any right or interest in them upon a buyer before severance was a contract or sale of an interest in land and were, therefore, governed by Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds of 1677 (29 Car. II c. 3). If they were severed before sale. Section 17 of that statute applied (see Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, second edition, para 90, p. 62). This distinction was, therefore, important in England for the purposes of the formalities required under the Statute of Frauds. Under the definition of goods given in Section 62(1) of the old English Sale or Goods Act of 1893, ‘goods’ included inter alia all industrial growing crops and things attached to or forming part of the land which were agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale. The formalities required for a contract for the sale of goods of the value of £10 and upwards by Section 17 of the Statute of Frauds were re-enacted in Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893. This section was repealed by the Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 1954. The definition of ‘goods’ in Section 61(1) of the new Sale of Goods Act, 1979, is the same as in the earlier Sale of Goods Act. Thus, the position now in English law is that crops and other produce whether fructus naturales or fructus industriales (except in the case of a sale without severance to a landlord, incoming tenant or purchaser of the land) will always be ‘goods’ for the purposes of a contract of sale since the agreement between the parties must be that they shall be severed either “before sale” or “under the contract of sale” (see Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, second edition, para 91, p. 63).
E. Section 5 of Transfer of Property Act, 1986.
Under Section 5 of the Act, the term ‘Transfer’ has been defined as an act of a living person whereby he conveys existing property to one or more living persons, and only those transactions that are covered under the term ‘transfer’ are subject to the application of this Act.7
(a) Background:
Property from one person to another can be transferred in several ways, such as by way of private or a court sale, gift, will, inheritance, relinquishment, dedication, etc, yet, all these kinds of transfers are not subject to the application of transfer of property act. Under section 5 of the act, has been defined as an act of a living person whereby he conveys existing property to one or more living persons, and only those transactions that that are covered under the term ‘transfer’ are subject to the application of this Act. Transfers of title that take place in other ways are governed by different enactments. For example, testamentary succession is regulated primarily by the Indian succession Act 1925 and for Muslims by their Quranic law and interstate succession is subject to the rules laid down by respective personal Laws to which the deceased was subject to. Similarly, dedication of property for religious and charitable purpose is governed by several religious and charitable endowment Acts passed for this very purpose.
(b) Living Person
One of the basic features of the definition is that it governs transfer between living person8 or transfers inter vivos. The term living person includes a juristic person9, a company10, or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, but does not include an
- The Preamble, The Transfer of Property Act,
- Living persons includes a company, or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or
- Such as a corporation.
- Hindustan leavers state of Maharashtra MANU/SC/0934/2003
idol of God11 or a temple12or even a court. It does not mean that the property cannot be transferred to God or idol, but only that if a person dedicates property to God, this transfer would not be subject to the rules of the Transfer of property act, but instead, would be governed by the relevant religious or charitable endowment Acts. The law contained in the TP Act does not affect the law in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies or association or body of individuals. As well as operates from the death of a testator and not during his lifetime, it is also not a transfer within the meaning of the act,13 but is subject to the rules provided under the Indian Succession Act 1925, for instance, if A gifts land to B, the transfer is subject to the rules of TP Act, as both of them living on the day of the transfer. However, if A leaves his property to B under a will, this conveyance would not be subject to the rules contained in the TP Act.
(c) Conveyance of the Property
Conveying of property involves creations of new title or interest in favour of the transferee14. In conveyance through this instrument of transfer, the titles of rights are conveyed to the transferee, for the first time. The transferor is divested of the right conveyed and the transferee acquires it for the first time under this instrument. For example a person A is the owner of a house, and permits B to stay in it. Such permission dose not convey any right in favour of B in respect to the house, as it can be withdraw at any time. After a month, B agrees to pay a rent of Rs 5000 per month, and A executes a lease deed in his favour. This lease is a transfer of an interest in his favour ie, a right of owner to posses and enjoys his property. This right through this lease deed is conveyed in favour of B. the right that B acquires is a right in immovable property and he does that with the help of an instrument. It is now a right and not a mere permission, and his stay in
- Harihar Gurupranth AIR 1930
- Biopat Rao Ram Chanddra AIR 1926 Nag 469
- N Ramaiah Nagraja s AIR 2001 kant 395
- Official assignee Madras Tehmina Dinshaw Tehraini AIR 1972 Mad 187.
the house will be governed by the term of the lease agreement and not by A’s directions. Through this conveyance, B is vested now with a legal right to possess and enjoy A’s house and during his lawful occupation, A is divested of the right to possession and enjoyment of his house. If, after a month, A executes a sale deed in favour of B, B now becomes the owner and through this sale deed, all the remaining rights in the house are also conveyed to him. The right to possess and enjoy was already conveyed, but what are now conveyed are the rights of title and of alienation. At the same time, A is deprived of these rights. A partition, a charge15, a relinquishment of the reversionary rights by the reversioners, surrender, a compromise, creation of an easement, razinama and kabuliyat in the collector’s books16,or recitals in the deed of mortgages or petition books17,are transfers as they do not convey the property or an interest in the property. A release deed can be a form of conveyance by a person having some rights or interests to another having a limited estate, ie, by a reminder man to a tenant for life and then the release operates as an enlargement of the limited estate. A registered instrument styled as a release deed releasing he right, title and interest of the executants in an property, in favour of the release for valuable consideration, operates as a conveyance if the document disclose and intention to operate as a transfer.18 A deed of appointment is a transfer. Thus where the done of power of a appointment exercises the power, it would amount to a transfer. If the deed shows a change of title or interest from transferor to transferee, without actually using the words convey or conveyance, it word be sufficient to constitute a valid transfer19.
(d) Partition of Joint Family Property:
- Gonind Chandra v.Dwarka Nath(1980) ILR 35 Cal 837
- Rachappa v.Ninagappa AIR 1926 Bom 40
- Pankajini v.Sudhir Datta AIR 1956 Cal 669,
- T Mammoo K Ramuni AIR 1966 SC 337
- A Nadalwar N Malvarayan AIR 1936 Mad 918.
In Hindu joint family, the coparceners collectively have the ownership of coparcenary property. Each coparcener has an antecedent title to the property, but community of interest and unity of possession being the essential features of coparcenary, all coparceners jointly possess the title to the property, a right to possess and enjoy it and a collective right to alienate it. After partition, the share of each coparcener is specified and instead of collective rights, they acquire individual rights over the property. Partition, therefore, involves a division of the right in the property and does not involve any divesting or vesting of rights in faviour of or against the owner. It is not as if through this instrument of transfer, the member of a vested with these rights previously also, but enjoyed it collectively with other coparceners. After partition, these antecedent rights are demarcated specifically. The process of partition therefore involves the transfer of joint enjoyment of the properties by all the coparceners into an enjoyment in severalty by them of the respective properties allotted to their share. It does not amount to a transfer within the meaning of s.5 of the act.20 It can neither be called an exchange nor a conveyance between one co-owner and another,21 as it in the nature of only a process of mutual renunciation by which common unspecified rights in larger extents are converted in to exclusive rights over specific property.22 There is no acquisition of property in another by independent right23. Each one has an antecedent title, a right to enjoy, and also a right alienation, but these could be exercised only collectively by them. After partition, no new rights are conveyed in their favour, but these antecedent rights are specified or divided. As there is no vesting are divesting of rights or conveyance of the same for the first time through this partition, it does not amount to transfer.
(e) Will
- VN Sarin Ajit Kumar Poplai AIR 1966 SC 432
- VD Deshpande Kusum Kulkarni AIR 1978 SC 1791
- Venkitesara Prabhu Ravindranath Prabhu Surendranath Prabhu AIR 1985 Ker 265.
- Revenue Board BA Mallya AIR 1971 Mad 210
Since a will takes effect from the death of the testator, it is not a transfer inter vivos, or between living persons, but is from a person, who is dead to the legatee and therefore, it will not be subject to the provisions of the T.P Act. It would be governed by the rules provide under the Indian succession Act 1925.
Conclusion
The only definition given therein is in Section 3 which states: “immovable property” does not include standing timber, growing crops or grass.
One of the basic features of the definition is that it governs transfer between living person or transfers inter vivos. The term living person includes a juristic person, a company, or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, but does not include an idol of God or a temple or even a court.
Conveying of property involves creations of new title or interest in favour of the transferee. In conveyance through this instrument of transfer, the titles of rights are conveyed to the transferee, for the first time. The transferor is divested of the right conveyed and the transferee acquires it for the first time under this instrument.
In Hindu joint family, the coparceners collectively have the ownership of coparcenaries property. Each coparcener has an antecedent title to the property, but community of interest and unity of possession being the essential features of coparcenaries, all coparceners jointly possess the title to the property, a right to possess and enjoy it and a collective right to alienate it.
Since a will takes effect from the death of the testator, it is not a transfer inter vivos, or between living persons, but is from a person, who is dead to the legatee and therefore, it will not be subject to the provisions of the T.P Act.
Important thing is that Property can be classified in many categories such as tangible and intangible, real and personal, corporeal and incorporeal, movable and immovable etc. but For the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; it is categorisation in movable and immovable.
References:
- Shantabai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 532: (1959) SCR 265
- Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Co. State of Madhya Pradesh [AIR 1953 SC 108 at 110]
- Ananda Behera State of Orissa [AIR 1956 SC 17 at 18 and 19]
- State of P. v. Orient Paper Mills Ltd.[AIR 1977 SC 687]
- Mohanlal Hargovind of Jubbulpore CIT, C.P. & Berar, Nagpur [AIR 1949 PC 311]
- 6.Property Law by Poonam Pradhan Saxena.