The sovereign power means basically the supreme power of a state. For any kind of crime the decision of the supreme authority is the final decision. A state within it there is no law. The law defined with specific rules and regulation in the state. Law represent justice to the crime, law is equal for everyone. If the state follows sovereign power the citizens may not get the equal judgment for any crime. There might be a revolution against sovereign power. People who has the internal affairs with supreme authority may treat different then others. For some people justice might not be the same for similar crime or deeds. So apart from the existence of a state and of a sovereign power within it, there can be no law.
Sovereignty in government is that public authority which directs or orders what is to be done by each member associated in relation to the end of the association. It is the supreme power by which any citizen is governed and is the person or body of persons in the state to whom there is politically no superior. The necessary existence of the state and that right and power which necessarily follow is “sovereignty.” By “sovereignty” in its largest sense is meant supreme, absolute, uncontrollable power, the absolute right to govern. The word which by itself comes nearest to being the definition of “sovereignty” is will or volition as applied to political affairs.
SOVEREIGN STATE. One which governs itself independently of any foreign power.
1. Distractedly , sovereignty live in the body of the nation and belongs to the people. But these powers are generally exercised by group of representatives.
2. When examined, sovereignty is naturally divided into three great powers; namely, the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary; the first is the power to make new laws, and to correct and repeal the old; the second is the power to execute the laws both at home and abroad; and the last is the power to apply the laws to particular facts; to judge the disputes which arise among the citizens, and to punish crimes.
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SOVEREIGNTY
Sovereignty, the notion that the state has the authority to exercise power within national borders free of external interference, celebrates its 345th birthday in 1993. The practice began with the Peace of Westphalia, drawn up in 1648 to end the Thirty Years’ War in Europe. The treaty, which involved the Pope and political leaders of Western Europe, utilized the Pope’s prestige to grant leaders of proto-nationstates the authority to exercise power within their national borders. The assistance of the Pope was vital to the success of the treaty; with the fall of the Roman Empire, political leaders in Europe experienced extreme difficulty exercising power over interlopers and often their own populations. Political leaders appealed to these groups to recognize that rulers should rule free of external interference.
Although sovereignty has existed for 345 years, uncertainty prevails as to whether it is a new or an old concept. Some scholars suggest that the concept is much older, arguably originating in Roman times.
Whether the concept of sovereignty is old or new, though, it has remained a flexible, yielding doctrine, not bound by its written word. The concept of sovereignty has not been with humankind since societies were created: sovereignty is a relatively new concept for human beings, one that is evolving through negotiations over the centuries.
Sovereignty can be applied in the twentieth century in organizing individuals and groups against threats. In the East and the West, threats were defined ideologically. Depending on one’s perspective, threats were divided between the capitalists and the communists. In both cases, the authority of sovereignty was enforced to deter the threatening barbarian. With the Cold War over, threats to people are not defined in the ideological terms which formerly characterized the contest between communism and capitalism. The question which now emerges is whether threats can be identified on the basis of pragmatic, grounded criteria. Threats to people, such as social disorder, famine, plagues, natural disasters, and cross-border environmental degradation, were acted upon previously as premises for ignoring the supreme power of that state exercised within its borders free from external interference.
Erosion of democracy may in some circles justify further questioning of sovereignty. The degree to which ultimate political power is vested in the people of a particular nation may be of varying importance to different peoples, states, or non-state actors. Some historical arguments and precedent have suggested that democracy is divisible, meaning that the interest in its preservation and dissemination advocated in advanced democracies is not yet connected with its emergence in the nations of the Global South, such as Kenya, Serbia, or Azerbaijan. The question of whether democracy is divisible in the modem world requires careful examination. While one can marshall normative arguments for both sides of this question, functional analysis suggests that, in the face of pragmatically-defined post-Cold War threats, people need to be not only open to change but able to communicate easily with others. In the contemporary world these “others” cannot be limited to neighbors: others must include “foreigners” from other locations on the
In China the condition of existing of reckless detention and a transition towards a rule of law is either seen as an expression composed of combined contrast, or as an aberration. This book analyses under-researched institutions and practices in China’s criminal justice system, arguing that detraction from the rule of law constitute an organic component of the legal order. Hidden behind the law, there lies sovereign power, a power premised on the choice to handle certain issues through procedures that derogate from rights. This theoretically sophisticated study overcomes the current deadlock in analyses of China’s criminal justice. The result is an highly innovative reading of law.
In 2000 the Council on Foreign Relations established the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies to examine issues at the intersection of global politics and economics. Few issues fit that description more closely than the subject of this Council Special Report. America’s current account deficit is financed by foreign purchases of such assets as Treasury securities and stakes in U.S. firms. A good deal of these purchases today are made by the central banks and sovereign wealth funds of countries that do not share many American political values and foreign policy goals.
Some argue that this is no cause for concern. But Brad W. Setser makes a compelling case that the U.S. deficit matters for economic and strategic reasons alike. The United States may have more to lose than its creditors if they sell American assets or stop accumulating them at their current pace. This gives creditors potential leverage over U.S. policy. Setser also argues that indebtedness limits America’s ability to influence other countries’ policies, for example through sanctions and lending arrangements.
The problems associated with U.S. indebtedness cannot be addressed overnight. But the report proposes ways for the United States to guard against the effects of a disruption in foreign financing, such as consulting with allies who hold dollars and encouraging other creditor countries to spend and invest surpluses instead of accumulating reserves. It also suggests measures to reduce the need for financing in the first place, such as working to balance the U.S. budget and, most importantly, taking steps to reduce U.S. oil imports.
Sovereign Wealth and Sovereign Power raises the potential strategic implications of U.S. indebtedness, challenging the sanguine view that global economic interdependence guarantees prudence. The report is a significant contribution to the debate on America’s political and economic position in an age of globalization.
BEYOND THE SOVEREIGN STATE
Since at least 1964, it has been the doctrine of the European Court of Justice that the Communities, now ‘Community’, constitute a new legal order, neither a subordinate part of the laws of the member states, nor simply a sub-system of International Law. From the point of view of a soundly pluralistic theory of law as institutional and systemic normative order, there is no difficulty about accepting this self characterization of Community Law as a distinct legal order. It owes its origin, certainly, to treaties binding under general international law; and, from the point of view of member-state legal systems, the ground of validity of provisions of Community Law in the processes of domestic law-application lies in acts of ratification or adoption by appropriate modes of decision-making determined by the state constitution in question. But the institutionalization of legal order under the foundation treaties, in particular the establishment of organs for law-making, for executive action, and for judicial law-application, and the efficacious operation of these organs over a considerable period of time, are properly recognized as bringing a distinct legal order into being.
In one highly important sense, sovereignty has not been lost in this process. In international law, no state outside the Union has any greater power over member states individually or jointly than before. Thus there is a kind of compendious legal external sovereignty towards the rest of the world; and politically it seems that the scale of the Community enhances the independence of action of its members collectively and perhaps even individually for some purposes. To the extent that the terminology of ‘divided sovereignty’ is found valuable rhetorically or even analytically, it can be applied here – the sovereignty of the Community’s member states has not been lost, but subjected to a process of division and combination internally, and hence in a way enhanced externally. But the process of division and combination has taken us beyond the sovereign state indeed, well beyond it. Despite the rhetoric of politicians, it cannot be credibly argued that any member state of the European Union remains politically or legally a sovereign state in the strict or traditional sense of these terms. Yet it is to their traditional sense that the political rhetoricians make implicit appeal when they harangue party conferences.
In this modem world, where the perception is that of many different actors at many tables bargaining among themselves, state sovereignty is limited to promote dynamic interdependence. To facilitate this interdependence, nations will be able to adjust to change and interrelate with greater ease if they respect the same rules both internationally and domestically. The domestic rules for the purpose of this discussion are those of democracy, adapted to local history and culture. As more nations adhere to democratic practices globally, they will find it increasingly easier to justify intervention in support of democracy for others in terms of national interest. The question in the future will not be whether nations will ignore sovereignty and intervene in the affairs of others in support of democracy; rather, current and future questions of concern will instead examine the different circumstances under which such intervention will take place, and how long intervention can be sustained. The questions surrounding 1993 international interventions with respect to Guatemala, Haiti, Peru, Somalia, and Bosnia reflect the 345 year-long continuing social construction of the concept of “sovereignty.”
 See THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATONS 6-7 (William C. Olson, David S. McLellan, & Fred A. Sondermann eds., 6th ed. 1993).
 Bernard Crick, Sovereignty, in TRE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THm SOCiAL SCIENCEs 78 (David L. Sills ed., 1968) (arguing that the concept of sovereignty in the Roman tradition of politics was not known since Roman emperors
viewed it as politically necessary to govern according to a myth of popularity).
 JAMES N. ROSENEAU, TURBULENCE IN WORLD PoLrIcs: A THEORY OF
CHANGE AND CoNTiNurry 435-39 (1990) (describing the erosion of sovereignty in the
late twentieth century).
 Professor Tom J. Farer, Address at the Conference on Changing Notions of
Sovereignty and Private Actors in International Lmv, Washington College of Law, The
American University (March 25, 1993).
 See generally KAARLE NORDENSTRENG & HERBERT I. ScHLLER. BEYOND
NATIONAL SOvEREIGNTY: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATON IN MM 1990s (1993);
HOWARD H. FREDERICK, GLOBAL COM1MUNICATON AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
 Costa v ENEL, case 6/64
 MacCormick 1993
 See generally JOSEPH NYE, BoUND TO LEAD: THE CHANGING NATURE OF AMERICAN POWER (1990) (describing the terms of the future of international relations).
 In 1993, delegations of the United Nations took limited action in support of democracy in Somalia and Bosnia. Moreover, Organization of American States delegations were dispatched to Guatemala, Haiti, and Peru in the wake of actions against
democratically-elected governments in each of these countries.