Khorshed Alam @ Shah Alam Vs. Amir Sultan Ali Hyder and another

Khorshed Alam @ Shah Alam (Appellant)

Vs.

Amir Sultan Ali Hyder and another (Respondents)

 

Supreme Court

Appellate Division

(Civil)

JUSTICE

F K M A Munim CJ

Badrul Haider Chowdhury J

Shahabuddin Ahmed J

Chowdhury A.T.M. Masud J

Judgment : March 22, 1984.

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Plaintiff-respon­dent instituted O.C. Suit No. 457 of 1977 for a declaration that the defendant-appellant was a child of unknown parentage and for a further declaration that the plaintiff is the only son of late Amir Ali Mia, Mutwalli of Salamat Mia Wakf Es­tate of Rajshahi and as such was eligible for the Mutwalliship of the Wakf Estate.

The defence case is that Amir Ali had 4 wives. First first wife Sakina Bibi died childless when Amir Ali married Monowara in 1928 and out of the said wedding defendant Khorshed Alam was born in 1933. On Monowara’s death in 1935 Amir Ali married Zohura Khatun in 1935 who later died in 1966. On the averments stated above the suit was brought out. The trial Court as well as the appellant Courts below discarded the defence case and decreed the suit.

The Appellate Division on correct analysis of the evidence on record and the principles of law involved in the case set aside the judgements of the Courts below and dismissed the suit on the findings that the plaintiff failed to prove that defendant Khorshed Alam was not the son of Amir Ali and that he was the son of prostitute Baramoni.

Acknowledgement by Amir Ali of sonship of defendant Khorshed Alam

Khorshed Alam proved Amir Ali’s acknowledgement and a written document Ext. H backed up by enormous documentary evidence that Amir Ali acknowledged him as his son. The onus was heavily on the plaintiff to disprove Monowara’s marriage with Amir Ali, which he failed to discharge.

The Courts below, including the High Court Division, wrongly placed the onus of proof upon the defendant. In that view of the matter, the concurrent findings of facts are no findings in the eye of law and should be interfered within the interest of justice in exercise of revisional power under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure…………….(42)

Practice and procedure

When some principles of law or procedure are violated leading to miscarriage of justice, higher Court can always interfere…………….(27)

Cases Referred to-

Md. Alladat Khan vs. Md. Ismail Khan 10 ILR (All) 289; Habibur Rahman Chow­dhury vs. Altaf Ali Chowdhury 48 LA. 114; Sadek Hussain Khan Vs. Hashim Ali 43 I.A 212; Mohabbat Ali Khan Vs. Md. Ibahim Khan 56 I.A. 201; Md. Baikder Hussain Khan Bahaour Vs. Shurfoon Nessa Begum 8 I A. 136; 11 M A 94.

Lawyers Involved:

Not represented-The Appellant.

Khondoker Mahbubuddin Ahmed, Senior Advocate (Mahbubey Alam, Advocate with him) instructed by Md. Aftab Hussain, Advocate-on-Record—For the Respondent No. 1.

Civil Appeal No. 68 of 1983.

(From the judgment and order dated May 5, 1981 passed by the High Court Division in Civil Revision No. 263 of 1981.)

Judgment:

Fazle Munim CJ. – I have gone through the judgments written by Badrul Haider Chow­dhury and Shahabuddin Ahmed, JJ. I concur with the decision of Badrul Haider Chow­dhury, J.

Badrul Haider Chowdhury J.-This appeal by special leave raises an important question of public importance namely whether the prin­ciple of acknowledgement of son ship under the Muslim Law has been correctly appreciated by the High Court Division as well as by the courts below.

3. Facts are as follows: Plaintiff respon­dent Instituted a suit being O.C. Suit No. 457 of 1977 for a declaration that the defendant appellant was a child of unknown parentage and also for a declaration that the plaintiff is the only eldest son of late Amir Ali Mia who was the Mutwalli of Salamat Mia Wakf Es­tate at Rajshahi and eligible for the Mutwalliship of the Wakf Estate in terms of the Waqfnama.

4. One Salamat Hernia created a Wakf deed dated 1.7.30 and the Wakf was the first Mutwalli. After his death Amir Ali Mia, the brother’s son of the Wakf became the Mut­walli in 1933 and continued as such till his death on 5.4.1967. After the death of Amir Ali a dispute arose with regard to the Mutwalliship of the Wakf Estate. The plaintiff claimed that he is the surviving eldest- son of Amir Ali Mia by his third wife Mst. Meher Shamsun Nahar. He, in terms of the wakf deed, was entitled to be appointed as Mut­walli on the death of his father. The defendant No. 1 Khorshed Alam also claimed to be the eldest son of Amir Mia by his alleged second wife namely Monowara Khatun.

5. Both the plaintiff and the defendant applied to the Wakf Administrator for being appointed as Mutwalli. The Wakf Adminis­trator appointed plaintiff as Mutwalli by his order dated 5.12.67 and the defendant prefer­red an appeal before the District Judge, Rajshahi but: the appeal was dismissed on contest. Thereafter the defendant moved the High Court Division and succeeded in getting an order in his favour. The plaintiff there­after moved the Supreme Court but the order of the High Court Division was upheld. It was observed that the question of legitimacy of the defendant would be decided by a com­petent civil court and till such decision the defendant was to contains as the Mutwalli (vide 29 D.L.R.) the first round was thus over.

6. Now the second round. The plaintiff brought the aforesaid suit for the declaration mentioned above. His cases were that Amir Ali Mia had three wives. His first wife Sakina Bibi had several issues but ail of them died during their infancy. His second wife was a tribal lady from Siliguri named Zohura Khatun who had and issue and as such she with the permission of her husband Amir Ali Mia adopted a son of a prostitute called Baramoni of Natore. The plaintiff stated that this adop­ted son is defenders Khorshed Alam and it was contended that defendant Khorshed Alam was never the legitimate son of Amir Ali Mia and as such was not entitled to be the Mut­walli. Plaintiff’s further case was Amir Ali Mia married for the third time in 1939 Mst. Meher Shamsun Nahar from Bogra and 3 sons and “five daughters were begotten out of the third marriage. The plaintiff is the eldest son by this wife and is entitled to be the Mutwalli of the Wakf Estate on the death of his father.

7. The defendant No. 1 Khorshed Alam contested the suit contending that Amir Ali had four wives; His first wife was Sakina Bibi, second wife was Monowara Khatuns, mother of the defendant No.1 son his third wife was Zohura Khatun and the 4th wife was Mst. Shamsun Nahar, the mother of the plain­tiff. The defendant stated that Monowara Khatun, the mother of the defendant No. 1 was married by Amir All Mia at Calcutta in 1929 and the defendant No. 1 Khorshed Alam was born out of the wedlock in 1933 and as such he is the eldest son of Amir Ali. De­fendant further contended that at the old age of Amir Ali when he was ailing and was com­pletely under the influence of his 4th wife Shamsun Nahar he began to disown the defendant No. 1 as his son though all along acknow­ledged defendant as his son.

8. On these averments the suit was fo­ught out and the trial court came to the con­clusion on evidence that the defendant No. 1 was not the son of Amir Ali nor Amir Ali acknowledged him “as his legitimate son”. The learned Munsif further held that it could not be proved that Monowara Khatun, mother of defendant No. 1 was one of the wives of Amir Ali. The appellate Court below affirm­ed the judgment and decree passed by the Munsif. It was held that the plaintiff proved his case that the defendant was not the legit­imate son of Amir Ail. The Appellate Court below farther found that there was no proof of marriage of Amir Ali Mia with Monowara Khatun. Tile appellate Court below fart­her noticed that as far back at 1965 defendant No. 1 could not give the name of his mother or the place where he was born, in this view of the matter the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. The matter came before the High Court Division in Civil Revision being C.R. No. 263 of 1981; the learned Single Judge noticed such a contradiction of the defendant to his previous deposition as to the came of hit mother and place of his birth and further noticed plaintiff’s posi­tive case by observing:

“We may notice that the plaintiff has come up with a case that the defendant No. 1 was not the son of Amir Ali but only adopted by his second wife Zohura Khatun and he was adopted from one Baramoni of Natore and he was not begotten by Amir Ali.”

The learned Single Judge further noticed that the very existence of Monowara Khatun was challenged by the plaintiff and the defen­dant has not been able to prove marriage” between Amir Ali Mia and Monowara Begum and as such the alleged marriage of Amir Ali with Monowara Begum has been disproved and concluded that the question of acknowledgement by Amir Ali of the defendant No.1 “as hit ion” is of no avail.

Leave was granted on the following term:

“It appears that the decision of the case hinges on the question whet­her the claim to son ship of Amir Ali by the petitioner is established by the acknowledgement of Amir Ali claiming the former to be his son. The point for consideration is whether the learned Ju­dge of the High Court Division has correctly decided the principle of acknowledgement under Muslim Law.”

Plaintiff is the respondent. He brought the suit:

(a) For a decree of declaration to the effect that the defendant No. 1 is the child of some unknown parentage other than that of Md. Amir Ali Mia; and

(b) for a decree of declaration that the plaintiff is the only eligible person to be appointed as Mutwalli of the Salamat Hossain Wakf Estate enrolled in E.G. No. 4028 of Rajshahi in terms and conditions of the Wakf deed there of.

9. As has been noticed that this is a se­cond round and on previous occasion over the Mutwalliship the controversy in issue was more or less the same namely, that the def­endant Khorshed Alam is the child of some unknown parentage other than that of Mr Amir Ali in paragraph 15 of the plaint it is stated that “the defendant is an illegitimate child of an unknown parentage who was only reared up by Md. Amir Ali Mia by way of a token of love to his said 2nd barren wife Zoaura Khatun who died in the year 1965. “Plaintiff examined 16 witnesses. The evidence of the plaintiff is more or less the same, namely, that Khorshed Alam is a son of one Baromoni of Natore and Amir Ali adopted him as his son. Amir Ali had three wives and no wife by the name Monowara Khatun as contended by the defendant. The defendant’s case is that Amir Ali had 4 wives, the first wife Sakina, died in 1941-42 who had given birth to number of children but all were dead. He married Monowara in 1929 and the defendant Khorshed Alam was born in the wedlock of this marriage, 1933 Monowara died in 1935. Thereafter Amir Ali married Zohura Begum in 1935 and she died on 6.2.66. The 4th wife plaintiff’s mother Mst. Meher Shamsun Nahar who was married to Amir Ali in 1939 and she is still alive. Be it noted that Amir Ali died in April, 1967 about a year after the death of Zohura. The contention of the plaintiff is that Amir Ali adopted this child Khorshed Alam when he was a boy 2 years old and gave him to Zohura for rearing him up. This was done only to comfort Zohura who was a barren woman. Evidence was led that Khorshed Alam actually is the son of prostitute namely Baramoni of Natore who is still alive. P.W.1 the plaintiff himself stated: “the said Zohura had no issue and she was barren. At Natore she got one boy about 2 year old in adoption from one Baramoni a prostitute of Natore and that boy is defendant No. 1” That was the main case of the plaintiff it is not necessary for this court to go into the details of evidence that was led by the parties for it is apparent that the bone of contention between the parties over the Mutwalliship was so severe that the witnesses can safely be discarded as being part san wit­nesses They were obviously hostile to one another and it is dear that neither was over scrupulous in what he swore to one may be fairly set off against the other as neither can be safely trusted. But the battle was fought on the ground that Khorshed Alam is son of one Baramoni of Natore. Onus was heavily on the plaintiff but this onus was not discharged. The evidence of the mother clearly shows this and, none of the witnesses could make any positive case to prove the theory that Khorshed Alam is the son of Baramoni. Moti Sk. P.W 5 claimed that Baramoni gave the son of her to Amir Ali and Amir Ali took the son at the request of Raja Birendra. He served as a Pakhawala in the Rajbari. In cross-examination he conceded that the boy was no handed over at the Rajbari nor was he present when the boy was handed over to Amir Ali by Baramoni. The rest of the witnesses on this point can better be ignored because they all gave a parrot like story to suit the plaintiff’s case. Baramoni was not cited as by the plaintiff though she private.

10. It is the question of Status of an individual. When that status is assailed by a posi­tive case much higher decree of proof was necessary and the courts below unfortunately had overlooked this point completely. The trial court ought not to have allowed such evidence to be led in when mere verbal state­ment damaging the social status of a person is being made. The entire plaintiff’s evidence on this point ought to have been discarded by the trial court and the court of appeal over­looked the fact that the court below had ignored the presumption of law end such presumption can only be rebutted by positive feet and not by mere assertion or ipsi dixit. It is the plaintiff who brought the suit and he took up the positive stand that the defendant is a son of one Baramoni and since this onus was not discharged the plaintiff ought to have been non-suited. Unfortunately that did not hap­pen. The courts below have decreed the snit and we shall come to this later as to whether such suit can at all be decreed.

11. The defendant took a consistent case that his mother was Monowara who was married by Amir Ali in 1929 at Calcutta. She gave birth to this son, the defendant, in 1933 and 2 years later she died in 135. It is true that the boy was reared up by Zohura, the 3rd wife of Amir AH whom he married in 1935 and died on 6.2.66. There was no onus on the defence to prove the maternity. To be more clear, law has not placed any onus on him to prove as to in whose womb he was born. The fact is that he was born obviously in the womb of a woman. He was reared up according to his own statement by Amir Ali who introduced him in the society as his son and he was reared by Zohura who admittedly bad no issue from 1935 right upto 1953 not a word was said by Buy group challenging the acknowledgement of a sonship by Amir Ali. Formal evidence was led by the defendant to show that Amir Ali had acknowledged the defendant as his son. He was admitted to a school and the Headmaster of that School gave certificate to that effect e.g. Ext.B which shows the defe­ndant as son of Amir Ali. Ext. C is the dep­osition by Amir Ali before a Magistrate on 14.11.35 where he stated ”Shah Alam aged 21/2 is my son by my second wife”. Kabinnama Ext.D dated 23.3.51 when Khorshed Alam married Jahanara Begum, his first wife and he was shown as the son of Sk. Amir Ali and the marriage was solemnised in the house of Amir Mi, (column 18). Khurshed Alam’s first wife died and he married again in 1953. This time he was married to Nazle Begun @ Zorna and the Kabinnama is dated 13.3.53. There he was shown as son of Amir Ali and who is Nazle Bagum. She was none but the daughter of the sister of the plaintiff’s own mother, in other word, the plaintiff’s first cousin (Khalato sister) and Amir Ali was himself one of the witnesses of this marri­age. Rent Receipt Ext. E series between 1953 to 1957 show that Khorshed rented a part of the wakf property from his father Amir Ali and he was shown as first son of Amir Ali. The most important document Ext. G Ekrarnama for Hiba-bil-ewaz executed by Amir Ali 19.3.53 were he stated

???? ??????? ????? ??????? ??? ???? ??? ????? ??? ????? ????? ??????? ????? ????????? ????? ???? ???? ???? ?????? ???? ???????? ????? ???? ???? ????????? ????? ????? ????????? ????? ???? ???? ?????? ??? ??? ???? ????? ????? ????????? ?? ?????? ????? ???? ??? ??????? ??? ???? ???????? ?????? ????? ???? ????? ?? ???? ??? ????? ?????ø ???? ??? ???????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??? ?????? ???? ?? ????/- ???? ??????? ????? ???? ??????? ?????, ??? ????? ?? ???? ??? ?? ???? ? ??????? ?????, ??? ????? ???? ????? ???? ?????? ?????????? ????????? ???????? ??? ??? ? ??????? ?????? ???????? ???? ???? ?? ???????? ???? ????????? ???????? ???? ?????? ???????? ??????? ?? ?? ??? ??? ? ??? ??????? ???? ????? ???? ?? ??????? ? ???????? ??????? ??, ??? ??????? ??????? ???? ??? ?????? ??????? ???? ???? ???????? ? ?????????????? ?????????? ????? ??????? ??? ???? ??????? ? ?????????? ????? ????? ???????? ??????? ?????????? ?????? ??????? ?????? ???? ??? ?????? ??????? ???? ???? ?????? ?????? ???????? ?????? ???? ?????? ???? ?????? ????? ?????? ????????? ???? ??? ?????? ????????? ????? ????? ? ??????? ????? ??????? ??? ???? ??? ??? ??? ?? ????? ??? ????????? ????? ???? ?? ? ???? ????????? ??? ??????? ??? ???? ?????? ????? ????? ???? ???? ????? ?????? ??????? ???? ???? ??????? ????? ??? ???? ????? ?????? ??? ????????? ???????? ??? ??????? ???? ?????? ????? ????? ????? ???? ?????? ?????? ????????? ???? ?? ?????? ???? ???????????? ??? ????? ??????? ? ????? ? ? ????? ??? ???????? ??? ??? ????? ?????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ?????? ????? ??????????????? ? ?????? ?????? ??? ???? ???? ????? ?????? ??? ????? ??? ??????? ????????? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ???????? ???? ???? ? ???? ????????? ???? ?? ?????? ???? ???????????? (???????) ?? ??????? ????? ???? ?????? ?? ?? (???????) ??????? ???? ????? ???????? ??????? ???????

We shall deal with the later part of this Ekrarnama in connection of the point of disclaimer of the acknowledgement or ifs repudiation at the appropriate place. Affidavit sworn by Bibi Gauharun Nessa Ext. H, Ext. H (1) by Roushan Akhter Firoza Ahmed who was the relation of the family have proved the cane beyond the doubt that the defendant was always acknowledged as the son of Amir AH. Series of letters were produced between the father and the son written in the year 1953, 1954, 1955 and 1956. Ext. L series which is the letters between the father and the son concerning family affairs. Khorshed Alam contested an election and evidence was led to show that his father Amir Ali asked Mussalli after Jumma prayer to support candidature of his son. Apart from the oral evidence that was adduced by the defendant to show that Amir Ali acknowledged Khorshed Alam as his son, this judgment proceeds on the basis of the written acknowledgement of the sonship and the legal consequence thereof.

12. Baillie says that the acknowledgement by a man of a child is valid under the fol­lowing circumstances: first, the ages of the parties must admit of the party acknowledged being born to the acknowledger: as otherwise he would be manifestly a liar. Second, the descent of the person acknowledged must not be already established from another; for if it were so, that would prevent its establishment from any bat him. 3rd, he must confirm the acknowledger in his acknowledgement if he can give an account of himself; for one he can do so in his own power contrary to the case of a child who cannot account for himself. (A Di­gest of Mohammadan Law—Baillie P 405).

13. Amir Ali acknowledges Khorshed Alam as his son and Khorshed Alam acknow­ledged Amir Ali as his father. So the condition, No. 1 and 3 are fulfilled. Now what about second condition, It says that the descent of a person acknowledged must not be already established from another. Has any­body proved that Khorshed Alam is son of another person? None whatsoever. On the contrary, plaintiffs own case was that Khorshed Alam was of unknown parentage. That was the specific case in the plaint thought evidence was led to say that Khorshed Alam was son of one Baramoni, hut it was not establi­shed, whereas the second condition saying that the descent of a person acknowledged must not be already established from Brother (em­phasis added). Thus the second condition is also fulfilled for rendering the acknowledgement valid. In Durrul Mukhtar it is stated thus:

“(i) If a person makes an acknowledge­ment in favour of a stranger whose pare­ntage is unknown and there after acknowledges him to be his son, and the latter verifies it which he is one of those who are fit to make such a verification, his descent is established with reference to the time of his being begotten.

(ii) If a person make an acknowledge­ment in favour of a youth whose paren­tage is unknown whether at his birth place or In the town where fee is, that the latter is his son and the acknowledgers and the acknowledged are such in age that the latter may be born of the former as a son, and the youth verifies it, he being capable of discretion (because otherwise his verification is not necessary as already stated) thus his descent is established, though the acknowledger be in sickness; and when the descent is so established, the youth will participate with the other heir”. (CS.10 All 312).

Hedaya sums up the law upon the subject

“If a person acknowledged parentage of a child who is able to give an account of himself, saving ”This is my son” and the ages of the parties be such as to admit of the one being the child of the other, and the parentage of the child be not well known to any person. It is well settled that the acknowledgement of parentage under the Mohammedan Law rests upon a footing higher than that of ordinary admission as pure matters of evidence. The rule of acknowledgement of paren­tage is based upon the words of Al-Quaran—Call them after their father”.

“(Sura 334) Muslim Jurists have tes­tified to this and the author of the Kifaya explains that such acknowledge­ment is sufficient because the burden of the obligation in respect of the child rests especially on the father, and the latter acknowledgement effects him per­sonally and is thus accepted without any verification by the mother”.

14. An author celebrated commentary on the Hedaya Fathual Qadir in explaining the rule quoted above as to the condition that the acknowledged child should be of unknown parentage, goes on to say that the condition has been imposed because otherwise the des­cent of the acknowledged child could not be established from the acknowledger since “des­cent after it is established is not susceptible of the annulment.” In other words the acknowledged child should be of unknown paren­tage.

15. In the case of Md. Alladat Khan vs. Md. Ismail Khan 10 I. L. R. Allahabad, 289 the Court considere1 the following questions:

“The question then is whether in cases like the present, where the paternity of a child, that his, legitimate descent from his father, cannot be proved by establishing a marriage between his parents at the time of his conception or birth, the Mohammadan Law recognises any other method whereby such marriage and legitimate descent can be presumed, inferred, or held to be established as a matter of substantive law for purpose of inheritance ” (at page 330).

Mahmood, J. noticed the leading cases namely 3 Moore I.A. 295, 8 More J.A. 136, 11 More LA. 94 then answered the question as in the following manner:

“All the cases which their Lordships had before them were cases in which the question of marriage itself was a matter in dispute and involved in obscurity with reference to the legitimacy of the child. In words those cases were such as left either the fact or the exact time of the alleged marriage a matter of un­certainty, that is neither proved nor disproved; and their Lordships in dealing with those cases applied the principle of the Mohammadan Law of acknowledgement of parentage with reference to legitimacy for purposes of inheritance”. (at page 334) Emphasis) added.

But this view is not applicable in the case of children born of Zina and such children can never be legitimated or entitled to inherit from their father. In the present case the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant is the son of another person and therefore he could not be acknowledged validly at son of Amir Ali. On the contrary, the plaintiff himself brought the suit for a prayer that the defendant is of unknown parentage other than Amir Ali. In that prayer plaintiff it invites the rule of acknowledgment of parentage in Muslim Law.

16. The defendant stated that he was born in the womb of Monowara Begum who was the accord wife of Amir Ali. The plaintiff contested it and stated that there had been no wife by name Monowara of Amir Ali. Straight, J. summed up:

“But where there is no proof of legiti­mate birth or illegitimate birth and me paternity of a child is unknown in the same that no specific person is shown to nave been his lather, then his acknow­ledgement by another, who claims him at his son, according to the authorities I have quoted from, afford a conclusive presumption total the child acknowledged it the legitimate child of the acknowledger and place him in that category.” (emphasis added) (10 All p. 317).

If the defendant failed to prove the marriage of his mother that will not create an impedi­ment to me acknowledgement itself and since the plaintiff did not take up the plea that the marriage between Amir Ali and Monowara could not have been possible it being within prohibitory degree or off spring of Zina. The force of the logic therefore upholds the con­tention of the defendant for the doctrine of acknowledgement to come into play. Mahmud, J. in his celebrated judgment in 10 Ali 289 (which was upheld by me Privy Council In the case of Habibur Rahman Chowdhury Vs Altaf Ali Chowdhury and others, 48 I.A. 114) pointedly answered the question: “I repeat that the rule is limited to case of uncertainty of legitimate desc­ents and proceeds entirely upon an assumption of legitimacy and establishing such legitimacy by the force of such acknowledgement” page 537). The learned Judge summed up the fact of that case:

“that the entire question of the desc­ent, birth and legitimacy of Alladad is involved in obscurity involved owing to the exact date of his mother’s marriage with Ghulam Gaus being unascertainable and that therefore this case presents all these conditions to which the Mohammedan Law as to the acknowledgement of par­entage is most appropriately applicable and further the requisite acknowledge­ment in words and by treatment was made by Gholam Gaus without any such intimation of Alladad being the offspring of illicit intercourse as would vitiate the effect of the acknowledgement according to the text.” (page 338-339).

17. Such acknowledgement could be in-effective by proving (1) that the acknowledged son is an offspring of Zina, (2) that the marriage between the acknowledger and the mother of the child was impossible or did not exist at the time which would make the child legitim­ate. The plaintiff did not prove either of these two essentials which would vitiate the acknowledgement of Amir All that Khorshed A lam is his son.

18. In the case of Sadek Hussain Khan Vs. Hashim Ali Khan, 43 I.A page 212 Privy Council considered the oral evidence of 4 wit­nesses who supported the acknowledgement of Sultan Mirza by his father Zaigham-ud-Daula. Their Lordships scoffed at the criticism passed upon their evidence that the boy Sultan Mirza was only introduced to each of them once, and therefore then recollection is unreliable by observing “as it was to be expected that a father would naturally introduce a son to a friend as his son more than once” (Page 233), Their Lordships reemphasized the law “no statement made by one man that another (proved to be illegitimate) is his son can make that other legitimate, but where no proof of that kind has been gi­ven such a statement or acknowledgement is substantive evidence that the per-son so acknowledged is the legitimate son of the person who makes the state­ments provided his legitimacy be possi­ble.” (emphasis, added)(page 234),

19. This proposition of law was reiterated in the case of Habibur Rahman Chowdhury vs. Altaf Ali Chowdhury, 48 LA. 114. It raises a presumption which may be taken advantage of by either wife-claimant or son-claimant. Being, however, a presumption of tact, and not juris et de jure, it; is, like every other presumption of fact, capable of being set aside by contrary proof. The Privy Council says m a formula as under:

“The result is that a claimant son who ban m his favour a good acknow­ledgement of legitimacy is in this positi­on. The marriage will be held proved and his legitimacy established unless the marriage is disproved. Until the claims ant establishes his acknowledgement the onus is on him to prove the marriage. Once he establishes an acknowledgement, onus is on those who deny a marriage to negative it m fact.”

(This principle was reiterated, in Mahabbat Ali Khan’s case 56 LA. at page 207. Here is the key to be problem. Khorshed Alam has proved the acknowledgement and a written document Ext. H backed by enormous documentary evidence that Amir Ali acknowledged him as his son, the onus is on those who deny a marriage of his mother Monowara Begum to Amir Ali (to negative it in fact). The plaintiff failed miserably on this score as well. Then the case of Mohabbat Ali Khan versus Muha­mmad Ibrahim Khan 56 LA. 201 the Privy Council considered the question of acknowle­dgement by a father, their Lordships observed:

“The present case accordingly is one of an acknowledgement by the father, an acknowledgement which involves the assertion that he, the father Khushdil, was married to Musammat Babo, the appellant’s mother. Such acknowledgement undoubtedly raises a presumption in favour of the marriage and of the legitimacy”. (Page 206).

The Privy Council reiterated the principle lay down in the case of Habibur Rahman Chowdhury Vs Altaf Ali Chowdhury, 48 LA. 114. The dictum was reiterated with approval:

“A claimant son who hat in his favour a good acknowledgement of legitimacy is in this position: The marriage will be held proved and his legitimacy establis­hed, unless the marriage is disproved. Until the claimant establishes his acknowledgement the onus is on him to prove a marriage. Once he establishes an ack­nowledgement, the onus is on those, who deny a marriage to negative it m fact.” (Page 207).

It would appear accordingly that it rests upon the respondent in this ease to establish that there was no marriage with Monowara. The plaintiff respondent did not discharge the onus and therefore acknowledgement by Amir Ali and his treatment of the defendant appellant Khorshed Alam as his son holds the field. The Privy Council in 561.A.201 considered the documents which had been produced and observed:

……it is sufficient to say that they appear to demonstrate with clearness both the son ship and the legitimacy of the appel­lant. The father took much interest in Ms Upbringing and there are letters between both the father and the son, on the one hand, and other members of the family on the other, showing that the interest in his upbringing and educa­tion was shared by these relations. Throughout the transactions and corres­pondence referred to, no suggestion of any kind appears to the effect that Mohabbat was illegitimate, foe entire body of facts is confirmatory of his legitimacy.” (P 205-206).

20. Precisely that is the position here in this case. Khorshed Ali was acknowledged at son and he was reared up and heated as such and to cap it all he was married to Nazleen, his Khalato sister (first cousin), daughter of plaintiff’s mother’s sister and upon her death her younger sister was married to him. What more is expected to show that Khorshed Alam was treated as legitimate son of Amir Ali. The crisis came in 1966 and now we shall deal with that chapter. The evidence is that plaintiff by now had become a major. He was born in 1945 in the womb or his mother Meher Shamsun Nahar who was married in 1939 Amir Ali. Be it noted that Zohura who reared up Khorshed Alam was married in 1935 and died in 1966. It appears that Amir Ali tiled a money suit being M.S. 33 of 1965 for realisation of rent of rk.900/-being the arrears of rent from 1962 to 1965. This suit was filed on 16.8.65 and it was filed against Khorshed Alam describing him as Khorshed Alam @ Shah Alam, (possa Putra of Amir Ali). The word (Possa) was written in bracket so one decree Ext.4. The deposition of Amir Ali is Ext.5 and he deposed on 26.4.66 just about two mouths after death of Zohura Begum. In his evidence he did not say a word that Khorshed Alam was his adopted son. Though in cross-examination he disputed the genuineness of the Hiba-bil-ewaz Ext.H. Khorshed Alam deposed as defendant and stated that he took lease of the entire building for the purpose; of running residential hotel and he stated that he lived in the Amir Manzil on the second floor with his father who lived on the first floor. He was cross-examined as to his place of birth, name of his mother and a suggestion that the plaintiff was not his father. Amir Ali himself died in April, 1967. High Court Di­vision and the courts below gave much emphasis on this fact that the appellant was shown as “possa Putra” in the cause title and the appellant in cross-examination could not give the name of his mother and his place of birth. Amir Ali himself dep­osed, he did not say a word in his evidence as to the acknowledgement of sonship of Khorshed Alam this way or the other. Defendant him­self explained that at this time at the investiga­tion of the plaintiff and his mother a ground was being prepared for disowning him as the eldest son of Amir Ali in view of prolonged ailment of Amir Ali and having an eye on the question of Mutwalliship after his death. Perusal of the documentary evidence and oral evidence adduced by the plaintiff snow that towards the end of 1965 the scheme was made for dislodging Khorshed Alam from she family and the rent suit for recovery of amount of Rs. 900/- was merely a device for letting In some evidence for the purpose of discarding legitimacy and acknowledgement of Khorshed Alam. As the Privy Council mentioned in 56 I A. at page 209 that such evidence ought not to have been allowed by the trial court and we axe also of the same opinion that in a Money Suit the question as to the paternity of else defendant ought not to have been allowed by the trial court. This evidence is therefore discarded. To fall back upon the dictum of the Privy Council. “Once he establishes an acknowledge-meet the onus is on those who deny a marriage to negative it in fact”. That acknowledgement has been well proved in this case by oral evidence and documentary evidence that since his childhood Amir All brought him up, gave him education and was a little boy 21/2 years old when his mother Monowara Begum died (1935). Amir Ali married Zohura in 1935 and this Zohura reared him up since 1935 and she died on 6.2.1966. Be it noted that Mst. Shamsun Nahar, the 4th wife of Amir Ali was married to him in 1937. Between 1935 and 1939 Amir Ali had only one wife namely Zohura. Meher Shamsun Nahar’s sister gave her daughter Nazleen in marriage to Khorshed Alam in 1953. The plaintiff was born in 1945 and an Ekrarnama for Heba-bil ewaz is dated 19.3.53 which has been reproduced in part already: Now a significant part of the Hiba-bil-ewaz may be considered:

???? ??? ?????? ??????? ???? ???? ?????? ?????? ???????? ?????? ???? ?????? ???? ?????? ????? ?????? ????????? ???? ??? ?????? ????????? ????? ????? ? ??????? ????? ??????? ??? ???? ??? ??? ??? ?? ????? ??? ????????? ????? ???? ?? ? ???? ????????? ??? ??????? ??? ???? ?????? ????? ????? ???? ???? ????? ?????? ??????? ???? ???? ??????? ????? ??? ???? ????? ?????? ??? ????????? ???????? ??? ??????? ???? ?????? ????? ????? ????? ???? ?????? ?????? ????????? ???? ?? ?????? ???? ???????????? ??? ????? ??????? ? ????? ? ? ????? ??? ???????? ??? ??? ????? ?????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ?????? ????? ??????????????? ? ?????? ?????? ??? ???? ???? ????? ?????? ??? ????? ??? ??????? ????????? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ???????? ???? ???? ? ???? ????????? ???? ?? ?????? ???? ???????????? (???????) ?? ??????? ????? ???? ?????? ?? ?? (???????) ??????? ???? ????? ???????? ??????? ??????? ???? ???? ????? ?? ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ??????? ???????? ???? ???? ??? ??????? ???? ???? ????? ???? ?????? ?????????? ????? ?????? ????? ???? ????? ???? ???? ???? ???????? ???? ????? ?????? ??????? ???????? ???????? ??????? ???????? ???? ? ??? ???????? ??????????????? ???? ??? ???? ????? ??????? ???????? ????? ? ??????? ??????? ???? ?? ????? ?????? ???? ??????? ??? ????? ???? ???? ??????? ? ?????????? ?????

The evidence that was led shows clearly that this Hiba-bil-ewaz was acted upon and Zohra was described as his first wife because at that time she was the first wife and Khorshed Alam was mentioned as the eldest son and his newly wedded wife Nazleen Begum was given a proportionate share in the three sto­ned house namely “Amir Manzil”. Then he says that another three stoned house on the bank of the tank will devolve upon the second wife Shamsun Nahar and her two sons and four daughters. As for the Wakf Estate he stated that his eldest son through his second wife will be the Mutwalli. Until the documents are executed and in the event of his stand he stated:

????? ?? ???? ??? ???????? ??? ???? ?? ???? ???? ???? ??????? ????? ??????? ??? ???? ??? ??? ? ???? ?? ??????? ??????? ????? ??? ????? ?????? ?? ???? ?? ??????? ???? ???? ???? ??????? ??????? ????? (???????) ?????? ??? ???? ?? ??????? ??????? ????? ?????? ???? ????? ????? ??????? ???? ??????? ????????? ?????? ??????? ????? ????? ?????? ??? ?????? ?????? ??????? ?????????? ??? ???? ?????? ?????? ???? ?????????? ?? ????? ???? ???? ??????? ????? ?????? ??? ??, ????/??, ????? ?? ??-?-???

21. That clinches the whole issue. Khorshed Alam was not only mentioned as his eldest son but he was given the status of a defacto guardian of the entire family in the business of Amir Ali till his step brother born through his second wife comes of age. What more is expected to how that the acknowledgement of sonship of Khorshed Alam admit of no doubt.

22. The next question comes that where there, is a valid acknowledgement whether such acknowledgement could be repudia­ted. In the case of Ashrufood Dowlah vs. Hyder Hossain Khan, 11 MLA.94 there had been no continuation of treatment upto the time of the father’s death. On the contrary there has been absolute denial of paternity by the father. There was no proof of any acknowledgement but there was proof of treatment strong enough to prove legitimacy in the ordinary case. In these circumstances their Lordships held: “that the acknow­ledgement was not proved satisfactorily for sonship and further held that the onus of proof of his illegitimacy was upon the plaintiff in a properly constituted suit. It was further held that a denial of a son either of a Nikabee (regular) or Motaher (irregular) marriage after acknowledgement is untenable though supported by a disclaimer and repudiation by the father. In that case the plaintiff appellant denied the marriage and the disclaimer of acknowledgement by the Nowab of the respondent as his son and relied upon deed of disclaimer and the repu­diation of the respondent executed by the Nowab in his life time denying that the res­pondent was his son was held to be untenable, Their Lordships however found that the defen­dant failed to establish acknowledgement. In the case of Mohammad Baikder Hossian Kkan vs. Shurfoon Nessa Begum, 14, 136 the question was whether the appellant was the son of Nowab of Karnatak by his Nika wife Amin Shaheba. Tb& respondent challenged the marriage who according to them a slave girl was observed:

“According to the Mohammedan Law, the law, which regulates the rights of the parties before us, the legitimacy or legitimating of a child of Mo­hammedan perverts may properly be presumed or inferred from circumstances without proof, cr at least without any direct proof, either of a marriage between the parent?, or of any formal act of legitimating.” (page 159).

In that case, it was held, there was absence of circumstances sufficient to find or justify such a presumption or much an inference.

23. Mr. Khondker Mahbubuddin Ahmed appearing for the respondent argued strenuo­usly on the Ext. 8 Ekrarnama and questioned as to why Amir Ali nominated the eldest son of his second wife to be the Mutwalli as far beck in 1953. To quote Lord Bowen, De­vil knows not what is in the mind of a man. It is not permissible in law lo speculate. When the person himself has spelled out in writing as to the disposition of his properties and as to the happening after his death that till the son of the second wife comes of age. Khorshed Alam whom he described as his eldest son was to manage the affairs. In this background he mentioned that after his death the eldest son of second wife will be the Mutwalli is left in the field of speculation and though Amir Ali lived for about 14 years thereafter he never clarified the position. It was only in 1967 just a month before his death that he declared: I nominate my eldest son Amir Sultan Ali Hyder as the next Mutwalli after me and he is educated religious minded and fit to be Mutwalli of the suit Wakf Estate

24. That one Khorshed Alam alias Shah Alam is not toy son and I reared him and never acknowledged him as my son and he it separate from (Ext-1/d dated 63.67) me. By that time Zohura was dead and interesting enough by this time Khorshed Alam was des­cribed as “my adopted son, is very dishonest, mischievous and for his nefarious activities, I drove him out from my family and I have no connection with him”. (Ext. 1 dated 14.3.66). Towards the end of 1966 and beginning of 1967 various representations were made denouncing Khorshed Alam. For instance Ext. 1 (d) dated 6.3.67 where Khorshed Alam was disowned as son and further it is stated that he was never acknowledged as his son. These are products of a grand design which will be evident when a petition filed by Md. Solaiman is consi­dered. This Solaiman submitted an objection dated 23.8.77 praying not to appoint Khor­shed Alam alias Shah Alam as he is illegitimate son of unknown person and adopted son of late Md. Amir Ali (vide Ext. l/e dated 238,77). By that time the battle was over Mutwalliship. Solaiman described himself as son of late Sk. Salamat Hossain in paragraph 1 he says that he is the only son of Salamat Hossain Khan who crea­ted Salamat Hossain Wakf estate and he stated that his cousin brother late Md Amir Ali was the ex Mutwalli of Salamat Ali Wakf Estate after his father And now that Amir Ali died on 5. 4.67, he joined with the plaintiff suppor­ting his candidature for Mutwalliship as again Khorshed Alam. He denounced Khorshed Alam on the same pattern as was done by plaintiff himself and prayed for the appoint­ment of the plaintiff as Mutwalli. Why this unusual zeal on the part of the person named who described aim self as only son of first wakf yet fee was not appointed Mutwalli. Answer in not far to seek. Amir himself has given the answer in his life till and it will be useful to consider Ext S(1) petition by Amir Ali dated 12.11.49. in respect Misc. Case No, 6 of 1944 before the Ws Commissioner who initiated the proceeds on various allegations by Solaiman Mia Amir Ali posed the question “who is the Solaiman Mia?” (at page 118 of volume 11 the Paper Book). He mentioned “Solaiman Mia is not the be gotten son of the Waqif Salamat Mia in his advanced age Nika married one Wahidan Bewa who was born and brought up at Patna. This Solaiman wanted be Mutwalli and he initiated series of providing against Amir Ali and Amir Ali state “It is very recently the Mutwalli was attack and the Mutwalli has been obliged to file petition under section 107 Cr.P.C. for protection before the S.D.O. on 2.9.49. Such is man Solaiman Mia”. Amir Ali himself the question and gave answer to it and less said the better, because Solaiman never appointed as Mutwalli though he now taken up the cudgel on behalf the plaintiff to dislodge Khorshed Alam who had been acknowledged as elder son of Amir Ali by Amir Ali himself throughout his life. These subsequent davits in and around 1966-67 expose design winch is now paved for dislodging Khorshed Alam then proving any disclaimer or repudiation. As the Privy Council in 431 A.212 considered such documents a no avail and the acknowledgement having proved such documents composed many subsequent to the dates of acknowledgement deposed to by the four witnesses mentioned and concluded that the evidence of the witnesses is not rebutted or discredited “by these documents”‘ (at page 234)

Issue No. 2 was framed as under:

“Is the defendant No.1 a man of un­known parentage other than that of Amir Ali Mia?”.

While the trial court initially started by pla­cing the onus on the plaintiff answered the question that the defendant was never a legitimate son of late Amir Ali Mia but he was a foster son of him end of unknown parentage and Amir Ali Mia “intended to establish him in the society as his son and simply acknowledg­ed him ” In pasting placed the onus on the defendant to prove that Monowara Khatun was the mother of the defendant no. 1 and she was married to Amir Ali Mia.

25. The lower appellate Court approached the question from another angle namely, that the plaintiff’s case was that defendant Khorshed Alam is the son of one Baramoni, a reputed prostitute of Natore and that he was adopted by Jahura Khatun, the second wife of Amir Ali Mid who was a tribal lady from Siliguri. It was noticed that this onus was not discharged by the plaintiff and that Bara­moni who was still alive was not adduced as a witness by the plaintiff. The appellate Court suggests “that Baramoni as mother of the de­fendant could not come forward to assert her mother-hood of the defendant at this stage, which may doom the future of the defendant. The defendant also did not produce her in support of his case. It is therefore well proved that the defendant is not a legitimate son of late Amir Ali” (page 494 of Paper book). The suggestion it unwarranted and the conclusion is arbitrary being contrary to all presump­tions of law built up over the last 150 years. The appellate court below look the view from Ext. G the Ekrarnama that “why then Amir Ali wanted to disprove Khorshed Alam from Mutwalliship back as 1951 which was due to him if he is a real son of Amir Ali Mia.”

26. Before proceeding further both trial court and the lower appellate court erred in law and failed to take notice of the presump­tion in the matter of personal status which will be considered presently.

27. The High Court Division further no­ticed that Ext. 5(a) and 6, depositions of the defendant in case No. 5/66 show that the defen­dant contradicted himself as to the place of his birth and origin, Not withstanding he challenge that was given by the learned Advo­cate appearing for the defendant appellant as to the admissibility of Ext. 5 and 6 which have been treated as substantive evidence, the High Court Division took the view that those pre­vious statement are admissible for the pur­pose of the contradiction. With respect, this conclusion is not founded in law. Ext 5 and 6 are inadmissible evidence and they cannot constitute as admission within section 19 of the Evidence Act. The High Court Division then dealt with Ext. G and concluded that be­cause Amir Ali wanted to deprive from the Mutwalliship as far back as in 1953 question of defendant No. 1’s relationship cropped up in the mind of the relations of Nazlee Begum, wife of defendant No. 1 and this document Ext G was executed as safe-guard for the defe­ndant and his wife. This finding is based on conjecture which was recorded overlooking the provision of section 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. The High Court Davison also viewed as the appellate Court below did that the defe­ndant could not prove the marriage of Monowara Begum with Amir Ali Mia and concluded as such the alleged marriage of Amir Ali Mia with Monowara Begum has been disproved.” This finding again has been recorded contrary to the well-fettled principle of law and of Evidence Act.

That the marriage, between Monowara Begum and Amir Ali Mia was pleaded, no doubt, by the defendant, but the onus is never upon the defendant to prove the factum of marriage as it has been already mentioned Mahmood J. after noticing the Privy Council cases namely, 3 MIA 295, 8 MIA 836 and 11 MIA 94 observed :

“In other words, these cases were such as left either the fact or we exact time of the alleged marriage a matter of uncertainty that is, neither proved nor disproved”.

But the well-settled proposition of acknow­ledgement of sonship is attracted, unless it could be shown that the child is born out of Zinah or of adultery and that onus is heavily upon she person who alleges. The plaintiff in this case stated as a positive case that defendant is a son of one. Baramoni but gave up the case. Then the Court of appeal below shifted the onus on Khorshed Alam to prove the marriage and it was erroneous allocation of onus because long line of cases do not place any onus on the evidence in a case of clear acknow­ledgement of parentage. Once acknowledge­ment is established the Privy Council says in 561. A at page 201:

“A claimant son who has in his fav­our a good acknowledgement of legiti­macy is in this position; the marriage will be held proved and his legitimacy established unless the marriage is dis­proved. Until the claimant establishes his acknowledgement the onus is on him to prove a marriage. Once he estab­lishes an acknowledgement the onus is on those who deny a marriage to nega­tive it in fact”.

The onus was clearly upon the plaintiff to establish that there was no marriage. The plaintiff failed both on the count that defendant is the son of one Baramoni and also on the count that there was no marriage of Amir Ali with Monowara Begum. All the findings which have been arrived at by the court below fellow from misconception of law which have been laid down in the decision already mentioned since nineteenth century. In Srimati Bibabati Devi Vs. Kumar Ramendra Narayan Roy, 5 C. W. N. 98 the Privy Coun­cil considered the nature of special circums­tances which would allow a departure from the rule of the concurrent findings of fact. It was held:

“that there must be some miscarriage of justice of violation of some principle of law or procedure, that miscarriage of justice means such a departure from the rules which permeate all judicial proce­dure as to make that which happened not in the proper sense of the word judi­cial procedure at all That the viola­tion of some principle of law or procedure must be such an erroneous proposition of law that if that proposition be correct­ed the finding cannot stand: or it may be the neglect of tome principles of law or procedure, whose application will have the same effect. The question whether there is evidence on which the Courts could arrive at their finding in such a question of law”. (emphasis added)

28. All the Courts below in the facts and circumstances of the case had misplaced the onus on the defendant for proving the marriage of Monowara Begum with Amir Ali Mia where as the settled principle of law is that the person who deny it will have to be established. 10 other words, it was for the plaintiff to prove Chat there was no marriage with Monowara Begum as alleged. As such, the concurrent finding of fact are no findings 10 the eye of law.

29. Secondly, toe Muslim dictum of acknowledgement was not appreciated by the Courts below and unfortunately the High Court Division also overlooked the settled proposition that is laid down in 56 I. A. page 201 that the marriage will be held proved and his legitimacy established unless the marriage is disproved. The High Court Division un­fortunately mentioned that the defen­dant has not been able to prove the alleged marriage with Minara Begum and concluded as such ‘alleged marriage of Amir Ali with Monowara bas been disproved.” Evidence Act deals with the concept, “proved or not proved or disproved”. Had the onus been on the defendant the High Court Division could have said that the marriage was not proved, but the Privy Council settled that so onus is upon the plaintiff to disprove the marriage and if he establishes it, marriages is disproved These legal conce­pts are to be applied in the facts and circu­mstances of the cases, and any derailment by way of allocation of onus bound to cause a miscarriage of justice and the findings of fact arrived at are in contravention of the presu­mptions of law and therefore such finding of facts cannot stand as noticed by the Privy Council in 51 C.W.N. Much emphasis was given by the plaintiff on Ext. G to show that Amir Ali Mia as far back as 1953 denied Mutwalliship to Khorshed Alam and nominated that after his death the eldest son by his other wife should be the Mutwalli. Strenuous arguments were advanced by Mr. Ahmed that this shows that the Mutwailli Amir Ali did not intend Khorshed Alam to be the Mutwalli. This document read as a whole belies the contention; on the other hand, Khorshed Alam was appointed as de fac­to guardian during the minority of the plaintiff. True that Amir Ali intended that Mutwalliship should pass on the issue of his other wife but wakf nama has ant reserved such power to him which says:

????? ?? ???? ???? ????????? ???? ??????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????? ????? ?????????? ????? ??????? ? ???????? ? ????????? ??????? ?????????????—-???? ????????

Further he said that-

???? ??????? ??? ???? ???? ????? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ??? ? ??????? ??? ?????????? ????????? ????? ????????? ? ???????? ??????? ? ???????? ???? ???? ??????? ?????

That was she instrument of the Wakf. It has already been noticed that Solaiman Khan was not appointed, on the other hand, the wakf appointed his brother’s son Shah Alam as Mutwalli. No power was reserved to the Mutwalli to vary the terms of the wakf deed for choosing the line of Mutwalliship. It is admitted; that Solaiman is now dead, and be has no male issue. Now condition is —

???? ??????? ??? ???? ???? ????? ???? ??????? ???? ??? ? ??????? ??? ?????????? ????????? ????? ???? ????????? ? ???????? ??????? ? ???????? ???? ???? ?????????? ??????? ??????

Now that Solaiman had no issue. Only sons of Amir Ali can claim Mutwalliship. The Wakf mentioned, three conditions —

???? ????????? ???????? ??????? ? ??????????? ??????

It irrelevant for the purpose that the prayer No. 2 of tae plaint was to the following effect:

“For a decree of declaration that the plaintiff is the only eligible person to be appointed Mutwalli of the Salam at Hossain Wakf Estate”.

Since the prayer No.1 that the defendant No.1 is the child of .some unknown parentage other than that of Md. Amir Ali Mia cannot be granted in view of the proposition of law mentio­ned above, the second prayer does not come for consideration in as much as the conditions for appointment of Mutwalli are mentioned in the Wakf deed itself and it is forth? statu­tory functionary namely, the Administrator of Wakf to consider whether these condi­tions have been fulfilled by any individual It is enough to notice that the assessment is to be made by the Administrator of Wakf Estate in Judicial manner (29 D.L.R. page;) Such jurisdiction exclusively conferred upon him by the law but his decision is nit immune from challenge on the ground of malafide or arbitrariness.

30. To sum up the conclusions:

1. Plaintiff though set up a positive case that the defendant is the son of Baramoni had given it up and the onus that was on him was not thus discharged.

2. Acknowledgement at Amir Ali Mia raises a presumption in favour of the defendant as to his sonship.

3. Written acknowledgement was nude in 1953 and that was never revalidated nor in law such acknowledgement could be invalidated by repudiation or disclai­mer (vide Privy Council in 11 M.I.A 94.)

4. Having proved the acknowledgment of Amir Ali there is no onus on the defendant to prove marriage of his mother Monowara Begum with Amir Ali. The onus is on him who denies such mar­riage, namely, the plaintiff and this onus was also not discharged. Marriage of Monowara Begum is thus neither “dispro­ved” nor “proved” and in such circumstances the dictum of Mahmood, J in 30 Allahabad comes info play.

5. All evidence that has been adduced by the plaintiff challenging the status of defendant is around 1966 and 1967 and it may be noted that Amir Ali died in April, 1967,

6. Social relationship with the family of Amir Ali, and Khorshed Alam and that of the plaintiff raises strong circumstances in fa­vour of the presumption of acknowledgement inasmuch a Khorshed Alam married to first cousins one after another of the plain­tiff. The affidavit of plaintiff’s mother’s mot­her (nani) though of 1967 throw light although how controversy arose over the Mutwalliship only for which the plaintiff went to length of denying the acknowledgement of sonship by Amir Ali Mia.

7. In the Wakf deed no power was reserved to Mutwalli for diverting the line of Mutwalliship the only condition was that the Mutwalli should be ???? ????????? ???????? ??????? ? ??????????? ??????

All these qualities are to be evaluated by the statutory functionary e.g. Wakf Administrator while choosing the Mutwalli. It is for him to resolve the problem of solution if any of these requisite qualifications are lacking.

8. Lastly, the present suit was misconceived and on plaintiff’s own showing such declara­tion namely, that Khorshed is of unknown-parentage cannot be made as that in contrary to law nor the second prayer can be allowed which calls for objective determination of fact by the statutory functionary and as such the plaintiff has to be non-suited.

In the result, therefore this appeal is allow­ed and all the judgments and orders of the Court below are hereby set aside end the suit is dismissed. No costs.

Shahabuddin Ahmed J. – I have had the opportunity to read and consider the judgment of my learned brother, B. H. Chowdhury, J. I very much regret that I am unable to agree with him on the views expressed and the deci­sion arrived at in his Judgment on the real question that calls for determination in this appeal. The real question is whether the pre­sumption raised by late Amir Ali’s ‘acknow­ledgement’ that the appellant in his eldest son has been rebutted or set aside by contrary proof adduced by the respondent, an admitted ion of late Amir Ali. Respondent filed the suit for this particular purpose in pursuance of this Court’s earlier judgment in Civil Appeal No. 27 of 1975, reported in 29 DLR SC 295. Both the trial Court and the lower Appellate Court. On a concurrent finding of facts, decreed the suit holding that defendant-appellant ii not a legitimate son of Amir Ali, and the learned Single Judge of the High Court Division, on a revisions application under section 115 if the Cads of Civil Procedure, did not find any ground to interfere with the concurrent finding of fact. Now it is to be seen whether the learned Single Judge rightly refuted to interfere with the concurrent deci­sion of the Courts below.

32. At the out set, I would refer to the judgment of this Court in Civil Appeal No, 27 of 1975 in order to make it clear that the pr