In my understanding, Bangladesh has gone through independence struggles at least twice in its history. Policing has for the most component part degenerated back into the feudal Ages, meanwhile. To take advantage of significant developments come abouting elsewhere in the human beings or at no stage has there been a serious attempt to modernize it. With the rapid developments in communications as to place Bangladesh completely out of touch Legal and investigative reforms are moving so slowly. Its consequences are attest and the atrophy.
This paper studies the declaration of a state of emergency in Bangladesh from constitutional law and this paper analyses the declaration of a state of emergency in Bangladesh from constitutional law. Like most indicted constitutions, the Bangladesh constitution. Are likely to affect, a large number of people or their property, or contains commissariat for a state of emergency to deal with situations which either affect. Normal protections under the criminal law the salient characteristic of the emergency authorities is the suspension of some fundamental human rights including, and the extension of police power to search, detain and interrogate, compromising the normal standards. However, this paper will not deal with the theoretical aspects of emergency powers. The apply of extraordinary powerfulness’s or the declaration of a state of emergency as such and countermines certain fundamental rights including basic due process rights, Political concerns considering the infraction of human rights and raises a number of legal, more so in a country which has experienced substantial periods of military rule.
For beef upping the political constitution from future abuse in the name of an emergency the aim of the paper is to argue. Another purpose is to bring forth further academic discussion in the light of lessons from Bangladesh, Importance of having a fresh look at the emergency commissariat and with consider to the infraction of human rights, to foreground the urgency, Develop a new jurisprudence of emergency and to aid. Many developed countries have go acrossed Laws somewhat similar to Laws in countries with a state of emergency, as a tool against act of terrorism. Abuse worldwide, the paper thus proposes developing an international standard to deal with emergency powerfulnesses and gave its wide applies. This paper further argues for the preserving of a strict protection of fundamental human rights at all contemporary world and for contriving a constitutional framework for a temporary state of emergency while preserving human rights argues. There is a real apprehension that the emergency authorities may gradually give go up to a permanent constabulary state, without the effective constraint of the rule of law.
NEED FOR AN EMERGENCY CONSTITUTION
Authorizing the executive to take extraordinary measure outs to deal with the crisis it is recognized that extraordinary situations necessitate, public awareness with consider to the earnestness of the situation thereby rising. More importantly, through this, the authorities attempts to demo that it is in full control of the situation and more importantly, through this, the regime attempts to show that it is in full control of the situation. During period of times of emergency, certain commissariat of the constitution guaranteeing fundamental rights are either curtailed or suspended. However, in many countries, including Bangladesh, A state of emergency is often used as a vehicle to remain in power by conquering the opposition and a state of emergency is often used as a vehicle to stay in powerfulness by conquering the opposition, including torture, in gross violation of human rights. However, with situations within the framework provided by the existing law sometimes it may be difficult to adequately deal, especially criminal law. ‘This likely inability to effectively deal with the crisis clears the conceptual path for another way to confront the problem: the “state of emergency.’’’ A declaration of a state of emergency has been an imminent menace to the wider society the reason for allowing, authorizing the authorities to take extraordinary measure outs to protect domiciles which necessitates.
Thus, the emergency constitution should contain commissariat to detain suspects endangering, without the criminal law’s usual protections. Nature of the future emergency are unknown and gave the fact that the graduated table, At its disposal the authorities should have all tools, including the declaration of a state of emergency, to deal with the crisis as it comes. Attempts to deprive the authorities of the power to declare a state of emergency altogether may limit its ability to react to the situation. At the same time to the authorities may consequence in the abuse of this extraordinary power giving a blank bank check.
Most postwar fundamental laws supply for a declaration of a state of emergency with wide protection of core civil and most postwar constitutions furnish for a declaration of a state of emergency with wide protection of core civil. The public that the situation is under control the aim of the declaration of a state of emergency should be to reassure and Effective short term actions to normalize the situation that the state is taking. The declaration of a state of emergency in a fashion is an expression of no assurance in the existing Laws and the declaration of a state of emergency in a way is an expression of no assurance in the existing Laws. The declaration of a state of emergency in state of affairses other than natural disasters is also an admission by the authorities of its failure to perform its functions to foreclose events, or the declaration of a state of emergency in situations other than natural cataclysms is also an admission by the authorities of its failure to perform its functions to foreclose events, leading to such a declaration. A distinctive interest may come into play when the authorities fails to perform its functions and a distinctive interest may come into play when the government fails to perform its mathematical functions. The norms of human rights are compromised and in the face of such a failure, the authorities be given to become authoritarian. The ill use of fundamental rights during a state of emergency thus needs a re look at the organic law and the abuse of fundamental rights during a state of emergency thus necessitates a re look at the constitution. A uniform procedural framework for the future exercise of all such powerfulness’s there is a need to establish.
Following the events of September 11, 2001, where a state of emergency is not formally declared or emergency powerfulness’s are being widely used. Countries law enforcement agencies are provided with extraordinary powerfulness’s even in some developed. Is whether these restrictive Laws over the year lead to the creation of a permanent system of criminal justice for act of terrorism suspects the worry. The pertinent question is how little evidence or mere suspicion is enough to justify how much detention? Consequently, The fashion in which these powerfulness’s are structured is a matter of great importance. Judicial case in points or the fashion in which emergency powerfulnesses are structured is as much a merchandise of the fundamental structures of political power and only a small component part flowings from the constitution’s texts. The role of the judiciary during the emergency is also influenced by political expedience, likewise. Less to concerns about judicial capacity than to the political structures more directly the role of the judiciary in this situation is relatively limited for reasons connected. On the imperatives of events rather than on abstract legal theories any actual run of power is likely to depend. Contemporary imponderables and everything will “depend on the imperatives of events, not ‘law’ in the usual sense. In the words of Mark Tushnet, ‘the interplay of events and contemporary imponderables — that is, politics — is constitutional law in this domain. During the emergency create a possibility that interested parties may have the enticement not to give up this new found power the extraordinary powerfulness’s granted. To create too many “emergencies’ there is a danger that the regime machinery will exploit the extraordinary powerfulnesses, there is a danger that the authorities machinery will exploit the extraordinary powerfulnesses to create too many “emergencies’, despite the adequacy of the more standard framework involving the criminal law. Bangladeshi particularities should not be allowed to divert attending from the more important project of institutional or the current war on panic design to prevent future abuses of human rights. Of emergency commissariat in the constitution is required an elaborate lay. However, it is difficult to contrive a constitutional authority for a limited state of emergency, gave the exact nature of emergency and however, it is difficult to design a constitutional government for a limited state of emergency, given the exact nature of emergency. All it will then simply be a case of one size accommodating. Nonetheless, ‘self-conscious design of an emergency regime may well be the best available defense against future breaches of human rights’ The judiciary, especially the higher judiciary, is expected to act as a watchdog to control panic-driven responses of the government to crises resulting in gross violations of human rights. Sole reliance on judiciary without a detailed lay of principles may not be enough, however. The nature of the political battle their opposition to the continuance of the emergency authorities will transform. The authorities will then be seeing as an enemy of the entire constitutional order. Consequently, an independent judiciary, to protect fundamental rights willing and willing to protect fundamental rights, acts as a deterrent against gross violations and reckless behavior of the executive government
The role of the president and the declaration of emergency:
On 20 October 2006, the 14-party opposition alliance declared that it would launch massive street agitations, indefinite strikes and blockades to protest against the handover of power to Justice K M Hasan after the completion of the government’s five-year term of office. On 27 October, Justice K M Hasan indicated his unwillingness to be appointed as chief adviser. On 29 October 2006, the government completed its five-year tenure and resigned. On its expiration of incumbency the parliament was also dissolved. Without exhausting other options available under the Thirteenth Amendment Act 1996, the President assumed the office himself. So he was the President and, at the same time, also the Chief Adviser (Prime Minister). Thus, the very aim of the thirteenth amendment to establish a neutral non party caretaker authorities to hold a free, fair and thus, the very purpose of the thirteenth amendment to establish a neutral non party caretaker authorities to hold a free, fair, Assuming the role of the real head of the caretaker authorities, being a campaigner of the previous political authorities. The assumption of the role of prime minister by the titular President, combining the two roles, was also against the principles of parliamentary democracy and, as such, was also against the basic structure of the Constitution. The way the Chief Justice interfered in the proceedings of this challenge, and in another case concerning various disclosures by the candidates before the election, created widespread resentment and even violent outbursts both inside and outside the court.
An emergency was declared after the elected 2001 06 authorities resigned at the end of its incumbency, in Bangladesh and Within 90 days from the day the caretaker authorities come into business office the parliament was also dissolved to pave the fashion for an election to be held. The election was scheduled to be held on 18 December 2008. Brought some electoral reforms and the election commission has already prepared an elector list with photo identification. However, the Speaker of the Parliament termed this government an irregular one. Some consider the government unconstitutional given that the constitution requires the caretaker government to hold the election within 90 days. However, the government can always find lawyers to provide legal justification for its actions. Legal arguments for and against the constitutional legality of the government will only confuse the general public. They are more likely to be impressed by the arguments in favor of the government given its control over the media. In the absence of the parliament, and with the government being unelected, the question of legitimacy remains a fundamental one. In such a situation the normal checks and balances envisaged in the constitution are totally absent. The imposition of restrictions on the media and the suspension of certain fundamental rights, especially political rights, run contrary to the principles of public accountability and contrary to any democratic norms.
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 There exists a vast literature dealing with theoretical aspects of emergency powers and the unilateral actions undertaken
by the US President, George Bush and the Attorney General, John Ashcroft, after September 11. See, eg, Giorgio
Agamben, State of Exception, (Kevin Attell trans, 2005 ed) [trans of: Stato de eccezione 2003]; David Cole and James
Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security (2nd ed, 2002);
Stephen J Schulhofer, The Enemy Within: Intelligence Gathering, Law Enforcement and Civil Liberties in the Wake of
September 11 (2002); kHarold Koh, ‘The Spirit of the Laws’ (2002) 43 Harvard International Law Journal 23.
 A distinguished US constitutional law expert calls it the ‘reassurance function’. See, eg, Bruce Ackerman, ‘Emergency Constitution’ (2004) 113 Yale Law Journal 1029, 1037.
 Ibid 1031.
 Youngstown Sheet & Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 637 (1952), quoted in Mark Tushnet, ‘The Political Constitution of
Emergency Powers: Some Lessons from Hamdan’ (2006) Schmooze ‘tickets’. Paper 73, 16.
<http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/schmooze_papers/73> at 1st November 2010.
 Tushnet, above n 4.
 Ackerman, above n 2, 1030.
 Hasan Jahid Tushar, “Opposition targets Hasan takeover”, Daily Star (Dhaka), 20 October 2006,
<http:thedailystar.net/2006/10/20/d6102001011.htm> at 1 November, 2010.
 ‘K M Hasan steps aside for the sake of people’, The Daily Star (Dhaka), 29 October 2006,
<http://www.thedailystar.net/2006/10/20/d6102901109.htm> at 1 November, 2010.
 The President then assumed the office of the Chief Adviser (CA) of the caretaker government and at the same time retained his position as the President. The Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act 1996 provided for a number of options to appoint the chief adviser of the caretaker government.
 For discussion on the basic structure theory of the constitution and the rulings of the Bangladesh Supreme Court, see A K M Masudul Haque, ‘State, Law and the Emergence of Public Enterprises in Bangladesh’ in Critical Reflections on Law and Public Enterprises in Bangladesh (PhD Thesis, Warwick University, 1992) 54. The authority to change the basic structure of the court by the parliament was an issue in Anwar Hossain Chowdhury and Others v Bangladesh, BLD (SPI) Volume IX, 1989. In this case, the Appellate Division decided that the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution decentralising the High Court Division constituted a change in the ‘basic structure’ of the constitution. In 1981, the Supreme Court in the case of Hamidul Huq Chowdhury v Bangladesh , 33 DLR (1981) 394, observed that by incorporation of a provision relating to the proclamation of emergency by introduction of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution by Act II of 1975, the basic and essential features of the constitution were altered and destroyed. The court observed: ‘These alterations and amendments of the Constitution reduced the Constitution out of recognition. It was in our opinion, beyond the powers of Parliament as the donee of prescribed powers under a controlled Constitution to alter the essential features and basic structure of the Constitution.’ These judgements were very much in line with article 7 of the Bangladesh Constitution proclaiming the supremacy of the Constitution.
 The response to the Chief Justice’s unprecedented interference in the proceedings of the court and the pro-government bias by the higher judiciary infuriated the lawyers. Lawyers attacked the Supreme Court building, damaged courtrooms and the Chief Justice’s chamber. The car of a former state minister for law, parked outside the court building was set on fire. Twelve eminent Supreme Court lawyers were later charged with vandalism. The Chief Justice was seen as very partisan because the legislation enforcing separation of judiciary from the executive had been ‘stalled by pro-government legal factions, led by the chief justice,’ writes Mute magazine. The magazine further quotes a retiring High Court judge who commented on the blatant political corruption of the legal system: ‘I have seen during my long 13 years in judicial career how the evil partisan political influence engulfed the sacred institution…’.See Marut Ret, ‘Bangladesh: ‘State of Emergency’ Powers Extended and Tightened — Strikes and Demonstrations Banned, Media Gagged’, Mute. <http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20385> at 1 November, 2010.
 The Election Commission declared the schedule of the election on 2 November 2008. M Abul Kalam Azad, ‘EC declares polls fixture’, Daily Star (Dhaka), 3 November 2008, http://thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=61622 at 1st November 2010.
 The Speaker was quoted as saying that ‘The Caretaker Government (CG) is a creation of the Constitution. The priority of this Government is to do routine works and assist the Election Commission (EC) for holding a general election within 90 days.’ See ‘Present govt irregular, but not illegal, says Speaker’, New Nation (Dhaka) 17 March 2008. <http://nation.ittefaq.com/issues/2008/03/17/news0309.htm> at 1st November 2010.
 Ruling on a writ petition, the High Court bench of Justice Mohammad Abdur Rashid and Justice Mohammad Ashfaqul Islam ruled that, ‘As per article 123(3) of the constitution, the Election Commission is bound to hold the election within 90 days after parliament is dissolved. The constitutional provisions are self-executing, and the commission has no right to avoid or violate those.’ The ruling further made it clear that ‘The Election Commission has no discretion to extend the time beyond 90 days.’ See ‘EC violated constitution’, The Daily Star (Dhaka), 23 May 2008, http://thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=37802 at 1st November 2010..