1 INTRODUCTION :.
Office of profit means a profit which brings to unexpected or pecuniary gain or advantage or benefit which is not legal. It will be an office of profit that it carries some remuneration, pecuniary advantage, and benefit by abuse of power. It may be an office or place of profit if it carries some remuneration, financial advantage, benefit etc which breaks the rule of constitution. The legislatures are making of laws, budget, and control of all government actions1. The executive branch of government should implement the laws, proper utilize the public money, and be accountable to the legislature in its Functioning2.office of profit’ is holding in Bangladeshi politics right now. In constitution of Bangladesh, the true principle is that there should not be conflict between legislatures and executives of the duties and interest. However, if the legislators are beholden to the executive, the legislature can no longer retain its independence. Even legislatures lose the ability to control the Council of Ministers and the army of officials and public servants. Consequently, the Constitution fervently tries to stop office of profit for legislators. The relation between the executive and legislative branches in Bangladesh has been inconsistent due to the political system3. In Bangladesh, the executive is enforced legislator to do unethical and unlawful activities4.The phrase ‘office of profit’ is holding in Bangladeshi politics right now. In addition, each and every member should take care to ensure that there is no real conflict between their personal interests and public duties. A MP receives some pecuniary gain in connection with office then it becomes an office of profit. Office of profit breaks the rule of constitution. If there is a legislature in presidential systems, as a result it tends to have more legislative power and decrease executive control. However, there is s parliamentary systems generally exhibit less legislative power, but more executive control. There has been alternation in government (after more than forty years of single party domination). Consequently, there is still a comparatively high level of government instability and inconsistence. In addition, the names used for each one of these systems do not reflect the legislative reality. Finally, there continue to be an abnormally high reliance on the decentralized legislative procedure5. Executives control important policy-making process6. In Bangladesh agenda-setting tools can be formal or informal. In addition, they perceive that the formal tools and institutional structures that govern the agenda-setting process are more efficient than any informal. However, such informal tools are unquestionably harder to measure. As a result, it takes more difficult to find efficient power or influence. In most of what follows the emphasis will be on formal agenda-setting tools rather than informal norms. It is difficult to find who control which agenda-setting powers of the legislature and executive exist within the broader context of informal norms and practices. In separation of powers systems the daily calendar, as well as the long-term calendar, is set by the legislature itself, without direct executive influence with few exceptions7
Office of Profit Show:
(a) Our policy-makers, politicians, leaders want to grab more and more power in one hand.
(b) Those people hold power; they do not want to let the door open for others.
(c) They need huge money and they hide their black money.
(d) They don’t practice democracy.
(e) The thirst of greedy leaders can be satisfied only by giving them of faces of profit.
(f) Our political parties, power-loving representatives and people’s leaders have lost morality, principle and dignity.
Office of Profit Practice in Bangladesh
If there is a legislature in presidential systems, as a result it tends to have more legislative power and decrease executive control. However, there is s parliamentary systems generally exhibit less legislative power, but more executive control. There has been alternation in government (after more than forty years of single party domination). Consequently, there is still a comparatively high level of government instability and inconsistence. In addition, the names used for each one of these systems do not reflect the legislative reality. Finally, there continue to be an abnormally high reliance on the decentralized legislative procedure5. Executives control important policy-making process6. In Bangladesh agenda-setting tools can be formal or informal. In addition, they perceive that the formal tools and institutional structures that govern the agenda-setting process are more efficient than any informal. However, such informal tools are unquestionably harder to measure. As a result, it takes more difficult to find efficient power or influence. In most of what follows the emphasis will be on formal agenda-setting tools rather than informal norms. It is difficult to find who control which agenda-setting powers of the legislature and executive exist within the broader context of informal norms and practices. In separation of powers systems the daily calendar, as well as the long-term calendar, is set by the legislature itself, without direct executive influence with few exceptions7.
1.The execution of the legislative function cannot be delegated to the executive without clear guidelines. If there are not guidelines regarding the principles and criteria of the delegated laws, it will be counted as an unlawful activity. Furthermore, delegation can only occur within a specified time period and for the achievement of clearly defined objectives and interest of executives. The main purpose of the delegated procedure is that it arduously allows the executive to directly control administrative and implementing legislation. As a result, legislator can not take independently the development decision of major policy initiatives
2.. The decentralized procedure calls to use of the ‘see legislative’. The executive branch makes the ultimate determination of laws with need for them. They also are passed by the full floor. As a result, Laws adopted in committee are often referred to as “little laws” because they are generally understood to be smaller, micro-sectional laws.
Office of profit breaks the rule of constitution.
1. The legislative branch of the government is a unicameral Parliament, or Jatiyo Sangsad (House of the People). This branch makes the laws for the nation (see fig.11) Members of Parliament. A legislator should have at least twenty-five years old. They are elected from territorial constituencies.
Parliament sits for a maximum of five years. It should meet at least twice a year. In addition, it should meet less than thirty days after election results are declared. The president calls legislative body into conference. Even, the legislative body elects a speaker and a deputy speaker. They control the discussion parliamentary activities. Finally, Parliament also appoints a standing committee, a special committee, a secretariat.
2. In reality, Bangladesh’s prime ministers fervently decide on major government policies with little or no involvement by Parliament. Prime minister has superior executive power that dominant all the member. Consequently, any Member of Parliament who votes against their respective party automatically loses their seats. The prime minister’s broad constitutional powers have been increased in recent years due to the cause of the opposition parties. Opposition party boycotts from Parliaments due to conflict of interest. In Bangladesh, while BNP MPs boycotted the legislature during much of the period of AL dominance in the late 1990s.In addition, AL MPs have sporadically boycotted the National Assembly since losing power to the BNP in the October 2001 elections.
3. In Bangladesh, Parliamentary systems executive initiated holds a privileged position on the calendar with opposition and private member proposals limited to specific days. In practice, the privileged position of the executive in a parliamentary system is derived from its ability to control the majority within the legislature. They control by via simple majority requirements for the determination of the amendment.
In Bangladesh, the model the policies of a confidence-dependent parliamentary government enjoy less uncertain support from governing coalition members. Their short-term policy goals are less important than the government’s survival. This support is stronger when the government has more agenda power and is weaker with a larger ruling coalition. We explore the empirical implications of these findings and their consequences for the comparative In Bangladesh Political violence and state repression have been major sources of instability in recent years9.There is Constitutional model of government and its actual practice in operation have completely reversed this logic. In this model, the executive (Council of Ministers) is drawn from the legislature. While in theory, the legislature holds the government to account, in reality the government controls the legislature as long it has a majority in the House10 .The key issue for the government’s survival is sustaining its majority. Much of the struggle for power, compromise on cabinet composition, and patronage are linked to this need to satisfy the majority of legislators. This is the reason why the size of Council of Ministers became unwieldy over the decades. Parliament has a lead role to play in raising issues and putting them on the national agenda. Strong supporting institutions remain essential to ensuring the effective implementation of its recommendations
. The research described in this report was sponsored by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF). The PITF is funded by the Central Intelligence Agency. The views expressed herein are the authors’ alone and do not represent the views of the US Government 9.In Bangladesh, Political participation is highly factional different in nature. It is shaped by very small, relatively homogenous elite group of people. In addition, elite people comparatively in origin. They ideologically have strong roots in the countryside. As a result this ruling oligarchy, leadership is highly personalized and maintained. In Bangladesh, multiparty electoral politics had discovered in 1991. As a result, the competition between these rival patronage networks, institutionalized in the form of the BNP and the AL.
Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed, Honorable Chief Adviser of Bangladesh, delivered a speech at Columbia University on an invitation by its World Leader’s Forum. At the same venue just a few days ago Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinajad was invited amid massive protests and gave a speech followed by questions and answers session during which Mr Mahmoud underwent a real tough time. Unlike Ahmedinajad, Dr Fakhruddin, however, was well received by the community of Columbia University, its students, teachers, staff and media. Dr. Fakhruddin’s speech was well-written and he delivered it well. Yet it might not be easy to predict, to what extent the Chief Adviser has been able to dispel the doubts about Bangladesh as “a paradox that has baffled many a pundit,” a phrase taken from his speech. Unlike what we see back home, here in US (and in much of the West) a speech or lecture by a VIP is almost always accompanied by the questions and answers (Q & A) session. But this session didn’t go as well as Dr. Fakhruddin might have predicted. And I am sure–our Chief Adviser, a Princeton alumni himself–has realizeditaswell.
The title of Dr. Fakhruddin’s speech was “Bangladesh’s Socioeconomic Development: Success, Challenges, and Imperatives.” During his more than half-an-hour speech which started at 11 am, Dr. Fakhruddin spoke on a wide range of issues starting from—Dr. Yunus’ micro-credit; challenges of poverty reduction; Bangladesh’s success in population control, food-production, garments industry, primary education, Non-formal education (NFE) (some may not agree with the way he promoted BRAC’s success as an NGO); migration issue— to current caretaker government’s drive against corruption and resolve to hold elections “before the end of December 2008.”
One very interesting aspect of Dr. Fakhruddin’s speech was his repeated utterance “democracy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for good governance.” (May be, General Moyeen has requested him to make it a point every where he goes to!) “Our democratically elected governments during the past 15 years failed to promote good governance and to protect citizens’ rights. We must accept that while democracy may take various forms and manifestations, its ultimate objective is always the same—the rule of law by the will of people. Democracy must put in place checks and balances against abuses of power and corruption,” said Dr. Fakhruddin during his speech. While many of us may agree with Dr. Fakhruddin’s statement about the failure and corruption (moral and fiscal) of country’s mainstream politicians, it’s quite dubious in my opinion that not even once did he mention that about the military’s repeated record of capture and abuse of power in Bangladesh by bypassing country’s constitution. After all, Bangladesh’s age is 35+ years, not 15 years. As for the underlined portion (Note: I did it to make my point. –J.A.) of his remarks, we only wish Mr Chief Adviser’s “various forms and manifestations” of democracy would not remind us of General Ayub’s “Basic Democracy.” The Q & A session started at around 11-35 a.m. I attended the speech on behalf of Mukto-Mona.com and carried a question with me which read as follows: Recently in Bangladesh, a young cartoonist Arifur Rahman was arrested and is held in prison for a cartoon which used the word, “Mohammed” and which some fundamentalist groups found objectionable. When a similar cartoon was published in the magazine of another fundamentalist group’s own newspaper, no allegation of people’s “religious sentiments being hurt” or any such issue arose. We are aware that lawyers have been restricted from representing Mr Rahman and that his own family has not been allowed to meet him. This follows on the heels of the brutal torture and killing of Tribe leader and Activist Cholesh Ritchil and the arrests of hundreds of university teachers, several thousands of people with no prior criminal record. Would you please comment on this horrific state of affairs in Bangladesh with respect to individual rights and freedoms? During Q & A session I saw Dr. Austin Dacey, a long time friend of Mukto-Mona, United Nations representative of the Center for Inquiry (CFI) Trans-national and assistant editor of Free Inquiry magazine, in the queue on the other side of the hall.
The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) makes a distinction between child work
and child labour. To see a child work is not necessarily bad. Work may be encouraged for
a young adult as an apprentice and to develop a sense of responsibility. The difference lies
between what is being done for a child’s development and what is sheer exploitation.
Work carried out by children ranges from the beneficial to the harmful. Unfortunately, it is
not always easy to draw a sharp line of distinction between benevolent child work and
destructive child labour.
Bertolaso, in the hearings before the United States Congress Subcommittee on
Labor (1994,55) proposed a criteria that could help distinguish child labour from child
work: full time work at too early an age; too many hours spent on working; work which
exerts undue physical, social or psychological stress; work and life on the streets in bad
conditions; inadequate pay; too much responsibility; work which hampers access to
education and is detrimental to full social and psychological development; and work that
undermines childrens’ dignity and self esteem. Further, no one has any doubt that children
should be excluded from highly dangerous employment
While these are generally acceptable criteria, there remains a substantial grey area
in which it is more difficult to legislate and for which appropriate policy will depend very
much on local circumstances and perceptions (Stalker, 1996,5). Apprenticeship in many
traditional skills may have to begin early and apprenticeship has to be distinguished from
Legislative In general legislatures Also known as Congress that first review policy proposals in committee before sending them for final vote. It has a greater degree of legislative influence and control over policy outcomes. To protect office of profit legislative take some steps.
Makes all laws which protected countries from office of profit.
Controls all the money: taxes, borrows, and sets the budget. As a result, it will be less occurred office of profit.
Confirms federal judicial appointments, and defines by law the jurisdiction of the judicial branch in cases not specified by the Constitution.
Only Congress can declare martial law.
In many parliamentary systems these institutional and structural weaknesses would not pose significant problems because the executive would represent a coherent and cohesive majority based on disciplined parties within the legislature. Such a majority would allow the Government to control the legislative process despite the institutional weakness of thepolitical structures.
Also known as the President.
Preserves, protects and defends the Constitution.
Faithfully executes the laws of the Country.
Executes the instructions of Congress.
May veto laws (but the veto may be overridden by Congress by a 2/3 majority) or refuse to execute them if she/he deems them unconstitutional.
Executes the spending authorized by Congress.
In this research I examine that there are huge office of profit occurs in Bangladesh. Most of the Politician and Law-maker are dishonest. They are regularly practicing office of profit due to their personal benefits. They are earning lots of money and even they do not give tax. In addition, I also found weaknesses of the Bangladesh overall system on the legislative process and the role of agenda setting within it. I am examining the history of legislative-executive relations in Bangladesh to clarify both one of the underlying structural weaknesses and ineffectiveness to implement Government Policies. I am also finding the importance of agenda-setting in the legislative process in general and the standard structural norms and formal rules that govern agenda-setting in democratic political systems
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