Premises Rent Control Act, 1953


Rent Control Act

Of 1953)

The East Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, as
appears from Notification No. 8935 L.R., date 26th June, 1954, was not made
applicable to the mouzas of the district of Noakhali before 26th June, 1954,
and in that notification mouza Shonapur Bazar within Police Station Ramganj has
not been included as a place to which the Act was made applicable.

Ramani M.
Mazumdar Vs. Jasodha Kumar Nath Bepari, (1959) 11 DLR 253.


S. 2(1):
Fixing of basic rent

In order to find out what is the basic rent
of a premises within the meaning of section 2(i) of the East Bengal Premises
Rent Control Ordinance, 1951, the Rent Controller will have to find, first,
what was the rent paid in respect of the premises in question in 1941, if it
had been tenanted. If such rent cannot be ascertained, then he has to determine
approximately the rent, at which in reasonable probability the premises were
let out in December, 1941. In trying to arrive at a reasonably payable rent he
should ascertain rent of similar premises in that locality in 1941.

The Municipal assessment by itself cannot be
taken as a correct index for fixing basic rent. If no other better data is
available, then perhaps the Rent Controller can take it into consideration in
ascertaining the reasonable rent in 1941.

Onus on
When the tenant applies for
fixation of standard rent and thereby evades payment of contractual rent, the
onus of establishing standard rent should be on him.

Aminul Islam
Vs. Hiru Mia (1955) 7 DLR 266.


10(2)(c)(ii): Requirement for the use of brother would not satisfy the
condition of the section—
of the premises by the landlord for the use of his brother would not satisfy
the condition of section 1 0(2)(c)(ii) of the Act, in the absence of anything
to show that the premises were held by him for the benefit of his brother.

Baloch vs. Adam Ali (1961) 13 DLR (SC) 13.


S. 14(3),

The necessary condition for interference by
the Controller under clause (h) of section 14(3) of the Act in a case like the
present is that, in his opinion, the rent at present fixed for any premises is
not just and fair. In such a case, he may fix a standard rent at such amount
as, having regard to the provisions of the Act and the circumstances of the
case, he deems just. Bearing in mind the proviso to the definition of “standard
rent”, the result might be that in a case of the present kind the “standard
rent” is any rent which the Controller might think to be just in his
uncontrolled discretion. Such a conclusion would, however, run contrary to the
nature of the Act, which provides with great particularity, in regard to a
large number of specific cases the manner in which the “standard rent” shall be

Md. Taher
Ali Vs. Hari Pada Roy Chowdhury, (1959) 11 DLR (SC) 193.

In view of the fact that the District Judge
in appeal has found that the agreement between the landlord and the tenant
fixing the rent of the Premises at Rs. 414—to be just and fair, the power of
the Controller under clause (h) of section 14(3) was not attracted, and for
that reason alone his order inducing the rent from Rs. 414—to 250/- was bad in
law. Ibid.


S. 15 — Standard
rent fixed between the landlord and the previous tenant will have no operative
force in a case where another tenant by a fresh contract with the landlord
occupies the premises.

Hossain Vs. Sherbanoo. (1961) 13 DLR 245.


S. 15(1) —
Standard rent fixed payable from the month next after the date of application:
ordinarily rule as laid down seems to be that the standard rent when fixed
should be payable from the month next after the date of application unless
reasons to be recorded by the controller he decides that such rent should
operate from any earlier or later date. Ibid.


S. 17 — Deposit
of rent in the Controller’s office by the tenant under the Act:
of money to the landlord or hold it till doubt as to person entitled to
receive, resolved—Landlord’s acceptance without prejudice- Rent Controller is a
mere ‘conduit pipe’.

The tenant is entitled to deposit rent under
section 21 in Rent Controller’s office by simply making allegations that the
landlord refuses to rent by the postal money order or that there is lx fide
doubt or dispute as to who is entitled to receive rent referred to in section
17 and the Rent Controller is bound to accept it and remit the amount by money
order to landlord in case of deposit under sub-section (1) of section 21 and in
a case of deposit it under sub-section (2) of section 21 hold it until the
removal of doubt or settlement of dispute.

Md. Akhtar
Vs. Md. Abdus Siddique (1956) 8 DLR 272.


—This the Rent Controller has to do under the
above provisions of the statute irrespective of and without determining whether
the said allegations are true or false and even if the landlord accepts any
such remittance sent by the Rent Controller under sub-section (4) of section 21
or withdraws ii under sec 22, this will be without any prejudice. Ibid.


17(1)—Where relationship of land-lord and tenant is denied—Duty of the Rent
In cases where the relationship is altogether denied and in spite
of that Rent Controller lakes the deposit, the landlord will be remediless to
go to the ordinary Civil Court for ejectment until he is compelled to apply for
permission to sue before t House Rent Controller and that is decided in his favour.
The acceptance of the deposit by the Rent Controller will at least mean that he
has assumed jurisdiction of the matter.

When a deposit case is heard and decided on
the ground that the parties do not stand in the relationship of landlord and
tenant at all, the House Rent Controller has .to come to some decision on the
same. In such a situation, the House Rent Controller is not a mere conduit pipe
for deposit or his office a mere counter for the acceptance of deposit.

Haji Yunus
Bepari Vs. Abdul Majid Khan (1960) 12 DLR 781.


S.17— ‘As
long as’- What the words connote:
The words “as long as” in section 17(1)
indicate that the point of time at which it has to be decided whether the
tenant has paid the rents allowable under 314. the Act to the full extent or
not is the point of time at which the order or decree for eviction is to be
made and this must inevitably be much later than the permission for the filing
of the suit granted by the Rent controller.

Sundari Karmakar Vs. Dr. Mozamnel Huq (1960) 12 DLR 720.


S. 17(1)
provision (e) — For use and occupation of landlord’s constituted attorney—
whether the proviso is applicable
: The words of the Act in section 17(I)(e)
that the premises are required by the landlord either for his own occupation or
for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held do not
include the constituted attorney of the landlord, for, the occupation or the
use of the constituted attorney is neither for the own occupation of the
landlord nor for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises c

Md. Israil Biswas
Vs. Amrita Lal Chowdhury (1960) 12 DLR 404.


stated in the application for permission is sue for ejectment before the Rent
controller as also before the Civil Court in a suit filed for ejectment-Because
an additional ground was added in the suit this will not make the suit

Faziul Kader Chowdhury Vs. Haji Abdul  Matin
Sowdagar (1957) 9 DLR 302.


S.17 (e) — Bona
fide requirement
: Where the landlord wants the house for his own use and
occupation, it will never be considered sufficient that he should “desire” to
have the premises back or even that he should “require” them, but it has been
further insisted that the requirement must be “bona fide requirement” for the
purposes recognized by the Act. As regards the “bona fide requirement” for
rebuilding, the landlord has to satisfy the Court that he honestly desires to
build and rebuild.

Partial eviction of tenant is not tenable
before a Court though it may be effected by the parties by mutual consent.

Sarkar Vs. Abdul Aziz (1955)7 DLR 314.


occupation includes occupation of family members as daughters—
By the use
of the word ‘required’ in section 17(e) of the East Bengal Premises Rent Control
Act, the Legislature clearly intended to indicate that there must be a genuine
present need which must not merely be a desire for the premises, but at the
same time it does not go to the .extent of saying that the word ‘required’
connotes that there must be an absolute necessity.

Mulla Mahbub
Ali Vs. Janab Ali, (1956) 8 DLR 448.


landlord’s case was that he would retire soon from service when he would have
to take up his residence at Pabna and that he required the premises for keeping
his marriageable daughters there under the guardianship of their uncle in

Held: So far as
the need for the housing of the marriageable daughters is concerned, even the
element of ‘must have’ is present there and the fact that the landlord
possesses a house in a village not very. far from the town of Pabna does not
affect the question of his need for a house in the place where the daughters
are already staying under the guardianship of their uncle. The only question is
as to whether the needs of the daughters comes sufficiently within the meaning
of ‘own occupation’ for the purposes of this Act. It would be putting too
narrow a construction on the words ‘own occupation’ to say that the words were
limited to the personal occupation of the landlord himself and of none others.
The words ‘own occupation’ must embrace the occupation of the landlord himself
personally as also of such members of his family as are dependent on him.

Mulla Mahbub
Ali Vs. Janab Ali, (1956) 8 DLR 448.


Sec. 17
clauses (1) and (6) —
The landlord brought a suit against the tenant, who has been found
to be habitual defaulter in payment of rent and who had not deposited the
admitted rent, for recovery of arrears of rent and he also filed an application
before the Rent Controller for permission to sue the tenant for ejectment.
About three months after the filing of the rent suit and the case for
permission for ejectment, the tenant applied to the Rent Controller for fixing
of standard rent.

Held: The
application for fixation of standard rent does not lie where it is made malafide.

Syed Akhtar
Alam Vs. Md. Zafirul Huq, (1957) 9 DLR 597.


S. 17(1) — Material
time in default of payment of rent is the date
of decree: The material time to
consider whether there has been default in the payment of rent is the date on
which the decree in the suit comes to be passed by the Court. The words ‘so
long as’ occurring in sub-section I of section 17 of the Act indicate a
continuity of payment and the opening words of that sub-paragraph indicate the
terminus of that continuity.

Mulla Mahbub
Ali Vs. Janab Ali, (1956) 8 DLR 448.


rents for period before transfer paid to the transferee -if can be treated
payment of rent falling due after the transfer.

The landlord acquired the premises in
occupation of the tenant in January 1955. The tenant paid to the landlord
arrears of rent due prior to his acquisition in January, 1955 and subsequently
when the landlord brought an ejectment suit against the tenant for default in
paying rent subsequent to January 1955, the tenant claimed that the arrears
rent paid to the landlord for the period which was prior to his acquisition in
January, 1955 should be adjusted to the rent fallen due after January, 1955. If
the tenant i given an adjustment for arrears of rent paid to the landlord in
respect. of the rents due prior to the landlord’s acquisition of the property
there would be no default at all.

Held: The tenant is not entitled to claim
such an adjustment. If he feels that the assignment of the arrears of rent has
been invalidly made and the arrears of rent wrongfully realized he may sue to
recover them from the landlord but that does not entitle him as a matter of
right to claim an adjustment in respect of the default accruing subsequent to
the transfer of the property.

Abdul Hafiz
Abdul Nabi Vs. M. Doud Ali, (1960) 12 DLR 528.


S. 17(1) Proviso
(b) —
there has been a sub-letting of the premises by the ten without any permission
or consent in writing o the landlord, he provisions of proviso (1,) of section
17(I) of the Act would apply.

Wahed Ali
Mia Vs. Haji Abdul Wahed (1954) 6 DLR 206.


S. 17(1) Protection afforded to the tenants
subject to his fulfilling the laid down conditions Sub-letting the premises by
the tenant is a breach of such condition.

Saradindu Bhusan Nandi vs. Gopal Chandra Roy (1968) 20 DLR 429.


S. 17(i)(e) —
‘Certificate’ of controller must satisfy all formal requirement of law:
plea that he required the premises bonafide for personal use negatived by Rent
Controller but he granted certificate on the ground thaw landlord required the
premises for re-construction purpose and in so saying the Rent Controller not
use the words “reasonably and in good faith Certificate invalid in law.

Baloch vs. Adam Ali (1961) 1 DLR (SC) 13.


S.17 (e) —
Bonafide requirement for personal use may arise subsequently
: A landlord
or a owner of a house may hay family members or other dependents who might grow
in number and might also require more accommodation from time to time.

It is true that the owner concerned must have
a bonafide necessity for using and occupying the entire house but while
determining the question as to bonafide necessity, the desirability of allowing
the landlord for having better accommodation should not be ignored or

Fazlur Rahaman
Vs. Nyeema Khatun (1961) 13 DLR 869.


S. 17(3) Provision
of sub-section 3:
Sub-section (3) of section 17 of the Act is a mere elaboration of
proviso (b) to sub section (I). It is not an independent sub-clause (3) but
must be read along with sub-section (1), proviso (b) which began with the words
“in the absence of any contract to the contrary”. Therefore the words “in the
absence of any contract to the contrary” must also be read with sub-section

Where there is no contract to the contrary,
subsection (3), will come into play so far as sub-letting with regard to
premises used by the tenant for commercial purposes are concerned. But if there
is contract to the contrary it will govern all cases of sub-letting whether the
premises are being used for residential purposes or for commercial purposes or
for industrial purposes.

Saradindu Bhusan Nandi Vs. Gopal Ch. Roy, (1968) 20 DLR 429.


S. 18 — Bona
fide requirement— Civil Court to decide the question over again:
Controller’s decision about the bona fide requirements is not final. Civil
Court can go into that question again.

Satish Ch.
Pal Vs. Mst. Mazidan Begum (1956) 1O DLR 271.


whether the landlord requires the premises bona fide is to be determined afresh
by Civil Court after the decision of the same question by the Controller.

Nissa Bibi Vs. Faizur Rahman (1958) 10 DLR 275.


Life of the
East Bengal Rent Control Act (XVI of 1953) expired on 31.12.60—Ordinance XXV of
1961 was promulgated in July 1961 which re-enacted the provisions of the Act
XVI of 1953. In between January 1961 to July 1961 the East Bengal Rent Control
Act did not exist.

In this particular case, an application was
made w the 22nd of May, 1960 for permission to sue the defendant in eviction on
the ground of plaintiff’s bonafide use and occupation of the premises. Such
premise was granted by the Controller on the 5th of June, 1961 that is to say,
on a date when the E.B. Rent Control Act did not exist nor the Ordinance XXV of
1961 came into being.

The suit was, however, filed, on the 30th of
September, 1961. Therefore, at the time when the suit was filed, under the law,
the permission of an appropriate Rent Controller again became necessary.

Held: The
application for such permission would come within the purview of the Ordinance
because it commenced proceedings which even after the period of vacuum, was
kept alive by section 38 of the ordinance. It is true that the permission
itself was given at a time when there was a legislative vacuum, but the
permission obtained by plaintiff is one which comes within the express terms of
the subsequent legislation namely Ordinance XXV of 1961.

Further no permission of the Rent Controller
is necessary under the Ordinance of 1963 at the present moment. Therefore,
plaintiff is new competent to maintain the suit without permission of the Rent

Vs. Sekander Jahan Begum (1965) 17 DLR 347.


Sec 18 and
19 —
to institute a suit for ejectment not obtained before the filing of the suit
for ejectment in Civil Court but obtained after the institution of the suit.

A suit for ejecting a tenant filed without
previously obtaining the permission of the House Rent Controller is
maintainable though the section speaks of “no suit or proceeding by a landlord
against a tenant shall be entertained or proceeded with by any Court”. It does
not say that no suit shall be filed without the permission of the House Rent
Controller. Therefore, filing of the suit is not barred. What is barred is the
entertainment of suit by the Court which means that the suit “shall not be
considered by the Court” unless a permission from the House Rent Controller has
been produced by the landlord.

Where the landlord has after remand obtained
an order from the House Rent Controller permitting him to institute a suit that
is sufficient for the entertainment of the suit by the Court.

Dwarika N.
Das Vs. Md. Abdulla (1960) 12 DLR 423.


S.19 As regards the question of default in
payment of rent—the civil court before passing a decree has to be satisfied
over again inspite of the decision of the Rent Controller.

Notwithstanding the decision of the Rent
Controller the question whether the tenant concerned has paid rent due to the
full extent allowable by the Act within the time fixed has to be re-investigated
into by the civil court when the Suit comes up for hearing there.

There is no difference in principle between
the provisions contained in section 18 and those in section 19 of the East
Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1953.

Sundari Karmakar Vs. Dr. Mozarnmel Huq (1960) 12 DLR 720.


causes of actions were all combined in a suit for eviction in which one of the
causes of action, namely, non-payment of rent required Rent Controller’s
permission-Suit for eviction not maintainable without Rent Controller’s

Suppliers & Co. vs. Tarapada Sarkar (1961) 13 DLR 127.


Sec 19(2)
and rule 6A — Matters which should weigh before giving permission to sue the
tenant for ejectment— Ejectment sought on the ground of default— Determination
of standard rent:
Rent Controller should be a little more vigilant in safe-guarding
the interest of the tenant when the permission applied for on behalf of the
landlord to sue the tenant in ejectment is made only on the ground of default.
The Rent Controller seems to have been given powers even to determine the
standard rent of the premises when he is satisfied that reasonable grounds
exist for non-compliance with the provisions of the Act and then to allow the
tenant an opportunity to pay or deposit the arrear rent before an order is made
rejecting the application for permission.

On a construction of rule 6A read with
section 19(2) of the Act it would appear that in a case where there is a
likelihood of dispute on the score of absence of any standard rent that dispute
should be resolved by fixation of the standard rent and by allowing tenant to
pay up according to the standard rent all arrears up to the date of the order.
In the event of the tenant defaulting in such circumstances the permission to sue
in ejectment on the ground of default could be granted in favour of the

Where there has been a case for fixation of
standard rent which resulted ultimately in favour of the tenant, it means that
there was some dispute or misgivings between the parties as to what should have
been a just and fair rent technically called standard rent.

Hussain vs. Sherbanoo. (1961) 13 DLR 245.


S. 19 (2) —
Requirements of the section which must be compiled with before passing an order—if
the tenant has paid to the landlord or deposited rents before the order for
eviction is made—application to be rejected:
In a proceeding for eviction for
non-compliance with the provisions of the Act as to the payment of rent,
section 19(2) of the Act provides that the Controller, after giving the tenant
in possession of the premises an opportunity of showing cause, must consider
all the circumstances of the case and be satisfied that there has been no such
compliance with the provision of the Act as to payment or deposit of rent due
by such tenant in respect of such premises and that no reasonable grounds exist
for such noncompliance. In the latter event, if the tenant has paid to the
landlord in the manner in which the deposit is to be made under the Act, rents
allowable there under before the order kr eviction is made, then the Controller
should make an order rejecting the application.

Md. Israil Biswas
Vs. Amrita lal Chowdhury (1960) 12 DLR 404.


—Under the provisions of sub-section (2) of
sec. 19 of the Act, if the Controller is satisfied that there has been no
non-compliance with the provisions of the Act as to the payment or deposit of
rent or that reasonable grounds exist for such non compliance and if the tenant
has paid to the landlord I or has deposited in the manner provided by the Act
all arrears of the rent then he shall refuse such permission. The section
further goes on to say that if the Controller in not so satisfied or if the
tenant has not so paid or deposited the rent as allowed in this Act the
Controller shall make the order applied for. It is thus clear from the above
provisions that the Rent Controller, as also the Appellate Court, are perfectly
competent to go into this question and have in fact to be satisfied about this
question before they could make any order one way or the other.

Mulla Mahbub
Ali Vs. Janab Ali (1956) 8 DLR 448.


Under the
provisions of sec. 19(2) the Controller will give an opportunity to the tenant
of showing cause and, thereafter if he considers and if he is satisfied on
consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances that there has been
no such non-compliance with the provisions of the Act or that reasonable
grounds exist for such noncompliance even then he will reject the application
of the landlord after recording the reasons, provided the arrears are paid as
laid down in the Act.

Syed Akhter
Alam Vs. Zafirul Huq. (1957) 9 DLR 597.


Secs. 19(2)
and 21(1)

Unless arrear of rent is either
paid to the landlord or deposited in the manner provided for under sub-section
(I) of section 21 of the Act, the Rent Controller has no other alternative but
to pass the order permitting the landlord to sue the tenant for ejectment under
section 19(2) of the Act.

Mukunda Lal
Pakrashi Vs. Traders Syndicate (1957) 9 DLR 260.


S.21 Payment of rent to the E.B. Evacuee
Management Committee after the property was purchased, not valid.

Md. Anwar
Vs. Hosne Ara Begum (1962) 14 DLR 586.


Sec 21 &
22 — Deposit of rent:
Deposits of rent in the Rent Controller are Office by the tenant
under the Act – Transmission of money the landlord or hold it till doubts as to
person entitle to receive, resolved. Landlord’s acceptance with prejudice-Rent
Controller is a mere ‘conduit pipe’.

Md. Akhtar
Vs. Md. Abdus Siddique (1956) 8 DLR 272.


S.22 Acceptance of money order does not
operate as a waiver of quit notice.

Moulana Vs.
Makhan Lal Saha. (1965) 17 DLR 306.


—Provision of the section would prevail over
those of the Transfer of Property Act. Ibid.


S.23 Benefits conferred require that
provisions of the Act must be strictly complied with when a party invokes the
privileges conferred —Tenant not entitled to make repairs and recover cost
unless the condition of the section fulfilled.

Sushil Kumar
Roy Vs. Rameswar Lal Agarwala (1962) 14 DLR 352.


Provisions for
realization of repair costs under the section are merely an alternative method.
The suit premises were in a bad condition. There upon the Municipality took up
the matter and directed the defendant by a notice to re-construct the Suit
house according to a plan approved by the Municipality and other necessary
things so as to avoid interference with free flow of water with refuses. The
landlord- defendant, on getting these notices approached the tenant-plaintiffs
and asked them to take up the matter with the Municipality and execute all
necessary works of the repairs.

The plaintiffs accordingly undertook the
repairs as in case of default the structure would be demolished and they would
lose their business which they were carrying on in the suit premises.

The defendant not having paid the costs of
repairs incurred by the plaintiffs the latter sued him for recovery of the

Section 23 of the East Bengal Premises Rent
Control Act is to be read subject to the provisions of the Act. This section
provides a machinery within the Act for realizing the dues of repairs carried
out by the tenant from the landlord but it is not the exclusive method. It must
be regarded as an alternative method in addition to other methods permissible
by law. Moreover the section refers to any repairs. It was not a question of
mere repairs but it was a question of support of the suit premises as required
to be altered by the Municipality.

Kazi Md.
Ishaque Vs. Surendra Chandra Bose (1968) 20 DLR 707.


Sec 23 and
25 —
any electric supply in any premises has been discontinued by the landlord the
proper section under which the application is to be filed is section 25 of the
East Bengal Premises Rent Control Act which corresponds to section 20 of the
Rent Ordinance, and not section 23 of the Act. Section 25 of the Act also does
not provide for any penalty in case of disobedience to carry out the order of
the Rent Controller based under section 23(I) of the Act or section 20(1) of
the Ordinance. An aggrieved party can go in appeal against an order under
section 23(1) of the Act in a proceeding under section 23(2) of the Act. 7 PLR (Dac.) 1163.


Sec 25 —
Any complaint by a party under section 25 of the Act must be
brought within 6 months from the date of the commission of the act in respect
of which the complaint is brought. 7 PLR
(Dac) 1163.


Sec 29 — District
expression connotes Court of District Judge and does not refer to him as a
persona designata.

Huq.Vs. Hanif (1955) 7 DLR 287.


Sec 29 — District
Judge, not a persona designata, but is the Court of the District Judge:
The words
‘District Judge’ in section 29 of the Premises Rent Control Act mean the Court
of the District Judge and, therefore, the District Judge or the Subordinate
Judge, to whom the District Judge may transfer an appeal becomes seized of the
appeal as ordinary Courts of the country under the Code of Civil Procedure; the
said courts must also be governed by the ordinary rules of Procedure applicable
to such Courts.

Bimal Dey Vs. Mst. Halima Bai (1957) 9 DLR 213.


Sec 29
(1)(5) —
order of the Rent Controller rejecting an application for review is not
appealable. Any order passed in an appeal against such order is a nullity.

M/S Yad Mahbub and Co. Vs. Dedar Bux (1964) 16
DLR 585.


Sec 29(3)
and 29(4) —
There is a distinction between “deciding an appeal” and “disposing
an appeal”. the word “decide” connotes the determination of the questions in
issue; but “dispose” is wider and may include the power to dismiss for default’
The power to “hear and dispose’ contained in section 29 of the Act is intended
to be used at a stage before the appeal is admitted and the records of the called
for. (1957) 9 DLR 213.


—The section
as amended by section 10A of the Act—If remand order by appellate authority is
without jurisdiction:
Where there is an appeal against the decision the House-rent
Controller to the District Judge the Appellate Court allowed the same and sent
the case on remand for ascertaining the basic rent first and then for fixing a
standard rent, it was that the remand order was clearly illegal and
jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of 10A of the East Bengal Premises
Rent Control which is an amendment of section 29, sub- (4) of the Act by the
Government notification No. 14162, dated the 22nd October, 1954. No consent or
waiver on the part of any party will make the order within jurisdiction.

The decision of the House Rent Controller
remand and the decision of the Appellate there from are clearly without
jurisdiction. 8 PLR (Dac.) 1209.


S.29 (5) Provisions of Order 47. Rule 7 C.
Code are attracted by section 29(5) and therefore and appeal would lie from an
order rejecting application for review.

The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code
down in Order 47, arc attracted to sub-section (5) section 29 of the East
Bengal Premises Rent Control Act as far as they are applicable. Since Order 47
of the Code bars an appeal from an rejecting an application for review, there
can consequently be no appeal under section 29 of the Bengal Premises Rent
Control Act, 1953, from an order rejecting an application for review under sub-section
(5) of the said section.

From the specific words used in sub-section
(I) and (5) of section 29, read with the relevant rules made under the Act it
is clear that the provisions of the Order 47 rule 7 of the C.P.C., are
attracted by sub-section (5) of section 29, of the said Act.

Kazi Altaf
Hossain Vs. Mst. Matia Begun (1960) 12 DLR 118.


Sec. 29(5) —
Violation of
the provisions of the Section 29(5) is no ground to uphold an order obtained by
practicing fraud on Court.

Provisions of the C.P.Code are applicable to
proceedings before the Controller, District Judge and others appointed under
section 29(2) of the Act.

Md. Idris
Khan Vs. Haji Erfanuddin. (1957) 9 DLR 601.


Sec 29(6) —
‘Final’- This word does not take away the revisional jurisdiction of the High
Court and means only not appealable.

The world “final” occurring in section 29(6)
of the Act means that the order of the Rent Controller subject to the result of
an appeal to the District Judge is final. It does not, however, take away the
jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the District Judge’s order
under section 115. C.P.Code.

Azizul Huq.
Vs. Hanif (1955) 7 DLR 287.


Sec. 29 (6)
— Not open to revision by the High Court:
Order of the District Judge under
sec. 29 (6) of the Act, 1953, is final and not open to revision by the High
Court under section 115 of the C.P. Code. (1954)
6 DLR 206.


Sec 34 and
37 — Inspection by Rent-Controller—Procedure to follow:
When the
Rent Controller himself holds the inspection, under rule 5, he shall follow the
procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for the regular trial of
suits. The Rent Controller shall not however base his finding solely on the
result of his local inspection without giving an opportunity to the parties to
let in counter evidence or to explain what is recorded in the inspection
report. He should not put his own views or impressions after inspection of a
place. He can only make notes of inspection which should be confined to facts.

The report of a subordinate officer holding
an inspection will be treated as report of a Commissioner for local
investigation, and under Order 26 rule 2(2) C.P.C., this will be evidence in
the case and the parties with permission of the Court will be entitled to
examine the officer concerned.

Aminul Islam
Vs. Hira Miah. (1955) 7 DLR 266.


S.38 – [See under section 18 in the case of
Iftakharuddin vs. Sakander Jahan Begum (1955) 17 DLR 347 above]