SPECIAL POWERS ACT [XIV OF 1974]

Section 2(f)—

Requests made through telegrams to oppose the release of the detenu from detention on the ground that some of the activities of the detenu are prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order cannot be considered to be materials sufficient for the satisfaction of the detaining authority to make an order of detention preventing detenu from indulging in any prejudicial act within the meaning of section 2(f) of the Act.

Maniruzzaman Majumder vs Bangladesh 2 BLC 151.

Sections 2 (f)(iii) and 8—

The action of the Government taken in an extraordinary situation at the time might have been justified on the doctrine of necessity but it would never qualify as a legal order under the Act for which the ground No. 1 was not pertinent and legally available to the authority for making an order of preventive detention against the detenu and as such the decision of the authority for making order of detention was wholly unfounded in law and fact and consequently the order was liable to be declared to have been passed without lawful authority.

Mostafizur Rahman vs Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs and another 3 BLC (AD) 141.

Sections 2(f) and 8—

The alleged prejudicial reports are in fact, as vague as the grounds of detention made in different paragraphs of the grounds of detention. Several criminal cases as are pending against some other party men cannot be a ground for detention. There are no materials regarding causing damage to the electricity supply and to give arms and money to the educational institutions and through his speeches the detennu instigated and provoked the party men to cause damage to the cars, vehicles and shops and on such vague, unspecified and indefinite
reports the detenu, who was a Minister of the previous Government cannot be detained. Rather, the detenu made speeches criticising the activities of the Government which he is entitled to in a democratic Government.

Bilkis Akhter Hossain vs Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs and others 2 BLC 257

Sections 2(f) & 8—

Any subsequent detention of the same detenu on the self-same grounds is a repetition of the illegality in gross violation of the Court’s order and that may amount to a contempt of Court. The impugned order of detention is a colourable exercise of power for a collateral purpose as it was issued at the behest of a Minister.

Nurul Amin vs State 5 BLC 53.

Sections 2(f) and 8—

It appears that the detenu is the Convener of Narayanganj City BNP and he is a public figure and a member of the Supreme Court Bar Association and is associated with some educational and social institutions and is a candidate for election to the post of Chairman, Narayanganj Pourashava. Right to freedom of speech as enshrined by Article 39 of the Constitution is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the security of the State, public order, incitement to offence, etc. A democracy cannot thrive if the law
of preventive detention is allowed to be used as the Damocles’ sword to stifle the voice of people working in the public field. The best course for administration is to set the appropriate law in motion in case of violation of any law. Hence, the alleged activities of the detenu as narrated in the grounds of detention do not constitute “prejudicial act” within the meaning of section 2(f) of the Act and as such the detention order is illegal and cannot be sustained.

Halima Farzana vs Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and others 4 BLC 189.

Sections 2 (f)(ii) and 8—

The action of the Government taken in an extraordinary situation at the time might have been justified on the doctrine of necessity but it would never qualify as a legal order under the Act for which the ground No. 1 was not pertinent and legally available to the authority for making an order of preventive detention against the detenu and as such the decision of the authority for making order of detention was wholly unfounded in law and fact and consequently the order was liable to be declared to have been passed without any lawful authority.

Mostafizur Rahman vs Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs and another 3 BLC (AD) 141.

Sections 2(f), 3(2) & 8—

The other averments made in the grounds of detention are the previous history of the activities of the detenu and there is only one ground which is specific, definite and very serious in nature and it comes within the mischief of prejudicial activities as defined in sub-section 2(f) of the Act which made the detaining authority to pass the order of detention under section 3(2) of the Act and in the absence of mixing up the bad ground with the good ones it cannot spoil the entire basket.

Serazul Islam vs State 1 BLC 369.

Section 2(1)—Clauses (i) & (ii)—

Both the Government and the DM/ADM have got almost concurrent power to issue an order of detention but the power of the latter is restricted as they cannot pass an order under clauses (i) and (ii) of section 2(f) of the Act.

Serazul Islam vs State 1 BLC 369.

Section 2(f)(iv) & (v)—

In the absence of any material showing that the fortnightly journal Chinta encouraged the Ansar revolt and the article contains anything encouraging a further revolt in future it can only be said a fair criticism of the problem but it cannot be construed as a prejudicial act as contemplated under section 2(1) (iv) and (v) of the Act.

Farida Akhter vs Bangladesh and others 1 BLC438.

Sections 2(f), 3 & 8—

Collecting of children with intent to smuggle them out of Bangladesh has not been included as a “prejudicial act” as defined in section 2(f) of the Act. With a view to preventing the detenu from the act as narrated in the grounds of detention an order of detention by invoking section 3 of the Act cannot be passed.

MA Hashem vs Government of Bangladesh and ors 1 BLC 5.

Section 3—

In the case of Abdul Latif Mirza this Division has in somewhat different language reiterated the same principles laid down in the case of Baqi Baluch. If one compares the impugned passages in the judgment of Qazi Shafiuddin, I. in the context of the law as laid down in Baqi Baluch and Abdul Latif Mirza and other cases, it will be seen that the views expressed by the learned Judge are not only unacceptable but are portentous of misleading and misguiding the people about the law. The impugned decision on the face of it put the clock back which need to be adjusted for the sake of upholding the correct law. The Indian view of “subjective satisfaction” is materially different from the view that we have been following in this Court and a note of caution was given in the case of Sajeda Parvin which the learned Judge does not seem to be aware of.

Mostafizur Rahman vs Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs and another 3 BLC (AD) 141.

Section 3—

There was nothing tendentious in the interview of the detenu with the BBC and he could not be held responsible if other people were about to react violently for that interview. It was for the administration to devise ways and means for meeting such an agitational situation which was about to break out; the law does not, however, authorise the application of section 3 of the Act for detaining a person (in this case a deposed President) who was neither threatening public safety or public order nor were there materials to show that he was about to engage in acts leading to such results.

Mostafizur Rahman vs Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs and another 3 BLC(AD) 141.

Section 3—

As the detenu is a mental patient he should be enlarged on bail treating the detenu as under trial prisoner if the two criminal cases are pending or if it is found that he was discharged from criminal cases then the detenu will be released from jail.

Abul Hasnat Md Serajudoula Bhuiyan vs Government of the People Republic of Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs & others 2 BLC 420.

Section 3(1)—

The law does not authorise the Government to detain a person for maintaining public safety and public order. Rather, the authority is given to the Government if it is satisfied that it is necessary to prevent a person from doing any prejudicial act. The condition for exercise of power under section 3(1) is therefore the necessity to prevent a person from doing any prejudicial act. The impugned order does not say that the Government was satisfied that it was necessary to detain Hussain Muhammad Ershad with a view to preventing him from doing any prejudicial act.

Mostafizur Rahman vs Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs & anr 3 BLC(AD) 141.

Section 3(1)—

The law has never granted absolute power either to the Government or to the President to make an order of detention even in the circumstances mentioned in the judgment nor it is the law that the satisfaction upon which an order of detention is made is immune from challenge.

Mostafizur Rahman vs Bangladesh, and another 3 BLC (AD) 141.

Section 3(1)(a)(3)—

Where the period of detention is about to expire but the Government wants to keep the detenu in detention further it can issue detention order afresh under section 3(1) (a), but there is no scope of keeping the detention going by extending the order of detention for a further period of three months.

SM Feroj vs Government of Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Home and others 2 BLC 231.

Sections 3(1)(2)(3), 10, 11,& 12—

In view of the provisions of section 3(l)(2)(3) it is apparent that the Government is not vested under section 3(3), with the power of extension of the initial order of detention passed by the District Magistrate or the Additional District Magistrate under section 3(2) of the Act but as per provisions of section 3(1) of the Act, the powers of the Government directing a person to be detained is unlimited subject to sections 10, 11 and 12.

Yeasmin Akhter vs Bangladesh & others 1 BLC 94.

Sections 3(1)(2)(3) and 8—

The District Magistrate passed the order of detention for a period of 30 days and as such the question of approval of such order by the government does not arise, government instead of passing a fresh order of detention under section 3(1) extended it under section 3(3) of the Special Powers Act which is illegal and without jurisdiction.

Abdus Samad vs State 3 BLC 186.

Section 3(2)(3)—

The order of detention having been signed on 24-6-99, there is no scope of passing any order under sub-section (2) or (3) of section 3 of the Special Powers Act with a qualification that it will come into force on the date of service of the order upon the detenu and hence the order of detention is illegal as it is not in conformity with section 3(2)(3) of the Special Powers Act.

Mosharaf Hossain (Md) & anr vs Government of Bangladesh & 3 ors 5 BLC 575.

Section 3(3)—

The Government is not empowered to extend the period of detention under section 3(3) of the Special Powers Act so passed by the District Magistrate.

TM Shahidul Alam vs Bangladesh and others 1 BLC 416.

Section 3(3)—

In exercise of power under section 3(3) of the Act the Government cannot extend the initial order of detention passed by the district Magistrate.

Champa Begum vs Bangladesh and others 1 BLC 275.

Section 3(3)—

An order of detention passed by DWADM for 30 days only does not require approval of the Government but such approval will be necessary only if the period of detention is made for more than 30 days but the Government is not empowered to extend the period of detention beyond 30 days as passed by the DMIADM and it can only approve such an order if the detention is for more than 30 days.

Serazul Islam vs State 1 BLC 369.

Section 3(3)—

It is settled law that subsection (3) of section 3 of the Special Powers Act does not empower the Government to extend the period of detention initially ordered by the District Magistrate.

Nurul Islam (Md) vs State 1 BLC 344.

Section 4—

Section 4 of the Special Powers Act, 1974 reading with section 80 of the Code of Criminal Procedure leave no room for doubt that an order of detention passed under section 3 of the Special Powers Act, 1984 must be served on the detenu.

MA Hashem vs Government of Bangladesh and ors 1 BLC 5.

Section 7—

If after making the order, the detaining authority was satisfied that the person to be detained by the order has absconded, the authority could proceed under section 7 of the Act which relates to the procedure of punishment of an absconder and does not in any way empower the detaining authority to detain a person by an order made more than thirty days prior to the service of the order upon the detenu.

MosharafHossain (Md) & anr vs Government of Bangladesh & 3 ors 5 BLC 575.

Section 8—

It is well-settled that the materials and grounds of detention upon which the detaining authority bases its decision are subject to judicial scrutiny and if the High Court Division finds that the materials and grounds of detention being unreasonable and not on rational basis and of probative value, it can strike down the detention on such ground alone. In the instant case, the alleged three reports are absolutely unreasonable and baseless having no rational basis and probative value as the same do not disclose any source or basis. The detention of the detenu is made for political victimisation and with malafide intention to harass and lower down the prestige and image of the detenu and his political party which is now in opposition in the House of the Nation.

Bilkis Akhter Hossain vs Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs & others 2 BLC 257.

Section 8—

Considered with the background thus given the allegations of character will stick, however emphatically the appellant or the detenu may deny it, but shorn of the background the allegations as to character are incapable of any effective rebuttal in any representation against the order of detention and consequently the continued detention of the detenu is illegal and unwarranted by law.

Nasima Begum vs Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and others 1 BLC (AD) 18.

Sections 8 and 15—

All the grounds except one are absolutely vague, indefinite and lacking in material particulars as to date, place and manner which is not sustainable in law as no effective representation can be made before the authority against such grounds when specific case mentioned in the grounds is neither serious in nature nor does it fulfil any criteria as enunciated in the case reported in 45 DLR (AD) 89.

Anwar Hossain (Md) vs Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and others 5 BLC 105.

Section 8(2) and 10—

There is nothing on record to show that the grounds of detention were served upon the detenu within 15 days from passing the initial order of detention and that the detenu was placed before the Advisory Board within 120 days of detention order and as such the order of detention is illegal.

TM Shahidul Alam vs Bangladesh and others 1 BLC 416.

Section 13—

As the Government have taken steps in time for revoking the detention order upon publication of newspaper report and that the criminal cases against the detenu are pending it is expected that the provision of law shall not be discriminately misused or abused in curtailing the fundamental right of the citizen in the enjoyment of life and liberty and that no compensatory cost was awarded as the criminal cases are sub judice against the detenu.

Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST) vs Bangladesh & others 4 BLC 600.

Section 25A—

On a combined reading of section 489A-489D of the Penal Code and section 25A of the Special Powers Act it manifests that the offence of counterfeiting currency-notes as defined in section 489A- 489D of the Penal Code is alike as in section 25A of the Special Powers Act when the alleged allegations of the prosecution clearly attract the definition of counterfeiting.

Ayub Ali alias Md Ayub Ali and another vs State 5 BLC 345.

Section 25(B)—

The allegations as disclosed in the FIR or in the charge-sheet do not disclose any offence either under the Special Powers Act or any other law and as such the proceeding is an abuse of the process of Court and for ends of justice it is quashed.

Atiqur Rahman Chowdhury (Md) vs State 3 BLC 473.

Section 25B—

The seizure list witnesses were declared hostile and the prosecution cross-examined them but the PWs 1 and 5 have proved that the appellants were apprehended from the truck at about midnight along with the contraband articles but the defence failed to challenge such facts and the seized articles were of Indian origin and as such there is nothing to disbelieve the prosecution case.

Hasanuzzaman and others vs State 1 BLC 219.

Section 25B—

As the appellants were apprehended with the contraband articles it was the duty upon the appellants to explain the circumstances under which they had been within their knowledge and since they failed to perform such duties the only inference that could be drawn under section 25B of the Special Powers Act was that the appellants were either smugglers or aided or abetted the smuggling or kept the contraband articles in their possession for sale, etc.

Hasanuzzaman and others vs State 1 BLC 219.

Section 25B(1)(2)—

As the heroin was not recovered from the possession of the accused persons at the time of their coming to Bangladesh but it was recovered from the hotels at the showing to the accused persons kept for the purpose of sale having been satisfactorily proved by reliable evidence, section 25B(2) of the Act is attracted instead of section 25B (1).

State vs Raja Abdul Majib and others 1 BLC 144.

Section 25B(1)(b)—

The allegation of contraband goods were kept in the house of the appellant at least cast doubt by the evidence of PW 6 that the building wherefrom the Indian goods were seized might not be the house of the appellant and, as such, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt.

Abdur Rob alias Nedon Miah vs State 1 BLC 270.

Section 25B(1)(a)—

Keeping of National VCR in one’s house even where the house is near the border of the country does not by any stretch of imagination suggest that it was kept for taking out of Bangladesh for the purpose of smuggling.

Abdur Rob alias Nedon Miah vs State 1 BLC 270.

Section 25B(2)—

In view of the contradictions and failure of the prosecution to identify the place of occurrence and want of evidence as seizure of salt from the kitchen of appellant and the alleged salt was of Indian origin or that these were smuggled into Bangladesh by the appellant or that the seized salt is a contraband goods and in the absence of such proof the conviction and sentence against the appellants are not sustainable.

Nowsher Mollah, @ Md Nowsher Ali Mollah vs State 3 BLC 251.

Section 25B(2)—

When all the PWs being police persons and members of the police force are not disinterested witnesses as they are interested in the result of the case where corroboration on some facts with one another, if any, cannot be accepted as independent corroboration as required under law to prove the charge beyond doubt when no independent impartial disinterested neighbour witnesses as required under section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be examined to prove the recovery and seizure list and also to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove beyond all reasonable doubt the recovery and seizure of the seized articles from the actual possession and control of the convict appellants who are entitled to get benefit of doubt and also are entitled to get acquitted.

Jewel and another vs State 5 BLC 248.

Sections 25B and 27(6)—

The publication of notice under section 27(6) of the Special Powers Act is not required in this case as the convict petitioner and two others absconded after being enlarged on bail and it cannot in any way be said that there is no evidence for implicating the petitioner and two others and the petitioner was a fugitive from justice and hence the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence cannot be quashed.

Toffazel Hossain vs State, represented by the Deputy Commissioner 5 BLC 44.

Section 26—

It is well settled that if a non-schedule offence is included in the trial of a schedule offence the trial does not necessarily become void or without jurisdiction. As the evidence of the witnesses have been elaborately recorded by the Tribunal, no prejudice has been caused to the appellants by the Tribunal during trial.

Aminul Islam alias Ranga and others vs State 5 BLC(AD) 179.

Section 26—

Merely because of section 26(2) of the Special Powers Act the Sessions Judge does not ipso facto become an ‘Exofficio Special Tribunal’ and the offence mentioned in the schedule of the Act cannot be registered as Sessions Case to be tried by Sessions Judge and the offence under Article 4 (b) of the Cruelty to Women (deterrent punishment) Ordinance, 1983 is distant and different forum from the Court of Session.

Abdul Mannan and others vs State 2 BLC 1.

Section 27—

While considering the police report (FRT) the Special Tribunal heard the learned Advocates of the parties and on perusal of the record and case diary took cognizance, as above, after observing that a prima facie case was made out by the prosecution but the Tribunal could not agree with the opinion of the IO and took cognizance on the basis of the materials on record.

Bikish Miah vs State 3 BLC (AD) 182.

Section 27—

The learned Special Tribunal committed no illegality in framing charge against the appellants under section 489A-489D of the Penal Code read with section 25A of the Special Powers Act after taking cognisance of the offence of cunterfeiting currency-notes joining together for trial the schedule and non-schedule offences as before commencing the trial it cannot be said that the accused-appellants are likely to be prejudiced by such mis-joinder as the framing of such charge for a schedule and non-schedule offence cannot be saidm to be altogether without jurisdiction.

AyubmAli alias Md Ayub Ali and another vs State 5 BLC 345.

Section 27(6)—

Trial in absentia without publication vitiates the trial—case remanded to the trialCourt—The petitioner was tried in absentia by the Special Tribunal but the provisions of section 27(6) of Special Powers Act was complied with by the Magistrate concerned. The petitioner was apprehended 3 years after the pronouncement of the judgment which is under challenge under section 561A of the Code. The High Court Division under inherent powers to secure ends of justice can send back the case on remand to the trial Court for giving an opportunity to the petitioner to cross examine the PWs and to try the case of the petitioner only in accordance with law as the trial was vitiated for non-compliance of the mandatory provision of law by the Special Tribunal.

Abdul Khalique alias Mona vs State 2 BLC 423.

Section 27(6)—

The publication of notice under section 27(6) of the Special Powers Act by the Magistrate and holding of trial by the learned Tribunal without publication of notice under the said section has made the entire trial illegal and without jurisdiction cannot be cured under section 537, CrPC.

Samiul Haider alias Kuib vs State 3 BLC 437.

Section 27(6)—

By the amending Act the word ‘shall” in place of the word ‘may was substituted in section 27(6) of the Special Powers Act making the provision of publishing directing the absconding accused person to appear at least in two Bengali daily newspapers by a Special Tribunal as mandatory, non-compliance of such mandatory provision is not an irregularity but glaring illegality not curable under section 537 of the Code.

Abdul Khalique alias Mona vs State 2 BLC 423.

Section 30—

The appellant having not been named in the FIR and the arms having not been recovered from him, the prayer for bail is allowed for a period of 6 months.

Sayed Kawser @ Ahad vs State 3 BLC 55.

Section 30—

In view of the fact that only two bottles of Phensidyl were recovered from the appellant, he is enlarged on bail.

Shafique vs State 3 BLC 196.

Section 30—

Since the judgment of acquittal does not suffer from any patent illegality and perversity carrying a grave injustice, it does not warrant any interference under section 30 of the Special Powers Act.

Haren Halder vs Md Akkas Ali & ors 3 BLC 455.

Section 30—

Admittedly as there is enmity between the informant and the wife of informant’s brother-in-law who filed many cases implicating the son of the informant and no infection or injuries was found in the medical report and no stain of semen was noticed on the petticoat and the FIR was filed after 15 hours of the time of occurrence in a written Ejahar and in such circumstances, for ends of justice the appellants are enlarged on bail.

Mustafa Tauhidur Noor and others vs State 1 BLC 589.

Section 30—

It appears from the impugned order, the First Information Report, the police report and other materials on record that the Special Tribunal was not justified in refusing the prayer for bail of the appellant in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreover, the Special Tribunal rejected the prayer for bail without applying his judicial mind and as such the impugned order is liable to be set aside and the appellant is entitled to be enlarged on bail is the interest of justice.

Mosharaf Hossain vs State 1 BLC 551.

Section 30—

As the charge-sheet was submitted on 21-11-1995 and then the appellant voluntarily surrendered before the court and then he was sent to jail and the other co-accused are on bail and different dates were fixed for framing of charge but charge could not be framed because the learned Public Prosecutor prayed for adjournment and thereby the disposal of the case is being delayed for no fault of the appellant and there is no early chance of framing charge and holding trial and in such circumstance the appellant is entitled to be enlarged on bail till conclusion of the trial.

Mihir Dutta vs State I BLC 591.

Section 30—

The charge-sheet of the case was submitted on 29-3-98 and then it was sent for trial on 29-3-98 and then charge was framed on 7-6-98 but not a single witness has yet been examined in this case when out of 16 charge sheet witnesses, 10 witnesses are police personnel including the informant. In such a position of uncertainty of concluding trial it will be improper to keep the appellant in jail custody for an indefinite period and hence the appeal is allowed enlarging the appellant on bail. The question of recovering a revolver from the possession of the appellant is a matter to be decided at the time of trial.

Anowar Hossain @ Mohasin @ Anar vs State 5 BLC 143.

Section 30—

Considering all the aspects of the case particularly its slow progress the High Court Division is inclined to enlarge the appellant on bail.

Akkas Ali vs State 5 BLC 420.

Section 30—

While admitting another criminal appeal against framing of charge filed by other co-accuseds all further proceeding of the case pending in the Tribunal has been stayed and no step has been taken by the Government for early hearing of that appeal. Since all the co-accuseds are on bail and it is uncertain when the said appeal will be disposed of and when the trial shall commence and in such circumstances ends of justice will be met if the appellant is enlarged on bail.

Liton vs State 2 BLC 355.

Section 30—

The appellant was enlarged on bail and then he absconded and in his absence the charge was framed as back as on 22-6-94 and subsequently he was arrested by police but his application for bail was rejected on 19-8-1996. Although the charge was framed long ago but not a single witness has yet been examined in the case and there is no certainty when the trial shall be concluded and some co-accused who stand on the same footing are on bail till the conclusion of the trial.

Montaz alias Monta vs State 2 BLC 482.

Section 30—

The informant-appellant was prevented from leading evidence material to the charge beyond his control and there was no real trial and the decision of the case resulted in grave injustice to the prosecutor and the prosecution should be afforded an opportunity to prove its case and after setting aside the judgment of acquittal the case was sent back on remand to the trial Court for holding trial by calling the prosecution witnesses.

Manik (Md) vs Chand Mian Sarder and others 4 BLC 152.

Sections 30 & 32—

Grounds for granting bail—The allegation made against the appellant is one of causing hurt by ram dao which definitely does come within the mischief of Explosive Substances Act and the allegation of explosion of bombs has been made in lump but the appellant surrendered before the CMM, Khulna immediately after filing the FIR and he never misused the privilege of bail and as such there should not be any discrimination in granting bail to appellant when other accused persons are enjoying the privilege of bail.

Yonus Member vs State 1 BLC 451.

Sections 30 and 32(c)(i)(ii)—

Bail—The prosecution story as disclosed in the FIR, the 161 statement of the witnesses and the charge-sheet voice the story that the alleged revolver’ was in possession of the absconding principal accused, who brought it out from his pocket and handed it over to the accused-appellant and fled away in presence of the informant and other police personnels does not disclose prima facie complicity of the appellant who is entitled to get bail.

Shahan (Md) vs State, represented by the Deputy Commissioner 2 BLC 279.

Section 32—

After conviction of an accused, even in a bailable offence, he cannot claim his bail as a matter of right which is absolutely a discretion of the court and this discretion is neither arbitrary nor capricious nor whimsical, and it should be exercised judicially with care and caution in the facts and circumstances of the case.

Abdul Sardar vs State 1 BLC 545.

Section 32-

Trial Court convicted and sentenced the petitioner under section 25B of the Special Powers Act for 3 years, the High Court Division granted bail on the grounds that the appellant petitioner was merely a helper of a truck and there was no chance of early disposal of the appeal and he had been in custody since 17-6-98.

Samnjan alias vs State 3 BLC 464.

Section 32—

As the appellant has been in custody since 3-5-92 without any trial, no charge has yet been framed, the trial is being delayed without any fault on the part of the appellant and the other co-accused persons have been enjoying the privilege of bail given by the Special Tribunal, the High Court Division clearly failed to apply their judicial mind in dismissing the appeal for bail summarily when the appellant was entitled to be released on bail.

Nurul Amin @ Bada vs State 1 BLC (AD) 115.

Section 32—

The petitioners were convicted under section 25B(1) and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 5 years but as they have been in custody for more than one and a half month being pardanashin ladies having children they were enlarged to be released on bail.

Jahura Khatun and another vs State 4 BLC 624.