“Strong barrier for Real Democracy cultivate cultivation”-explain
INTRODUCTION
This topic attempts to delve into one of the provocative questions since the inception of the drafting the Constitution of Bangladesh in 1972. This provision of the constitution is contained in the Article 70 of the Constitution of Bangladesh. Even after 15 amendments to the Constitution, that was promulgated 40 years ago in 1972, Article 70 stands proudly and relatively unhurt, stating as follows:
“70. A person elected as a member of Parliament at an election at which he was nominated as a candidate by a political party shall vacate his seat if he
(a) resigns from that party; or (b) votes in Parliament against that party; but shall not thereby be disqualified for subsequent election as a Member of Parliament.”
The very notion of a parliament being a place where its members come together and discuss an concern, try to convince fellow members to support their grounds and then call for voting, is a completely extraterrestrial concept to Bangladeshi parliamentary democracy[1]. We can hardly recall having heard of ‘close vote’ in Parliament, neither have we heard that the government losing on a bill, irrespective of how unpopular a particular bill has been. No government has had to rally for public support on issues it has tried to push through the legislature. The question is, why would it have to, when it possesses the luxury of Article 70?
If I am to single out one provision of law in Bangladesh for its contribution towards holding back our otherwise promising parliamentary democracy, it would most certainly be Article 70 of the Constitution. Article 70 bars an MP from voting against his/her party in Parliament. Originally designed to prevent MPs from engaging in what is known as “floor-crossing”, i.e. changing party loyalty after being elected, the barrier of Article 70 is not absolute, in the sense that an MP can still vote against his party; but, in fact at the high cost of losing his/her Parliament membership and therefore at the same time, ceasing to be a representative of his/her people.
Therefore, I strongly feel that this sort of hindrance is a strong barrier for cultivation of real democracy, which in turn appreciates the tendency of dictatorship.
Reservations with regard to Article 70 have been there since the birth of the Constitution and there was lack of consensus in opinions even within the constitution drafting committee. The day after the beginning of the Constitution’s journey, the constituent assembly formed a constitution drafting committee consisting of 34 members under the chairmanship of the law minister Dr. Kamal Hossain. The committee came up with the draft of the constitution. It included the restrictions imposed by the Bangladesh Constituent Assembly Members (cessation of membership) Order 1972 in the draft constitution in the form of Article 70. Four members of the constitution drafting committee, who belonged to the ruling Awami League, strongly opposed some of the draft provisions including the Article 70 and gave note of dissents.
Hafiz Habibur Rahman, in his note of dissent, said, “Nowhere in the democratic world, membership of Parliament ceases on the ground of one’s expulsion from a political party. Such cessation of Parliamentary membership may be found only in a dictatorship where system of one party prevails. A Member of Parliament is elected by the voters and not by party members. Once he is elected, he becomes a member of National Assembly and he no longer remains simply a member of his political party.”
He said the system such cessation of membership would result in party dictatorship and dictatorship of party leader. A party can never have right to nullify the verdict of the people, i.e. election, and here is where I agree with him and find it totally undemocratic to bar an MP from voting against his/her own party. Because, as a voter, I expect my MP, should he win, to speak for me, my country as a whole, and not be the parrot of his own party? That my understanding of whole idea of an electoral system, a democratic government.
Habibur Rahman further said, “If such a system is retained, the members would not have courage to raise their voice against the misdeeds of his party-Minister and Prime Minister even in the parliamentary party meeting for fear of being victimized by the party.”
Abdul Muntaquim Chowdhury, another member of the constitution drafting committee, argued that countries in which parliamentary democracy has been firmly established were pulling on very well without a provision like this[2]. He added, “But since we are going to introduce Parliamentary democracy for the first time in this country, we should, in the initial stage, guard against any possible attack on it. So, at least as a transitional arrangement it is necessary to put such restrictions on the members of the Parliament,”
Although I strongly oppose his note of dissent, he was actually against inclusion of the provision in the constitution. He suggested that such a provision could be made by enacting a law to achieve the same objective without a constitutional provision.
Subtle ambiguity, however, have had no bearing on ground authenticity. None except one MP, so far, has taken the leap against Article 70. The practical effect of this understanding has been that, sadly, since the very beginning of our country, following governments have used our Parliament only as a rubber stamp to authorize or permit its pre-determined actions. No party in power has fear or detrimental decision of the government. A decision party MP speaking beside the government is free to address his mind on the Parliament floor but the sovereignty ends once the Speaker calls for votes.
A Sub-continental Problem ?
The Tenth agenda of the Constitution of India while defining “defection” state that a constituent of assembly will lose his/her seat if s/he votes or abstain from voting:
“…divergent to any direction issued by the political party to which he belong or by any person or ability approved by it in this behalf, without obtaining, in either case, the prior authorization of such political party, person or authority and such selection or nonparticipation has not been condone by such political party, person or influence within fifteen days from the date of such determination or refraining.”
The stipulation would suggest, firstly, that there must be an convey “direction issued” by the party, meaning that in the position that the party does not “issue” a “route” upon its members, they can vote as they wish. Secondly, to circumvent losing their seat, an MP has the option of seeking authorization to vote alongside the issued direction. Thirdly, even if they fail to achieve permission prior to the voting, they still have the option of apply for cond nation within 15 days of voting.
Article 63A of the Pakistani structure, the provision that deals with prohibition of parliament members; provide even wider exceptions to the general rule of official position voting. The constraint on the member’s voting or nonparticipation is limited to three situations only: (i) ballot vote of the Prime Minister or the Chief Minister; (ii) a vote of assurance or a vote of no-confidence; or (iii) a Money Bill or a foundation (revision) Bill.
Democracy hits brick wall:
At its simplest core, democracy means government of the “demo” or people. The two other thinking democracy by the people and equality for the people — then repeatedly follow, illustrate that the reach of the “demo” in governing the state does not stop at the summit where they have elected the legislature to protect their interests in the elected representatives. Rather, stable checks and balances must continue living to ensure that those council are constantly representing the benefit of the people and effective for them.
In our system of parliamentary democracy, however, the command of the people ends at appointment time when they have chosen their delegates to the governmental meeting[3]. Once an MP is elected, they have no further legal commitment to vote in Parliament as their voters unswerving, instead, our foundation dictates that guidelines to be obeyed by them are to come from the party that designated them. No matter how much a diplomat of the people may be influenced by their constituent, or regardless of how much their scruples may beg of them to challenge a party decision, they must track their party superiors. equality then hits a brick wall.
In a energetic democracy, egalitarian practice or power of the people should not end with the cast of a ballot. But regrettably for us, as soon as we have elected our delegate lawmaker, he is out of our hands and in the charge of the party that voted him. This really begs the question — how successful, if at all, is the Parliament in debating national policy? The government asking the opposition to attend Parliament is a familiar media headline. But sadly, no party in power has taken a principled stance against Article 70, which practically renders the opposition powerless in Parliament. [4] In a way, our formation, through Article 70, reiterates the old Bangla saying: “You’re invited to argue with me about who owns the taal-gachh, but keep in mind that the taal-gachh is mine!”
After so many years of democracy and with the existence of a strong bi-partisan political system, unfounded fears of “floor-crossing” are hardly any justification for holding back MPs from liability what they are command to do. It seems likely that without a wholesale scrap of the condition and address the issue head-on, the opportunity will go misplaced for a vibrant parliamentary culture.
In responsibility so, the regime forget the people’s objective it cite just three years ago. “It is the apparent target of the people of Bangladesh that a parliamentary social equality shall purpose in Bangladesh,” announce the conditional constitution order 1972 for overture of the parliamentary equality.
CONCLUSION:
Nobody knows how long the dark shadow of article 70 will linger in compel, make the people’s council subservient to the opinionated party. In contrast, the supervisory subdivision has been consolidate its situation in all unholy ways, making difference of power and withdrawing the outlook of good governance. Nothing can throw in significantly to convert the parliament into country’s superlative political institution to represent the popular will until MPs are set free from the rigid restriction of the following parties.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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[1] Okoro, C. (2010, June). Law and the State: a Philosophical Evaluation. 7.1/7.2, 136.
[2] Benson, E. T. (1987, September). The Constitution—A Glorious Standard.
[3] Liton, S. (2010, November). Of Chaos, Confusion and our Constitution. The Daily Star, 3(11).