Act done by a person bound, or by mistake of fact believing himself bound, by law
76. Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith believes himself to be, bound by law to do it.
Illustrations
(a) A, a soldier, fires on a mob by the order of his superior officer, in conformity with the commands of the law. A has committed no offence.
(b) A, an officer of a Court of Justice, being ordered by that Court to arrest Y, and, after due enquiry, believing Z to be Y, arrests Z. A has committed no offence.
Act of judge when acting judicially
77. Nothing is an offence which is done by a Judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or which in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law.
Act done pursuant to the judgment or order of Court
78. Nothing which is done in pursuance of, or which is warranted by the judgment or order of, a Court of Justice, if done whilst such judgment or order remains in force, is an offence, notwithstanding the Court may have had no jurisdiction to pass such judgment or order, provided the person doing the act in good faith believes that the Court had such jurisdiction.
Act done by a person justified, or by mistake of fact believing himself justified, by law
79. Nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith, believes himself to be justified by law, in doing it.
Illustration
A sees Z commit what appears to A to be a murder. A, in the exercise, to the best of his judgment, exerted in good faith of the power which the law gives to all persons of apprehending murderers in the act, seizes Z, in order to bring Z before the proper authorities. A has committed no offence, though it may turn out that Z was acting in selfdefence.
Accident in doing a lawful act
80. Nothing is an offence which is done by accident or misfortune, and without any criminal intention or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful means and with proper care and caution.
Illustration
A is at work with a hatchet; the head flies off and kills a man who is standing by. Here if there was no want of proper caution on the part of A, his act is excusable and not an offence.
Act likely to cause harm, but done without criminal intent and to prevent other harm
81. Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if it be done without any criminal intention to cause harm, and in good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or property.
Explanation.-It is a question of fact in such a case whether the harm to be prevented or avoided was of such a nature and so imminent as to justify or excuse the risk of doing the act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause harm.
Illustrations
(a) A, the captain of a steam vessel, suddenly and without any fault or negligence on his part, finds himself in such a position that, before he can stop his vessel, he must inevitably run down a boat B, with twenty or thirty passengers on board, unless he changes the course of his vessel, and that, by changing his course, he must incur risk of running down a boat C with only two passengers on board, which he may possibly clear. Here, if A alters his course without any intention to run down the boat C and in good faith for the purpose of avoiding the danger to the passengers in the boat B, he is not guilty of an offence, though he may run down the boat C by doing an act which he knew was likely to cause that effect, if it be found as a matter of fact that the danger which he intended to avoid was such as to excuse him in incurring the risk of running down C.
(b) A, is a great fire, pulls down houses in order to prevent the conflagration from spreading. He does this with intention in good faith
Act of a child under nine years of age
Act of a child above nine and under twelve of immature understanding
Act of a person of unsound mind
Act of a person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication caused against his will
Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated
Act not intended and not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, done by consent
Act not intended to cause death, done by consent in good faith for person’s benefit of saving human life or property. Here if it be found that the harm to be prevented was of such a nature and so imminent as to excuse A’s act, A is not guilty of the offence.
83. Nothing is an offence which is done by a child above 34[nine] years of age and under twelve, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion.
84. Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.
85. Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, is, by reason of intoxication, incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong, or contrary to law: provided that the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.
86. In cases where an act done is not an offence unless done with a particular knowledge or intent, a person who does the act in a state of intoxication shall be liable to be dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated, unless the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.
87. Nothing which is not intended to cause death, or grievous hurt, and which is not known by the doer to be likely to cause death, or grievous hurt, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, to any person, above eighteen years of age, who has given consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm; or by reason of any harm which it may be known by the doer to be likely to cause to any such person who has consented to take the risk of that harm.
Illustration
A and Z agree to fence with each other for amusement. This agreement implies the consent of each to suffer any harm which in the course of such fencing, may be caused without foul play; and if A, while playing fairly, hurts Z, A commits no offence.
88. Nothing, which is not intended to cause death, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, or be known by the doer to be likely to cause, to any person for whose benefit it is done in good faith, and who has given a consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm, or to take the risk of that harm.
Illustration
A, a surgeon, knowing that a particular operation is likely to cause the death of Z, who suffers under the painful complaint, but not intending to cause Z’s death, and intending, in good faith Z’s benefit, performs that operation on Z, with Z’s consent. A has committed no offence.
Act done in good faith for benefit of child or insane person, by or by consent of guardian
89. Nothing which is done in good faith for the benefit of a person under twelve years of age, or of unsound mind, by or by consent, either express or implied, of the guardian or other person having lawful charge of that person, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause or be known by the doer to be likely to cause to that person:
Provided-
Firstly.-That this exception shall not extend to the intentional causing of death, or to the attempting to cause death;
Secondly.-That this exception shall not extend to the doing of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous hurt; or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;
Thirdly.-That this exception shall not extent to the voluntary causing of grievous hurt, or to the attempting to cause grievous hurt, unless it be for the purpose of preventing death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;
Fourthly.-That this exception shall not extend to the abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would not extend.
Illustration
A, in good faith, for his child’s benefit without his child’s consent, has his child cut for the stone by a surgeon, knowing it to be likely that the operation will cause the child’s death, but not intending to cause the child’s death. A is within the exception, inasmuch as his object was the cure of the child.
Consent known to be given under fear or misconception
90. A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or
Consent of insane person
If the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or
Consent of child
Unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age.
Exclusion of acts which are offences independently of harm caused
91. The exceptions in sections 87, 88 and 89 do not extend to acts which are offences independently of any harm which they may cause, or be intended to cause, or be known to be likely to cause, to the person giving the consent, or on whose behalf the consent is given.
Illustration
Causing miscarriage (unless caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of woman) is an offence independently of any harm which it may cause or be intended to cause to the woman. Therefore, it is not an offence “by reason of such harm”; and the consent of the woman or of her guardian to the causing of such miscarriage does not justify the act.
Act done in good faith for benefit of a person without consent
92. Nothing is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause to a person for whose benefit it is done in good faith, even without that person’s consent, if the circumstances are such that it is impossible for that person to signify consent, or if that person is incapable of giving consent, and has no guardian or other person in lawful charge of him from whom it is possible to obtain consent in time for the thing to be done with benefit:
Provided-
Firstly.-That this exception shall not extend to the intentional causing of death, or the attempting to cause death;
Secondly.-That this exception shall not extend to the doing of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;
Thirdly.-That this exception shall not extend to the voluntary causing of hurt, or to the attempting to cause hurt, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or hurt;
Fourthly.-That this exception shall not extend to the abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would not extend.
Illustrations
(a) Z is thrown from his horse, and is insensible. A, a surgeon, finds that Z requires to be trepanned. A not intending Z’s death but in good faith for Z’s benefit, performs the trepan before Z recovers his power of judging for himself. A has committed no offence.
(b) Z is carried off by a tiger. A fires at the tiger knowing it to be likely that the shot may kill Z, but not intending to kill Z, and in good faith intending Z’s benefit. A’s ball gives Z a mortal wound. A has committed no offence.
(c) A, a surgeon, sees a child suffer an accident which is likely to prove fatal unless an operation be immediately performed. There is no time to apply to the child’s guardian. A performs the operation inspite of the entreaties of the child, intending, in good faith, the child’s benefit. A has committed no offence.
(d) A is in a house which is on fire, with Z, a child. People below hold out a blanket. A drops the child from the housetop, knowing it to be likely that the fall may kill the child, but not intending to kill the child, and intending, in good faith, the child’s benefit. Here even if the child is killed by the fall, A has committed no offence.
Explanation.-Mere pecuniary benefit is not benefit within the meaning of sections 88, 89 and 92.
Communication made in good faith
93. No communication made in good faith is an offence by reason of any harm to the person to whom it is made, if it is made for the benefit of that person.
Illustration
A, a surgeon, in good faith, communicates to a patient his opinion that he cannot live. The patient dies in consequence of the shock. A has committed no offence, though he knew it to be likely that the communication might cause the patient’s death.
Act to which a person is compelled by threats
94. Except murder, and offences against the State punishable with death, nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is compelled to do it by threats, which, at the time of doing it, reasonably cause the apprehension that instant death to that person will otherwise be the consequence: Provided the person doing the act did not of his own accord, or from a reasonable apprehension of harm to himself short of instant death, place himself in the situation by which he became subject to such constraint.
Explanation 1.-A person who, of his own accord, or by reason of a threat of being beaten, joins a gang of dacoits, knowing their character, is not entitled to the benefit of this exception on the ground of his having been compelled by his associates to do anything that is an offence by law.
Act causing slight harm
Things done in private defence
Right of private defence of the body and of property
Right of private defence against the act of a person of unsound mind, etc
Acts against which there is no right private defence
Explanation 2.-A person seized by a gang of dacoits, and forced by threat of instant death, to do a thing which is an offence by law; for example, a smith compelled to take his tools and to force door of a house for the dacoits to enter and plunder it, is entitled to the benefit of this exception.
95. Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm, is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm.
Of the Right of the Private Defence
96. Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence.
97. Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in section 99, to defend-
Firstly.-His own body, and the body of any other person against any offence affecting the human body;
Secondly.-The property, whether moveable or immovable, of himself or of any other person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass.
98. When an act, which would otherwise be a certain offence is not that offence, by reason of the youth, the want of maturity of understanding, the unsoundness of mind or the intoxication of the person doing that act, or by reason of any misconception on the part of that person, every person has the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence.
Illustrations
(a) Z, under the influence of madness, attempts to kill A; Z is guilty of no offence. But A has the same right of private defence which he would have if Z were sane.
(b) A enters by night a house which he is legally entitled to enter. Z, in good faith, taking A for a house-breaker, attacks A. Here Z, by attacking A under this misconception, commits no offence. But A has the same right of private defence against Z, which he would have if Z were not acting under that misconception.
99. There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that act may not be strictly justifiable by law.
There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that act may not be strictly justifiable by law.
There is no right of private defence in cases in which there is time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities.
Extent to which the right may be exercised
The right of private defence in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence.
Explanation 1.-A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant, as such unless he knows, or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is such public servant.
Explanation 2.-A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant, unless he knows, or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is acting by such direction, or unless such person states the authority under which he acts, or if he has authority in writing, unless he produces such authority, if demanded.
When the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death
100. The right of private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions mentioned in the last preceding section, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the assailant, if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely:-
Firstly.-Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
Secondly.-Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
Thirdly.-An assault with the intention of committing rape;
Fourthly.-An assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust;
Fifthly.-An assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting;
Sixthly.-An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person, under circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his release.
When such right extends to causing any harm other than death
101. If the offence be not of any of the descriptions enumerated in the last preceding section, the right of private defence of the body does not extend to the voluntary causing of death to the assailant, but does extend, under the restrictions mentioned in section 99 to the voluntary causing to the assailant of any harm other than death.
Commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of the body
102. The right of private defence of the body commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence though the offence may not have been committed; and it continues as long as such, apprehension of danger to the body continues.
When the right of private defence of property extends to causing death
103. The right of private defence of property extends, under the restrictions mentioned in section 99, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the wrong-doer, if the offence, the committing of which, or the attempting to commit which, occasions the exercise of the right, be an offence of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely:-
Firstly.-Robbery;
Secondly.-House-breaking by night;
Thirdly.-Mischief by fire committed on any building, tent or vessel, which building, tent or vessel is used as a human dwelling or as a place for the custody of property;
Fourthly.-Theft, mischief or house-trespass, under such circumstances as may reasonably
cause apprehension that death or grievous hurt will be the consequence, if such right of private defence is not exercised;
When such right extends to causing any harm other than death
104. If the offence, the committing of which, or the attempting to commit which, occasions the exercise of the right of private defence, be theft, mischief, or criminal trespass, not of any of the descriptions enumerated in the last preceding section, that right does not extend to the voluntary causing of death, but does extend, subject to the restrictions mentioned in section 99, to the voluntary causing to the wrong-doer of any harm other than death.
Commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of property
105. The right of private defence of property commences when a reasonable apprehension of danger to the property commences.
The right of private defence of property against theft continues till the offender has effected his retreat with the property or either the assistance of the public authorities is obtained, or the property has been recovered.
The right of private defence of property against robbery continues as long as the offender causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint or as long as the fear of instant death or of instant hurt or of instant personal restraint continues.
The right of private defence of property against criminal trespass or mischief continues as long as the offender continues in the commission of criminal trespass or mischief.
The right of private defence of property against house-breaking by night continues as long as the house-trespass which has been begun by such house-breaking continues.
Right of private defence against deadly assault when there is risk of harm to innocent person
106. If in the exercise of the right of private defence against an assault which reasonably causes the apprehension of death, the defender be so situated that he cannot effectually exercise that right without risk of harm to an innocent person, his right of private defence extends to the running of that risk.
Illustration
A is attacked by a mob who attempt to murder him. He cannot effectually exercise his right of private defence without firing on the mob, and he cannot fire without risk of harming young children who are mingled with the mob. A commits no offence if by so firing he harms any of the children.
Abetment of a thing
107. A person abets the doing of a thing, who-Firstly.-Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly.-Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or
Thirdly.-Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1.-A person who, by wilful misrepresenta-tion, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing.
Illustration
A, a public officer, is authorized by a warrant from a Court of Justice to apprehend Z. B, knowing that fact and also that C is not Z, wilfully represents to A that C is Z, and thereby intentionally causes A to apprehend C. Here B abets by instigation the apprehension of C.
Explanation 2.-Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.
Abettor 108. A person abets an offence, who abets either the commission of an offence, or the
commission of an act which would be an offence, if committed by a person capable by law of committing an offence with the same intention or knowledge as that of the abettor.
Explanation 1.-The abetment of the illegal omission of an act may amount to an offence although the abettor may not himself be bound to do that act.
Explanation 2.-To constitute the offence of abetment it is not necessary that the act abetted should be committed, or that the effect requisite to constitute the offence should be caused.
Illustrations
(a) A instigates B to murder C. B refuses to do so. A is guilty of abetting B to commit murder.
(b) A instigates B to murder D. B in pursuance of the instigation stabs D. D recovers from the wound. A is guilty of instigating B to commit murder.
Explanation 3.-It is not necessary that the person abetted should be capable by law of committing an offence, or that he should have the same guilty intention or knowledge as that of the abettor, or any guilty intention or knowledge.
Illustrations
(a) A, with a guilty intention, abets a child or a lunatic to commit an act which would be an offence, if committed by a person capable by law of committing an offence, and having the same intention as A. Here A, whether the act be committed or not, is guilty of abetting an offence.
(b) A, with the intention of murdering Z, instigates B, a child under seven years of age, to do an act which causes Z’s death. B, in consequence of the abetment, does the act in the absence of A and thereby, causes Z’s death. Here, though B was not capable by law of committing an offence, A is liable to be punished in the same manner as if B had been capable by law of committing an offence, and had committed murder, and he is therefore subject to the punishment of death.
(c) A instigates B to set fire to a dwelling-house. B, in consequence of the unsoundness of his mind, being incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is wrong or contrary to law, sets fire to the house in consequence of A’s instigation. B has committed no offence, but A is guilty of abetting the offence of setting fire to a dwelling-house, and is liable to the punishment provided for that offence.
(d) A intending to cause a theft to be committed, instigates B to take property belonging to Z out of Z’s possession. A induces B to believe that the property belongs to A. B takes the property out of Z’s possession, in good faith, believing it to be A’s property. B, acting under this misconception, does not take dishonestly, and therefore does not commit theft. But A is guilty of abetting theft, and is liable to the same punishment as if B had committed theft.
Explanation 4.-The abetment of an offence being an offence, the abetment of such an abetment is also an offence.
Illustration
A instigates B to instigate C to murder Z. B accordingly instigates C to murder Z, and C commits that offence in consequence of B’s instigation. B is liable to be punished for his offence with the punishment for murder; and, as A instigated B to commit the offence, A is also liable to the same punishment.
Explanation 5.-It is not necessary to the commission of the offence of abetment by conspiracy that the abettor should concert the offence with the person who commits it. It is sufficient if he engages in the conspiracy in pursuance of which the offence is committed.
Illustration
A concerts with B a plan for poisoning Z. It is agreed that A shall administer the poison. B then explains the plan to C mentioning that a third person is to administer the poison, but without mentioning A’s name. C agrees to procure the poison, and procures and delivers it to B for the purpose of its being used in the manner explained. A administers the poison;
Z dies in consequence. Here, though A and C have not conspired together, yet C has been
engaged in the conspiracy in pursuance of which Z has been murdered. C has therefore committed the offence defined in this section and is liable to the punishment for murder.
Abetment in Bangladesh, of offences outside it
35[108A. A person abets an offence within the meaning of this Code who, in Bangladesh, abets the commission of any act without and beyond Bangladesh which would constitute an offence committed in Bangladesh.] Abetment in Bangladesh of offences outside it
Illustration
A, in Bangladesh, instigates B, a foreigner in Goa, to commit a murder in Goa. A is guilty of abetting murder.
Punishment of abetment if the act abetted is committed in consequence and where no express provision is made for its punishment
109. Whoever abets any offence shall, if the act abetted is committed in consequence of the abetment, and no express provision is made by this Code for the punishment of such abetment, be punished with the punishment provided for the offence. Punishment of abetment if the act abetted is committed in consequence and where no express provision is made for its punishment
Explanation.-An act or offence is said to be committed in consequence of abetment, when it is committed in consequence of the instigation, or in pursuance of the conspiracy, or with the aid which constitutes the abetment.
Illustrations
(a) A offers a bribe to B, a public servant, as a reward for showing A some favour in the exercise of B’s official functions. B accepts the bribe. A has abetted the offence defined in section 161.
(b) A instigates B to give false evidence. B, in consequence of the instigation commits that offence. A is guilty of abetting that offence, and is liable to the same punishment as B.
(c) A and B conspire to poison Z. A, in pursuance of the conspiracy, procures the poison and delivers it to B in order that he may administer it to Z. B, in pursuance of the conspiracy, administers the poison to Z in A’s absence and thereby causes Z’s death. Here B is guilty of murder. A is guilty of abetting that offence by conspiracy, and is liable to the punishment for murder.
Punishment of abetment if person abetted does act with different intention from that of abettor
Punishment of abetment if person abetted does act with different intention from that of abettor 110. Whoever abets the commission of an offence shall, if the person abetted does the act with a different intention or knowledge from that of the abettor, be punished with the punishment provided for the offence which would have been committed if the act had been done with the intention or knowledge of the abettor and with no other.
Liability of abettor when one act abetted and different act done
Liability of abettor when one act abetted and different act done 111. When an act is abetted and a different act is done, the abettor is liable for the act done, in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had directly abetted it:
Provided the act done was a probable consequence of the abetment, and was committed under the influence of the instigation, or with the aid or in pursuance of the conspiracy which constituted the abetment.
Illustrations
(a) A instigates a child to put poison into the food of Z, and gives him poison for that purpose. The child, in consequence of the instigation, by mistake puts the poison into a food of Y, which is by the side of that of Z. Here if the child was acting under the influence of A’s instigation, and the act done was under the circumstances a probable consequence of the abetment, A is liable in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had instigated the child to put the poison into the food of Y.
(b) A instigates B to burn Z’s house. B sets fire to the house and at the same time commits theft of property there. A, though guilty of abetting the burning of the house, is not guilty of abetting the theft; for the theft was a distinct act, and not a probable consequence of the burning.
(c) A instigates B and C to break into an inhabited house at midnight for the purpose of robbery, and provides them with arms for that purpose. B and C break into the house, and being resisted by Z, one of the inmates, murder Z. Here, if that murder was the probable consequence of the abetment, A is liable to the punishment provided for murder.
Abettor when liable to cumulative punishment for act abetted and for act done
112. If the act for which the abettor is liable under the last preceding section is committed in addition to the act abetted, and constitutes a distinct offence, the abettor is liable to punishment for each of the offences.
Illustration
A instigates B to resist by force a distress made by a public servant. B, in consequence, resists that distress. In offering the resistance, B voluntarily causes grievous hurt to the officer executing the distress. As B has committed both the offence of resisting the distress, and the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, B is liable to punishment for both these offences; and, if A knew that B was likely voluntarily to cause grievous hurt in resisting the distress, A will also be liable to punishment for each of the offences.
Liability of abettor for an effect caused by the act abetted different from that intended by the abettor
113. When an act is abetted with the intention on the part of the abettor of causing a particular effect, and an act for which the abettor is liable in consequence of the abetment, causes a different effect from that intended by the abettor, the abettor is liable for the effect caused, in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had abetted the act with the intention of causing that effect, provided he knew that the act abetted was likely to cause that effect.
Illustration
A instigates B to cause grievous hurt to Z. B, in consequence of the instigation, causes grievous hurt to Z. Z dies in consequence. Here, if A knew that the grievous hurt abetted was likely to cause death, A is liable to be punished with the punishment provided for murder.
Abettor present when offence is committed
114. Whenever any person, who if absent would be liable to be punished as an abettor, is present when the act or offence for which he would be punishable in consequence of the abetment is committed, he shall be deemed to have committed such act or offence.
Abetment of offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life- if offence not committed; if act causing harm be done in consequence
115. Whoever abets the commission of an offence punishable with death or 36[ imprisonment] for life, shall, if that offence be not committed in consequence of the abetment, and no express provision is made by this Code for the punishment of such abetment, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine;
and if any act for which the abettor is liable in consequence of the abetment, and which causes hurt to any person, is done, the abettor shall be liable to imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to fourteen years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Illustration
A instigates B to murder Z. The offence is not committed. If B had murdered Z, he would have been subject to the punishment of death or 37[ imprisonment] for life. Therefore A is liable to imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and also to a fine; and, if any hurt be done to Z in consequence of the abetment, he will be liable to imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years, and to fine.
116. Whoever abets an offence punishable with imprisonment shall, if that offence be not committed in consequence of the abetment, and no express provision is made by this Code for the punishment of such abetment, be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for that offence for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term provided for that offence; or with such fine as is provided for that offence, or with both;
Abetment of offence punishable with imprisonment- if offence be not committed; if abettor or person abetted be a public servant whose duty it is to prevent offence
Abetting commission of offence by the public, or by more than ten persons
Concealing design to commit offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life- if offence be committed; if offence be not committed
and if the abettor or the person abetted is a public servant, whose duty it is to prevent the commission of such offence, the abettor shall be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for that offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of the longest term provided for that offence, or with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both.
Illustrations
(a) A offers a bribe to B, a public servant, as a reward for showing A some favour in the exercise of B’s official functions. B refuses to accept the bribe. A is punishable under this section.
(b) A instigates B to give false evidence. Here, if B does not give false evidence, A has nevertheless committed the offence defined in this section, and is punishable accordingly.
(c) A, a police-officer, whose duty it is to prevent robbery, abets the commission of robbery. Here, though the robbery be not committed, A is liable to one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for that offence, and also to fine.
(d) B abets the commission of a robbery by A, a police-officer, whose duty it is to prevent that offence. Here though the robbery be not committed, B is liable to one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for the offence of robbery, and also to fine.
117. Whoever abets the commission of an offence by the public generally or by any number or class of persons exceeding ten, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
Illustration
A affixes in a public place a placard instigating a sect consisting of more than ten members to meet at a certain time and place, for the purpose of attacking the members of an adverse sect, while engaged in a procession. A has committed the offence defined in this section.
118. Whoever intending to facilitate or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby facilitate the commission of an offence punishable with death or 38[imprisonment] for life,
voluntarily conceals, by any act or illegal omission, the existence of a design to commit such offence or makes any representation which he knows to be false respecting such design,
shall, if that offence be committed, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or, if the offence be not committed, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years; and in either case shall also be liable to fine.
Illustration
A, knowing that dacoity is about to be committed at B, falsely informs the Magistrate that a dacoity is about to be committed at C, a place in an opposite direction, and thereby misleads the Magistrate with intent to facilitate the commission of the offence. The dacoity is committed at B in pursuance of the design. A is punishable under this section.
Public servant concealing design to commit offence which it is his duty to prevent-
119. Whoever, being a public servant intending to facilitate or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby facilitate the commission of an offence which it is his duty as such public servant to prevent,
voluntarily conceals, by any act or illegal omission, the existence of a design to commit such offence, or makes any representation which he knows to be false respecting such design, if offence be committed;
shall, if the offence be committed, be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of the longest term of such imprisonment, or with such fine as is provided for that offence, or with both;
if offence be punishable with death, etc;
or, if the offence be punishable with death or 39[ imprisonment] for life, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years;
if offence be not committed
or, if the offence be not committed, shall be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for the offence for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term of such imprisonment or with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both.
Illustration
A, an officer of police, being legally bound to give information of all designs to commit robbery which may come to his knowledge, and knowing that B designs to commit robbery, omits to give such information, with intent to facilitate the commission of that offence. Here A has by an illegal omission concealed the existence of B’s design, and is liable to punishment according to the provision of this section.
Concealing design to commit offence punishable with imprisonment
120. Whoever, intending to facilitate or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby facilitate the commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment,
voluntarily conceals, by any act or illegal omission, the existence of a design to commit such offence, or makes any representation which he knows to be false respecting such design,
if offence be committed; if offence be not committed
shall, if the offence be committed, be punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-fourth, and, if the offence be not committed, to one-eighth, of the longest term of such imprisonment, or with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both.