“A member of parliament has no power to vote against his party as per the constitution of Bangladesh”. Explain.

Introduction

Liberal democracy has been a burning question on 21^st century. Balanced view of parliamentary freedom of vote has been requiring removal of distortions caused by regulations or the presence of government, rather than new regulations or government programs to reduce distortions caused by constitutional faults[1]. Traditional views of laissez faire, presence of restrictions over MPs vetoing right in policies have been emphasizing the distortions by government dictatorship supporting constitutional restrictions over MPs. Political analysts view argues that government has to pay a role in managing the liberally democracy by establishing freedom of voice in the parliament.

1. 1.   Restriction Over MPs Vetoing Rights

1.1  Restriction over MPs vetoing rights Bangladesh perspective

“A member of parliament has no power to vote against his party as per the constitution of Bangladesh. It he or she votes against the will of his party, through the will is mollified; he/she will loss his seat in the parliament” simply known as restriction over MPs vetoing rights of Bangladesh constitution. With an ideology of putting a bar on an MP from vetoing against his/her party in Parliament, Even after 15 amendments to the Constitution that was promulgated 40 years ago in 1972, and such Restriction Over MPs Vetoing right has been standing proudly and relatively unhurt[2]. It was originally designed to prevent MPs from engaging in what is known as ‘floor-crossing’, changing party loyalty after being elected, the barrier of vetoing restriction is not absolute, in the sense that an MP can still vote against his party. But, the fact remains that she/he can only do so at the high cost of losing his/her Parliament membership and therefore at the same time, ceasing to be a representative of his/her people. Vetoing restriction over MPs at Article 70 (a) states that “A person elected as a Member of Parliament at an election at which he was nominated as a candidate by a political party shall vacate his seat if he (a) votes in Parliament against that party; but shall not thereby be disqualified for subsequent election as a Member of Parliament or (b) resigns from that party[3].

1.2  Restriction over MPs vetoing rights Sub-Continental perspective

Draconian restrictions on its MPs are also prominent phenomenon of colonial cousins India and Pakistan. However both of these countries have imposed incorporated provisions restricting over MPs vetoing rights albeit with significant exceptions. The Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India while defining “defection” states that a member of parliament will lose his/her seat if s/he votes or abstains from vetoing:

“…contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authority authorized by it in this behalf, without obtaining, in either case, the prior permission of such political party, person or authority and such vetoing or abstention has not been condoned by such political party, person or authority within fifteen days from the date of such vetoing or abstention.”

The provision would suggest, firstly, that there must be an express “direction issued” by the party, meaning that in the situation that the party does not “issue” a “direction” upon its members, they can vote as they wish. Secondly, to avoid losing their seat, an MP has the option of seeking permission to vote against the issued direction. Thirdly, even if they fail to obtain permission prior to the vetoing, they still have the option of applying for condemnation within 15 days of vetoing.

Article 63A of the Pakistani Constitution, the provision that deals with disqualification of parliament members, provides even wider exceptions to the general rule of party-line vetoing. The restriction on the member’s vetoing or abstention is limited to three situations only: (i) election of the Prime Minister or the Chief Minister; (ii) a vote of confidence or a vote of no-confidence; or (iii) a Money Bill or a Constitution (Amendment) Bill. Although the three situations protected by the restriction covers most bills which are likely to be critical and controversial, in terms of numbers, the members are free to vote according to their conscience on most bills[4].

1.3  Restriction over MPs vetoing right Global perspective

There are certain restrictions over MPs vetoing right in the global perspective. Westminster parliamentary democracies such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa has introduced restriction over voting with the opposition against some piece of government sponsored legislation even if many of these countries have semicircular debating chambers and mechanisms for voting without Members of Parliament leaving their seats. In Australia, one of the major parties (the Australian Labor Party) forbids its members from crossing the floor, [5]while amongst other parties it is rare. Senator Barnaby Joyce of the National Party of Australia however, crossed the floor 19 times under the Howard coalition government[6].

1. 2.   Comparative Evaluation

2.1  Strong barrier for Real Democracy cultivation

 Restriction over MPs vetoing right has been leading to the defective democracies which only offers limited guaranties for political rights (exclusive democracy) where powerful groups use their influence to condition and limit the autonomy of the elected leaders (dominated democracy) (Merkl, 1999). Bangladesh constitution has been restricting the vetoing rights of MPs in the parliament, where British permanent has been following more liberal and delegate democracies (O’Donnell, 1994)[7], sometimes referred to as populist democracies which  hosts ‘clean elections’, ‘parties, parliament, and the MPs are usually free to express the criticisms’, and ‘the courts block unconstitutional policies’. Parliamentary debate in British Parliament has been a major symbolic of such delegate democracies which has been providing abundant opportunities to analysis pros and cons of proposed bills before passing through the House of Common[8].

2.1.1        Democracy hits brick wall

Restriction over MPs vetoing rights has been creating artificial crisis in good democracy procedural dimension of accountability by limiting progressive implementation of greater political, social, and economic equality (Kitschelt et al. 1999)[9]. With the simplest core, democracy stands for government of the “demos” or people serving two other notions — democracy by the people and democracy for the people –which have been illustrating that the reach of the “demos” in governing the state does not stop at the point where they have chosen the representatives to protect their interests in the legislature. Rather, constant checks and balances must exist to ensure that those representatives are constantly representing the interests of the people and working for them. In Bangladesh parliamentary democracy, however, the power of the people is limited once an MP is elected, constitutional restriction on MPs imposes further legal obligation to be obeyed by them are to come from the party direction that nominated them. No matter how much a representative of the people may be influenced by their constituents, or regardless of how much their conscience may beg of them to contradict a party decision, they must follow their party superiors. Democracy then hits a brick wall[10].

2.1.2      Destabilization of Parliaments’ scrutinize power

Due to Restriction over MPs Vetoing right, parliament has been lacking the scrutinize power. Parliament has been playing little role in the “making” of a law and only is assumed the role of “passing” it, one of the very basic principles of our Constitution, separation of powers, crumbles. A basic feature of Bangladesh Constitution as declared in judgments of her apex court is the separation of the powers of the three organs of the State, namely, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Yet, the executive goes to Parliament with its “cabinet approved” bills and whizzes them through the House. Parliament rarely scrutinizes or corrects, as if it is not an organ of the State but an organ of the executive itself. Evidences shows how these takes place around the parliamentary days. The Local Government (Amendment) Act 2011, dividing the Dhaka City Corporation, was passed in four minutes after a set of amendments to the bill proposed by an independent lawmaker was quickly gunned down by the ruling majority. The bill was hugely unpopular and it was hardly given any time for discussion either in Parliament or for public discussion in the media. But most unfortunately, the party in power did not even seek the opinion of their own MPs, the very people who were made to vote for the controversial split[11].

2.1.3      MPs’ “right (or lack of) to vote”

Proceedings of the Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsad have been lacking debate over a controversial bill or a nail-biting vote is due to the imposed restriction on MPs by Restriction over MPs Vetoing right. Objective portion of a parliament being a place where members come together and discuss an issue, try to convince fellow members to support their cause and then call for vetoing, is a concept alien to Bangladesh parliamentary democracy. Bangladesh parliament have never even executed of a close vote in Parliament, let alone the government losing on a bill, no matter how unpopular a particular bill has been. No government has had to rally for public support on issues it has tried to push through the legislature[12].

2.2  Creates tendency of Dictatorship

 Due to some voting deciplain on MPs really leads to the dictatorship tendency of majority. Such phenomenon is quit prominent in British parliamentary system. The party which commands a majority in the House of Commons forms the government. The governing party should consequently be able to pass any bill they wish through the Commons, provided that voting discipline is enforced amongst their Members of Parliament (MPs)[13]. This is accomplished largely through the whip system. The dominance of Parliament’s legislative programmed by the majority party is such that 95 per cent of bills are initiated by the government. Rebellions, though not unknown, are rare.

2.2.1        Dictatorship practices

According to Hafiz Habibur, nowhere in the democratic world, membership of Parliament has been ceasing on the ground of one’s expulsion from a political party which is a dictatorship system that support one party prevail. He further explained the issue such a system of cassation where membership would result in party dictatorship and dictatorship of party leader. Thereby A party can never have right to nullify the verdict of the people, i.e. election. He also has addressed Restriction over MPs Vetoing right as a retained system where the members would not have courage to raise their voice against the misdeeds of his party-Minister and Prime Minister even in the parliamentary party meeting for fear of being victimized by the party. On the other hand, another member of the constitution drafting committee, Asaduzzaman Khan, was more critical on inclusion of Restriction over MPs Vetoing right in the constitution. According to him, inclusion of the article is against all principles of democracy and violation of the rights of the electors, that it would render the members of the party subservient to the party high-ups and more so, when they occupy top position in the government[14].

2.2.2      A Conflicting Agenda

Restriction Over MPs Vetoing right is itself a conflicting with Article 11, 55 (3) of Bangladesh constitution. Democracy is one of the four fundamental principles of Bangladesh state policy. Article 11 has been reiterating that the Republic shall be a democracy. But Restriction over MPs Vetoing right of our Constitution directly runs counter to the very idea of democracy. It has been frustrating all positive devices in the Constitution in the name of preventing floor crossing. Secondly, article 55 (3) states, “The Cabinet shall be collectively responsible to Parliament.” This provision of collective responsibility has become empty rhetoric because of Restriction over MPs Vetoing right as the Cabinet always rests assured that it is not going to be defeated by motion of no confidence[15].

1. 3.   Comparative Assessment

From the above discussion, it can be said that Restriction over MPs Vetoing right of Bangladesh Constitution should be amended but not totally abolished. If Restriction over MPs Vetoing right is totally abolished, members of Parliament will exercise their right whenever they desire. According to analysts, Restriction over MPs Vetoing right should be applicable only in case of no-confidence motions and money bills. But in the case of ordinary bills, Restriction over MPs Vetoing right should not be applicable. Thereby a common proposal from reformers to reduce this executive dominance is to reduce the power of the majority party by adopting an electoral system based on proportional representation for the Commons[16]. The Liberal Democrats have consistently supported PR for the Commons, although without noticeable support from the other parties[17].

1. 4.   Conclusion

Overall research work is a clear indication for Bangladesh to get out of restrictions over MPs. Proper utilization of liberal democracy recounting its limitations and related factors by “Anti Defection law” that has been affecting the parliamentary democracy both directly and indirectly since 2000 is a major factor. Realistic policy implementation rather than the biased view on particular sector is necessary to explore. This recipe (constitutional reform of anti defection law) is not only essential for Bangladesh, but also for stabilizing the sub-continental liberal democracy, which is still going through the aftershocks of the political conflicts. Indeed, a more liberal parliamentary democracy stable global democracy will support right to voice in the emerging transformational democracy, with less and less restricted democracy on Bangladesh, and will provide mutually beneficial growth opportunities for both developed and developing countries.

1. 5.   References

 Article 70 (1) n.d, ‘Article 70 (1) Constitution of Bangladesh: Some observations.’ Retrieved on May 5, 2011, from http://ronyasia.blogspot.com/2011/05/article-70-1-constitution-of-bangladesh.html

Bangladesh constitution agenda n,d, ‘Bangladesh Constitution: An agenda for reforms’, Retrieved on November 10, 2011, from http://mohammadrayhanuddin.blogspot.com/2011/11/bangladesh-constitution-agenda-for.html

Crossing the floor in the Federal Parliament 2004, Research Note no. 11 2005–06. Australian Parliament

Debelle, Penelope 2008,  independently inclined” The Age.

Elective dictatorship 1976, The Listener, pp. 496–500

Hogg fears for British constitution 1969, The Times, p. 6

Liton, S 2011, ‘3 NOs on MPs’, The Daily Star, Retrieved on November 16, 2011, from http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=187656

Macafee, Michelle (April 11, 2006). “Proposed reforms would ban floor-crossing in Man.”. Canadian Press. Archived from the original on March 23, 2007.

Mahbub, S 2012,’ Can Parliament be more than a Rubber Stamp?’The Daily Star, Retrieved on April 6, 2012, from http://www.thedailystar.net/forum/2012/April/price.htm

Mr. Hogg’s way to end the tyranny of Whitehall 1968, The Times, p. 10; a

Protect freedom of speech n.d, ‘Amend Section 5 to protect freedom of speech, MPs say.’ Retrieved on May 5, 2011, BBC, from http://www.christian.org.uk/news/amend-section-5-to-protect-freedom-of-speech-mps-say

Tight rein on MPs n.d,’ Article 70: A tight rein on MPs’, The Daily Star, Retrieved on June 10, 2011, from http://www.thedailystar.net/suppliments/2011/anniversary/section2/pg9.htm

“The Elections Reform Act – Schedule E”. Statutes of Manitoba. Manitoba Laws. 2006.

 The Rule of the Monk 1870, The Times, p. 4