Appellate Division Cases
(Civil)
PARTIES
Aloke Nath Dey………………….Appellants
-vs-
Government of Bangladesh …………Respondent
JUSTICE
Mainur Reza Chowdury. C.J
Syed J.R. Mudassir Husain. J
Abu Sayeed Ahammed J
JUDGEMENT DATE: 11th March 2003.
The Succession Act, 1925, Section 370-381, 372. Sub-Section (2) The Wealth Tax Act, 1957, Section 2(m).
Mt. Shyam Sundari Devi and others v. Sarti Devi and others reported in AIR 1962 Patna
220. State Bank of India v. Netai Ch. Porel reported in AIR 1982 Cal. 92. Dina Nath v. Balkrishna, AIR 1963 All. 46. Muthupalaniapa Chettiar v. Alagamal Achi. AIR 1961 Mad. 438 at p. 442.
Since the ornaments were mortgaged with ‘H.Dey Jewellers’ the appellant had no right, title and interest in the mortgaged property and as such no succession certificate could be issued in favour of his heir……………. (4)
That the High Court Division failed to consider that the word ‘debt’ has not been defined in the Succession Act and that it has been given various meanings with reference to particular legislation where the definition of debt was required to be given and as such word ‘debt’ is to be ordinarily understood as a sum of money due under an express or implied agreement or an amount due or payable from one person to another in return for money but is liability owing from one person to another whether in cash or account’ secured or unsecured, whether ascertained or ascertainable arising out of such obligation expressed or implied ……………..(5)
The facts and circumstances indicate that the ornaments now lying with the Bangladesh Bank or with the appellant in respect of which succession certificate is asked for cannot be construed as a debt. These were not kept by any of the petitioners of the succession certificate or by their father. Those were recovered or seized by a Magistrate and were lying in safe custody in Bangladesh bank. So, by no stretch of imagination this covers the definition of word ‘dept’ and when sections 370-381 in the succession Act deals with the issuance of succession certificate in respect of securities and depts. and when the ornaments were fond to be not securities and debts” ……………………(6)
This aspect of the matter distinguishes the case from the facts of the case before the Calcutta High Court. Here the deceased Juthikabala herself deposited the articles with the Bank for safe custody, she had the option to go and collect it at anytime she liked. The Bank was merely a custodian of the same …………………(21)
In conclusion we find that although in the facts and circumstances the ornaments recovered from H. Dey Jewellers and kept with the Bangladesh Bank is a debt, ought to be returned to the real owners, it appears from the power of attorney that Aloke Nath Dey as the heir of Haladhar Chandra Dey is not the only claimant to the ornaments and as such the granting of succession certificate in his favour for the entrie Jeweelery by the District Delegate, Khulna in Miscelleneous Case No. 121 of 1997 was illegal ……………………….(27)
Civil Appeal No. 222 of 2000. (From the Judgment and order dated 18 February 1999 passed by the High Court Division, Dhaka in First Appeal No. 19 of 1998)
Abdul Waclud Bhuiyan Senior Advocate, instructed by Mvi,. Md. Wahidulla’i, Advocateon-Record ……………….For the Appellant
Abdur Razaque Khan, Additional Attorney General, instructed by Ahsanulkh Patwary,
Advocate-on-Record………………………. For Respondent
JUDGMENT
1. Mainur Reza Chowdhury, C. J:- This appeal by leave has arisen from the impugned judgment and order dated 18.2.1999 passed by a Division Bench of High Court Division in First Appeal No. 19 of 1998 setting aside the judgment and order dated 5.1.1998 passed by the Subordinate Judge and District Delegate in Miscellaneous Case No. 121 of 1997 granting succession certificate to the appellant under Section 372 of the Succession Act.’,
2. The case of the appellant in short is that one Haladhar Chandra Dey, the proprietor of M/S. H. Dey Jewellers, a jewellary shop situated in Khulna died in Calcutta on 4™ June, 1970 . His ordinary residence at the time of death was in the town of Khulna. He left behind 5(five) sons of whom the appellant Aloke Nath Dey is the only one alive. The appellant is the only survivor and legal heir of the deceased. He was entitled to succession certificate of the debts and securities of the deceased Haladhar Chandra Dey. Deceased Haladhar Chandra Dey left no will and there was no impediment in granting succession certificate in favour of the appellant. The further case of the appellant is that during the war of liberation they left khulna town and during that time Haladhar Chandra Dey left gold ornaments, silver ornaments and bronze ornaments as described in annexure ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C to the petition for succession certificate in the iron safe in the shop. All these ornaments were taken by police from his Jewellary shop vide G.D. entry No. 279 of 1971 dated 8.4.1971 Mr. A.R. Bhuiyan, Magistrate. First Class, Khulna went to Kotwali police inventory of the ornaments as contained in Annexure-A to C to the petition for succession certificate. The ornaments so seized were kept in the State Bank of Pakistan in Khulna. The further case of the appellant is that some of those ornaments were mortgaged to “H. Dey Jewellers” by different customers on different dated for loans taken by them.
3. A petition for succession certificate was filed earlier as Miscellaneous Case No. 203 of 1981 but the same was withdrawn with permission to sue oftersh. A fresn petition was thereafter filed with the prayer to grant succession certificate.
4. One Haji Tasiruddin Shah was added as opposite party in Miscellaneous Case No. 138 of 1982 asserting that Haladhar Chandra Dey died in the middle of 1970 at Calcutta Medical College Hospital while under treatment leaving 5 sons including the appellant . During the war of liberation Haladhar Chandra Dey Jewellery shop was looted by miscreants. This opposite party took1 initiative in making a G.D. Entry No. 279 djited 8.4.1971 in.fcotwali P.S Khulna and deposited the iron sa/e there, wherefrom the same was deposited in the then State Bank of Pakistan. Subdequently the appellant received a sum of Tk. 5 lacs from him and relinquished their claim to the ornaments etc. kept in the said iron safe. His further case was that the instant application for succession certificate has not been filed by the appellant but same has been filed by his alleged attorney Mr. Lutfor Rahman Sarder fraudulently and for grabbing the property and a such the application was liable to be dismissed. The Government of Bangladesh contested the case asserting that the power of attorney dated 11.9.1981 in favour of Mr. Lutfor Rahman Sarder was fraudulent, collusive and forged and as such Mr. Lutfor Rahman Sarder had no locus standi to file this case for succession certificate. Since the ornaments were mortgaged with “H.Dey Jewellers’ the appellant had no right, title and interest in the mortgaged property and as such no succession certificate could be issued in favour of his heir. Moreover, many of the mortgagers were dead and in the meantime Haladhar Chandra Dey left for India and they could not be represented by an attorney in the instant case.
5. The succession certificate was granted by the District Delegate. The judgment and order granting succession certificate was set aside by the High Court Division holding primarily that no succession certificate could be granted of those ornaments as those were not dept or security within the meaning of section 370 of the Succession Act. On an application for leave to appeal against the judgment and order dated 18.2.1999 in First Appeal No. 19 of 1998 of the High Court Division, this Division was pleased grant leave to consider the submission on behalf of the appellant “that a ‘debt’ is property and is heritable and it is treated as property under Section 3 and 130 of the Transfer of Property Act which calls it an ‘actionable claim’ and ornaments taken from the Jewellery shop of the petitioner’s father and seized by a Magistrate and kept with the Bangladesh Bank being ‘dept’ as per Transfer of the Property Act and is heritable and therefore the petitioner was entitled to a ‘succession certificate’ as of right under Section 372 of the Succession Act. 1925, and the interpretation of the term ‘debt’ as given by the High Court Division is erroneous…”That the High Court Division failed to consider that the word ‘debt’ has not been defined in the Succession Act and that it has been given various meanings with reference to particular legislation where the definition of debt was required to be given and as such word ‘debt’ is to be ordinarily understood as a sum of money due under an express or implied agreement or an amount due or payable from one person to another in return for money but is liability owing from one person to another whether in cash or account’ secured or unsecured, whether ascertained or ascertainable arising out of such obligation expressed or implied.
6. Lengthy submissions was made by both sides on disputed question of facts like whether on the death of Haladhar Chandra Dey the properietor of M/S H. Dey Jewellers and his 5(five) sons had permanently left for India or that 4(four) of his sons were drowned and the appellant Aloke Nath Dey was the only son alive .We shall not go into the disputed question of fact as to whether the person claming to be Aloke Nath Dey is in fact the son of Haladhar Chandra Dey and whether the power of attorney given by him in favour of by Mr. Lutfor Rahman Sarder was genuine. The High Court Division fund these facts in favour of the appellant. We will confine ourselves purely to question of law whether on the facts whether the appellant could ask for succession certificate of the jewellaries and ornaments mortgaged to ‘M/s. H. Dey Jewellers’ as debt being the only survivor of Haladhar Chandra Dey, the proprietor of M/s. He Dey Jewellers. The High Court Division considered the question whether the gold and silver ornaments seized by the magistrate is a debt or not. The word ‘debt’ has not been defined any where in the Succession Act. It is found that the dictionary meaning of word ‘debt’ is an action for the recovery of specified sum of money alleged to be due from the other side or which is due from one person to another or others. In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary a ‘debt’ is defined as a sum payable in respect of a liquidated money recoverable by action. It was also stated that one of the essentials of the debt is that it must be a really calculable amount. One consideration of the definitions of debt and the facts and circumstances of the case of the High Court Division held that it had no alternative but to hold that the gold and silver ornaments lying with the Bangladesh Bank “cannot be construed as a debt.”. The High Court Division observed that the “ornaments recovered from the iron safe which were allegedly pledged with the deceased Haladhar Chandra Dey and his son Aloke Nath Dey and p.W.I admitted that part of it belonged to his father. The facts and circumstances indicate that the ornaments now lying with the Bangladesh Bank or with the appellant in respect of which succession certificate is asked for cannot be construed as a debt. These were not kept by any of the petitioners of the succession certificate or by their father. Those were recovered or seized by a Magistrate and were lying in safe custody in Bangladesh bank. So, by no stretch of imagination this covers the definition of word ‘dept’ and when sections 370-381 in the succession Act deals with the issuance of succession certificate in respect of securities and depts. and when the ornaments were fond to be not securities and debts”. The High court Division therefore held that the learned Subordinate Judge (District Delegate committed illegality in ordering issuance of succession certificate by judgment and order dated 5.1.98 and as such required interference, and set aside the judgment and order passed in Miscellaneous Case No. 121 of 1997 filed under the Succession Act and dismissed the appeal.
7. Mr. Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan the learned counsel appearing for appellants has taken us through various definitions and meanings of the word ‘debt’ including one found in Law lexicon. He first draws our attention to the comment that ‘debt’ has not been defined in the Indian Succession Act. It has been given various meanings with reference to particular legislation where the definition of debt were required to be given, for example in Indian Debt Laws.
8. The word “debt” is of a large import, including not only depts. of record on judgment and debts by specialty, but also obligations arising under simple contract, to a very wide extent, and in its popular sense includes all that is due to a man under any form of obligation or promise.
9. What is ordinarily understood by the word “debt” is a liability owing from one person to another whether in cash or kind, secured or unsecured, whether ascertained or ascertainable, arising out of any obligation express or implied Dina Nath v. Balkrishna, A.I.R 1963 All. 46 at page 47.
10. The term ‘debt’ no doubt, is commonly used to describe liabilities which have an origin in contract but we see no reason why we should restrict the connotation of that term to such liabilities only. Anything due and payable is a debt. In Muthupalaniapa Chettiar v. Alagamal Achi, AIR 1961 Mad. 438 at p. 442.
11. Debt is that which is due from one person to another, whether money, goods or services, that which one person is bound to pay to another or to perform for his benefit, things owed.
12. In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 1 page 461, it is stated inter alia as under : “Debt:-(1) That which is owed or due; anything (as money, goods, or service) which one person is under obligation to pay or render to another. (2) A liability to pay or render something’. According to Wabster, ‘debt’ is also defined as “thing owed”. The same thing is said in one form or the other by Burrows on Words and Phreases and in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary. The plain meaning of the word in the English language indicate that ‘debt” is that which is owed or due; anything “as many, goods, or service”. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to consider whether the “debts owed” within the meaning of those words in Section 2(m) of the Wealth tax Act, 1957, would cover an obligation other than an obligation to pay a sum of money. It may be that a person apprehending a rising spiral of prices may, when advancing money, may bargain for a return to be made to him in terms of certain commodities like silver ; Commissioner of Walth tax, Gujarat, Ahmedabad v. Raipur Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (1963) 4 Guj. L.R. 741 at page 751-52. (emphasis is put by us).
13. It appears to be clear from the above definitions and meanings of ‘debt’ that is deposit could be included as a ‘debt’ as an obligation to render goods by one person to another as in the instant case. If the appellant Aloke Nath Dey being the only survivor of Heaiadhar Chandra Dey the owner or M/s. Dey Jeweellers’ with whom ornaments were kept as securities for loan had a claim to those ornaments as a debt and the Bangladesh Bank was under obligation to render those ornaments to Aloke Nath Dey.
14. From the above definition and meaning it is clear that the ornaments now lying with the Bangladesh Bank could come within the definition of debt if when the claimed by its lawful owner. If Aloke Nath Dey was but only heir of Haladhar Chandra Dey could he claim the ornaments as the owner. In view of the admitted fact that some of the ornaments were mortgaged to the deceased father as security for loan. In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Voliume-3, Fifth Edition, Page 1829 an owner included a mortgage in possession. On the debt of the appellant’s father Aloke Nath Dey stepped into the shoes of the father and became a pony in respect of the ornaments pledged to his father and therefore “as owner” could claim from the Bangladesh Bank to render those ornaments to him as a debt.
15. The Additional Attorney General agreeing with the judgment of the High Court Division concentrated on facts that the appellant had failed to proved that the other sons of Haladhar Chandra Dey had actually died and the present claimant to be Aloke Nath Dey who did not appear personally and the alleged power of attorney given by him in Mr. Lutfor Rahman Sarder is false and a devise by Mr. Lutfor Rahman Sarder to grape the ornaments now lying with the Bangladesh Bank. He also supported the judgment of the High Court Division that ornaments lying with the Bangladesh Bank were not ‘debt’ to the appellant and therefore could not obtain a succession certificate for the same.
16. We have already held that we shall not embark into the disputed fact but concentrate on the question whether ornaments of a deceased is a ‘debt’ or no and whether it could be claimed by an heir and as such can obtain a succession certificate.
17. We have already held that we shall not embark into the disputed fact but concentrate on the question whether ornaments of a deceased is a ‘debt’ or not and whether it could be claimed by an heir and as such can obtain a succession certificate.
18. The learned Additional Attorney General has referred to the case Mt. Shyam Sundari Devi and others v. Sarti Devi and others reported in AIR 1962 Patna 220. The matter was an appeal under section 384 of the Indian Succession Act and was directed against the order of the learned District ludge dismissing in limine, the appellants application for a succession certificate in respect of certain ornaments pledged with the Punjab National Bank at Darbhanaga. The application was dismissed, as being not maintainable on the ground that the ornaments pledged cannot be said to be either ‘debts’ or ‘securities’ in respect of which a succession certificate can be granted.
19. The Patna High Court was of the view that the learned District Judge was correct. Reading the relevant provisions of the Succession Act especially Sections 370 to 381 there did not seem to me any scope for doubt that succession certificate could be asked for and granted only in respect of “debts’ and ‘securities’ and not for any other kind of property. The ornaments were pledged by the deceased with the Bank by way of security for the debt which the Bank had advanced. It seems, that the appellants are ready to pay off that debt and take back the pledged articles. Therefore the debt in question was not a debt due from the Bank in respect of which a succession certificate was asked for, but the certificate has perhaps been though necessary in order to enable the appellants to get back the pledged ornaments on payment of the dues in the Bank. In this view of the matter, the appeal was dismissed.
20. On the other hand Mr. Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has referred to the case of State Bank of India v. Netai Ch. Porel reported in AIR 1982 Cal. 92, the facts in that case were as follows: “One Juthikabala Porel wife of the opposite party No. 1 kept certain ornaments and Jewelleries in a Safe Deposit Locker of the State Bank of India at its main branch, Calcutta. She having died, her husband the opposite party herein applied for succession certificate in respect of the said goods, which was registered as Act 39 Case No. 414/78. After the filing of the said application a question was raised by the Court as to whether the prayer for grant of succession certificate in respect of the said goods was maintainable .After hearing the learned advocate for the opposite party and the petitioner in that case, the learned District Delegate by his order dated June 12, 1978 held, on the authority of the decision in the case of Dina Nath v. Balkrishna, AIR 1963 All. 46 , that the liability to refund the ornaments was a debt and as such the application for the grant of succession certificate in respect of the same was maintainable and the succession certificate was granted. Thereupon the petitioner the State Bank of India filed an application for reconsideration of the order which was deposed of by the impugned order. It was held that the question regarding maintainability of the application for succession certificate was thoroughly considered by the order dated June 12, 1978 and on the basis of that succession certificate was granted by the Court. The learned Judge held that the application of the State Bank of India was misconceived in so far as the order for grant was requiiod to be revoked before the order dated June 12, 1978 could be reconsidered. The application was accordingly rejected. The petitioner being aggrieved has moved the revisional application before the Calcutta High Court. It was contended that the ornaments which were kept in deposit in the Safe-Deposit-Locker of the State Bank were neither a debt nor a security within the meaning of the provisions of Section 370 of Indian Succession Act and as such no succession certificate could be asked for or granted in respect of he said goods. The expression ‘security’ has been explained in sub-Section (2) of section 370 but the expression ‘debt’ has neither been explained nor defined .It was however nobody’s case that the ornaments in question fall within the category of security with in the meaning of section 370. The question therefore was whether it is a debt or not. In support of the contention that it was not a debt, the learned counsel appearing in support of the obligation relied on a decision of the case of Shyam Sundari Devi v. Sarti Devi, AIR 1962 Patna 220 (we have already referred). The facts of that case however were different .There the deceased had pledged with a bank certain ornaments by way of security for the debt(loan against mortgage) which the Bank had advanced. It was held that succession certificate could not be granted and asked for in respect of the ornaments since it was not a debt due from the Bank. In that case the Bank has advanced a loan to the deceased and the ornaments were pledged with Bank merely as a security for the repayment in the same. In the circumstances the Bank could not be said to be a debtor in respect of the articles. On the contrary the deceased was debtor to the Bank. Therefore, that decision did not seem to de directly touching the point involved in the case before Calcutta High Court.
21. It was noticed by the Calcutta High Court that the Division in the case of Dina Nath v. Balkrishna relied on by the learned District Judge was not to the point as in that case a lady died during the Kumbhamela tragedy and the ornaments found of her body were taken possession of by the District Authorities. On an application for the grant of succession certificate in respect of the same it was held that the refund of the ornaments became an obligation on the authorities to hand over the same or the value there of to the rightful clamant and that for such a liability an application for succession certificate could be asked for and granted. The Calcutta High Court, however, was unable to agree to such a broad proposition that any liability owing from one person to another whether in case or in kind, secured or unsecured, whether ascertained or ascertainable, arising out of any obligation is a debt. In the particular case however the facts also were different in so far as it was not the deceased who had kept the ornaments of the District Authorities but that the District Autorites themselves collected the ornaments on their own and as such incurred the liability to refund the same to the rightful claimant. This aspect of the matter distinguishes the case from the facts of the case before the Calcutta High Court. Here the deceased Juthikabala herself deposited the articles with the Bank for safe custody, she had the option to go and collect it at anytime she liked. The Bank was merely a custodian of the same. In ordinary parlance debt means a sum certain due from one person called the debtor to another called the creditor. In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary a ‘debt’ is defined as a sum payable in respect of a liquidated money demand recoverable by action. One of the essentials of a ‘debt’ is an ascertained amount or readily calculable amount. In that sense the State Bank of India in this case could not be said to stand in the position of a ‘debtor’ nor could Juthikabala be called a ‘creditor’ in respect of the ornaments. But that apart the more important distinguishing point is that unlike in cases of debt, the Bank had no right of disposition of any kind in respect of those ornaments. The Bank stood in the position of its a bailee or a trustee to whom though possession was entrusted, there was no intention of transferring the ownership. It is settled law that debt is not a trust and any or every liability irrespective of true legal character does not become a debt. Since succession certificate could be granted only in respect of debts and securities and not for any other kind of property, it was of the opinion that in the case before it succession certificate could not be granted.
22. We found that the facts in the case on Dina Nath v. Balkrishana reported in AIR 1963 Allahabad 46 are similarly to the present case. In that case a lady died during the Kumbhamela tragedy and the ornaments found on her body were taken possession of by the District Authorities, it was held that the refund of those ornaments were an obligation of the authorities to hand over the ornaments or the value to the rightful claimant of the deceased. For such a liability an application for succession certificate could be made in law and it was a fit case in which a succession certificate should be granted. The Allahabad High Court observed that:”Having regard to the wide definition of the world ‘debt’ given above it will appear that the refund of the ornaments, recover from the person of the dead lady, became an obligation on the authorities to hand over the same or their value to the rightful claimant of the deceased .For such a liability an application for a succession certificate could be made in law and should not have refused. The courts below in granting a certificate got the refund of the cash only and refusing to grant a succession certificate for the return of the valuables erred in putting a correct interpretation on the word “debt’ which has been used in Section 370 of the Indian Succession Act. it was a fit case in which a succession certificate should have been granted.”
23. In the instant case before us neither Haladhar Chandra Dey nor any of his heirs deposited the ornaments with the Bangladesh Bank. The iron safe contained the ornaments was taken from the ship M/s. H. Dey Jewellers owned by Haladhar Chandra Dey and deposited with the Bangladesh bank by a Magistrate, First Class. It was therefore a debt by the Bangladesh Bank to haladhar Chandra Dey or his heirs and the heirs could apply for grant of succession certificate for those ornaments.
24. Having considered the definition of ‘debt’ and the decided cases where ornaments were lying with the Bank could be considered as “debt’ we are of the view that the ornaments lying with the Bangladesh Bank being recovered from M/s. H. Dey Jewellers are a ‘debt’ which could be claimed by its owners.
25. The next point for consideration was whether the appellant was the real owner and the respondent were under any legal obligation to return the same on obtaining succession certificate from the District Delegate. It is seen that the respondent admitting that the ornaments were recovered from H. Dey Jewellers asked the appellant and his brother to obtain succession certificate for the ornaments.
26. In the Course of the hearing our attention was drawn to the inrrevocable power of attorney executed by the heirs of Haladhar Chandra Dey in favour of Mr. Lutfor Rahman Sarder, in paragraph-7 of that power of attorney it is stated as follows : f^SVS ?T?I <t>Rc<H I “It is appearing from the power of attiring itself that Mr. Lutfor Rahman Sarder, the attorney was 50% owner of the Jewellery shop M/s. H. Dey Jewellers and admittedly Jewellers and ornaments were kept as security for loan provided by H. Dey Jewellers. The attorney being the owner of 50% of the Jewellery shop and its business was entitled to claimed 50% of the ornaments lying with the Bangladesh Bank as ‘debt’ of Haladhar Chandra Dey. But we find that the attorney had applied for succession certificate for the entire ornaments for and on behalf of Haladhar Chandra Dey’s only survivor heir Aloke Nath Dey as the sole owner. The attorney alleged by way of an irrevocable power of attorney being 50% owner of H. Dey Jewellers could not have applied for granting a succession certificate in favour of only Aloke Nath Dey. As it appeared from the record that had the power of attorney Mr. Lutfor Rahman Sarder was 50% owner of H. Dey Jewellers the granting the succession certificate by the district Delegate, Khulna in favour of Alok Nath Dey was erroneous and illegal. (Bangla)
27. In conclusion we find that although in the facts and circumstances the ornaments recovered from H. Dey Jewellers and kept with the Bangladesh Bank is a debt, ought to be returned to the real owners, it appears from the power of attorney that Aloke Nath Dey as the heir of Haladhar Chandra Dey is not the only claimant to the ornaments and as such the granting of succession certificate in his favour for the entrie Jeweelery by the District Delegate, Khulna in Miscelleneous Case No. 121 of 1997 was illegal.
28. Nothing has as well been produced before the Court that Aloke Nath Dey is the son of Haladhar Chandra Dey or is the only surviving son of the deceased Haladhar Chandra Dey or to repel the allegation that alleged power of attorney in favour of Lutfor Rahman Sarder is a forged one created for grabbing the ornament. In that view of the matter as well Lutfor Rahman Sarder had no locus standi to file the case on the basis of alleged forged power of attorney.
29. Accordingly, the identity of Aloke Nath Dey or that he is the only heir of Haladhar Chandra Dey or the granting of alleged Power of Attorney in favour of Lutfor Rahman Sarder having been seriously challenged and there being no material to brush away the challenges, we do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment for our interference. The appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs.
Ed
Source: I ADC (2004), 528