Section 227—The Court under section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is competent to alter or amend the charge at any stage of the proceeding before pronouncement of judgment. Nasim (Md) vs State 57 DLR 546.
Sections 227, 241A & 242—The case having been sent to the Special Judge after taking of cognizance by the Senior Special Judge there is no illegality in the adding of a fresh charge by the former. HM Ershad vs State 45 DLR 534.
Section 227(1)—The Court is competent to add or alter charge if situation arises and the materials placed before it reveals justification. HM Ershad vs State 45 DLR 533.
Section 232—The accused has been prejudiced by absenée of charge or framing of the charge at a belated stage. Section 232 CrPC contemplates a new trial or remanding of the case to the trial Court in such a situation. It is too late now to direct a retrial after a long lapse of time. Abdur Razzaque @ Geda vs State 48 DLR 457.
Section 233—দুটি খুনের জন্য আসামীদের বিরুদ্ধে একটি চার্জ গঠন করা হয়েছে । ইহা আইনসংগত হয় নাই । দুটি হত্যার জন্য পৃথক পৃথক ভাবে চার্জ গঠন করতে হবে । Abdul Aziz vs Sekendar Ali 111.
Section 233—The element of continuity of action was also present in the instant case in that the petitioner and others encircled the house of the victims and that thereafter petitioner and some others entered into the hut of the victims and caused injuries by sharp cutting weapons in consequence whereof the death occurred. In this state of the matter it can in no way be said that the offences or, in other words, causing death of the two persons by the petitioner and others was not committed or done in the course of the “same transaction” or in one transaction. Delower Hossain Khan vs State 54 DLR (AD) 101.
Section 233—The object of this section is to save the accused from being embarrassed in his defence if distinct offences are tried together in one case. The legislature has engrafted certain exceptions to the provision contained in section 234, 235, 236 and 239. Zahed Hossain vs State 60 DLR 386.
Section 234—The period of one year is available in section 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but it is absent in section 6(1B) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and thereby in view of the provision laid down in section 6(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958 section 6(1 B) excludes the application of section 234 which relates to the period of the commission of the alleged offence. Habibur Rahman Molla vs State 61 DLR 1.
Section 234—Mis-joinder of charges—One charge both under sections 460 and 302/34 Penal Code framed against all the accused is defective and conviction thereunder is set aside. Abdul Quddus vs State 44 DLR 441.
Sections 234 and 236—Applicability of sections 234 & 236 Manner of—Section 234 and section 236 apply to cases where one person may be dealt with at one trial for more than one offence while section 239 applies to the trial of more persons than one jointly. Where two incidents are independent and wholly unconnected with each other, no joint trial is permitted. Lal Mia vs State 40 DLR 377.
Sections 234-236—Mis-joinder of charge— When the accused have been charged under sections 302/34 Penal Code on the allegation that they committed murder in furtherance of common intention, the addition of section 460 Penal Code in the charge is materially defective. The accused having been convicted and sentenced under sections 302/34 their, conviction and sentence at the same time under section 460 in the same case is bad in law and should be set aside. Khelu Mia vs State 43 DLR 573.
Sections 234 and 561A—The contention that there cannot be three separate cases out of single transaction and the petitioners cannot be put on trial in three separate cases arising out of one transaction is of no substance. Abul Fazal (Md) alias Abul Fazal alias Badal vs State 53 DLR (AD) 100.
Section 235—The various acts were done in pursuance of a particular end in view and they were connected together by proximity of time, unity of purpose and continuity of action and those acts formed parts of the same transaction within the meaning of section 235, CrPC. (Per Siddiqur Rahman Miah J: agreeing). Zahed Hossain vs State 61 DLR 386.
Sections 235 and 239—The provisions of section 235 and 239 of the Code vest a discretion with the Court to try offences of the kinds indicated therein jointly in the circumstances mentioned, but there is nothing in them to indicate that the Court is bound to try such offences or persons together. (Per Siddiqur Rahman Miah I agreeing). Zahed Hossain (Md) vs State 61 DLR 386.
Sections 235-237—Where from the facts of the case it is not clear which of the several offences has been committed, the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences and he may be convicted of the offence which he is shown to have committed, although he was not charged with it. Parveen vs State 51 DLR 473
Sections 235-237 and 403—When facts of the case are such that it is doubtful which of the several offences has been committed the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences; and after trial for one such offence the accused may be convicted for the other offence even though he was not charged thereof—In the instant case “robbery” and “unauthorised possession of fire arms” are not offences of the same nature contemplated in sections 236 and 237 (1) CrPC, but these are two distinct offences for which a person may be charged for each of them as provided in section 235(1) CrPC. Arfan Ali vs State 42 DLR (AD) 22.
Sections 235 and 239—Section 235 empowers trial of a person for more offences than one if those are committed in the same transaction but section 239 provides for persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction. State vs Lieutenant Colonel Syed Farook Rahman 53 DLR 287.
Sections 235 and 239—Whether a series of acts are so connected as to form the same transaction is purely a question of fact depending on proximity of time and place, continuity of action and unity of purpose and design. A comprehensive formuia of universal application cannot be framed regarding the question whether two or more acts constitute the same transaction. State vs Md Abu Taher 56 DLR 556.
Sections 236, 237, 238 & 337—The accused raised no objection on the score of defect in charge at any stage of the trial. The objection raised for the first time in the Appellate Division is not entertainable by virtue of explanation appended to section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Rajib Kamrul Hasan vs State 53 DLR (AD) 50.
Section 236 & 237—An offence under a particular section if not proved but some other offence is made out by the prosecution, the accused persons can be very well convicted and sentenced for the other offences proved before the court through legal evidence. Al-Amin vs State 51 DLR 154.
Sections 236 & 237—When an accused is charged under sections 302 and 134 Penal Code his conviction under section 201 Penal Code is legal. Kalu vs State 45 DLR (AD) 161.
Sections 236, 237, 238, 417 and 423—A fmding of acquittal can be converted into one of conviction only in an appeal under section 417 which being in accord with section 423 CrPC is the correct view taken in Bawa Singh’s case. Mofizuddin vs State 40 DLR (AD) 286.
Section 237—In view of the provisions of section 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the conviction of the petitioner under section 381 is maintainable although he was charged under section 408 but not under section 381 of Penal Code.
In view of the provisions of section 237 CrPC and being in respectful agreement with the pronouncements of the learned Judges, I am of the view that although in this case the petitioner was charged under section 408 of the Penal Code and not under section 381 of the Penal Code still his conviction under section 381 of the Penal Code is quite maintainable as the petitioner was fully aware of the nature of accusation against him and had the opportunity to meet the elements of offence punishable under section 381 of the Penal Code and he was not also prejudiced by conviction under section 381 of the Penal Code. Mahbubul Alam vs State 41 DLR 7.
Section 237—Where an accused person is charged with one offence and it appears in evidence that he committed a different offence for which he might have been charged in respect of a single act or series of acts, then, subject to absence of prejudice, the accused may be convicted of the offence, which he is shown to have committed although he was not charged with it. Parveen vs State 51 DLR 473.
Section 237—The trial Court committed gross mistake in passing sentence under different penal provisions with which the convicted accused persons were not even charged with. Alam vs State 54 DLR 298.
Section 237—Law is well settled that if an offence under a section is proved though not charged the accused can be convicted for the offence proved on the strength of the provision of section 237 of The Code. State vs Ershad Au Sikder 56 DLR 305.
Sections 237 and 238—Appellate Court can alter the conviction for other offence for which no charge was made. Jahangir Hossain vs State 40 DLR 545.
Section 238—An offence to be a minor offence to a major one must be a cognate offence to the major one, having the main ingredients in common. State vs Sree Ranjit Kumar Pramanik 45 DLR 660.
Section 238—An offence under section 342 of the Penal Code which is not included in the schedule of the Special Powers Act cannot be the basis of conviction as the same is a non-schedule offence. Had the original offence charged been one under Penal Code then the learned Judges by application of section 238 of the Penal Code could come to a finding that the offence constitutes a minor offence and in that view could have convicted the appellant under a minor offence, but here the original offence charged was exclusively triable by the Special Tribunal and in that view the alteration of the conviction from a schedule offence to an offence which is only referable under Penal Code is not legally permissible. Abdur Rahman vs State 51 DLR (AD) 33.
Section 238(2)—It is true that no charge was framed against the accused under section 25B(2) but in view of the provisions of section 29 of the Special Powers Act and sub-section (2) of section 238 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he may be convicted under sub-section (2) of section 25B of the Special Powers Act, 1974. Shamsul Haque vs State 49 DLR 528.
Section 239—Mis-joinder of charges— Validity of trial—In a case where it is found that the trial is vitiated by misjoinder, then in the eye of law there has been no valid trial and therefore an accused cannot be acquitted after setting aside conviction. State vs Constable Lal Mia 44 DLR (AD) 277.
Section 239—Joinder of charges—Sameness of transaction—Circumstances which must bear on the determination whether certain acts or events constitute a single transaction in each individual case are proximity of time, proximity of place, continuity of action and community of purpose or design. Which factor or factors shall be given relative importance depends on the facts of each case. State vs Constable Lal Mia 44 DLR (A D) 277.
Sections 239 & 537—Sameness of transaction—Defect—If there is good evidence that the transaction was one and the same, then mere absence of certain links in the accusation will not make the trial illegal. If at all it is a defect which is curable under section 537 CrPC. State vs Constable Lal Mia 44 DLR (AD) 277.
Section 241, 241A—Forgery—fabrication of bank record taking recourse to forgery and using the same as genuine by deceitful means for taking pecuniary advantage for themselves and for others—Prima facie case made out against the accused—Order of discharge of the accused (Shafiqul Islam) shows total non-application of judicial mind of the Special Judge to the materials on record. Provision of section 241A is to be strictly followed. An order of discharge can be made only when no case is made out against the accused. State vs Shafiqul Islam 40 DLR 310.
Section 241A—Magistrate cannot discharge accused persons on the plea of alibi that they were at different places at the time of commission of offences alleged by the prosecution—Magistrate’s “finding” in this regard is based on no evidence. Mere submission of some papers supporting alibi is neither sufficient nor admissible as the stage of adducing defence evidence was not yet come. Magistrate’s order of discharge was not sustainable as it was based on gross misconception of law. Nannu Gazi vs Awlad Hossain 43 DLR (AD) 63.
Section 241A—This provision casts a duty on the Judge to discharge the accused when there is no ground for proceeding with the case and his order must record reasons therefor. HM Ershad vs State 45 DLR 533.
Section 241A—Trial Court has a wide power regarding framing of charge. This cannot be interfered with lightly either by the revisional court or the appellate Court. Forhad Hossain vs State 50 DLR 337.
Section 241A—At the stage of framing the charge the Magistrate is to consider documents of the prosecution and not those of the defence which could form part of the record after the charge is framed. Additional Sessions Judge on consideration of some documents produced by the accused opposite party before him came to the conclusion that the charge was groundless. Accused opposite party could not produce such document before the trial begins and the learned Additional Sessions Judge was not justified in considering those documents to pass the impugned order. Additional Sessions Judge acted illegally in passing the impugned order relying upon the documents filed by the accused-opposite party for the first time before him. Mahbuba Akter vs Mozemmel Hoque 47 DLR 404.
Section 241A—The time of producing defence alibi is during the trial and after the prosecution has adduced its own evidence and they must be given a chance to prove their case. Jalaluddin Bhuiyan vs Abdur Rouf 51 DLR 408.
Sections 241A & 164—To frame a charge or to consider an application of the accused person that the charge brought against him is groundless trial Court is not obliged to consider the statements of any witness recorded under section 164 CrPC. Forhad Hossain vs State 50 DLR 337.
Sections 241A and 242—Court is to record the reasons for discharging the accused under section 241A of the Code, but no such reasons are required to be recorded in farming charge against the accused as per provisions of section 242 of the Code. The Special Judge framed charge against the accused-petitioner after hearing both the parties and being satisfied that there was ground for framing of charge. No illegality in framing of charge against the accused-petitioner and there is no ground of setting aside the impugned order. Amanullah vs State 62 DLR 382.
Sections 241A, 265B & 265C—The Sessions Judge is directed to allow the Advocates of the accused to go through the papers and documents upon which the prosecution will rely for framing charges in the case. Hossain Mohammad Ershad [former President Lieutenant General (Rtd)] vs State 48 DLR 95.
Sections 241A & 439A—The accused-petitioner, if he would have felt aggrieved, against the order passed by the Magistrate framing charge against him, could have invoked the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge under section 439A for the relief. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court Division has been wrongly invoked. Rustom All Matubbar alias Alam vs Mohammad Salahuddin 50 DLR 301.
Sections 241A & 265C—অভিযোগ গঠন বিষয়ে শুনানীর সময় আসামীর দাখীলী প্রমাণ তথা দলিল পত্র বিবেচনা করা যায় না এবং তার ভিত্তিতে আসামীর বিরদ্ধে মামলা বাতিল করা যায় না । Nazrul Islam vs State 50 DLR 103.
Sections 241A, 265C & 561A—An accused can only prefer an application under section 561A for quashing the proceeding if he becomes previously unsuccessful in his application either under section 265C or 241A, otherwise his application for quashing shall be premature.
Section 265C speaks of discharge of an accused in a trial before Court of Sessions. Section 241A speaks of discharge in a trial by a magistrate. These sections indicate that when an accused is brought for trial before a Court of law the Court upon hearing the parties and on consideration of the record of the case and the documents may discharge the accused. These sections have nothing to do with quashing of a proceeding. Section 561A is an independent inherent power of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court and this power can be exercised in case of abuse of process of Court and for securing the ends of justice and or to give effect to any order under the Code ref. Latifa Akhter vs State 51 DLR (AD) 159.
Section 241A, 439, 439A and 561A—Even a party unsuccessful in a revision before the Sessions Judge may invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Matiur Rahman vs Nuru Sikdar 56 DLR 246.
Sections 241A & 242—The trying Magistrate is required to exercise his own independent judgment and to see whether there is a prima facie case to proceed with the trial. The report of the judicial Magistrate cannot be binding on the trying Magistrate. Abul Ahsan Joardar vs Kazi Misbahul Alam 45 DLR 606.
Sections 241A & 242—The trial Court has a wide power to frame charges and this cannot be interfered with by the Revisional Court by way of giving direction for altering a charge or framing a charge. Sharful Islam vs Billal Hossain and the State 45 DLR 722.
Sections 241A & 242—The Court has jurisdiction to pass an order of discharge if it was satisfied that the charge was groundless for which it was to give reasons but if it framed charge it was not required of the Court to record reasons. HM Ershad vs State 45 DLR 533.
Section 242—Consideration of the statements made under section 161 CrPC while framing of charge or otherwise is a necessary part of the Court’s duty. HM Ershadvs State 45 DLR 533.
Section 242—Consideration of the statements made under section 161 CrPC while framing of charge or otherwise is a necessary part of the Court’s duty. Saber Ahmed vs Manzur Mia 35 DLR 213 & State vs Md Safikul Islam 40 DLR 310 relied. NM Ershad vs State 45 DLR 533.
Sections 243 and 537—Violation of the mandatory requirements of section 243 in recording the individual statements of the accuseds either in their language or in words as nearly as expressed by them is not curable by Section 537. Conviction and sentence are not sustainable in law accordingly. Ali Newaj Bhuiyan vs State 40 DLR 398.
Sections 243 & 537—The alleged admission of guilt was not recorded as nearly as possible in the words used by the accused. Section 243 CrPC is mandatory, the violation of which causes prejudice to the accused and is not curable under section 537 CrPC. The order of conviction and sentence as against the appellant on the basis of such so-called admission of guilt cannot therefore be sustained in law and the same should therefore be set aside in the interest ofjustice and the case should be sent back on remand to the trial Court to hold that trial afresh from the stage of framing the accusation or charge again after hearing the parties and considering the materials on record in accordance with the law in the light of the observations made above. Saheb Ali Miah vs State 46 DLR 238.
Section 245(1)—The prosecution having not taken any steps the learned Magistrate rightly acquitted the respondents under section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Mobarak Ali vs Mobaswir Ali 49 DLR (AD) 36.
Section 247—The Magistrate had no reason to adjourn hearing of the case as neither the complainant or his advocate appeared and took any steps whatsoever. The Magistrate was therefore bound to acquit the respondent. Ayub Ali Bangali vs Mia Manir Ahmed 46 DLR 330.
Section 247—Summons must be issued for securing the attendance of the accused on the day appointed for hearing of the case. Shajib vs Md Abdul Khaleque Akand 51 DLR (AD) 119.
Section 247—Interpretation of Statute— Words “Summons” and “Warrant”—Meaning of —Whether they convey different meanings though they are different modes of process to compel appearance—Whether there is scope to interpret the “summons” to include “warrant”— Court cannot put a word in legislation which is not there. Hazi Hafez vs Abdul Mobud 41 DLR 321.
Section 247—Section 247 CrPC shall apply to a case in which summons has been issued on complaint and shall not apply to a case in which warrant has been issued though on complaint. Hazi Hafez vs Abdul Mabud 41 DLR 321.
Section 247, Proviso—Complainant petitioner a Deputy Attorney-General of Bangladesh Government, busy with official matters could not present himself in the Court of Magistrate and pray for adjournment. His witnesses were examined and cross-examined but no adjournment was given though the petitioner was entitled to such privilege. His petition was not rejected but simply stated therein “Not admitted”;
Held—The Magistrate’s order is not sustainable in law. Sultan Ahmed vs Golam Mostofa 41 DLR 219.
Section 247—Appraisal of evidence—Complainant petitioner’s evidence was discredited because, in the opinion of the Magistrate, he had not filed any GD entry about the incident alleged by him.
Held—This is not necessary at all in law. Sultan Ahmed vs Golam Mostofa 41 DLR 219.
Section 247—Learned Magistrate did not base his finding on proper appreciation of evidence on record and was rather biased against the petitioner for reasons not known. Sultan Ahmed vs Golam Mostafa 41 DLR 219.
Section 247—Applicability of section 247 CrPC—Case to be originated from a petition of complaint and summons to be issued following the complaint—But warrant was issued in the present complaint case and the necessary condition such as issuance of summons for the application of the section is absent—After amendment there is no distinction between summons case and warrant case at the trial stage. Hazi Hafez Md Shamsul Islam vs Abdul Mabud 41 DLR 321.
Section 247—Acquittal—Accused present but complainant absent in Court—complainant filed an application for adjournment through his advocate—No order was passed by the Magistrate on the adjournment application—He acquitted the accused of all charges—The order of acquittal was not in keeping with law. Md Musa Khan vs Farookh Hossain 42 DLR 257.
Section 247—A complaint case ought not to be dismissed for non-appearance of the complainant on an adjourned date unless his attendance in the court is specially required on that date or unless the Court is convinced that the complainant is not keen about prosecuting his case. A Jabber Howlader vs Ali Akbar Howlader and State 52 DLR 329.
Section 247—It is necessary for the Magistrate before dismissing the complaint to see whether the complainant had been dilatory in the prosecution of the case or not. GM Morshed vs City Bank Ltd 56 DLR 205.
Section 247—Power to dismiss the case is undoubtedly there when the complainant is found absent but that power must be exercised judicially and it must be seen and considered having regard to the circumstances of a given case. Tofael Ahmed vs Chand Mia, State 56 DLR 614.
Section 247—When evidence was closed, statement under section 342 CrPC was recorded after due examination of the accused and the case reached the stage of argument, acquittal of the accused under section 247 CrPC was not proper judicial exercise of the power. Tofael Ahmed vs Chand Mia, State 56 DLR 614.
Sections 247 and 403—Acquittal under section 247 CrPC will bar fresh complaint or trial under section 403 CrPC. Tofael Ahmed vs Chand Mia, State 56 DLR 614.
Sections 247 & 403—Acquittal of the accused under section 247 CrPC is not an acquittal within the meaning of section 403 of the Code and cannot bar a fresh prosecution. Gadahar Namadas vs Joytun Akhtar 47 DLR 313.
Section 247(2)—It was for the Magistrate to ascertain before dismissing the petition of complaint whether the complainant was notified properly or whether she took delay dalling tactics in order to harass the accused inspite of receipt of notice issued by the court. Nabiran Bibi vs Md Panna Miah 52 DLR 394.
Sections 249, 339C(4) & 403—Fresh proceeding on self-same facts against the same accused persons after a proceeding is stopped and the accused is released—When a proceeding is stopped without a judgment either of acquittal or of conviction and the accused is released, it does not operate either as acquittal or discharge—the same proceeding is not revivable unless there is legislative intent to that effect. Section 339C(4) was inserted providing for revival within 90 days those proceedings of which trial was stopped—In the present case, more than 90 days having elapsed before the Ordinance came into force and revival of the proceeding being out of question, there was no legal bar against fresh prosecution on same allegations. Taking cognizance for the second time must however depend on facts and related considerations of each case—Fresh cognizance should not be taken where there is default in taking revival proceeding without sufficient cause. Niamat Ali Sheikh vs Begum Enayetur Noor 42 DLR (AD) 250.
Section 250—The Assistant Sessions Judge acted beyond jurisdiction in making the impugned order under section 250 CrPC as the offence under section 382 Penal Code is triable by Court of Sessions, and not by a Magistrate. The offence under section 382 of the Penal Code being triable by a Court of Sessions and not by a Magistrate the Assistant Sessions Judge acted beyond his jurisdiction in making the impugned order inasmuch as, provisions of section 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not relate to an offence which is not triable by the Magistrate. Karimdad vs Abul Hossain 40 DLR 441.
Section 250-Section 250 CrPC empowers only a Magistrate to invoke the said provisions while trying a case by him he finds that the accusations are false and either frivolous or vexatious and the same does not empower an Asstt. Sessions Judge. Karimdad vs Abul Hossain 40 DLR 441.
Section 265A—ln sessions cases of this nature it is the Public Prosecutor who represents the State as provided under section 265A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In such cases the role of an Investigation Officer is that of a witness. If such an application is to be filed it ought to have been filed through the Public Prosecutor. Rahmatullah vs State 48 DLR 158.
Section 265B—From a scrutiny of this section it does not appear that the section requires the actual production of documents before the court. Securities and Exchange Commission vs Abu Tyeb 55 DLR (AD) 47.
Sections 265B, 265C, 265D & 265E— Sections 265B, 265C, 265D and 265E form a composite session and steps to be taken under these sections are to be taken in the same session. No question arises of fixing another date for taking steps under section 265C or of separate hearing under section 265C of the Code. Securities and Exchange Commission vs Abu Tyeb 55 DLR (AD) 47.
Section 265C—ln discharging an accused under section 265C of the Code, the Court is obliged to record the reasons for so doing, which reasons should be reasonable. Ferdousi Islam vs Nur Mohammad Kha 54 DLR 418.
Section 265C—The admitted position is that the respondent was the Chairman of the Company and she was never involved in the business of stock brokerage—In the absence of any allegation in the complaint-petition, the High Court Division rightly discharged the respondent from the charge. Securities and Exchange Commission, represented by its Chairman vs Runa N Alam 57 DLR (AD) 161.
Section 265C—The accused has no scope to have any shelter under Section 265C of the Code since a prime facie case has already been disclosed against him. Md Lokman @ Lokman vs State 63 DLR (AD) 156.
Sections 265C, 241A & 202(2B)—Discharge under the provisions of these sections is of different character than the discharge of the accused under sub-section (2B) of section 202 where discharge is made before taking of the cognizance. In our view there is no scope for making further enquiry after discharge if the accused under sections 241A or 265C of the Code as the same is made after taking cognizance. Moreover at the time of hearing under section 241A or under section 265C the court considers the record of the case, the documents submitted therewith and the submissions made by both parties. So, all necessary materials are before the court and as the order is passed on consideration of all such materials, there is no scope for passing any order for holding further inquiry. But there is scope for further enquiry when accused is discharged under the provision of sub-section (2B) of section 202 of the Code as the said order is made before taking of the cognizance. Abdul Hai vs State 50 DLR 551.
Section 265C and 265D—While framing charge against the accused the trial Court is to apply independent judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and the materials on record, particularly the First Information Report, so as to be satisfied that innocent persons are not harassed unnecessarily. Khandaker Md Moniruzzaman vs State 47 DLR 341.
Sections 265C, 265D & 439—High Court Division under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure having supervisory jurisdiction can scrutinise and go into facts to examine the propriety of the orders passed under section 265C or 265D of the Code. Jobaida Rashid vs State, represented by the Deputy Commissioner; Dhaka 49 DLR 373.
Section 265C & 265D—Sections 265C and 265D are abridged substitutions of the now repealed chapter XVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure and these cast a duty upon the Sessions Judge to apply his judicial mind in considering the materials collected by the prosecution in order to come to a decision whether charge should be framed. Jobaida Rashid vs Stale, represented by the Deputy Commissioner; Dhaka 49 DLR 373.
Sections 265C, 265D & 221-223—আসামী পক্ষ থেকে মামলা অব্যাহতি দেয়ার জন্নে কোন দরখাস্ত দেয়া হোক বা না হোক আসামীর বিররদ্ধে অভিযোগ গঠন করা হবে কি না সে সম্পর্কে ২৬৫ সি ও ২৬৫ ডি ধারার বিধান অনুযায়ী দায়রা আদালত তথা যে কোন ট্রাইবুনালের দায়িত্ব হচ্ছে উপরোক্ত বিষয় বিবেচনা করে এবং পদক্ষের বক্তব্য শুনে সঠিক সিদ্ধান্ত উপনীত হওয়া । শুধুমাত্র এজাহারে নাম উল্লেখ থাকলে এবং আসামীর বিরুদ্ধে পুলিশ অভিযোগপত্র দাখিল করলে বা অভিযোগের দরখাস্তে আসামীর নাম উল্লেখ থাকলেই তার বিরুদ্ধে যান্ত্রিক ভাবে অভিযোগ গঠন করা সমীচীন নয় । Nazrul Islam vs State 50 DLR 103.
Sections 265C & 561A—We do not find any reason to quash the instant criminal case by involving our inherent jurisdiction under section 561A CrPC as the Code under section 265C provides for an alternative remedy. Salahuddin vs State 51 DLR 299.
Section 265C & 265D—The Tribunal without considering the facts and circumstances and materials on record and applying its judicial mind to the provisions of section 265C and 265D of the Code of Criminal Procedure framed charge mechanically. The impugned order framing charges against the accused is thus liable to be set aside. Ruhul Amin Kha vs State 56 DLR 632.
Sections 265C and 435/439—The order of the Additional Sessions Judge discharging the accused is not based on correct appreciation of the facts disclosed in the first information report and charge-sheet, and therefore, it suffers from illegality. Abdur Rahman Kha vs Stale 56 DLR 213.
Sections 256C and 265D—The provisions of section 265C and 265D are mandatory. A duty is cast upon the Court to scrutinise the record and the document submitted there before discharging or framing a charge in a case as the case may be. Just because name of a particular person is mentioned in the FIR or charge-sheet is not sufficient to frame charge against him or frame charge mechanically so that innocent person may not be harassed on false and vexatious allegations. Debobrota Baiddya Debu vs State 58 DLR 71.
Sections 265C & 561A—Procedural law is generally applied retrospectively, hi the cases here neither cognizance has been taken nor charge framed. As such it cannot be said that proceeding was pending before the Magistrate, when the law comes into operation. Shafiqul Islam vs State 61 DLR 280
Sections 265C & 561A—Whether the accused received the legal notice or not, it is merely a disputed question of fact and the same should be decided in trial. The plea of the accused is nothing but the defence plea. Be that as it may, the proposition of law is now well settled that on the basis of defence plea or materials the criminal proceedings should not be stifled before trial, when there is aprimafacie case for going for trial. Shamsul Alam vs State 60 DLR 677.
Section 265D—Statements made under sections 164 and 161 CPC are documents on record within the meaning of section 265D. State vs Auranga @ KM Hemayatuddin 46 DLR 524.
Sections 265E and 412—There is no bar to the acceptance of the plea of guilty, even cases involving capital punishment or imprisonment for life—But no conviction should normally be based on the plea of guilty. The practice has been that the plea of guilty in such cases is not usually accepted. It is desirable for the Court to record the evidence and judge the case in the light of the evidence so recorded. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman @ Razibulla vs State 58 DLR 393.
Sections 265E and 412—An accused person who pleads guilty and is convicted has no right of appeal except as to the extent or legality of the sentence. ‘Where the facts alleged by the prosecution do not amount to an offence, the plea of guilty of an accused cannot stand in the way of his acquittal and section 412 of the Code cannot bar an appeal from his conviction. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman @ Razibulla vs State 58 DLR 393.
Section 265G—The mere fact that witnesses examined were not mentioned in the FIR is no ground for disbelieving them. Siraj Mal vs State 45 DLR 688.
Sections 265G & 37—Submission of sentence for confirmation—the order of conviction under section 302 Penal Code by the Sessions Judge on the basis of part of the evidence recorded by an Assistant Sessions Judge, who is not competent to hold trial under that sections is illegal. The death reference is rejected and the case is sent back for re-trial of the condemned- prisoner in accordance with law and in the light of observations made. State vs Imdad Au Bepari 42 DLR 428.
Section 288 [omitted by Ordinance XLIX of 1978]—Two ways of making the previous recognition of the accused admissible in evidence. Rules stated in 1925 AIR (All) 223 have been relied on by the State (Respondent).
One way, being by putting in his statement before the committing Magistrate under section 288 CrPC and “The other method is to elicit from the witness at the trial a statement that he identified certain persons at the jail and that the persons whom he there identified were persons whom he had seen taking part in the dacoity. Ratan Kha vs State 40 DLR 186.
—Principle of identification of an accused by witness in dock when there was a previous TI parade—Circumstances when a witness cannot possibly identify the accused in dock stated. Ratio decidendi in 1925 AIR (All) 223 approved. We are in respectful agreement with the ratio decidendi reported in 1925 AIR (All) 223.
—It is well-settled that the evidence that a witness gives in the witness box is the substantive evidence and it is always desirable that the witness should be able to identify the accused persons in dock when there was a previous TI Parade, but owing to lapse of time and other compelling reasons it may not be possible for the witness to identify the accused persons in dock. Ratan Kha vs State 40 DLR 186.
—Failure of witnesses to identify accused persons who are strangers to the witnesses— Identification if made without naming them Court’s duty to sift evidence in that circumstance—Any statement, express or implied, made by a witness identifying the accuseds but without naming them, it qualifies as substantive evidence—Test of. Ratan Kha vs State 40 DLR 186.
—Improbable suggestion categorically denied by PWs. That the appellants were taken either to the house of the informant or to the police barrack first and were shown to the PWs 1- 3 before the TI parade has no leg to stand upon. Ratan Kha vs State 40 DLR 186.
Sections 337, 335 and 339(1)—Certificate of the Public Prosecutor necessary for the prosecution of a person who has earlier accepted pardon. This section of the Code provides that a person who earlier accepted the pardon may be tried for the offence in respect of which the pardon was tendered, if the Public Prosecutor certifies that in his opinion the person has either wilfully concealed anything essential or had given false evidence and has not complied with the condition on which the tender was made. This implies that the whole basis for the prosecution of a person to whom pardon has been tendered under section 337 or 338 of the Code for the offence in respect of which the pardon was tendered is a certificate by the Public Prosecutor that in his opinion the person who has accepted the pardon has either wilfully concealed anything essential or had given false evidences and has not complied with the condition on which the tender was made. Angur vs State 41 DLR 66.
—Prosecution of approver who has not [complied with the condition on which pardon wasreceived. Angur vs State 41 DLR 66.
Sections 337, 338, 342 and 494—Unless the ditions are attached before allowing his application, it cannot be said that the accused has been legally pardoned for examining him as an accomplice. Therefore, attachment of terms of which he has been tendered is a condition precedent in allowing an application under section 338. State vs Ershad Ali Sikder 56 DLR 185.
Section 339B—The High Court Division did not give any finding on this point of circulation of the newspaper. Since it is a question of fact about the sufficiency or otherwise of circulation of the newspaper this cannot be raised at this stage. State vs Anowar Hossain Pinto alias Anowar Hossain 61 DLR (AD) 108.
Section 339(1)—The defects pointed out above are not cured by the provisions of the said section of the Code. Here in the present case before us the prosecutor who conducted the earlier sessions case in the 4th Court of Assistant Sessions Judge Mymensingh has not issued any certificate as required under sub-section (1) of section 339 CrPC and there is also no finding that the approver has broken the condition on which the pardon was tendered which is sine qua non for prosecuting an approver. In that view of the matter we are of the view that section 537 has no manner of application in this case. Angur vs State 41 DLR 66.
Section 339(1)—No material available to conclude that TI parade was conducted legally. Appellant entitled to benefit of doubt. From the materials on record it is also found that this appellant was produced before the Court on 4-6-78 for the first time and thereafter was produced in Court on various occasions before the holding of the TI Parade on 11-6-79 and definitely therefore, it was possible for the witnesses like PW 3 Joynal to see the appellant in Court. In such circumstances of the case the identification by PW 3 in the TI Parade is found to be quite unreliable and without any significance. Furthermore, the Magistrate who conducted the TI Parade has not been examined during the trial. There is no material before the Court to find definitely that the TI parade was conducted legally and after observing legal formalities. In view of the above it is found that the identification of appellant Angur by PW 3 Joynal is very much unreliable and the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Angur vs State 41 DLR 66.
Section 339(1)—Conviction of the appellant who was identified by PW 3 who saw the appellant earlier while deposing as PW 7 in the case is not sustainable. Angur vs State 41 DLR 66.
Section 339(1)—Non-compliance of section 339(1) CrPC by the APP. In the present case before us the Assistant Public Prosecutor who conducted the case before the Assistant Sessions Judge, 4th Court, Mymensingh has not issued any certificate regarding his opinion as contemplated under sub-section (1) of section 339 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Angur vs State 41 DLR 66.
The petition for prosecuting the appellant (approver) by the successor APP cannot be termed as a certificate contemplated under section 339(1) of the Code. The Assistant Public Prosecutor who conducted the case before the Assistant Sessions Judge, 4th Court, Mymensingh filed a petition before the trial Court on 8-12-82 praying for the prosecution of the present appellant (Approver) as, according to him, the appellant has not fulfilled the conditions on which pardon was tendered and accepted. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge on the basis of this petition directed for framing charge against the appellant. This petition dated 8-12-82 and the petition dated 23-3-85 submitted by successor APP Mr. Khan at Kishoreganj cannot be termed as a certificate issued by the Public Prosecutor as contemplated under section 339(1) of the Code. Angur vs State 41 DLR 66.
Section 339(1)—Condition for tendering pardon—Enmity between the approver and the other two accused—Whether such pardon is a pardon on condition. Furthermore, from the perusal of the record it is found that as regards the condition for tendering pardon it is at best a pardon on the condition that the approver will speak the truth and in this case he has spoken the truth by saying that he implicated accused Jamir and Sattar as he had litigation and disputes with them and, on the other hand, none of the other witnesses said that accused Jamir and Sattar participated in the dacoity or were present there. Angur vs State 41 DLR 66.
Sections 339(1) & 537—Certificate required under section 339(1) CrPC. If not complied with section 537 has no manner of application. The defects pointed out above are not cured by the provisions of the said section of the Code. Here in the present case before us the prosecutor who conducted the earlier sessions case in the 4th Court of Assistant Sessions Judge, Mymensingh has not issued any certificate as required under sub-section (1) of section 339 CrPC and there is also no Finding that the approver has broken the condition on which the pardon was tendered which is sine qua non for prosecuting an approver. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that section 537 has no manner of application in this case. Angur vs State 41 DLR 66.
Section 339(1)(2)(3)(4)(6)—Time for disposal of criminal cases—”Working days” mean “working days of a particular Judge or a Magistrate” and not the “working days of a particular Court”. Aminul Huq vs State 40 DLR 144.
Section 339B—Frequent adjournment of criminal trial—Court’s duly in the matter— Disinterested witnesses are losing interest to appear before the Court to avoid harassment of going to court again and again. It is desirable in the interest of administration of justice that witnesses be summoned on a day when the Court is in a position to examine them. No adjournment at the instance of any party should be allowed causing inconvenience to witnesses. Practice of adjourning criminal trial frequently on the prayer of the defence in spite of appearance of prosecution witnesses on the ground of absence of any accused overlooking provision of section 339B CrPC is contrary to law and should be discontinued. Mahbubur Rahman Khan vs State 45 DLR
Section 339B—Accused facing trial on capital charge—Entitled to be defended by a lawyer even if the trial is held in absentia— Court’s responsibility to appoint a lawyer to defend—Section 339B CrPC does not come in conflict with the rule of PR Manual—Cardinal principle of criminal administration of justice stated. State vs Jahaur Ali 42 DLR 94.
Section 339B—The appellants were tried in absentia although they were in custody in connection with another case and not produced in the present case for no fault of their own. In such a position prayer for fresh trial is not entertainable. Muslim vs State 47 DLR 185.
Section 339B, sub-section (1)—Failure to publish the order in at least one Bengali daily news-paper is violative of the provision of section 339B CrPC and also of principle of natural justice. Moktar Ahmed vs Hazi Farid Alam 42 DLR 162.
Sections 339B(2) & 512—Since section 339B(2) provides for absentia trial, section 512 has no application in the case of an accused who appeared before the court but thereafter absconded. Baharuddin vs State 47 DLR 61.
Section 339C—Provisions of this section s not merely a procedural law. It is a law vesting the accused with a right which could not be taken away by a subsequent amendment if the law. Abu Sufian vs State 45 DLR 610.
Section 339C—Section 29 of the Special Powers Act makes the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable to the proceedings of the Special Tribunal—the time-limit imposed by section 339C CrPC will also apply to the procee-dings of Special Tribunal. Chand Miah vs State 42 DLR 97.
Section 339C—”Working days” for disposal of criminal cases—stopping proceedings for release of the accused—”Working lays” of the Court—”Working days” shall bç understood to mean the “Working days” during which the learned judge will hold the charge of the trial Court—A Division Bench of the High Court Division rightly excluded the period of 53 days from the statutory period for the trial s the Additional District Judge held the charge of the District and Sessions Judge for 53 days which were not treated as “Working days” for the trial Court. The application for quashing the proceedings rightly rejected. Abul Kashem vs State 40 DLR (AD) 97.
Section 339C read with Ordinance No. 37 of 1983 (coming into force on 8-8-1983 extending the time-limit upto 30-6-1985 in his case and later on fmally upto 30-9-1985) Charge-sheet was submitted on 16-6-83 before SDM who in due course forwarded the record to the Sessions Judge for trial. The case comes within the ambit of the lime limit of the Ordinance No. 37 of 1983 which was intended to save such trials. Construction put to the Ordinance by the HC Division is not correct to conclude that this case is “not pending” on the date of commencement of the Ordinance. State vs Madhu Mridha 40 DLR (AD) 99.
Section 339C—Concluding a trial beyond time—The Sessions Judge having received the case for disposal on 8-12-84 and delivered his judgment on 29-9-87 long after the expiry of the stipulated time for disposal of the case the trial was without jurisdiction and the conviction illegal in view of the provision of section 339C. Abdul Quddus vs State 44 DLR 441.
Section 339C—The provision of this section does not show legislative intention to permit exclusion of the days of adjournment taken by the defence or non-production of the accused in a case on the ground of illness. Motiar Rahman vs State 47 DLR 593.
Section 339C, 339D(b)—Section 339C and 339D(b) of the Code are inconsistent with the provision of section 8 of the Ordinance and due to this inconsistency these two provisions 339C and 339D(b) are not applicable in the cases revived under the Ordinance. “Working days” of the Court as provided in section 339D(b) cannot be brought into the ambit of section 8 of the Ordinance. The provisions of section 8 provided that trial of such cases must be concluded within two years from the date of commencement of the Ordinance. In the present case it appears that the case was revived on 17-2- 87 and in view of the provision of section 8 the trial ought to have been concluded within 20-1- 87. But the trial Court failed to conclude the trial within that period and when the petitioner approached the court for stopping the proceeding his prayer was rejected applying the section 339D(b). But in view of the above the provision of section 339D(b) has no manner of application. Abdul Nur Mehidi vs State 46 DLR 303.
Section 339C(6)(b)—The trial could not be held for 26 working days of the Tribunal as the accused after being released on bail remained absent. The absence is on his own peril and he cannot take advantage of his own wrong so as to ask for deduction of 26 working days. Humayun Kabir vs State 46 DLR 410.
Section 339C—Non-working days of a particular judge for reasons beyond his control like unsuitable working condition in the Court room should be excluded while computing the working days. Abdul Motaleb Shaque vs State 47 DLR 24.
Section 339C—The days on which the case was adjourned due to default of the accused should not be considered as working days, otherwise it will be easy for the accused to stretch the trial beyond the statutory period. Abdul Motaleb Shaque vs State 47 DLR 24.
Section 339C—The whole purpose of unamended section 339C was to whip up the prosecution and activise the trial Court so as not to delay the trial of a case unnecessarily. Abdul Wadud vs Slate 48 DLR (AD) 6.
Section 339C—The Sessions Judge made a mistake in holding that after receipt of records of the case for trial in December 1988 by his predecessor, a fresh period of 270 days will start for him to complete the trial since he had taken charge of the Sessions Division in January 1991. Section 339C referred to an office, not a person. Abdul Wadud vs State 48 DLR (AD) 6.
Section 339C, 339D(b)—Section 339C and 339D(b) of the Code are inconsistent with the provision of section 8 of the Ordinance and due to this inconsistency these two provisions 339C and 338D(b) are not applicable in the cases revived under the Ordinance. Abdul Nur Mehedi vs State 46 DLR 303.
Sections 339C(1)(4)(6), 435 and 439— Section 339C(4) does not provide for abating any case nor does it provide for acquittal of the accused but merely provides for stopping the trial of the case and releasing the accused’ person— Impugned order by the learned Magistrate suffers from manifest illegality as only 22 days out of 30 extended days have passed—339C(6) provides for counting of working days in determining the time for disposal of cases. Sultan Ahmed vs Golam Mostafa 40 DLR 85.
Section 339C(2)(3)(4)(6)—Time for completion of trial of Sessions case within the statutory period of 270 days including the extended time— Case pending before the sessions Judge, Narail since 12-12-1985—After examination of one witness the petitioner filed a petition under section 339C(4) of the Code for release of the accused petitioner on he ground that the specified period of 240 lays and extended time of 30 days totalling 270 working days for trial of the accused petitioner had already elapsed—Dictionary meaning of the word is not a safe guide for interpreting an expression in a statute—Calculation sheet showed that more than 361 working days of the court had passed from 12-12-85 to 30-3-87 and the number of 361 days excluded only holidays and Fridays but not the days during which the Sessions Judge could not sit in court when the Court was open— “Working days” shall be interpreted as ‘working days” of the Judge and not of the Court—Non- working days of a particular Judge for reasons beyond his control should be excluded from the “working days” when counted. Ekramul Hoq vs State 40 DLR 139.
Section 339C(4)—It was incumbent upon the Special Tribunal to allow the accused to go on bail when it could not complete the trial within the time provided. RaJIq Hasan alias Biplob vs State represented by the Deputy Commissioner 48 DLR 274.
Sections 339C(4) & 497—Besides inordinate delay in prosecuting the trial of the case and the provision of section 339C(4) of the Code, the fact that the appellant has been suffering from enlarged prostate gland and problems in his urinary track attracts the proviso to section 497 CrPC for consideration to enlarge the accused on bail. Captain (Retd) Nurul Huda vs State 55 DLR (AD) 33.
Sections 339C(4) and 498—Even in a non- bailable offence the accused is entitled to be enlarged on bail unless the Court decides otherwise assigning reasons which are relevant to the fact of the case. Captain (Retd) Nurul Huda vs State 55 DLR (AD) 33.
Sections 339C(4) & 498—The prosecution could not give plausible reason for inordinate delay in proceeding with the case—This circumstance can be considered as a ground for granting bail to an accused. Captain (Retd) Nurul Huda vs State 55 DLR (AD) 33.
Sections 339C(4) & D—Revival of a case— By the use of expressions in an unambiguous manner the legislature has left absolutely no doubt that the limitation regarding making an application by the Government to the court for revival of the relevant case shallrun from the date on which the court concerned actually stopped the proceedings and not from the date on which the proceedings of the trial of the case should have been stopped. AHM Kamaluddin vs State 43 DLR 294.
Section 339C, sub-section (6)—Criminal trial—”Working days” to be counted in determining the time for disposal of criminal cases— “Working days” mean the days on which a Judge works as such. So, the days when the learned Sessions Judge was on leave and outside the stations should not be regarded as “Working days” of the learned Sessions Judge. The court is of the opinion that these days should be excluded while computing the time required for disposal of the sessions case. This being the legal position 150 days did not expire in the present case and application for stopping of the proceeding of the sessions case and for release of the accused petitioners has rightly been rejected. Akbar Au vs State 40 DLR 29.
Section 339D—Revival of a case under section 339D. Under the scheme of the Code itself, the Public Prosecutor is competent to file application for revival of a ease on behalf of the Government without any authority or instruction whatsoever. Dr SM Abu Taher vs State 42 DLR 138.
Section 339D—The petitioner being the full brother of the deceased victim and a charge-sheet prosecution witness, is no doubt an aggrieved person and competent to file the application for revival of the case. Abdus Sobhan vs Ali Akbar 47 DLR 598.
Section 339D—A Public Prosecutor represents the State in a case “of which he has charge” which is under enquiry, trial or appeal. Any action taken by the Public Prosecutor in such a case particularly when a case has been stopped due to expiry of the time-limit (which law has since been repealed) will be deemed to be an action on behalf of the Government so long as the Government do not disown it. Alimuddin vs State 49 DLR (AD) 118.
Section 339D—Where a case is revived under section 339D(1) whether the statutory period of 240 days should be counted from the date the case was received by the trial Court after revival or from the date of revival? A careful examination of all the sub-sections of section 339D will show that the sub-section (5) of section 339D reconciles section 339D(4) with section 339C(2) by laying down in an unambiguous language that the starting point of computation of the statutory period in a case revived under section 339D(1) is the date of revival which, according to sub-section 5 of section 339D, is deemed to be dated on which the case is received for trial. Belayet Hossain vs State 46 DLR 413.
Section 339(4)—Working days should be understood to mean actual working days during which the learned Judge holds the Court. Nurul Islam Monzoor vs State 53 DLR 59.
Section 339(4)—There is no absolute direction to allow bail, even in case of failure to complete the trial within the statutory period, as the mandate, if any, for allowing bail is subjected by the words, “unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Court otherwise directs”. Nurul Islam Monzoor vs State 53 DLR 59.
Section 340—An Advocate to defend an undefended accused charged with capital offence should be appointed well in time to enable him to study the case and the lawyer should be of sufficient standing and able to render assistance. He should be provided with papers which are ordinarily allowed to the accused. The deficiencies as on the record are due to the appointment of State lawyer without giving him sufficient time to prepare the case. This has seriously prejudiced the accused persons and their defence was materially affected. The State defence lawyer could not to justice to the case of the absconding accused who have been sentenced to death. The impugned order of the learned Sessions Judge convicting and sentencing condemned-prisoner Hanif and convict Waliur to death under sections 302/34 of the Penal Code is set aside and they are directed to be tried of the charge already framed. The case is sent back on remand for fresh trial in the light of the observation made. State vs Hanif Gani 45 DLR 400.
Section 340—The requirement of law is that irrespective of whether the accused is absconding or not he is as of right entitled to be represented and defended by a lawyer appointed by the court and the trial Court must ensure that it has been done before the commencement of the trial or else the trial and the resultant conviction and sentence would be vitiated. Mobarak Ali vs Bangladesh 50 DLR 10.
Section 340—The condemned-prisoner was in custody and he was produced before the court from time to time but he was not represented by any lawyer of his choice. So it was the duty of the court to appoint a lawyer at the cost of the state to defend the condemned-prisoner as the offence was punishable with death. State vs Rabiul Hossain alias Rob 52 DLR 370.
Section 340-Right of an accused to be defended by a lawyer in a case charged under section 302 of the Penal Code being punishable with death is, an inalienable right guaranteed in the law of our land and if any trial takes place refusing such fundamental right the trial is a misnomer and the judgment passed convicting an accused is no judgment in the eye of law. Babu Khan vs State 55 DLR 547.
Section 340-Right of an accused to be defended by a lawyer in a case charged under section 302 of the Penal Code being punishable with death is an inalienable right guaranteed in the law of our land and if any trial takes place refusing such fundamental right, the trial is a misnomer and the judgment passed convicting an accused is no judgment in the eye of law. Abdul Hannan vs State 61 DLR 713.
Sections 340, 342, 343—A self-confessed accused may be treated as an approver but who does not participate in the criminal act along with others cannot be accepted as an accomplice. State vs Ershad Ali Sikder 56 DLR 185.
Section 340(3)—As the accused has right to know about the prosecution’s evidence so the prosecution should have right to know about the accused’s evidence before trial. Ali Akbar vs State 51 DLR 268.