Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance [LX of 1983]
Section 4(Kha) & 9—The 84 love letters and photographs exhibited in the case indicate that there was a romantic relationship between the alleged victim Samroz and appellant Jugal—In view of the materials on record the Court finds itself in a confusion as to who is the victim in the real sense and accordingly ordered Jugal’s acquittal. Jugal Kumar Das (Shovon Ahmed) vs State 59 DLR 11.

Section 4(b)—For sustaining a charge of kidnapping a woman for unlawful purposes the alleged victim must be in between 16 and 18. If she is above 16 but below 18 and if no force is used to go with the accused it will not be an offence under the Penal Code or the Ordinance for deterrent punishment. Monindra Kumar Malaker vs State 42 DLR 349.

Sections 4(b) & 4(c)—Even if the plea of the defence that the victim girl gave her consent to the alleged marriage and sexual intercourse is accepted still that will not help the defence, because she being a minor her consent was in fact no consent in the eye of law. Siraj Mal vs State 45 DLR 688.

Section 4(b)(c)(9)—There is no overt act proved against accused Ananda in any conspiracy resulting in the abduction of the victim girl by Swapan—Prosecution failed to prove the charge of abetment against Ananda. Ananda vs State 41 DLR 533.

Section 4(b)(c)(9)—The Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to try the case under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898). State vs Khalilur Rahman 41 DLR 1.

Section 4(c)—In a case punishable under section 4(c) of the Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance medical evidence is not a must if the allegation can be proved otherwise. Alamgir Hossain vs State 49 DLR 630.

Sections 4(c) and 9—Where the evidence of prosecutrix forms the only material on which the Court has to act upon, it is absolutely necessary in the interest of justice that at least the victim’s statement be in conformity with the probability. In a case like this the evidence of a solitary witness calls for corroboration as a rule of prudence. Mozam vs State 59 DLR 276.

Section 6—’Dowry’ includes not only money, etc. agreed to be paid before, or at the time of marriage, but also money, etc. demanded afresh after the marriage for continuing the marriage already solemnised. AKM Kumar Pramanik vs Bokul Rani Pramanik 46 DLR 290.

Section 6—By inclusion of the offence of the above ordinance in the Schedule to the Special Powers Act the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court has been ousted. Now, as the death is proved but not for demand of dowry, the present case is sent back to the Sessions Court for trial. Firoz Miah vs State 51 DLR 37.

Section 6—None of the witnesses deposed that this convict demanded any dowry and for non-payment of dowry he has caused the death of the victim. If the demand of dowry is not proved the tribunal has no jurisdiction to try this case. The charge brought against the convict under section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition (deterrent punishment) Ordinance, 1983 has not been proved. The learned Tribunal without considering the evidences and the materials in the record passed the impugned judgment which is liable to be set aside. Rabiul Karim vs State 59 DLR 401.

Sections 6 and 10—Mere allegation made by the wife that her husband (accused) had beaten her on 2-11-1984 while demanding dowry and ousted her from her house, in the absence of any allegation that the accused husband caused or attempted to cause death or grievous hurt to her, will not come within the mischief of section 6 of the Ordinance. Firoza Begum vs Hormuz Ali 40 DLR 161.

Section 9—The charge of abetment of an offence under this Ordinance falls through if allegation as to the principal offence is not substantiated. The moment the abettor has instigated or aided to commit the act his part is complete and the offence of abetment is also complete but this is not the case as defined in the Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance, 1983, Here section 9 has clearly stated that the offence of abetment is punishable under this Ordinance if the act in consequence of such abetment is committed. Enayet vs State 48 DLR 514.

Section 29—An appeal is continuation of a case and so long an appeal is pending, the case also remains pending. In this view, the instant case be considered as a pending case and sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Act shall apply. There is no bar for trial of the case if it is sent back though the Ordinance has been repealed. Ekramul Huq @ Bachchu vs State 51 DLR 219.