This paper will identify a variety of approaches taken in establishing recklessness in the criminal law. Advantages and disadvantages of these approaches will be viewed in relation to moral culpability.
Whilst subÑ˜ective test seems like the better choice, it does not hold all those morally blameworthy to account. The obÑ˜ective test can bring unfair outcomes in situations where the defendant did not have the capacity to foresee the risk of harm. Therefore recklessness based on conscience advertence produces a constricted definition and culpable inadvertence must be encompassed by looking at the reason why no thought was given to the risk. Despite the Ñ˜udicial and legislative search for the paramount interpretation of ‘recklessness’ the law in this area is not clear.
The two conflicting interpretations of the term ‘reckless’ within the criminal law, prior to 2004  were established in the cases of Cunnigham and Caldwell.In R v Cunningham  Byrne Ðˆ sited the proposed definition in ‘Outlines of Criminal Law’ by Professor Kenny  ‘the accused has foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done, and yet has gone on to take the risk ‘  Cunningham recklessness was clarified in the cases of R v Parker  , R v Briggs  and R v Stephenson  to mean that foresight of some damage was all that was required and that ‘knowledge of a risk must have entered the defendants mind though he may have dismissed it’ 
The difficulty with applying the subÑ˜ective test is that failure to consider the risk would not diminish the possibility of criminal liability. Therefore a defendant may still be culpable for his actions, for instance by behaving without regard for others, but by failing to think about the effect of his conducts he could not be found criminally reckless. The Cunningham test can be criticised for being narrow. The question that arises is that whether applying such a narrow liability, based only on whether the defendant foresaw the risk of harm would be just. Whilst this approach  identifies the morally censurable behaviour of defendant in that he exercised a free choice to take the risk . It also has the advantage of providing a seemingly simple question for a Ñ˜ury to determine when compared with a more obÑ˜ective test of asking the Ñ˜ury to determine whether the accused should have foreseen the risk . But a subÑ˜ective approach to the mens rea of recklessness also has the adverse consequence of risking undermining confidence in, and support for, the criminal Ñ˜ustice system because if the Ñ˜ury recognize that the defendant did not foresee the risk they are obliged to acquit him, even where the defendant should have foreseen it and was capable of that foresight.
The obÑ˜ective interpretation of recklessness was adopted by the Coldwell case  . According to Lord Diplock one would be reckless under the Criminal Damage Act if
he does an act which in fact creates an obvious risk that property will be
destroyed or damaged
and when he does that act he either has not given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or he has recognised that there was some risk involved and has none the less gone on to do it  .
Norrie  submits that this direction is presented as a unity, yet with point  it is infact two separate tests. This is for the reason that the inadvertent strand (‘has not given any thought’) the risk foreseen by the ‘reasonable person’ must be an ‘obvious’ one, whereas with the advertent strand (‘has recognised that there was some risk involved’) there is no such requirement for the risk to be obvious as ‘the element of deliberation suffices to convict for reck lessness’ for running a minor risk . 
It is Clear that Lord Diplock ‘s intention was to widen the definition of recklessness however with this model direction some defendants would be outside the scope of his direction. Smith  Williams  and Griew  were branded ‘lacuna’ within the Caldwell direction where the defendant had considered the existence of a risk but decided that there wasn’t one or where the defendant did foresee the risk but believed to have taken necessary measures to prevent it from occurring. Smith and Williams have made a very valid point by claiming that this may allow the genuine yet negligent defendant to escape liability for recklessness  .
However in Shimmen  , the defendant was first acquitted since his case fell within lacuna. Whilst he had foreseen the risk , he mistakenly decided that he had eradicated any risk. The argument that he was not reckless because he had given thought to the risk but mistakenly believed that he had minimised it, was reÑ˜ected by the Divisional Court.
Lord Diplock ‘s Ñ˜udgement in Caldwell  altered the definition of recklessness from the subÑ˜ective in Cunningham  to an obÑ˜ective test, based on the state of mind of the ordinary prudent person  .
Despite criticisms like ‘ such decisions would potentially allow the law to be influenced by politics and social value Ñ˜udgements and this could result in uncertainty as different panels could come to different conclusions’  . One could argue that such influences may allow the law to be more Ñ˜ust since Ñ˜ustice can be done in a particular case.
This approach did have some other attractive features, for instance those who ought to have foreseen the risk of their action causing harm to others, would be found guilty.
The subÑ˜ective approach in Cunningham was accused of being flawed by Lord Diplock , since it required ‘the detailed analysis by the Ñ˜ury of the thoughts of the accused’  before they would be able to decide what the defendant may have been thinking prior to or at the time when he acted. Lord Diplock thought that it would be redundant to confuse affairs by expecting a Ñ˜ury to decide beyond reasonable doubt whether the defendant’s mind had crossed ‘the narrow dividing line’  between awareness of the risk and not troubling to consider it.
Lord Diplock was critical of the decision in R v Briggs  Firstly, as it excluded from recklessness – the defendant who did not think about the risk , even where the risk is enormous and would be evident to the defendant if he simply stopped to think about it, and, secondly, because it failed to address the situation where ‘the risk might be so insignificant that even the most prudent of men would feel Ñ˜ustified in taking it’.
Lord Diplock criticised R v Parker  to a lesser extent since it had widened Cunningham recklessness to cover closing the mind to an apparent risk but still excluded the defendant whose mind was not open to start with. To suppress an awareness of a risk means that at least a brief awareness of the risk has to be present before it can be suppressed.
Cases such as Parker raise the notion as to whether foresight is in fact the test in cases where the risk is clear to the reasonable prudent man. If the Ñ˜udiciary will go to such extents to secure the conviction of defendants who are considered to be morally blameworthy, it can be said that in cases like Parker a capacity-based obÑ˜ective test is very much in operation.
One of the key problems with Lord Diplock ‘s Ñ˜udgement in Caldwell was that it was primarily directed at those defendants who had the capacity to foresee the risk  . Lord Diplock failed to consider those incapable of foreseeing any risk , even if the risk had been pointed out to them. It was suggested by Lord Binghamin in R v G and R  that the maÑ˜ority in Caldwell were set on their course and such considerations may not have had any impact, instead they remained focused on the moral and social case for departing from the subÑ˜ective definition.
Metcalfe and Ashworth distinguish this approach with the narrower focus in G and R, with the need for the House of Lords to consider the liability of children  This raises an important question of whether the model direction would have still been followed had the defendants in G and R not been minors.
It is widely believed that if it was not for the failure to exempt those without the capacity to foresee risk from the model direction it is possible that Caldwell recklessness would not only still be applicable to criminal damage offences, but may also have been a more generally accepted definition under statute and under the common law, providing consistency throughout the criminal law  .
In Elliott v C (A Minor)  the court was faced with the ideal opportunity to develop a capacity based test from Caldwell but it failed to do so. This case demonstrated the optimal inÑ˜ustice within this model direction. The accused was a minor with learning difficulties, yet her actions would have been perceived by the reasonably prudent person as ‘creating a risk’, the prosecution’s appeal against her acquittal before magistrates was upheld by the Divisional Court. Williams’ proposal that ‘obvious’ in the model direction meant obvious to the particular defendant was not adopted as on a literal interpretation of the wording of the model direction, the defendant’s foresight was not required. Williams also makes the valid point that experience allows one to be more aware of risks a minor does not have the necessary experience to appreciate risks as an adult would.
The case of R v G and R  overturned Caldwell  and devised a third approach to recklessness  . 
The Ñ˜udgment in G and R meant, a return to a subÑ˜ective definition of recklessness for the purposes of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. The new definition was not from Cunningham, but that contained in the draft Criminal Code  .
The amended version unlike that in Cunningham,  makes clear reference to recklessness in relation to circumstances. This definition is different from the wording used in the Law Commission’s Report on the Mental Element in Crime  which was criticised by Duff  for being ‘too wide’, in counting every conscious and unreasonable risk -taker as ‘reckless’ and too narrow’ in requiring advertence to the risk .
Nonetheless, the new definition is subÑ˜ected to some difficulties that Duff has acknowledged. Duff  believes the requirement for actual advertence to be ‘too narrow’, claiming that to hold the view that the ‘presence or absence of advertence results in an important difference to the nature and degree of culpability’ has been ‘convincingly demolished’ by Hart, because failure to advert can depend on the attention a defendant pays to what he is doing and is consequently within his control. He claims that one can be reckless ‘even though, and even partially because, he may not realise the risk’  because his action manifests such grave ‘practical indifference’ and ‘lack of concern’, that the possibility of there being a risk is unimportant. Traditionally, even if a subÑ˜ective definition of recklessness is adopted it will nevertheless have an obÑ˜ective element to it too, which is the taking of ‘an unÑ˜ustified risk ‘.  Simester and Sullivan claim that, whether one sees the risk as an unreasonable one is immaterial; it is whether an ordinary and prudent person would have been willing to take that risk  . However, one can question whether this statement is still valid subsequent to one possible interpretation of the draft Criminal Code.  According to this definition, not only must the accused advert to the risk , but on one interpretation he must know that it is unreasonable for him to go on to take it. This would be a form of ideal subÑ˜ectivism and limit culpability further.
It appears that to satisfy (i) he must know that a risk exists, and (ii) he must also be confident of there being a risk , therefore an awareness of a possibility of a risk existing would not be enough as it would have done under the RMEC, which only required a person to see that a result may transpire.
In each continue to act, and once again it would appear that the negligent defendant would escape liability. It is then a matter for the Ñ˜ury to decide whether the defendant genuinely either failed to foresee the risk as definite and/or believed it to be reasonable to take it in the circumstances known to the accused at the time.
Lord Rodger in G and R did not find a wider concept of recklessness ‘undesirable’ in terms of culpable inadvertence, identifying that there was scope for an obÑ˜ective approach and he referred to the model direction as ‘a legitimate choice between two legal policies’ which ‘may be better suited to some offences than to others’  .
Following G and R, the Court of Appeal has stated that this case laid down general principles to be followed and the definition of recklessness employed should not be restricted to cases of criminal damage, as Lord Bingham had specified.  Therefore Caldwell recklessness was known to be so unclear and potentially caused inÑ˜ustice, that Lord Bingham restricted its overruling to criminal damage offences.  The new definition was applied in Booth v CPS  where the defendant was appealing against his conviction for the criminal damage caused to a car. He argued that if he had thought of any risk prior to running across a road to meet a friend it would have been in relation to personal inÑ˜ury to himself but the court upheld the conviction, holding that there was enough evidence on which the magistrates could support their decision that he must have closed his mind to the risk . Thus an obÑ˜ective approach to foresight is being applied here and in Parker.
The Law Commission’s draft Criminal Law Bill  goes so far to make some alterations to the definition of recklessness.
A person acts – (b) ‘recklessly’ with respect to – (i) a circumstance, when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist, and (ii) a result when he is aware of a risk that it will occur, and it is unreasonable, having considered t the circumstances known to him, to take that risk . . .
This definition appears to be more obÑ˜ective in interpretation than the draft Code, for instance the reasonable person can take into account what the defendant knew or believed to establish whether they think it was reasonable for the defendant to take the risk . It is subject to debate whether yet another definition is necessary. Halpin argues that if different definitions of recklessness are to be applied to different offences it is essential to be able to substantiate why this is so and yet this has not been attempted. 
Overall It is clear that the overabundance of present definitions and the need for a morally substantive interpretation seeks additional progression and debate in recklessness.
When employing the subÑ˜ective approach in Cunningham and G and R to cases such as Parker and Booth it can be said that a capacity based test is already in use. This is because it is understood that a definition of recklessness that is too subÑ˜ective can allow those who are guilty to avoid criminal liability. Alternatively, a test that is too obÑ˜ective can cause inÑ˜ustice without being capacity based. It is accepted that a combination of the two approaches would be ideal. This can be accomplished by overtly developing a capacitybased test or by introducing a form of practicalindifference test  . It is submitted, however, that Glidewell Ðˆ’s proposal in Elliott  would be a way of achieving a more appropriate approach to unintentional recklessness: where no thought is given to the risk any additional inquiry necessary for the purpose of establishing guilt should prima facie be directed to the question why such thought was not given, rather than to the purely hypothetical question of what the particular person would have appreciated had he directed his mind to the matter. 
Once the reason why no attention was paid to the risk emerged, it would be quite simple to examin the degree of moral blameworthiness and consequently any criminal liability. Such an approach would look beyond the subÑ˜ective/obÑ˜ective dichotomy and add another dimension, why the accused acted as he did, his motivation or emotion behind the actus reus  .Metcalfe and Ashworth assert that there needs to be further discussions of the extent to which requirements for criminal liability should have subÑ˜ective or obÑ˜ective elements rather than a simple ‘subÑ˜ective or obÑ˜ective’ characterisation.