Section-5
(a) Family Courts have jurisdiction to entertaintiy and dispose of any suit relating to the matters in clauses (a) to (e) section 5 of the Family Courts Ordinance only between the litigants who are Muslims by the faith.
Krishnapada Talukder Vs Geetasree Alias Baby 2BLT (HCD)-208
(b) The preamble of a statute is not ordinarily on independent enactment able to confer any right or to restrict or widen the enacting part which is clear and unambiguous. Even the preamble is to be disregarded when there is conflict between section and preamble and in that case express provisions of the section are to be given full effect.
Krishnapada Talukder Vs Geetasree Alias Baby 2BLT (HCD)-208
Section-5
Family Courts Ordinance applies to all citizens irrespective of religion — “Subject to” has not created any embargo in the jurisdiction of the Family Courts in respect of cases and suits filed by citizens professing religion other than Islam. But while deciding the cases of the subjects enumerated in section 5 it is clear that Family Courts will follow the personal laws of those subjects.
Pachan Rishi Das Vs. Khulai Rani Dasi 5BLT (HCD)-174
Section-5
Whether the Family Court have jurisdiction to entertain the suit and to decide the question of validity of the marriage between the parties which was denied by the defendant
Family Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain, try and dispose of any suit relating or arising out of restitution of conjugal right, dower, maintenance etc. which would obviously include the determination of the validity of a marriage as that is related to an inter-connected with the question of determination of dower, maintenance etc. Any other interpretation
will be simply preposterous.
Md. Chan Mia Vs. Rupnahar 6BLT (HCD)-92
Section-5
A Subordinate Judge has got no jurisdiction to invoke any power under Section 151 of the Code in the proceedings of a title suit either to grant stay or injunction in respect of a family suit of a Family Court.
Md. Shafiqul Haque Vs. Mina Begum 10BLT (HCD)185
Section-5
The appellate court below hold that the plaintiff got five bighas of land as dower and thereafter, the money which was given to the defendant No.1 by selling five bighas of land was money loan by the wife to the husband which cannot be treated as dower — the family court cannot adjudicate upon the dispute.
Held:
The court of appeal below erred law in holding that the money given by the plaintiff by selling 5 bighas of land to the defendant No.1 was not dower and that the said money was loan. The court of appeal below in the premises, has committed error of law in holding that the said dispute cannot be adjudicated upon by the family court. I am of the view that the family Court has rightly
directed the defendant No.1 to give 5 bighas of land as dower.
Most. Rowshan Ara Begum Chowdhury Vs. Tahera Noor Jahan & Ors. 10 BLT(HCD)-307
Section-5 read with Specific Relief Act, 1877 [I of 1877] Section-39
On 12.10.2000 opposite party No.1 instituted the family suit before the Family Court for dower and maintenance. The petitioner has already appeared and filed a written statement denying his marriage with her. He has got every opportunity to challenge the ‘Kabinnama’ and the solemnization of the marriage on the very same grounds on which he on 22.10.2000 filed Title suit No.296 of 2000 before a Subordinate Judge. Family Court has got every jurisdiction to decide as to whether the ‘Kabinnama’ in question is a genuine and valid document or not and whether any marriage between the petitioner and Opposite Party No.1 was ever solemnized or not before it decides to grant any decree for dower and /or maintenance. In such a suit for a decree for dower and/or maintenance, no declaration in respect of the ‘Kabinnama’ or cancellation of the ‘Kabinnama’ is at all necessary. Family Court therefore cannot be expected to wait for the final decision of a title suit on like issues as nobody can surely say when such title suit would find the end of the tunnel. Moreover, it would be acting to frustrate the very purpose of the Ordinance.
Md. Shafiqul Haque Vs. Mina Begum 10 BLT (HCD)-185
Section- 17(1)(5)
Whether a decree will be drawn up by the Family Court after the pronouncement of the judgement.
The formal expression of a decision of a Civil Court is an order. The word ‘Order’ occurring in sub-sections 1 and 5 of section 17 may be said to include any ‘decision’ rendered by a court on a question between the parties of a proceeding before the court. The “Decision” may be both interlocutory and final. The decision rendered by the Family Court is final decision/judgement setting the controversy and determining the rights of the pareties in the suit on consideration of the facts, issues and legal aspect and the same is not an interlocutory order-a decree will be drawn up by the Family Court after the pronouncement of the judgement.
Ms. Farhat Rahman Vs. Roomee Tarek Moudud 8BLT(HCD)-108
Section-5 (D) The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 Section-9, Read with The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 Section-488
Past maintenance — A wife can claim past maintenance for herself and for her children for only 6 years prior to the filing of the suit.
From a reading of the entire ordinance of 1985 it appears that the provisions thereof are intended to provide for the establishment of Family Courts and for matters connected therewith and are not intended to make provisions for modification or amendment of Mohammedan law or any other substantive law. The Ordinance is indeed procedural in nature.
Jamila Khatoon Vs. Rastom Ali 4BLT(AD)97
Under section 5 of Ordinance of 1985 the wife can claim past maintenance for the child if she has been supporting the child in the same household without any contribution from the father. But if she does not claim separate maintenance for the child,
the court will consider the overall needs, keeping in view the fact that she has been supporting a child in the same household. In either case, the claim is subject to Article 120 of the Limitation Act.
Jamila Khatoon Vs. Rastom Ali 4BLT (AD)97
Section-20
The affidavit of divorce is a public document and it requires no formal proof the Appellate Court having the power of the original Court has rightly admitted the said instrument of divorce and legally marked the same as Ext. A.
Sirajul Islam Vs. Helena Begum & Ors. 3BLT (HCD)-40
Section-21
Attorney in the instant case the defendant petitioner—the defendant petitioner is the husband of the plaintiff-opposite-party and he is male and not a pardahnashin lady and he cannot be represented by an authorised agent, here his brother in whose favour the Power of Attorney has been made by him [defendant].
Md. Atiqur Rahaman Vs. Ainunnahar 7BLT (HCD)-241
Financial Institution Act, 1993 Section-25(3)
We are of the opinion that the embargo on banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions to nominate its directors on the Board of a financial institution is based on a reasonable classification. It appears to us to be obvious that the legislative policy is to exclude the same set of persons to manage, control, regulate and monopolize the policy making functions of capital generating financial institutions. A textile manufacturing company is generating goods and it may not be immoral from the point of view of financial policy to allow the directors of such a company to be represented on the Board of financial institution in which the textile manufacturing company may have a shareholding interest. But it appears to be the police of the legislature that directors of capital generating institutions should not be allowed to flock together in a financial institution to control and monopolize the capital market.
City Bank Ltd. Vs. Bangladesh Bank & Ors 8BLT (AD)-20
Section-25(3)
Section 25(3) does not on terms make any distinction between directors who represent their own shareholding individually and nominee directors who represent their companies shareholdings. It applies to all, whether they are individuals or nominees of a bank, insurance or financial institution.
Phoenix Leasing Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Bangladesh Bank & Ors 8BLT (AD)-117
Section-25(3) and 48
Withdrawal of exemption by Bangladesh Banks Notification dated 14.12.1996 is prospective and not retrospective as contended by the petitioners learned Counsel
This interpretation of the impugned notification dated 14.12.1996 is not acceptable on the face of it. Section 25(3) of the said Act is a barring provision making certain persons ineligible for being appointed as directors of a financial institution. Until there is an exercise of power of exemption under section 48, the bar remains as a permanent provision in the said Act. When an exemption is given the bar under section 25(3) is relaxed: but when the exemption is withdrawn the legal consequence is he revival of the permanent bar under section 25(30, which will affect the existing nominee directors including petitioner Nos.2-5
The question of prospectively and retrospectively does not arise in these circumstances. It is a case of certain section of an Act remaining in abeyance as if in a state of hibernation because of an exemption granted and the revival of it as soon as the exemption is withdrawn.
Phoenix Leasing Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Bangladesh Bank & Ors 8BLT (AD)-117
Fire Insurance Policy Condition Nos 3, 13 & 19 Read with word “Action”
(a) The plaintiff-respondent established a homeopathic laboratory and a fire insurance policy was taken from defendant No. 1 (Sadharan Bima Corporation). covering the risk of fire due to fire which arose out of short circuit of electricity the laboratory of the plaintiff was turn to ashes.
Sadharan Bima Corporation Vs Sanjit Kumar Das 2BLT (HCD)-101
(b) There was no electricity connection in the room where the spirits were stored but in other rooms the electricity connection for lighting the rooms was there — since the plaintiffs house is adjacent to the laboratory and he is the owner of both laboratory and house only for lighting purpose of the room of the laboratory he extended the electricity to his laboratory room from his house — no Misdescription about electricity connection.
Sadharan. Bima Corporation Vs Sanjib Kumar Das 2BLT (HCD)-101
(c) After filling up and submission of the proposal form for fire insurance the officers of the defendant No.! (Sadharan Bima Corporation) inspected and visited the area and the laboratory. The officers of the defendant No.1 had given a favourable report and on the basis of the report of their officers, the defendant No. I became satisfied and then issued fire insurance policy to the
plaintiff — now the defendant No. 1 cannot take a different view only to avoid the payment of compensation to the plaintiff.
Sadharan Bima Corporation Vs Sanjit Kumar Das 2BLT (HCD)-101
(d) The condition No. 3 of the insurance Policy Ext. Uma which clearly shows that the properties of S. B. Homeo Laboratory situated at 20/46, Zilla Parishad Super Market, Court Road, Chittagong, was insured with the Green Delta Insurance Company. But the present property of S. B. Homeopathic Laboratory is situated of the village Kulkurmai, Police Station Rangunia — it appears that condition No. 3 has not been in any way violated by the plaintiff.
Sadharan Bima Corporation Vs Sanjib Kumar Das 2BLT (HCD)-101
(e) The condition No. 19 of the Insurance Policy—the claim must be a subject matter of any legal proceeding or arbitration within 12 months from the date of damage — the word “action” in condition No. 19 will not only mean a suit or other legal proceeding in court for recovery of the damage, but it will also mean and include any legal action pending before the authority who is under legal obligation to compensate the damage under the Insurance Policy condition Nos 13 and 19 are not contradictory or contrary, rather they are supplementary and complimentary to each other in order to give an effective relief to the sufferer and the aggrieved person — the present case is fully covered by condition No. 13 of the Insurance Policy, as the “action” contemplated in condition No. 19 will mean and include the action which was legally pending before the insurer for
decision as to whether and insurer would compensate the loss and damage of the plaintiff — the claim of the plaintiff cannot be time barred in any manner — appeal dismissed.
Sadharan Bima Corporation Vs Sanjib Kumar Das 2BLT (HCD)-101
Fundamental Rules Rule-18
The petitioner not being on foreign service his service conditions are controlled by Rule-18. Admittedly the petitioner was absent from service for more than 11 years and Rule- 18 provides that a Government servant ceases to be a Government employee after 5 years continuous absence from duty. From the words employed in Rule 18 of the Fundamental Rules it seems to us that for taking action as has been taken in the instant case no prior show cause necessary as Rule- 18 take effect automatically on expiry of 5years continuous absence from service by a Government employee, other than those who are on deputation on foreign service.
Sarder Borhan Uddin Vs. Govt. of Bangladesh & Ors 8BLT(AD)-40.