Md. Mostafa Hossain (Appellant)
Vs.
Sikder Md. Faruque and another (Respondents)
Supreme Court
Appellate Division
(Civil)
Present:
Badrul Haider Chowdhury J
Shahabuddin Ahmed J
M.H. Rahman J
A.T.M. Afzal J
Judgment
June 29, 1987.
(i) The Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972, Article 102
There is no room to entertain any doubt as to the maintainability of a writ petition by any citizen who questions the title to office of any person who is, or purportedly, holding a public office whenever it is found that the said functionary is disqualified from holding the office and the Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction will entertain the petition and examine the question on merit. Mere delay in raising the question is not a ground for denying this extraordinary remedy……………….(12)
(ii) Local Government (Upazilla Parishad and Upazilla Administration) Ordinance, 1982 (LIX of 1982), Section 6
A bill for payment of money is certainly a pecuniary interest of the claimant. Had the bill been scrutinized payment was yet to be made, than probably it could have been made out to say that he got no more any pecuniary interest in the matter. Reading the disqualification clause in section 6 as a whole we are of the view that the pecuniary interest as referred to is an interest of any kind whether it is in connection with the contract or independent of it, for the law provides that a person having any pecuniary interest in the affairs of the Parishad is debarred from seeking election or from acting as Chairman.
Cases Referred to-
Dr. Kamal Hossain v. Mohammad Sirajul Islam, 21 DLR (SC) 23, Darley v. The Queen, 12 Cl & F. 537, King v. Spyer and The King v. Cassel, 1 KB (1916) Vol.1, p. 595, Farzand All v. Province of West Pakistan, PLD 1970 SC 98, Laliteshwer Prasad vs. Bateshwar Prashad, AIR 1966 SC 580.
Lawyers Involved:
Syed Ishtiaq Ahmed, Senior Advocate, (Mahmudul Islam, Advocate with him), instructed by Sharifuddin Chakladar, Advocate-on-Record– For the Appellant.
Moinul Hossain, Advocate, (Joynal Abedin, Advocate with him), instructed by Md. Aftab Hossain, Advocate-on-Record (absent) – For Respondent No. 1.
B. Hossain, Advocate-on-Record – For Respondent No.2.
Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan, Additional Attorney General. – Amicus curiae.
Civil appeal No. 3 of 1987.
(From the Judgement and order dated 28.9.86 passed by the High Court Division, Dhaka Bench in Writ Petition No. 141 of 1986.)
Judgment:
Badrul Haider Chowdhury J.-I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment of my learned brother Shahabuddin Ahmed J. I agree that this appeal should be dismissed.
2. The crucial question in this case was whether the appellant had any pecuniary interest in the affairs of the Kathalia Upazilla Parishad when his bill for payment was pending after his election as chairman of the Upazilla Parishad. The respondent is also an Ex-Officio member of the said Upazilla Parishad. So there cannot be any doubt that he had locus standi to lodge the information which led the High Court Division to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction. As for the contention whether the writ jurisdiction could be invoked in the election disputes when the law has provided for machinery for adjudicating the same by the Election Tribunal from whose decision an appeal and revision lay before the superior Courts, I would rather reserve my opinion for appropriate occasion. Suffice to say that the High Court Division in, exercise of its jurisdiction found pecuniary involvement of the petitioner. S. Ahmed, J, has focused:
“Even if he does not preside over the meeting of the Parishad while dealing with the bill, his very position is sufficient to influence other members of the Parishad, or they may themselves feel embarrassed in examining the bill of their Chairman. Bill for payment of money is certainly a pecuniary interest of the claimant. Had the bill been scrutinized and passed before his election but only the actual payment was yet to be made, then probably a case could have been made out to say that he got no more any pecuniary interest in the matter.”
I fully agree with this exposition of law and have nothing further to add.
Shahabuddin Ahmed J. – This appeal by special leave calls in question an order of the High Court Division dated 28 September 1986 declaring that the appellant, Chairman of a Upazilla Parishad, is disqualified both from being elected asand for holding office of, Chairman. This arises from a proceeding in the nature of quo-warranto instituted by a member of the public by filing Writ-Petition No. 141 of 1986 under Article 102(2) of the Constitution.
4. The appellant was elected chairman of Kathalia Upazilla Parishad in an election held on 16 May 1985 under the provisions of the Local Government (Upazilla Parishad and Upazilla Administration Reorganisation) Ordinance, 1982(Ordinance No. LIX of 1982) and the Rules framed thereunder and entered upon his office on 25 May 1985. Respondent No.1 filed the Writ petition asking for an information as to under what authority the appellant claims to hold the office of chairman which is a public office alleging that the appellant is party to a contract for some work to be done for the same Upazilla Parishad and has otherwise pecuniary interest in the affairs of the Parishad; the petition pointed out that these facts constitute disqualifications for holding such an office as specifically described in section 6(2)(f) of the Ordinance No. LIX of 1982. It was alleged in the Writ-petition that the appellant was an enlisted contractor of the Upazilla Parishad or the year 1985, that he got two contracts from the Upazilla Parishad, one for constructing a pucca drain and the other for constructing an Iron-wooden bridge under Work Orders dated 18 December 1984 and 23 December 1984 respectively, but while these contracts were subsisting, the appellant filed his nomination paper on 23 April 1985 for contesting the election for chairmanship of the Upazilla Parishad and was elected as such in the election held on 16.5.85. It was further alleged that “the appellant submitted a bill on 23 May 1985 for TK. 76,000/- and odd, for construction of the pucca drain but the bill was not paid because of an objection that the work was not yet done according, to the specifications stated in the contract. It was further alleged that the appellant was also disqualified for this office as he was part-time Principal of the local Shahid Reza College and drew 50% of his pay from the Government.
5. The appellant entered appearance by filing an affidavit-in-opposition and denied the material parts of the allegations. His contention, was that both the works were completed “long before” he filed the nomination paper and as such there was no work under the contracts left to be done. As to the pendency of his bill for one of the two works, the passing of the bill, he contended, was a mere routine work which neither brought his work within the class of work” to be done” nor it constituted any pecuniary interest in the affairs of the Union Parishad He explained that he had withdrawn from the list of contractors of the Upazilla Parishad a few days before he filed the nomination paper and denied having received any pay or remuneration from the Government for his part-time work as Principal of the local college which is not a Government institution. He questioned the very maintainability of the Writ-petition, particularly on the ground of inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing the petition.
6. The learned Judges of the High Court Division found that though the contract for the Iron-wooden bridge was completed, the accounts were not yet finalized since the contractor did not withdraw his earnest money to the extent of 10% of the consideration of the work. As to the work for construction of the pucca drain, they found that the work was not completed before the election was held in that the bill for this work was submitted after the election and further that the work was not done according to the specifications described in the contract: the learned Judges further found that in view of pendency of the-bill for Tk. 76,000/- and odd the appellant had pecuniary interest in the affairs of the Parishad. The writ-petition was held maintainable and the delay was found properly explained. On these materials the ‘High Court Division found the appellant disqualified not only from being elected as chairman but also from holding this office and that this disqualification was a continuing disqualification.
7. Leave was granted by us to examine the legality of the impugned decision of the High Court Division, particularly its interpretation of the relevant statutes including the disqualification clause of Ordinance No. LIX of 1982 in section 6(2) (f) in the background of the facts and circumstances of the case.
8. It may be mentioned here that before the hearing of this appeal was taken up, an application was filed jointly by the appellant and respondent No.1 to the effect that they have settled their disputes amicably on the advice of their common well-wishers and that for the sake of peaceful relationship they pray for allowing the appeal on compromise by setting aside the impugned order of fee High Court Division in the Writ-petition. The learned additional Attorney General appearing for the government, Respondent No. 2, opposed the petition for compromise on the ground of public interest contending that this writ-petition being a proceeding in the in the nature of quo warranto does not relate to any private grievance between the Appellant and respondent No. 1 but it is matter of public interest and that when any person may question the holder of a public office about his title thereto the question cannot be left to be decided by compromise between the private parties particularly when the High Court Division in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction held that the purported holder of the public office got no lawful authority to hold the office. At the same time some members of the public from the same Upazilla filed an application to be added as party on the side of the respondents and to contest the appeal taking the ground that after the adverse decision of the High Court Division the appellant influenced respondent No. 1; they want to contest the appeal as public interest is involved in the matter. After hearing all these parties we rejected the compromise petition and proceeded to hear the appeal on merit as question of great public interest is involved therein. Petition for addition of party was also rejected as it was found to be unnecessary particularly when the State was contesting the appeal.
9. Syed Ishtiaq Ahmed, Learned Counsel for the appellant, has assailed the decision of the High Court Division mainly on three grounds. The first ground is that the writ-petition is not maintainable as the Petitioner (respondent No.1) was a candidate in the said election for chairmanship of the Upazilla Parishad and as such he got adequate alternative remedy to raise this question as to disqualification of the elected chairman by an election petition under section 20 of the Ordinance and the Rules made thereunder. The learned Counsel has pointed out that respondent No.1 had filed nomination paper to seek election as chairman but withdrew his nomination paper; nevertheless, he remained a candidate since, the Ordinance and the Rules contemplate two kinds of candidates-‘contesting candidate’ and ‘non-contesting candidate. The learned Counsel contends that respondent No. 1 came under the category of non-contesting candidates and as such he, like a contesting candidate, had an opportunity to file an election petition before the Election Tribunal. This argument does not appear to be a plausible one, nor is it in conformity with the provisions of law as relied upon by the learned Counsel. It is true that a non-contesting candidate may file an election petition; but respondent-petitioner cannot be included in such a category since he voluntarily withdrew his nomination’ paper and thereby completely ceased to have an interest in the election. There is a difference between a person who after filing a nomination paper withdraws it and person whose nomination paper has been rejected by the authorities on certain grounds. The latter is a candidate since he may challenge the rejection of his nomination by filing an election petition and also by taking recourse to other procedures; the former who has withdrawn from the race is not interested in the election. Respondent-petitioner who withdrew voluntarily got no grievance against anybody and as such he is not a person competent to file election petition against a returned candidate. An election petition is filed to question the election itself, whether it has been properly held, according to the rules and procedures, or whether any corrupt practices have been adopted by any candidate. In the matter like this a person who had withdrawn his nomination paper before the election was held got no interest. As such the contention that respondent No. 1 was, a candidate and had an alternative remedy by way of an election petition is found to contain no substance. Moreover, this contention taken before us runs counter to the ground taken by the appellant before the High Court Division where it was submitted on his behalf that the respondent “being not a candidate after the withdrawal of his nomination paper got no interest in the election and as such he had no locus standi to question the election of the returned candidate. This stand was also reiterated in the leave-petition as Ground No. 1 which reads:
“For that the respondent No.1 being not a candidate for the post of Chairman of the Upazilla Parishad after withdrawal of his nomination paper and that he having no interest the High Court Division in the exercise of this jurisdiction acted illegally in holding that the petition praying ‘for writ of quo-warranto is maintainable.”
It is rather unfortunate that conflicting arguments were adopted on behalf of the appellant in a matter involving substantive questions of law. Learned Counsel next argued that an election petition, being election Petition No.1 of 1985, has been filed before the Election Tribunal by one Nurul Huq, a contesting candidate, raising the same questions including this question as to the returned candidate’s qualification to hold the office of chairman and this matter is pending; since this question can be determined in that alternative forum, High Court Division’s extraordinary jurisdiction to give the same remedy should not be exercised. We do not find this argument to be convincing, for the remedy by a quo-warranto proceeding, in which the title to a pubic office may be questioned by any person, is independent of remedy available to a limited number of persons having personal grievances; Moreover, the election-petition may be withdrawn by way of compromise on personal considerations.
10. The next ground urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that there has been inordinate delay of about 10 months in filing the writ petition and that since remedy by way of writ petition lies in the discretion of the Court, this discretion is not to be exercised when there are laches on the part of the petitioner seeking such a remedy. Election in this case was held on 16.5.85 and, the writ-petition was filed on 10.3.86. The question now is whether this delay can be considered inordinate preventing the petitioner from seeking remedy in a proceeding in the nature of quo-warranto relating to the very title of a person holding a public office. The learned Counsel argues that his delay has hot been explained by the petitioner; but the learned Judges of the High Court Division considered this matter and were satisfied that the delay was properly explained by the petitioner who stated that he was not aware of the disqualification of the returned candidate. The learned Counsel for the appellant has referred to a decision of the Pakistan Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Kamal Hossain v. Mohammad Sirajul Islam, 21 DLR (SC) 23 in which delay was held to be a bar to remedy by a proceeding in the nature of quo-warranto. In that case the petitioner was found to be a person set up by some defeated candidates in an election to the Provincial. Bar Council and was all along aware of the matter. In those circumstances, it was observed by the court that:
“A writ of quo-warranto in particular is not to issue as a matter of course on sheer technicalities on a doctrinaire approach. In the present case, considering all the circumstances I cannot escape the feeling that Mr. Serajul Islam is not entirely playing his own game, for high altruistic motives, and that he has instituted the writ petition not so much for the vindication of any public right or the redress of, a public wrong as to redeem the discomfiture of the defeated candidates, and to fight their battle on another front which some of them had already waged by the process of the election petition.”
In the instant case the facts are quite different which do not give any indication that the respondent-petitioner had any malafide intention or was .set up by some other person to file the Writ-petition. Moreover, mere delay in seeking a remedy in writ jurisdiction is not a ground for denying the remedy, particularly when the remedy sought relates to the very title of a person holding any public office. The contention that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay got no substance.
11. Again, the filing of a writ-petition by a person other than a candidate in an election cannot be questioned in view of the clear provision of the Constitution in Article 102(2) (b) (ii) which shows that any person, whether he is “aggrieved” or not may seek an information as to the title of the holder of any public office. This Article is quoted below:
“The High Court Division may make an order on the application of any person requiring a person holding or purporting to held a public office to show under what authority he claims to hold that office.”
It is clear that for issuing of a writ of quo-warranto no special kind of interest in the petitioner is required, nor is he required to show that he is personally aggrieved at the holding of office by that person. What this Article aims at is that a person who holds any public office must be a person having required qualification for holding it and must be ready to show that he got the qualification whenever he is asked by the Court at the instance of any person. Again, if a person having no such qualification is found holding the office ho is then usurping the office; such person cannot be allowed to take the plea that the person questioning his legal authority to hold the office has a personal grudge against him for, even if the latter has any such grudge, it will not stand in the way to raise the question as it is strictly a question of law as to basic qualification of a person to hold a public office. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. II, page 148, it has been stated that even “in a case where an election petition is the only remedy when an election is objected to on the ground that the person whose election is questioned was disqualified at the time of the, election, yet the remedy by injunction in lieu of quo-warranto is available where a person becomes disqualified after election”.
12. Mr. Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan learned Additional Attorney General has cited a number of cases in which the question as to title to a public office has been raised. In “Darley v. The Queen”, 12 Cl & F. 537; the House of Lords observed that this proceeding by information in the nature of quo-warranto will lie for usurping any office, whether created by Charter alone, or by the Crown, provided the office is of a public nature, and a substantive office. In the case of the King v. Spyer and The King v. Cassel, 1 KB (1916) Vol.1, p. 595, two members of the Privy Council were asked to show under what authority of law they were continuing as Councilors though they were appointed by the King in exercise of his prerogative power. This information was sought by a private relater who alleged that the two Councillors who were born abroad of foreign parents were naturalized British subjects and disqualified to be so appointed under the Naturalization Act, 1870, read with section 3 of the Act of Settlement, 1700. The contention was accepted and the appointments were declared invalid. In the case of Farzand All v. Province of West Pakistan, PLD 1970 SC 98, a question arose whether two members of the Sind Provincial Assembly, who had cast their votes for the passing a legislative enactment, were themselves qualified to be elected and then to continue as members of the Assembly. Hamoodur Rahman CJ. after reviewing a number of cases including from English and American jurisdictions made the following observation:
“An election dispute is a dispute raised by a voter or a defeated candidate in his individual capacity under the Statute. It determines the private rights of two persons to the same office, but a proceeding for information in the nature of quo-warranto is invoked in the public interest. The latter seeks to determine the title to the office and not the validity of the election. These are two distinct and independent remedies for enforcing independent rights, and the mere fact that the disqualification has been overlooked or what is worse, illegally condoned by the authorities who were responsible for properly scrutinising a person’s right to be enrolled as a voter or his right to be validly nominated for election would not prevent a person from challenging in the public interest his right to sit in the house even after his election if that disqualification is still continuing.”
Upon a consideration of these decisions we find that there is no room to entertain any doubt as to the maintainability of a writ petition by any citizen who questions the title to office of any person who is, or purportedly, holding a public office whenever it is found that the said functionary is disqualified from holding the office and the Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction will entertain the petition and examine the question on merit. We, therefore, find that the High Court Division has rightly answered the questions as to maintainability of the writ petition considering them from different angles. Mere delay in raising the question is not a ground for denying this extraordinary remedy.
13. Election of the appellant as chairman and his right to continue in his office has been challenged in view of section 6 of the Ordinance No. LIX of 1982 which is quoted below (relevant portion):
“6. (1)…….
(2) A person shall be disqualified for election as, or for being a Chairman of a Parishad, if-
(a)……..
(b)……..
(c)………
(d)………
(e)……..
(f) he is a party to a contract for work to be done for, or goods to be supplied to, the Parishad concerned, or has otherwise any pecuniary interest in its affairs, or is a dealer in essential commodities appointed by the Government.”
The facts admitted or established in this case are that the petitioner while he was a contractor of the Bakerganj Zilla Parishad got two contracts for work from the Kathalia Upazilla Parishad and thereafter he was also enlisted as a B-Class Contractor of the Upazilla Parishad for the year 1985 by a resolution of the Parishad dated 12.1.85. It is clear from section 6 that to be enlisted as a contractor, whether of the Zilla Parishad or of the Upazilla Parishad, is by itself not a disqualification. The disqualification clause applies when the contractor has actually got a contract for work which is to be done or goods to be supplied. In this case the work for construction of an Iron-wooden bridge assigned to him by Work Order dated 18.12.84 was completed some time before he filed the nomination paper and his payment was made but only the security deposit to the extent of 10% of the consideration was yet to be withdrawn; it remained with the Upazilla Parishad. The question is whether in these circumstances the work for construction of the Iron-wooden bridge is a work “to be done” within the meaning of section 6(2)(f) of the Ordinance. When the authorities made full payment for the work without raising any objection and when there was no other demand from either side of the contract, non-withdrawal by the appellant of his own money deposited as security does not keep the contract subsisting. Technically his accounts have not yet been closed with the Upazilla Parishad, but this is a mere formality which does not bring him within the mischief of law terming his work ‘to be done’. The learned Judges it appears did not find the appellant incurring disqualification on this count.
14. But serious difficulty for the appellant arises in respect of the contract for the other work -construction of the pucca drain which was undertaken as per work order dated 23.12.84. The question is whether this work was yet 10 be done when he filed his nomination paper and thereafter when he was elected as chairman. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the work was already completed, whereas the learned Additional Attorney General contends that it was not. The appellant in his affidavit-in-opposition stated that this work was completed “long before” the election, but did not give the date of completion. He sent an intimation by letter dated 25.4.85 (Annexure-D) to the Executive Engineer of the Upazilla Parishad stating that he had completed the work and he should be paid his bill, but did not mention any date of completion of the work, nor any bill for his dues was also submitted on that day. According to the respondent-petitioner, the claim as to completion of the work is false and the letter, Annexure-D, is antedated, for if the work had been completed by 25.4.85, why no bill was submitted then but was submitted after one month, on 23.5.85 (Annexure-H) for an amount of Tk.76,000/- and odd that is, after the election itself was held. Learned Additional Attorney-General argues that even, if it is taken that the work was completed on the day the letter was written, still the work was not completed when the nomination paper was submitted on 23.4.85. In that letter, Annexure-D, the appellant gave an explanation for using Pazar Haat instead of Batari Haat-which was to be used for this work according to the terms of the contract. In this letter the appellant requested the Engineer for taking steps so that he could get the money. According to the respondent-petitioner this letter is a clear admission of the appellant that the work was not done as per terms of the contract. The learned Judges accepted this contention and held that this work not having been done as per terms of the contract was a work “to be done”.
15. Learned Additional Attorney-General next contends that mere sending of a letter as to completion of the work or even submission of a bill for payment is not a proof that the work had been actually completed, for it may be that the work has not been done satisfactorily or no work has at all been done, but an incorrect or false report has been submitted and as such inspection on the spot will be necessary to see whether the work has been done, and if so, done according to the specification. The work is complete when both the parties to the contract agree to this effect. The learned Additional Attorney-General has contended that when it is found on inspection and verification that the work though claimed to have been completed was not done according to specification as admitted in the letter Annexure-D, the contractor will be required to do the work over again in which case the work is yet to be done. He contends that the contract of the appellant subsisted when he sought election and placed reliance upon the case of Laliteshwer Prasad vs. Bateshwar Prashad, AIR 1966 SC 580. In that case a similar question as to when a contract subsists was considered by the Indian Supreme Court which also dealt with both executed and executory contracts and observed:
“A contract for the supply of goods or for the execution of any work or the performance of any services undertaken does not cease to subsist only because the goods had been supplied or work had been executed or services performed. It continues to subsist till payment is made and the contract is fully discharged by performance on both sides.”
16. Learned Counsel for the appellant argues that the appellant resigned and withdrew from the list of contractors of the Upazilla Parishad by a letter dated 10.4.85 which was accepted by the Nirbahi Officer and as such he ceased to be a contractor. We have already pointed out that to be a contractor is by itself not a disqualification; but the disqualification as described in section 6(2) (f) occurs when a person is a party to a contract for “any work to be done” or he has otherwise “any pecuniary interest”. If the work for construction of the Pucca drain was yet to be done then appellant’s resignation or his ceasing to be a contractor of the Upazilla Parishad is immaterial. The learned Additional Attorney-General contends that the letter dated 10.4.85 regarding withdrawal from the contractor’s list is not genuine and referred to a letter dated 22.5.85 of the Executive Engineer of the Upazilla Parishad (Annexure-F) which shows that the appellant had purchased some Quotation Forms for further contracts from the Upazilla Parishad even after his alleged resignation on 28.4.85; he has also questioned how the Nirbahi Officer could accept the resignation of the appellant when he was enlisted by the Upazilla Parishad by a Resolution adopted in a Meeting.
17. Learned Counsel for the appellant has vehemently assailed the finding of the High Court Division that the appellant had “otherwise pecuniary interest in the affairs of the Upazilla Parishad” in view of the pendency of his bill for TK.76, 000/- and odd, submitted after he was elected chairman. Learned Counsel contends that pendency of the bill after execution of the work is a mere formality and because of this pendency it cannot be said that the appellant got pecuniary interest in the affairs of the Upazilla Parishad. For the sake of argument we would take that the work was executed but only the bill was pending payment when the appellant was elected as chairman of the Upazilla Parishad and see whether because of his pending bill, he otherwise had any pecuniary interest in the affairs of the Parishad. A bill for payment of money on account of some work done is not payable as a matter of course, but it requires to be examined, scrutinized and then passed by an order of sanction by the appropriate authority, in this case by the Upazilla Parishad of which the claimant is himself the Chairman. As the bill was submitted after its claimant was elected chairman, the entire work of examination, scrutiny, verification and sanction was left to be done by the Upazilla Parishad with the claimant himself as its head. He is in a position to influence the clearance of the bill. Even if he does not preside over the meeting of the Parishad while dealing with the bill, his very position is sufficient to influence other members of the Parishad, or they may themselves feel embarrassed in examining the bill of their chairman. Bill for payment of money is certainly a pecuniary interest of the claimant. Had the bill been scrutinised and passed before his election but only the actual payment was yet to be made, than probably a case could have been made out to say that he got no more any pecuniary interest in the matter. The learned Counsel next argued that the expression “has otherwise any pecuniary interest” contemplates an interest other than an interest in connection with any contract for work to be done, but it refers to an interest independent of any contract. The principle of ‘ejusdem generis,’ origin from or belonging to same class, learned Counsel contends is not applicable to this phrase” otherwise pecuniary interest”. The learned Additional Attorney General on the other hand contends that the expression “he has otherwise any pecuniary interest” includes any interest whether it is relating to a contract or is independent of any contract. Reading the disqualification clause in section 6 as a whole we are of the view that the pecuniary interest as referred to is an interest of any kind whether it is in connection with the contract or is independent of it, for the law provides that a person having any pecuniary interest in the affairs of the Parishad is debarred from seeking election or from acting, as chairman. The High Court Division is, therefore, found to have correctly interpreted the law and come to the conclusions that the appellant is a party to a contract for a work to be done or has otherwise pecuniary interest in the affairs of the Upazilla Parishad, and as such he got no authority to hold the office.
18. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. In view of the circumstances of the case, no order as to costs is made.
Ed.
Source: 40 DLR (AD) (1988) 10