Payment of Wages Act, 1936

 

Payment of
Wages Act [IV of 1936]


Section 2(vi)—

“Wages”—defined—Includes
any sum payable on termination of employment.

Respondent
No. 2 could have applied to the Labour Court under section 34 for determination
of the quantum of the termination benefits.

Sekander
Miah vs Chairman, 1st Labour Court, 41 DLR 203.

 

Section 2(vi)—

Gratuity of
any type, either on discharge, or termination or arising out of a settlement is
not included in the definitive clause as wages.

Shaw Wallace
Bangladesh Limited vs Tofazzal Hossain son of late Abdul Kader and others 50
DLR 22.

 

Sections 2(vi), 3 & 15(2)—

Not only the
person in employment but anybody competent under section 15(2) of the Act on
his behalf who was in employment can make an application for dues within the
period of limitation. There is no substance in the submission that an
application made by a person not in employment is not maintainable.

Editor,
Bangladesh Observer, & another vs Member, Labour Appellate Tribunal and
others 50 DLR 606.

 

Section 7—

Non-payment
of the gratuity does not come within the scope of deduction from wages. No
provision is made for deduction of gratuity from wages under this section.

Shaw Wallace
Bangladesh Limited vs Tofazzal Hossain son of Late Abdul Kader and others 50
DLR 22.

 

Section 15—

To come
under section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act the requirements are that the
complainant must be a worker in a factory and be still employed.

Shaw Wallace
Bangladesh Limited vs Tofazzal Hossain son of late Abdul Kader and others 50
DLR 22.

 

Section 15—

This Court
can as well for doing complete justice in any cause treat the application under
section 25(1)(b) as an application under the Payment of Wages Act for
realisation of the benefits consequent upon retirement of the deceased worker.

BWDB and
others vs Chairman, Divisional Labour Court, Khulna and others 55 DLR (AD) 5.

 

Section 15(2)—

the objects
and purpose of the Payment of Wages Act and the objects and purpose of the
Employment of Labour (SO) Act and Industrial Relations Ordinance are not in
pari materia. Their fundamentals are different in nature. A person cannot seek
relief under the Payment of Wages Act for a claim arising out of the Standing
Orders Act as that will cause anomaly: Once it is allowed the aggrieved persons
mostly will come under section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act to avail of a
larger period of limitation.

Shaw Wallace
Bangladesh Limited vs Tofazzal Hossain son of late Abdul Kader and others 50
DLR 22.

 

Section 15(2)—

For not
availing of the forum as provided in section 25 of the Act of 1965 a worker is
not precluded from realising the termination benefits by filing an application
under section 15(2) of the Act of 1936.

Managing
Director, Contiforms Forms Limited and Peasant Trading Cold Storage (Pvt) Ltd
vs Member, Labour Appellate Tribunal, Dhaka and others 50 DLR 476.

 

Section 15(2)—

From the
definition of ‘wages’ in the Act of 1936 and in the Act of 1965 it is quite
clear that termination benefit as provided in section 19 of the Act of 1965 is
also ‘wages’.

Managing
Director, Contiforms Forms Limited and Peasant Trading Cold Storage (Pvt) Ltd
vs Member, Labour Appellate Tribunal, Dhaka and others 50 DLR 476.

 

Payment of Wages Act, 1936

 

Payment of Wages Act (IV of 1936)


Purpose

To compel employers to make prompt and full
payment of wages to certain class of workers.

Divisional
Superintendent vs. Md. Sharif (l963) 15 DLR (SC) 261.

 

S. 1(5)—Applicable
to an industrial establishment:
Provision of
the section applicable to an industrial establishment within the meaning of
sec. 2(9) of the E. B. Shops and Establishment Act, 1952, even though no
notification was published as required under section 1(5) of the Payment of
Wages Act.

Md Azizur
Rahman Vs. Md. Babar Ali (1956) 8 DLR 721.

 

S. 2(ii)(f):
The definition of “wages” in
S.2(vi) of the Payment of Wages Act made it perfectly clear that the authority
must decide as to what was the remuneration which would, if the terms of the
contract of employment express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable, whether
conditionally upon the regular attendance, good work or conduct or other
behavior of the person employed, or otherwise, to a person employed in respect
of his employment or of work done in such employment. To say that the authority
has absolutely no jurisdiction to entertain an application under that Act, if
the wages stated by the petitioner are denied by the employer, would defeat
that Act itself and make it completely ineffective.

Under sub—section (3) of section 15, it is
not payment of the delayed wages but the payment of compensation which is
affected by a bona fide error or bona fide dispute as to the amount payable to
the emp4oyed person. PLR (1960)2 (WP)
251.

Under section 8(2) of the East Bengal Shops
and establishment Act 1952, the provisions of Payment of Wages Act are
attracted even though no notification was published as required under section
1(5) of the later Act.

Md Azizur
Rahman Vs. Md. Babar Ali (1956) 8 DLR 721.

 

S. 2(vi): Employee ready and willing to render service
but employer not giving employee opportunity to render szxh service — Entitled
to wages for period of suspension.

Divl. Supdt
vs. Md. Sharif (1963) 15 DLR (SC) 261.

 

S. 15: The word “direction” in section 15 includes refusal
to make direction. Authority appointed under the section is not a court but a
persona designate.

Golam Ahmed
vs. Md. Ata Karim (1957) 9 DLR 382 = PLR (Dac.) 195
.

 

—Claims mean entire sum overdue as wages. 1952 PLR (Lah.) 657

 

Secs 15 and
7(2)(h):
Claims of wages for the period of extraordinary leave disallowed
by the competent authority cannot be granted.

Bacha Meah
Vs. Province of E.P. (1975) 27 DLR 563.

 

S.
15(2)—Authority’s satisfaction with the reasons for the delay in filing the
application before it is sufficient.

According to the last proviso to sub—section
(2) of section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, if the “authority” is satisfied
that there was sufficient cause for the petitioners for not making the
application within six months from the date on which the payment of wages was
due application will not be barred by time.

RaiIwaymen’s
Store vs M. Sultan Ahmed Chodhury (1957) 9 DLR 286.

 

S. 15(2).
Proviso 1,2:
Limitation for application for
payment of wages for illegal removal from service—Time taken in getting removal
declared illegal by Civil Court and securing order for reinstatement
—sufficient reason for condonation of delay.

Div Supdt Vs
Md. Sharf (1963) 15 DLR (SC) 261.

S. 15(3): See
under section 2(f) above.
LR (1960)
2(WP) 215.

 

S. 15 (3)
(a):
The sub-section contemplates a
bona fide dispute and not a voluntary dispute created by the employer or the
employee.

Md. Azizur
Rahaman Vs. Md. Babar Ali (1956) 8 DLR 721.

 

Secs. 15(2)
and 16(2):
Non compliance with the
provisions of subsection (2) of section 16 of the payment of Wages Act is not
fatal to the maintainability of an application for recovery of wages under
section 15 (2) of the Act

Railwaymenis
store Vs. M. Sultan Ahamed Chowdhury (1957) 9 DLR 286

 

Sec 15 and
17:
The authority appointed under
section 15 of the Act is a Court subordinate to the High Cowl within the
meaning of section 115 C. P. Code. An appeal lay to the District Judge under
section 17 (1) (b) of the Act against an order whereby the employee’s claim had
been rejected in tow. PLR (1960)I (WP)
495.

 

S. 17 (1): The expression “District Court” as mentioned
in section 17 (I) of the Payment of Wages Act is not a persona designata but
means the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction in the district. Ibid.

Section 17, clause (a) provides that an
appeal may be filed “by the employer or other person responsible for the
payment of wages under section 3” which expression can only mean that an appeal
is to be filed either by the employer or, in cases where some other person is
responsible for the payment of wages, by that other person. 1954 PLR (Lah.)
356.

 

S. 18: Authority under the Act is not to be
deemed a civil court
.

If it was the intention of the Legislature
that the authority referred to in section 18 of the Payment of Wages Act will
be the same as an inferior civil Court of ordinary jurisdiction, there was no
necessity of providing in section 18 that the authority shall have all the
powers of a civil court for all purposes of section 195 and of Chapter XXXV of’
the Code of Criminal Procedure. These provisions only go to show that the
authorities functioning under the Act are not in reality civil courts properly
so called, but are only so by fictitious supposition. (1957) 9 DLR 383 =8 PLR (Dac) 195.

 

Payment Of Wages Act, 1936

 

Payment Of
Wages Act, 1936

 

Section—15(2)

Since
the Labour Court is one of the specified authorities to hear and decide the
claim of a worker upon an application filed before it under section 15(2) of
the Act as regards payment of wages (termination benefit), payment whereof has
been delayed, the High Court Division held that no illegality has been
committed by the Labour Court in entertaining the application filed under
section 15(2) of the Act by the worker claiming termination benefit and seeking
direction for the payment thereof, having been delayed.

Managing
Director, Contiform Forms Ltd. Vs. The Member, Labour Appellate Tribunal,
l’3haka and ors., 18 BLD (HCD) 531.

 

Section—15(2)

After examining the provisions of section
15(2) of the Act it is clearly seen that ‘persons employed’ means and includes
both persons had been in employment’ and ‘persons are in employment’ and
section 15 does not contemplate and exclude the person not in employment debarring
them from making an application under section 15(2) of the Act, as modified.

Any
person who was in employment but not discharged, is entitled to make an
application under section 15 of the Act as modified, after being out of service
for any reasons except being discharged. The provision of subsection 2 of
section 15 of the Act made it clear that not only the person in employment but
anybody so competent, on his application who was in employment, can make an
application within the period of limitation prescribed therein.

The Editor,
The Bangladesh Observer, Dhaka and another Vs. The Member, Labour Appellate
Tribunal and ors., 18 BLD (HCD) 543

Ref:
50 DLR 22—differed.

 

Payment of Wages Act, 1936

Payment of Wages Act, 1936 [IV of 1936]

Section-15(1)

Persona
designata-whether a Judge or a presiding officer of a court is distinguished
from the court itself is direction to perform any function of an authority
created by a statute, such a Judge may be considered as ‘persona designata’ and
not a court.

Hayder Miah Vs.
Labour Court & Ors. 10 BLT (HCD)-202

Section-15, 20,21 read with Industrial
Relations Ordinance, 1969 Section-36(3)

Whether the authority appointed under Section
15 of the Payment of Wages Act, in the absence of vesting of powers of a Magistrate,
First Class, as has been vested to the Labour Court under sub-section (3) of
Section 36 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 for trial of offences
under the said Ordinance can take cognizance of any offence.

(a) If
any Court, tribunal or Authority is specified by a particular enactment by
which an offence is created as having jurisdiction to take cognizance and try
such offence, it is only such Court. Tribunal or Authority that can exclusively
take cognizance and to try that offence and a trial by other court becomes
without jurisdiction.

(b) The
power of issuing process is an incidental and ancillary power of the Court/Tribunal/Authority
to be invoked to the power of taking cognizance of the offence, and

(c) As
this power of taking cognizance by Tribunal 
authority court is not an enlargement of the original power, such
Authority/tribunal or Court can issue process against the accused at the  time of taking cognizance of the offence and
also can issue process upon any person other than the accused as well for
production of any document or thing without being vested with the powers of
Magistracy.

Hayder Miah Vs.
Labour Court & Ors. 10 BLT (HCD)-202

Section 15 & 25(1)(b)

It
appears that a general statement that the case is barred under Section 25(b)
without specifying the reasons supported by facts has been made in the written
statement. Facts remain that the petitioner is entitled to the benefits allowed
by the labour Court and we find no infirmity as to the claim as the petitioner
is entitled to approach the labour court being the authority under Section 15
of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 for realisation of his benefits, thus
enforcing his right guaranteed or secured to him i.e. which are legally due
upon his retirement from the service under the provision of Payment of Wages
Act, 1936. It would operate as hardship and futile exercise of application of
legal provision, if the heirs of the deceased workers are put to a protracted
litigation afresh for realization of the benefits of their father who after
successful completion of 31 years service with the petitioner retired from the
service. This Court can, as well for doing complete justice, in any cause
treated the said application under Section 25(1)(b) as an application under the
Payment of Wages Act, 1936 for realization of the benefits consequent upon
retirement of the deceased worker.

BWDB & Ors. Vs.
Labour Court &Ors. 10 BLT (AD)-107.

 

Payment of Wages Act, 1936


Payment of Wages Act [IV of 1936]


Sections 15 and 20—

The
Labour Court took cognizance of offence under section 20 of Payment of Wages
Act as the accused petitioner contravened sections 4, 5, 7 and 25 of the Act
but alike the provisions of IRO the Labour Court under the Payment of Wages
Act, has not been given the same power as are vested in the Court of
Magistrate, First Class I under the Code of Criminal Procedure for the purpose
of trying an offence and hence the Labour Court cannot take cognizance of the
said offence and as such the proceeding is quashed.

PM
August, Director Operations vs Chairman, First Labour Court 4 BLC 402.