PENAL CODE, 1860 (PART 1)

Section 21—
Members of Union Parishad are “Public Servants” whom the Legislature has treated as a separate class of people’s representatives and provided additional disqualification for them.
Above all, members of a Union Parishad are ‘public servants’ within the meaning of section 21 of the Penal Code. The term Public Servants’ denotes some executive control over them and they are subject to disciplinary rules which are applicable to regular government servants. In view of these differences in respect of functions and duties, the Legislature thought it proper and expedient to treat them as a separate class of people’s representatives and has provided for the addition4 disqualification in question.
Sheikh Abdus Sabur Vs. Returning Off leer 41 DLR (AD) 30.

Sections 25 and 463—
Where there is an intention to deceive and by means of the deceit to obtain an advantage there is a fraud and if a document is fabricated with such intent, it is a forgery.
Jahangir Hossain Vs State 40 DLR 545.

Section 34—
Amendment of section 34—isertion of the words “in furtherance of the common intention of all” after the word person’ and before the word “each” —its aim was to make the object of the section clear.
Chand Mia Vs. State 42 DLR (AD) 3.

Section 34—
In order to make an accuse constructively liable with the help of 34 for an offence not actually committed by him, it is essential to prove that he had intention to commit the offence. Unless such intention is proved, he cannot be made liable under that section.
Belal Ahmed Vs. State 40 DLR 154.

Section 34—
Mere standing of accused Belal at the door of Parvin will not constitute offence under section 34 read with section 324 Penal Code in causing voluntary hurt by dangerous weapon.
Belal Ahmed Vs. State 40 DLR 154.

Section 34—
Principle of vicarious liability, applicability of—Test as to the applicability of that principle—Common intention implies a pre—arranged plan and it must be proved that a criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the pre—arranged plan.
Kabul Vs. State 40 DLR 216.

Section 34—
Common intention—Distinction between same or similar intention and common intention. Common intention within the meaning of section 34 of the Penal Code pre—supposes prior concert; it also requires pre—arranged plan and care must be taken not to confuse same or similar intention with common intention, the partition which divides “their bounds” is often very thin; nevertheless the distinction is real and substantial and if overlooked will result in miscarriage of justice.
Kabul Vs. State 40 DLR 216.

Section 34—
Mere proof of each of the participating culprits having same Intention to commit certain act is not sufficient to constitute common Intention.
Kabul Vs. State 40 DLR 216.

Section 34—
Principle of joint liability—Existence of common intention animating the accuseds leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of it.
Kabul Vs. State 40 DLR 216.

Section 34—
Inference of common intention shall never be reached unless it is a necessary inference from the circumstances of the case.
Kabul Vs. State 40 DLR 216.

Section 34—
Common intention may be proved by direct evidence.
Kabul Vs. State 40 DLR 216.

Section 34—
Inference of common intention shall not be reached unless it, is a necessary inference deducible from the evidence or circumstances of the case.
Kabul Vs. State 4O DLR 216.

Section 34—
Common intention—Nature of injuries caused by different accused—The fact that some of the accused had caused fatal injuries and others caused minor injuries is immaterial if the act was done in furtherance of their common intention. The nature of injuries has nothing to do as the two accused are found to have shared the intention of other accused whose acts resulted in the death of the victim.
State Vs. Montu 44 DLR (AD) 287.

Section 34—
Common intention—Pre—plan not essential ingredient—It is true in this case there was no pre—plan of the accused to kill the victim—their common intention to kill developed on the spot when they all simultaneously fell upon the victim as soon as he appeared on the scene.
State Vs. Montu 44 DLR (AD) 287.

Section 34—
Common Intention —Unless the Court Is told what the exact words were used by the accused person it cannot act on the inference supplied by the witnesses—There is no evidence on record that the appellant Nos. 2—4 had an intention to cause the death of Nandalal.
Amar Kumar Thakur Vs. State 40 DLR (AD) 147.

Section 34—
Omission of charge as to common intention—Non—mentioning of section 34, Penal Code during his examination under section 342 CrPC has not in any manner prejudiced the accused in their defence. It is a mere irregularity which is curable and there has been no failure of justice for such non-mentioning.
Abul Kashem Vs. State 42 DLR 378.

Section 34—
Common intention—Each person may have same intention to kill yet there might not be a prior meeting of minds to form a pre—arranged plan—Individual liability as opposed to joint liability.
Kabul Vs. State 40 DLR 216.

Section 34—
No evidence of a pre—concert or meeting of minds to cause the death of the deceased—Assault in furtherance of common intention is difficult to prove.
Kabul Vs. State 40 DLR 216.

Sections 34 & 37—
Rule of joint responsibility for criminal act —In order to attract section 34 it is not necessary that any overt act must be done by the particular accused. The provision shall be applicable if it is established that the criminal act has been done by any one of the accused persons in furtherance of the intention of all. Mere distance from the scene of crime cannot exclude culpability. Criminal sharing, overt or covert, by active presence or by distant direction, making out a certain measure of jointness in the commission of the act is the essence of section 34.
State Vs. Abul Khair 44 DLR284.

Sections 34 and 109—
The conviction of appellant Nos. 2—4 upon the evidence on record for the offence of murder with the application of section 34 or 109 Penal Code is not sustainable in law.
Amar Kumar Thakur Vs. State 40 DLR (AD) 147.

Sections 34 & 149—
Constructive criminality—Section 149, like section 34, does not create and punish any substantive offence. These sections may be added to the charge of any substantive offence. Without the charge for any substantive offence, no charge under either of them can be conceived of.
Abdus Samad Vs. State 44 DLR (AD) 233.

Sections 34 & 149—
Common intention and common object—Section 34 provides that when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of their common intention each of them is liable for that act in the same manner as if it was done by him alone. Section 149 postulates an unlawful assembly and commission of an offence by any of its members in prosecution of the common object of such an assembly.
Abdus Samad Vs. State 44 DLR (AD) 233.

Sections 34 & 149—
Scope of the two sections—Both sections deal with combination of persons to become punishable as sharers in an offence. Basis of a case under section 34 is the element of participation, and that of one under section 149 is membership of an unlawful assembly. The scope of the latter is wider than that of the former.
Abdus Samad Vs. State 44 DLR (AD) 233.

Sections 34 & 149—
these sections do not confer punishment for any substantive offence. They are intended to deal with liability for constructive criminality. Section 34 applies where criminal act is done by two or more persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, whereas section 149 applies in the case of a member involved in unlawful assembly for a common object. So there is difference between the two sections as there is a difference between object and intention.
Ataur Rahman Vs. State 43 DLR 87.

Section 94—
Even order of the superior authority, in the absence of threat of instant death, was not sufficient to justify the irregular payment for which the accused was prosecuted.
AMA Wajedul Islam Vs. State 45 DLR 243.

Section 109—
Abetment of offence—Mere presence of the accused near the place of occurrence does not constitute the offence of abetment. Intentional aiding and active complicity is the gist of the offence in the absence of which the charge of abetment must fail.
Mostain Moliah Vs. State 44 DLR 295.

Section 109—
Common intention having been not proved against Belal, it is difficult to hold good the charge of abetment upon him.
Belal Ahmed Vs. State 40 DLR 154.

Section 109—
Non-consideration of a vital element of law while convicting accused has caused serious prejudice resulting in failure of justice to the accused.
Belal Ahmed Vs. State 40 DLR 154.

Section 147—
The Sessions Judge found the appellants guilty of charge under section 147 PC and granted interim bail pending filing of appeal. The learned Judge by the impugned order summarily rejected the appeal petition on the ground that the appellants did not surrender before moving their petition of appeal and they being “fugitive from Law cannot get its protection.” Leave was granted to consider whether the impugned order was a just and proper order.
Saidur Rahman Vs. State 40 DLR (AD) 281.

Sections 148 & 149—
Error in recording conviction—the charge framed and findings of the Court show the accused to be guilty of rioting punishable under section 148. But the trial Court erroneously recorded conviction under section 149, although this section 149 does not independently punish any offence. The High Court Division attempted to correct it, but unnecessarily added section 149 to section 148. This is a mere irregularity which does not touch the merit of the case as the charge specifically said they were members of an unlawful assembly. The order of conviction needs be modified so as to record the conviction under section 148.
Abdus Samad Vs. State 44 DLR (AD) 233.

Sections 148, 302/149 and 302/34—
Accused charged under section 149 Penal Code but convicted under section 302—On the question whether such conviction is sustainable in law, Court held: Conviction under sections 302/34 Penal Code is sustainable in law.
Md. Hossain Vs. State 41 DLR 373.

—Alteration of charge from section 302 to that of sections 302/34 Penal Code is permissible in the facts and circumstances of the case.
Md. Hossain Vs. State 41 DLR 373.

Sections 148 and 324—
Members of unlawful assembly—Rioting committed in prosecution of their common object—Accused Tayeb Ali assaulted PW 1—Conviction of both the accuseds under section 148 PC and Tayeb MP conviction under section 324 BPC based on good evidence—But their conviction under sections 302/149 not sustainable as their —participation in assault upon deceased Bazlur Rabman doubtful.
Tayeb Ali Vs. State 41 DLR (AD) 147.

Section 149—
Member of an unlawful assembly—Whether he can be convicted when the principal offender has not been convicted —Once the court finds that an offence has been committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of its common object, then whether the principal offender has been convicted or not all other members may be constructively liable for conviction.
Abdus Samad Vs. State 44 DLR (AD) 233.

Section 149—
Applicability of the provision under section 149—Even after acquittal of the five accused there could be an unlawful assembly if there was evidence that besides the accused on trial there were others even though not stated as such in the charge or in the FIR.
Rafiqul Islam Vs. State 44 DLR (AD) 264.

Section 149—
Offence committed in prosecution of common object—Section 149 Penal Code by itself creates no offence; It carries the liability of each member of an unlawful assembly for the act done in prosecution of their common object.
Tenu  Miah and others Vs. State 43 DLR 633.

Section 149—
Constructive liability—T occurrence appears to have taken — sudden quarrel and in a fit of rage deadly appear to have suppressed material facts. In such a situation charge under section 149 is not maintainable. Mere presence of the accused at the scene of the occurrence of murder is not sufficient to charge him with1 constructive liability.
State Vs. Giasuddin 45, DLR 267.

Section 161—
Illegal gratification—Trap case—Because of the tough requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt the laying of trap is the only method for detecting crimes like bribery which are committed in covert manner. Such a method is not prohibited. For laying a trap the Investigating Officer cannot be said to be thereby ‘instigating commission: of the offence. Principles of accomplice evidence cannot be extended to the evidence of trap witness, because the latter cannot be termed as accomplice. As to corroboration of trap witnesses no hard and fast rule can be given. There may be cases where the Court will look for independent corroboration— equally there may be cases where the Cowl may accept evidence of trap witnesses.
Shahabullah Vs. State 43 DLR (AD) 1.

Section 161—
There is no authority for the proposition that making demand for illegal gratification is an essential ingredient of the offence under section 161 Penal Code. In order to prove this offence it is the duty of the prosecution to prove that there was conscious acceptance of the bribery money by the accused.
AKM Mukhlesur Rahrnan Vs. State 45 DLR 626.

Section 161—
When factum of recovery has not been proved by independent and disinterested witnesses, it would be unsafe to find the guilt of the accused under section 161 Penal Code.
AKM Mukhlesur Rahman Vs. State 45 DLR 626.

Section 161—
The act for which the illegal gratification is to be paid or received was already over before the commission of the alleged offence and in such circumstances it will be most unsafe to hold a person guilty.
AKM Mukhlesur RahmaA Vs. State 45 DLR 626.

Section 175—
Documents required to be filed on 27.4.1986 have been filed long after that date by which time cognizance of the alleged offence has been taken on 28.8.1986.
Held—Prima facie offence has already been committed by the petitioner.
Abdu Sattar Bhuiya. Vs. Deputy Commissioner Dhaka 42 DLR 151.

Sections 193 and 228—
The Tribunal shall have the same powers as vested in a civil Court for the purpose of inquiry and every enquiry as such shall be deemed o be judicial proceeding within the meaning of s1ions 193 and 228 of the Penal Code—A Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Coil for. Purposes of sections 480 and.482 CrPC. The proceeding before tribunal is of a civil nature and as such there appears to be no bar to effect a compromise between the parties in a proceeding before the Tribunal. Fees paid to a lawyer for professional services is not a loan—The complainant was not entitled to receive back from the appellant any single farthing—The amount of Tk. 10,000.00 received from the appellant is not as a refund of money paid but as a compromise sum. Tribunal’s manner of acceptance of the case on a matter in which amicable settlement was reached between the parties out of their free will and without prejudice to any one disapproved.
Muhammad Raushan Ali Vs. Bangladesh Bar Council 42 DLR 201.

Section 201—
Accused’s statement the part of which is incriminating does not connect him with the act of killing. In the statement of accused Yasin Majhee which was recorded in Bengali it appears that he accompanied the murderers up to the house of Yasin Mridha where the dead body was brought. This part of the statement may be incriminating if at all in respect of the offence of concealment of the dead body, but it does not connect him with the act of killing.
State Vs. Abdur Rashid Piada 40 DLR (AD) 106.

Section 201—
The statement of the accused Joynal to the Chairman is of the same nature and as such is not a confessional statement As to the extra—judicial confession orally made by accused Joynal to PW 2, Chairman, this is also of the same nature as the statement recorded by the Magistrate; he did not implicate himself in the murder, and as such it is not a confessional statement implicating himself and other accused In the murder.
State Vs. Abdur Rashid 40 DLR (AD) 106.

Section 201—
Disappearance of evidence—there was no witness saying that the accused participated in concealment and burial of the dead body, nor the eye—witnesses disclosed that the accused assaulted the victim. In such circumstances mere pointing out the place where the dead body was concealed would not constitute the offence of causing disappearance of evidence.
Gopal Rajgor Vs. State 42 DLR 446.

Section 290—
Offence under section 290 of the Penal Code being a non-cognizable one, the proceeding initiated on police report without the permission of the Magistrate as required under section 155(2) CrPC is illegal.
Aroj Ali Sarder Vs. Stare 41 DLR 306.

Sections 298, 300, 302 and 304—
Ingredients of murder and culpable homicide stated to elaborate the point. It has been held in the decision reported in 1987 BLD (AD) 165 that “all murders are culpable homicide but all culpable homicides are not murder.” Excepting the General Exceptions attached to the definition of murder an act committed either with certain guilty intention or with certain guilty knowledge constitutes culpable homicide amounting to murder. If the criminal act is done with the intention for causing death then it is murder clear and simple. In all other cases of culpable homicide it is the degree of probability of death from certain injuries which determines whether the injuries constitute murder or culpable, homicide not amounting to murder and if death is the likely result of the injures it is culpable homicide not amounting t and; if death is the most likely result then it is murder.
Momin Maitha Vs.State 41 DLR 37.

Sections 299, 300 & 302—
In the case of culpable homicide the intention or knowledge is not so positive or definite. The injury caused may or may not cause the death of the victim. To find that the offender is guilty of murder, it must be held that his case falls within any of the four clauses of section 300 otherwise he will be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Facts of the case show that death was caused without premeditation.
Bandez Ali Vs. State 40 DLR (AD) 200.

Section 300, clauses 1, 2, and 3—
The weapon used was a lethal one and the injury I grave in nature was caused on the vital part of the body. The act was done with the—intention of causing such bodily injury intended to be inflicted as was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It falls clearly within the 1st, 2nd & 3rd clauses of section 300 Penal Code.
Md. Abdul Majid Vs. State40 DLR (AD) 83.

Section 300 Exception 1, Sections 302 and 304 part I—
the present case is—covered by the exceptions to the section: 300 of Penal Code. From the facts and circumstances of the case, we think that the criminal acts of the accuse4 respondents which resulted in the death of the victim constitute culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under section 3O4Part I of the Pena code.
On a Consideration of the fact and circumstances of the case, it appears that the& case is covered by exception—1 to section 300 of  the Penal Code and accordingly the conviction of the appellants is altered from section 302 to 304 Part I of the Penal Code and the sentence —of each of the appellants is reduced to RI for 10 years each thereunder.
Momin Malitha Vs. State 41 DLR 37.

Section 300, Exceptions 1 and 4—
Appellant cannot be convicted and sentenced under section 302 as the alleged offence conies within the ambit of Exceptions I and 4, section 300 of the Penal Code.
From the evidence on record, it transpires that there was quarrel and golmal over the fencing on the disputed land and also altercation took place On the day of occurrence between the parties over removal of the fencing which ultimately culminated into a ‘maramari causing thereby bleeding injury on the person of the appellant’s son Kalu on one hand and the death of victim Abdul Karim on the other. Besides, the injury on the person of the son of accused Momin Malitha could not be explained away by the prosecution It also appears that the accused had no undue advantage in the matter Be that as it may, on a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on record and also the relevant provisions of law, we are of the view that the alleged offence committed by this appellant Momin Malitha comes within the ambit of the Exceptions I and 4 of section 300 of the Penal Code and as such this appellant cannot be convicted and sentenced under section 302 of the Penal Code.
Momin Malitha Vs State 41 DLR 37.

Section 300, Exceps 2 & 4—
Murder— Right of private defence—In the case of right of private defence of property one accused of murder must prove that the property in question was his property. When upon evidence it is found that the primary object of the accused was to make a forcible attempt to snatch away the paddy of the informant party question of defending such right cannot arise. It was nowhere suggested that the informant party carried any weapon or made any kind of assault on the accused while, on the other hand, the accused were found to have been armed with lethal weapons. In this case there was certainly premeditation on the side of the accused without which he would not have come armed with lethal weapons.
Dilip Vs. State 43 DLR 269

Sections 300, 299 & 304—Part I—
Culpable homicide—The injuries, though caused intentionally, are of such a nature that these are “likely to cause death” and this does not constitute murder’—It constitutes culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
State Vs. Montu 44 DLR (AD) 287.

Section 302—
Substitütion of sub-section (5) of section 367 CrPC by the Law Reforms ordinance—Effect of change on sentencing— Previously death sentence was the normalal sentence for murder and the court was required to give reasons if the lesser sentence of life Imprisonment was given—After the substitution now reasons have to be given in either case —A death sentence is to be justified in as much in the in the same way as in the case of lesser sentence of life term imprisonment.
Abed Ali Vs. State 42 DLR (AD) 171.

Section 302—Sentence—
Commutation of death sentence—Delay of about two years or so in the disposal of the Death Reference Case and the Jail Appeal in the High Court division cannot by it if be a ground for awaiting lesser sentence.
Abed Ali Vs. State 42 DLR AD 171.

Section 302—
Culpable conduct of the accused that he made no attempt to look for his wife since she was missing is explicit, which is confirmatory of his involvement in the murder of his wife. Normally an accused is under no obligation to account for the death —for which he is on trial, but this is bound to be different.
Dipok Kumar Sarker Vs. State 40 DLR (AD) 139.

Section 302—
In the present case the offence followed a brief tenure of a rancorous married life between the appellant and the deceased. It was admitted by the prosecution that it was not a blissful union from the beginning. Circumstances would have been taken notice of while inflicting proper punishment prescribed under the law.
Dipok Kumar Sarker Vs. State 40 DLR (AD) 139.

Section 302—
The question Is whether the materials on record warrant conviction of the appellant Momin Malitha under section 302 of the Penal Code. We have carefully examined the evidence on record from all aspects and we are of the opinion that the offence committed by this appellant does not come within the scope of section 302 of the Penal Code.
Momin Maltiha Vs. State 41 DLR 37.

Section 302—
CommutatIon of sentence— extenuating circumstances for commutation —condemned prisoners are under peril of death sentence for almost 3 years suffering—agony and torments thereby partially purged their guilt. Their life may be spared. Sentence of death commuted to one of imprisonment for life.
Abul Kashem Vs State 42 DLR 338.

 Section 302—
subMission of sentence for confirmation—the order of conviction under section 302 Penal Code by the Sessions Judge on the basis of part of the evidence recorded by an Assistant Sessions Judge, who is not competent to hold trial under that section, is illegal. The death reference is rejected and the case is sent back for re—trial of the condemned prisoner in accordance with law and in the light of observations made.
State Vs. lmdad Ali Bepari 42 DLR 428.

Sections 302/32—
Motive is though a piece of evidence and may not be a sine qua non for bringing offence home to accused, yet it is relevant and on the question of intention .The existence of motive has a great significance in a criminal trial.
State Vs. Mizanul Islam 40 DLR 58.

Sections 302/132—
The credit to be given to the statement of witness is a matter not regulated by rule of procedure. The credibility of a witness depends upon his knowledge of fact to which he testifies his disinterestedness, his integrity and his veracity.
State Vs. Mizanul Islam 40 DLR 58.

Section 302/32—Evidence of a witness is to be looked at from a point of law of its credibility. Appreciation of oral evidence depending as it does on such variable inconsistent factor as human nature cannot be reduced to a set formula.
State Vs. Mizanul Islam 40 DLR 58.

Sections 3O2/34—
Commnon intention—Whether the evidence of PW 1 and PW 11, two eye witnesses, shows that the appellant NOs 2—4 had shared common intention to cause the death of Nandalal along with the appellant No. 1—There was no proper evidence to make such an inference.
Amar Kumar Thakur Vs. State 40 DLR(AD) 147.

Sections 302/34—
Evidence adduced by PW 1 was corroborated by PWs 3,17 and 18 who were eye—witnesses.
Nurul Islam Vs. State 40 DLR 122.

Section 302/34—
Common intention to murder the deceased Kanchan having been established by the appellant’s participation in the offence, they were rightly convicted.
Nurul Islam Vs. State 40 DLR 122.

Sections 302/34—
Sessions Judge did not take any step for proper arrangement of defending the condemned prisoners who were denied the substantive right of being defended through a lawyer at the cost of the State— Conviction not sustainable in law.
State Vs. Jahar Ali 42 DLR 94.

Sections 302/34—
Conviction of co—accused who had not confessed— Circumstances show the accused Shahajahan Manik had intimacy with accused Rina and this put them to visiting terms and the visits had strengthened his intimacy with Rina. Their guilty conscience is also evident from the false plea in their statements made under section 342 CrPC that they did not know each other.
Shahjahan Manik Vs. State 42 DLR 465.

Sections 302/34—
The confession is sufficient to find accused Rina guilty of the charge under sections 302/34 Penal Code inasmuch as she participated in the murder starting from hatching of conspiracy for killing her husband in order to marry accused Manik to allowing the latter to bring in poison and mix it with the drinking, water of her husband’s jug and then to see the husband drinking that water, then after his death to hang the body and raising a feigned cry. Besides, the circumstances showed there was no scope for anyone to enter the room to kill her husband without her co-operation.
Shahjahan Manik Vs. State 42 DLR 465.

Sections 302/34—
Inconsistent evidence of PWs 2 and 4—Omissions and contradictions in their depositions were not given consideration by the Courts below —Defence case appears to be more probable than that of the prosecution “as it fits in human, nature and conduct”. Appellants entitled to acquittal as a matter of right.
Abul Kashem Vs. State 41 DLR (AD) 152.

Sections 302/34 and 201—
No hint having been given to her during her examination under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to the disappearance of evidence of crime she was prejudiced in her defence, and her conviction under section 201 Penal Code is not sustainable.
Abdul Khaleque Vs. State 41 DLR 349.

Sections 302/34 & 302/ 109—
Confession —Conviction on confession alone—Relying on his incriminating statements that he made conspiracy with co—appellant Abdul Khaleq to murder his step—mother and when from his statement it appears that he was very much present standing outside the hut at the time of the murder, appellant Hazrat Ali can be safely convicted for abetment of murder.
Hazrat Ali & others Vs. State 44 DLR (AD) 51.

Sections 302/109 and 148—
Evidence on record does not justify the order of conviction under sections 302/109 and 148 of the Penal Code upheld by the High Cowl Division—The learned Judges did not at all consider the evidence relating to the alleged abduction of Sohrab, Mahtab and Mobarak for which the appellants were convicted also under sections 362/149 Penal Code.
Jamal Vs. State 40 DLR (AD) 38.

Sections 302/109—
Conduct of the accused—No evidence to suggest the intention of the accused to kill the victim while taking him along with them—Facts, evidence and circumstances do not bring the case under sections 302/109 Penal Code.
Soleman Vs. State 42 DLR 118.

Sections 302/109—
Abetment—To sustain a charge of abetment of an offence it is necessary that there must be some evidence of overt act or omission so as to suggest a pre—concert or common design to commit a particular offence So long as the design rests in intention short of overt act directed to the commission of the offence it is not indictable in law.
Ali Ahmed Malaker Vs. State 43 DLR 401

Sections 302 and 304 Part 1—
Culpable homicide not amounting to murder— From the circumstances of the case and the nature of injury that resulted in the death of victim after 11 days after the infliction of the injury, the appellant cannot be held guilty of murder. Conviction altered to section 304, Part I.
Lal Miah alias Lalu Vs. State 41 DLR (AD) 1.

Section 304—
Culpable homicide not amounting to murder—In the absence of any conspiracy, pre—plan Or premeditation on the part of the accuseds while inflicting injury resulting in the death of the victim 4 days after the occurrence, the accuseds did not intend to cause his death but they caused culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
Dalilur Rahman Vs. State 44 DLR 379.

Sections 304/34—
Joint action—Omission may also render an offender liable for punishment—If a man joins with another to assault a person, even though the original intention was merely to inflict relativel harmless injuries, but if he sees his. Companions in course of the action giving serious beating which is likely to cause his death, but he does not take any step to interfere and the victim dies, such omission may render him liable under section 304.
Shaikh Baharul Islam Vs. State 43 DLR 336.

Sections 304/34—
since accused Abdul Bari merely in an innocent manner brought the victim in obedience to OC’s order; he is not involved in any criminal act.
Shaikh Baharul Islam Vs. State 43 DLR 336.

Section 304 Part I—
Culpable homicide not amounting to murder— from the facts proved it is clear that the victim did not die immediately after assault by her husband. There is no evidence of ill—feeling between the two, rather it is in evidence that he enticed her away and then married her. In the circumstances the accused—husband is not guilty of murder but of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
Abdul Khaleque Vs. State 45 DLR 75.

Section 304 Part I—
The Immediate cause that triggered off serious violence and resulted in the loss of four lives though calls for the maximum punishment, being shrouded in mystery a lesser punishment may meet the ends of justice.
State Vs. Giasuddin 45 DLR 267.

Section 304 Part I—
Culpable homicide—Intention to cause death—From the evidence there can be no manner of doubt that the assault was done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. The accused—husband was not content by striking his wife with a branch of a tree but was reckless enough to kick her in the tender part of her body which immediately caused bleeding. It was not a case of mere knowledge only (to constitute offence under section 304 Part II) that such act was likely to cause death but that the intention to cause such injury as is likely to cause death was very clear. It is true —there is no finding as to “intention” either in the impugned judgment or in the judgment of the trial Court. This is certainly not desirable because the law requires a clear finding as to “intention” before recording a conviction under Part I of section 304. Notwithstanding the absence of the requisite finding as to intention, the appellant—husband was rightly convicted.
Jatin Chandra Sil Vs State 43 DLR (AD) 223.

Section 304, Part II—
Attack on the deceased by the appellant in an infuriated state—Imposition of 5 years’ imprisonment is a proper sentence. The criminal and not the crime must figure prominently in shaping the sentence. Reform of the individual in the society and other necessities to prevent recurrence are right factors. Heinousness of the crime is a relevant  factor in the choice of sentence.
Samosh Mia Vs. State 42 DLR 171.

Sections 307/34—
Suspicion is not substitute of evidence. A faint doubt means a doubt without any reasonable basis. No benefit of doubt is contemplated in law.
Reversal of the appellate Court’s finding will not bring the case within the ambit of murder under section 302 PC.
Trial Court arrived at the finding that these injuries constitute murder. It is the degree of probability of death from certain injuries which determines whether the injuries constitute murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
State Vs. Tayeb Ali and others 40 DLR (AD) 6.