It provides that nothing in this part shall apply to intestate or testamentary succession to the property of any Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, Sikh, Jaina or Parsi.

A sisters son or a cousin sisters son is a relation by consanguinity within three degrees of the donor. Such a transfer is not pre-emptible.

Shamsul Islam and others Vs. Badiar Zaman alias Bablu and another, 15 BLD (AD) 243.

Ref: Sale Mohammad Vs. Mosammat Ayesha Khatoon Choudhurani, 20 DLR 376; Tamizunnessa Vs. Umar Ali, 18DLR 572- Cited.


The executor or administrator of a deceased person, whether is his legal representative for all purposes and all the property of a deceased person vests in him as such.

The executor or administrator, as the case may be, of a deceased person is his legal representative for all purposes and all the property of the deceased person vests in him as such.

Sree Jogendra Nath alias Gobinda Sarker V. Amulya Chandra Sarker & ors., 13 BLD (AD) 160.



Section 213 of the Succession Act is a bar to any right claimed by any person under a Will whether as a plaintiff or as a defendant unless probate or letters of administration of the Will has been obtained. In this view of the matter the decision reported in 7 BLD,244 was not relied upon.

Subhra Nandi Majumder Vs Amar Prasad Bhattachariee and others, 17 BLD (HCD) 227.

Ref: 7 BLD 244 -Not relied upon AIR 1916 (PC) 202; A.I.R. 1962(SC) 147—Cited.


Conclusiveness of Probate or Letters of Administration

Grant of probate is the proof of the validity of a will. So after granting of probate and after the disposal of the revocation case there is no scope to determine whether the will in question was executed by the testator and it is genuine or not.

Sree Sree Narayan Chakra Bigraha Vs Niranjan Bhattacharjee, 17 BLD (HCD) 167



Application for Probate or Letters of Admission

When there is no executor to apply for grant of probate of the will, any surviving legatee is entitled to apply for grant of letters of administration in respect of the properties covered by the will. There is no provision in the Succession Act that a legatee cannot apply for grant letters of administration when there is no executor to apply for grant of probate. The court can grant letters of administration even in respect of part of the property covered by the will.

Moktar Hossain Vs. Budhi Bala Dashi, 15 BLD (HCD) 38.



Probate or Letters of Administration

In a suit for probate or letters of administration the Court is to grant probate or letters of administration if it finds that the will was duly executed by the testator and he was in a state of mind competent to exercise his testamentory powers. In this case 3 witnesses were examined by the plaintiff who proved the execution and attestation of the Will. The trial Court without discussing the evidence of the witnesses dismissed the suit by merely comparing the signatures of the executor by naked eyes. The learned Judge ought to have discussed the evidence of the witnesses before coming to any sweeping conclusion. On consideration of the evidence of the witnesses the High Court Division accepted the execution and attestation of the Will and granted probate.

Sree Pratik Bandhu Roy Vs. Sree Alok Bandhu Roy 16 BLD (HCD) 445.


Sections—286, 287 and 288

Reading the provisions of section 286, 287 and 288 of the Succession Act, particularly the explanation of a word “contention” mentioned in section 286 of the Act, it is reasonable to hold that a District Delegate shall cease his hands under section 286 as soon as a contention as to the grant of probate or letters of administration is raised in any case. Even in the case of a non-contentions petition, in case of any doubt, the District Delegate has to seek directions of the District Judge. He cannot, however, reject a non-contentions petition for probate or letters of administration as has been done in the instant case in violation of section 288 of the Succession Act. The caveat or respondent claiming through the testator has no difficulty in contesting the probate proceeding.

Haripada Ghose and another Vs. Gopal Chandra Ghose, 15 BLD (AD) 140.

Ref: Kalpana Das Gupta Vs. Govt. of Bangladesh and another, 40 DLR 373; Charubala Sen Vs. Abul Hashem, 33DLR(AD) 254; Shubra Nandi Majumder Vs. Begum Mahmuda Khatoon, 42 DLR(AD) 133; Samir Kumar Vs. Sachindra Chandra, 20 DLR (1968) 766—Cited.

Sections—295 and 299

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 , Section—115(1)

In a case for granting probate or letters of administration before the District Judge, the proceeding shall take as nearly as may be, in the form of a regular suit according to the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. Every order made by the District Judge by virtue of the power shall be subject to appeal to the High Court Division and accordingly the revision is incompetent.

Anuj Chowdhury and others Vs. Sailendra Kishore Chowdhury and others, 19 BLD (HCD) 379.

Ref: AIR 1963 Kerala 188—distinguishable


Revocation of certificate

A person seeking revocation of certificate granted by a competent Court must have some interest, immediate or remote, in the property of the testator. In the absence of such a right he is not entitled to seek revocation of a certificate.


Arabinda Sarker Vs. Bimalendu Bhowmick and others, 16 BLD(AD) 18

Ref. A.I.R. 1978 Calcutta 140—Cited.

Section—388 Sub-section (2)

Sub-section 2 of Section 388 of the Succession Act provides that where any Court inferior in grade to a District Judge is vested with the power to exercise the function of a District Judge, such a Court will be deemed to be a District Judge. But proviso to the said Sub-section also provides that from any order passed by such an inferior Court, appeal lies to the District Judge.

Dudu Miah and others Vs. Sikandar Au and others, 14 BLD(HCD)228




Section—2(e) Surplus Public Servants

According to Section 2(e) of the Ordinance Surplus Public Servant means a public servant whose post is abolished by the Government for the purpose of administrative reorganisation or who, being a servant of the erstwhile Government of Pakistan, joined the Government of Bangladesh on repatriation or escaping or defecting from Pakistan, or any other public servant the responsibility of whose absorption has been taken by the Government.

Lt. Col. (Retd) Nazimuddin Ahmed Vs. Bangladesh and others, 15 BLD (AD) 179.


Sections—5 and 6

Section 5 of the Ordinance laid down the principles in accordance with which a surplus public servant is to be absorbed in any particular post while Section 6 provides that the seniority, pay and pension of a Surplus Public Servant shall, on his absorption in a post, be determined in accordance with the principles laid down by the Government from time to time. Inspite of some amount of dubiousness on the part of the Government as regards the absorption of the respondent, the Appellate Division found it to be just and proper to extend the benefit of doubt in favour of the respondent. A double standard treatment meted out to different employees by the executive Government is deprecated.

The Director General, NSI Vs. Md. Sultan Ahmed, 16 BLD (AD) 76.



 Sections—7 and 24

The very preamble to the Ordinance describes Tea as an industry. Section 7 of the Ordinance describes the function of the Tea Board viz : to correct statistics from growers, manufacturers or dealers of tea or other persons on any matter relating to tea industry and to undertake, assist or encourage scientific, technological and economic research and to assist in the maintenance of demonstration farms for the promotion of tea and other economic crops. Section 24 of the Ordinance provides that no person shall manufacture tea except in a registered tea factory. It therefore follows that tea is an industry and it is to be manufactured in a tea factory and as such there is no warrant for the conclusion that a tea garden is half agricultural and half industrial in nature. A Tea Company being an industrial company is to be assessed income tax at the rate of 50% and not at the rate of 60%.

Although the basic raw materials used for processing tea are agricultural in nature, yet tea manufacturing is an industrial process. It being an individual process and one business not being divisible into half agricultural and half industrial, the concerned tea garden cannot be deprived of the benefit of reduced tax as provided under the Finance Act.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Chittagong (South), Chittagong Vs. The Deandi Tea Company lid, 15 BLD (HCD) 372.

Ref: Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City Vs. Maharashtra Sugar Ms Ltd, Income Tax Report, 1971 (Vol) 82 at page 452—Cited.


Sections—22, 29(1), 79(2), 93A and 93B

Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance, 1982 (II of 1982)


Sub-section (1) of Section 29 of the Town Improvement Act as amended by section 22 of the Town Improvement (Amendment) Act, 1953 empowers RAJTJK to dispose the acquired land by a sell, lease, exchange or otherwise and sub-section (2) of section 79 provides that acquisition of any land or interest in land for any scheme shall be deemed to be acquisitioned for public purpose within the meaning of the Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance, 1982 and provisions of the Ordinance shall apply to all proceedings relating to acquisition of property for such purpose. Inspite of repeal of section 93A and 93B of the 1953 Act the proceeding taken under these sections shall not affect such proceeding although section 12 of 1982 Ordinance provides that where compensation has not been paid or deposited within one year from the date of the decision of the Government the proceeding of acquisition shall stands abated. Claim for release of unutilized acquired land is not a vested right and nor failure of the requiring body to utilize the land acquired within 3 years from the date of acquisition in view of the decision of the Government creates no constitutional or legal right in the petitioners who claim for release of such land. Non-payment of compensation within one year from the date of decision of the Government for acquisition of land as contemplated under section 12 of the Ordinance does not render such land liable to be released. Section 12 is not applicable to the facts of the instant cases which was started long before the Ordinance came into force in view of the provision of amended section 79 of the 1953 Act as no retrospectively can be read into section 12 of the Ordinance of 1982.

Md. Jamir Ali and others Vs The Secretary, Ministry of Land & ors., 20 BLD (AD) 245.


TRADE MARKS ACT, 1940 (V OF 1940)


Trade Marks Rules 1963, RuIe—30

The date of advertisement of an accepted application for registration of a trade mark, from which date the limitation period of four months for filing an opposition is computed, means the date on which the advertisement was actually published in the Trade Marks Journal and the date on which it was circulated among members of the public for subscription.

The registration of the mark, before expiry of the period of limitation for filing an appeal, cannot be a ground for treating the instant appeal as infructuous.

Philip Morris Products Inc. v. National Tobacco Co. Ltd. and another, 22 BLD (HCD) 227.


Ref: Province of West Pakistan v. Muhammad Jaman PLD 1960 Kar. 908; Aktiebola Get Jonkoping Vulcan v. The Register of Trade Marks PLD 1968Kar. 363.


Section—70 (c) and 80

Section 70(c) of the Act provides that the Registrar shall not exercise any power vested in him by the Act or the rules made thereunder adversely to any party duly appearing before him without (if required in writing within the prescribed time so to do) giving such party and opportunity of being heard. The Registrar rejected the prayer for adjournment solely on the ground that the appellant did not appear before him in accordance with law as he did not file any power of attorney or vokalatnama.

Section 80 of the Act provides that whereby or under this Act, any act other than the making of an affidavit, is required to be done by any person, the act may, subject to prescribed conditions or in special cases with the consent of the government, be done in lieu of by that person himself, by a duly authorised agent being either a legal practitioner or a person registered in the prescribed manner as a Trade Marks agent. The application for time, as has already been said, was not filed either by the person required to file the same under law or by a duly authorised agent. The provisions of section 70(c) or 80 of the Act have no manner of application in the instant case. Section 70 (c) could have come it into play had the opposition been duly filed and in case of rejection or abandonment of such opposition but in the instant case extension of time was sought for filing opposition and that too not by any duly authorised person. Rule 76 of the rule framed under the Act empowers the Registrar to extend time for doing act in any particular case under certain circumstances. This rule apparently does not contemplate extension of time for doing any act by a person who is not party to a proceeding or is not an authorised agent of a party.

Nabisco mc, U.S.A Vs The Registrar of Trade Marks, 21 BLD (HCD) 402.

Ref: Anath Bandhu Guha and sons Ltd. through its attorney Md. Sirajul Huq Vs. Babu Sudhangshu Shekhar Halder, in 42 DLR(AD) 1990 page 244.—Not applicable.


Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order 39 rules 1 and 2

The pendency of an application for registration before the Registrar of Trade Marks or even the granting of a provisional certificate of registration of the mark does not debar a civil court in a suit for infringement of a trade mark from passing an order of temporary injunction against the use of the mark where there is the likelihood that the mark would deceive or cause confusion in the minds of unwary purchasers, or passing off.

In disposing of a prayer for temporary injunction against use of an alleged infringing trade mark, in a suit for infringement of a trade mark, the High Court should not take into consideration the registration of the alleged infringing trade mark after institution of the suit, as the questions whether the suit is maintainable and whether the registration is proper or not ate to be decided at the time of trial and not at the time of hearing of temporary injunction.

There is no restriction against a person who obtained registration of a trade mark prior to the registration of an alleged infringing trade mark from filing an action for infringement against the person who obtained the subsequent registration.

Abdul Mannan Miah v. Md. Solaiman Miah, 22 BLD (HCD) 11O.

Ref: 48 DLR28; 50 DLR548; 1987 BLD (AD)130; 28DLR1171; Burneys Industrial and Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Rahman Match Works PLD1983 Karachi 357; Flowerdale v. Hale Electric (1949) 66RPC33; Berloi v. Bali (1970) RPC 469; 1984 SCMR 1024; A.R.Gonga Dhara and Co. Nirmal and another v. Firmot Police Mallaih Rajeswar and Co. AIR 1962 AP5IO.


Since the proceeding was at the stage of hearing, the registrar ought to have fixed a date of hearing for disposal of the case giving notices to the parties. The law enjoins that the registrar shall not exercise any power vested in him by the act or rules adversely to any party duly appearing before him without giving the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard. The registrar without giving the parties a chance of being heard cannot dispose of the matter and that is contemplated of section 70(c) of Act, 1940.

Nabisco inc. U.S.A. v. The Registrar of Trade Mark & Another, 22 BLD (HCD) 640.




It appears from a reading of section 9 of the Ordinance that all acts and proceedings of trade organisations are subject to the control of the Director, Trade Organisations. This section gives the Director Trade Organisation the general authority to arrogate to itself the power to look into and regulate the internal affairs of the CCCI. Sub-section (f) of section 9 specifically gives power to the DTO to cancel, suspend or modify any resolution adopted or any decision taken, by the general body or its Executive Committee for its not being in conformity with the provisions of the Memorandum and Articles of Association or any Rules, Regulation made thereunder.

Kamaluddin Ahmed Vs Director of trade Organisations, Ministry of Commerce, Dhaka and others, 20 BLD (HCD) 457.



Section 12 of the Ordinance has not completely ousted the jurisdiction of the Court but before coming to the Court the petitioners are to refer the matter to Arbitration as provided in section 12 of the Ordinance.

Ibrahim Cotton Mills Ltd. and others Vs The Chittagong Chamber of Commerce and industry and others, 19 BLD (HCD) 372.



Attestation of a document

Mere attestation of a document by a person does not mean that he had knowledge about the contents of the document and as such he is not bound by the transaction.

Amanatullah and others Vs Au Mohammad Bhuiyan and another, 17 BLD (AD) 199.



Notice determining tenancy

In the absence of any agreement between the landlord and the tenant a 15 days’ notice determining the tenancy is required. But if the tenant denies title of the landlord in the suit premises, the necessity of serving any notice upon him under Section 106 of the T.P. Act is waived.

In the original tenancy there was a provision for giving one month’s notice for determination of the tenancy. But with the change of ownership and attornment this position changed. Since no period for notice was fixed in the new tenancy, the tenant cannot invoke the plea of one month’s notice stipulated in the original tenancy. Moreover, the tenant started a new partnership firm under the name and style: “MIs. Greenland and Company’ and the landlord issued rent receipts in favour of the company. This clearly shows that a fresh tenancy was created and the original contract was no longer in force.

Even if there is an agreement between the landlord and tenant providing for 30 days notice for terminating tenancy and the notice served on the tenant falls short of 30 days but the suit for ejectment is filed after one month of service of notice under Section 106 of the T.P.Act, the notice will be regarded as a valid and sufficient one.

Alhaj Md. Solaiman Vs. Sufia Akhtar Alam being dead her heirs Narjesa Rahamatullah and others, 16 BLD (HCD) 304.

Ref: AIR 1971 (Rajasthan) 55; PLD 1956 (Lahore) 261; 1982 SCMR, 1056—Cited.


Evidence Act, 1872(1 of 1872), Section—115

Section 41 of the T.P. Act is an exception to ordinary rule that the transferor cannot convey a greater till to the transferee than he himself has and has to be construed strictly. If anyone seeks protection purportedly either under section 41 of the T.P. Act or under Section 115 of the Evidence Act, he must prove the facts entitling him the benefits under either of the laws. He is required to prove that he, after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer, acted in good faith.

Wahidha Begum Vs Tajul Islam, 20 BLD (HCD) 431.



Feeding the grant by estoppel

The essential requirements for application of the provision of this section are : (a) erroneous or  fraudulent representation by a person having no title or having imperfect title to certain immovable property that he was authorised to transfer such property; (b) actual transfer of the said property by him for a reconsideration and (c) subsequent acquisition of tille or interest by the said person in the said property. On fulfillment of these conditions the transfer made by the unauthorised person would operate on the title or interest which has subsequently been acquired by the said person at the option of the transferee.

Abdul Motalib alias Motalib Vs. Yusuf Au Munshi alias Isab Ali, 14 BLD (HCD) 533.

Ref: Abu Saber Aziz Mohammad and others Vs. Government of Bangladesh and others, 31 DLR (AD) 218; A.l.R. 1936 (Peshwar) 103—Cited.


It provides that a transfer by an unauthorised person, who subsequently acquires interest in the property transferred, fraudulently or erroneously representing that he is authorised to transfer certain immovable property and professing to transfer such property for consideration, such transfer shall, at the option of the transferee, operate on any interest which the transferor may acquire in such property at any time during the subsistence of the contract for transfer.

Thus although an agreement to transfer the right of an heir apparent or spes succession is invalid and unenforceable under the law, conveyance of an estate by an heir apparent on contingent remains dormant for valuable consideration to a purchaser is not void. If the state expectant subsequently acquires title in the property, he is bound to make good the sale and the Court will compel him to carry out the agreement by way of a legal conveyance.

Khatibun Nahar and others Vs. Syed Hafizullah and others, 15 BLD (HCD) 565.



Doctrine of lis  pendens

Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto

The doctrine of liss pendens under Section 52 of T.P.Act is applicable to pre-emption proceedings and as such any reconveyance made during the pendency of the preemption case is hit by Section 52 of the T.P. Act.

Khorshed Ali and another Vs. Aftabuddin and others, 16 BLD(HCD) 1.

Ref: 37 DLR 324 ; 29DLR 153 ; 1 BCR (AD) 170; 29DLR 229; 1 BCR 27 ; 35 DLR (AD) along with AIR. 1958 (SC) 838 ; I.L.R. 7 (All) 775; 18 DLR 317 ; 19DLR 677; 33 DLR(AD) 323; 35 DLR (AD) 225—Cited.



Adverse Possession

Receipt is not a deed of title and cannot therefore, confer title to the plaintiff under section 54 of Transfer of Property Act. But uninterrupted adverse and hostile possession over a period of 12 years confers title upon the plaintiff. Courts below on misreading evidence on record and on misconception of law wrongly held that elements constituting adverse possession are lacking in the instant case.

Sree Santipada Datta being dead his heirs: Aranangshu Datta and others. v. Satish Chandra Das and others, 22 BLD (AD) 246.

Ref: Mir Laik Au Vs. Standard Vacum Oil Co., 16 DLR SC 287; Abdul Jalil Miah Vs. Niropama Ritchil, 49 DLR(AD)61; Abdul Kader Vs. Noor Mohammad 36 DLR (AD) 261; Fjaz Ali Qidwai Vs. Special Manager, Court of Wards, Bulrampur Estate AIR 1935 P.C. 53; Hafiz Mohammad Fatch Nasib Vs. Sir Swarup Chandra Hukum Chand (1947052 C.W.N. 382; Mozher Sowdagar Vs. Z. Alam  40 DLR AD 62.

Section— 60

Right of redemption of a mortgage

When a deed of mortgage is out and out a sale deed with a condition of re-purchase and subsequently the mortgagor accepts some money from the mortgagee and relinquishes his right of re-purchase/redemption, the subsequent deal takes place as a separate transaction between the contending parties and it has the effect of redemption of mortgage.

Tafzal Ahmed Contractor Vs. Abdur Rahim and others, 16 BLD (AD) 160.



Heritability of monthly tenancy

When the petitioners kept the issue on heritability of monthly tenancy alive and the transaction is not past and closed, the Court is competent to take note of the latest decision on the subject.

Md. Enayet Mowla and others Vs. Md. Abdul Karim Biswas, 13 BLD (HCD) 351.

Ref: Abdus Sattar Vs. Suresh Chandra, 32 DLR(AD)170; 1983 BLD(AD)37, 1983 BLD (HD)274; 1989 BLD(HD)162; Prodip Das vs. Kazal Das, 44DLR (AD)!; Sharifa Khatun Vs. Md. Yusuf, 44 DLR(AD) 185- Cited.

Sections—105 and 106

Lease of immovable property is created under Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act and, as such, statutory notice must be given under Section 106 of the Act for termination of the tenancy. Without serving a notice. upon the tenant as contemplated by Section 106 of the T,P. Act, no suit for ejectment of a monthly tenant can be filed.

Abdul Aziz Vs. Md. Abdul Majid, 14 BLD (AD) 147.



The defendants could not be evicted on the ground that the relationship of landlord and tenant had ceased with the death of the defendants predecessor and the tenancy was not heritable. There being no legal and valid ground for the eviction of the defendants, the suit must fail.

Subash Chandra Talukdar and others Vs Abdul Sattar Chowdhury being dead his heirs: Ambia Khatun and others, 19 BLD (AD)17

Ref: 44 DLR(AD)1—relied upon; 38 DLR(AD)97; 32 DLR(AD)170—Cited.


Holding over

It means retaining possession in a demised premises. It does not necessarily create any tenancy after the expiry of the stipulated lease period. The common law rule is that if a lessee remains in possession after the expiry of the terms, he is a tenant by sufferance. There is, of course, a distinction between a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of the tenancy with the consent of the landlord and a tenant remaining in possession without the landlord’s consent. The former is called a tenant holding over or a tenant at will and the latter is called a tenant by sufferance’.

Md. Mokbul Hossain Khondker Vs. Mosammat Jaheda Khatoon, 14 BLD (HCD) 549.

Ref: Siddique Au Vs. Nurunnessa Khatun and others, 43 DLR (AD) 3; Nukul Das Mridha Vs. Bangladesh and others, 6 BLD (HCD) 331; Azizur Rahman and others Vs. Abdus Sukur and others, 36 DLR (AD) 195; Khitish Chandra Mondal Vs. Shiba Rani Debi and others; AIR. 1950 (Cal) 441; Jiwa Lal and Co. Ltd. Vs. Manat and Co. Ltd. 64 C. W. N. 932; National Carriers Ltd. Vs. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd; (1981) 2 W. L. R. 45; Abdul Khaleque Mia Vs. Maya Bibi and others, 35 DLR (AD) 310; Kesho Vs. Goyal and Company, A.1. R. 1938 (Lahore) 95; R. Vs. Judge of Essex County  Court, (1887) 18 Q. B. D. 704; A. K. M. Ruhul Amin Vs. District Judge and Election Tribunal, Bhola and others; 38 DLR (AD) 172—Cited.


The petitioner having continued as a tenant in the remaining part of the demised premises after demolition of the front portion he will be deemed to be a tenant of whatever portion he occupies and there can be no manner of making the notice ineffective because of changes in the size of the demised premises. Also it cannot be said that because of demolition of two-third of the tenancy there was no tenancy at all.

Sree Mukti Pada Shil Vs Golam Mohammad, 19 BLD (AD) 124.



Notice terminating tenancy

When a tenant denies the title of the landlord in the demised premises without any valid reason it operates as a forfeiture of his tenancy right and in such a case a notice under section 106 of the T.P. Act may be dispensed with.

Alhaj Md. Solaiman Vs. Mrs. Sufia Akhtar Alam being dead her heirs: Narjesa Rahamatullah and others, 16 BLD (AD) 47.

Ref: Muhammad Islam Khan Vs. Cantonment Board, 1982 Supreme Court Monthly Review 1956—Cited.



A notice served upon a tenant with more than 30 days as contemplated by the agreement between the parties does not in any way prejudice the petitioner or suffer from any illegality or infirmity in the service of notice determining the tenancy and is in consonance with the terms of the agreement and the provision of law, inspite of the fact that the payment of rent was according to the English calendar month and only 15 days notice is re quired for determination and termination of the tenancy under the provision of the section 106 Transfer of Property Act.

Santosh Kumar Das v. Hajee Badiur Rahman, 22 BLD (AD) 30.


Rights and liabilities of lessor and lessee

After a deed of lease has been executed and registered between the parties for 99 years in respect of the case land and delivery of possession has been given to the petitioner, the lease-hold right being admittedly heritable and transferable, the Government cannot cancel the allotment order without cancelling the lease deed as the petitioners right in the land finally accrued on the lease deed.

Government of Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Works and others Vs. MIs. Eastern Industries (B. D.) Ltd, 14 BLD (AD) 254.


Section—111 (g)

In the case of forfeiture of a tenancy for denial by the lessee of title to the immovable property in the lessor, a written notice to the lessee of intention to determine the lease is not compulsory as the notice is not part of the cause of action for eviction. The cause of action is the denial of the landlord’s title resulting in determination of the tenancy by forfeiture.

Muhammad Ishaque v. Ekramul Haque Chowdhury and others, 22 BLD (AD) 8.



An exchange is a mutual transfer between two persons of the ownership of properties, but either both the things should be money or neither of them should be money. Therefore, transfer of ownership is a pre-condition for a valid exchange. When there is a question of title to be decided on the basis of an exchange deed, the party claiming title must prove that he had ownership in the property exchanged.

Mst. Sahera Khatun and another Vs. Anwara Khatun and others, 13 BLD (AD) 171.



In the absence of a registered instrument a gift by a person belonging to Hindu community (governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law) is not valid under the provision of section of 123 of the Act.

Kala Miah Vs Sree Gopal Chandra Paul and others, 18 BLD (HCD) 670.