Suits Valuation Act
(VII of 1887)
S. 3—Appeal in
land suit or suit concerning interest in land—Forum is determined by valuation
determined under the rules and not by market value.
The forum of
appeals in land suits or interest in the land for the purposes of section 18 of
the Ordinance the determining factor would be the value of original suit
determined under rules framed under section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act for
the purposes of jurisdiction, and not the market value of the subject- matter
of the suit. Maqarrab Khan Vs. MoM. An- war Khan PLD 1964 (WP) Peshawar
228=PLR 1965 (2) WP 168=PLR 1965 (1) WP 527 (DB) (Daud, I).
falling under s. 7(iv)(l) Court-Fees Act—Valuation for Court-Fee and
jurisdiction is the same.
In a suit
for rendition of accounts the plaintiff must state the amount at which he
values the relief sought. In such a suit the crucial value is value of the
relief and the plaintiff need not state any value for purposes of jurisdiction
because it will be the same as laid down in section 8 of the Suits Valuation
Act, 1887. The value for purposes of jurisdiction inadvertently stated in the
plaint, therefore, cannot be taken to be value for purposes of relief claimed.
Khan Vs. Muhammad Zaman Khan, PLD 1961 AzadJ. & K48 (DB) (Shah, CJ).
in partition suit where the plaintiff is out of possession.
partition suit where the plaintiff is excluded from possession section 8 of the
Suits Valuation Act now applies and the valuation given for the purpose of
court-fees must also be the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction. The
proper method is first to make the valuation for the purpose of court-fees, and
then to take that value for the purposes of jurisdiction and not vice versa.
Haldar Vs. Sademan Howladar (1957,19 DLR 190.
suit where plaintiff is out of possession.
In a suit
for partition where the plaintiff is excluded from possession, court-fees must
be paid ad valorem according to the market value of the plaintiff’s share in
respect of which the suit is instituted and the value for the purposes of
jurisdiction must also be determined by the same value which has been computed
Mondal Vs. Katnalakanta Saha (1960) 12 DLR (FB) 329 (331).
Ss. 8 &
for the purpose of court’s jurisdiction in a partition Suit where plaintiff is
in possession is determinable by the value of the plaintiffs share in the
[Held by the
majority, accepting AR Cornelius, CJ, disagreeing.] In a suit for partition of
joint property by a person, claiming to be in joint possession, the valuation
for purposes of jurisdiction is determined by the value of the share of the
plaintiff in the property and not by the value of the whole property.
In a suit
for partition, where the plaintiff is excluded from possession, the plaintiff
has to pay ad-valorem court-fees on the market value of the share claimed by
him and that value also determines the forum of the trial or appeal. It is
difficult to appreciate why in a case for partition, where the plaintiff is in
joint possession he must be given the benefit of having his suit tried or his
appeal heard by a higher tribunal by valuing his suit according to the value of
the entire property sought to be partitioned.
Rahman Fakir (1961)13 DLR SC) 191.
a suit—Plaintiff’s absolute discretion In a Suit coining under section 7 (IV) (c)
of Court-fees Act having, as regards its valuation, no objective standard
available, nor have any rules been framed by the High Court under scc9 of mc
Suits Valuation Act, plaintiff has a discretion as to the amount at which the
relief is to be valued and the court has no power to revise such valuation.
Vs. Sargam Pictures (1954) 6 DLR 466.
9—Plaintiff’s discretion to value
In a suit
coming under section 7(iv) (c) of the Court-Fees Act, having, as regards its
valuation, no objective standard available, nor have any rules been framed by
the High Court under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, plaintiff has a
discretion as to the amount at which the relief is to be valued and the court
has no power to revise such valuation.
Distributors Vs. Sujan Pictures (1954) 6 DLR 466 (468 rt.h.col),
of section 8(c) of the Court-fees Act are independent of section 9 of the Suit
The Court is
authorized under section 8(c) of the Court-fees Act to hold an enquiry as to
valuation of any suit and to assess the same. This is absolutely an independent
power consciously given by the legislature to the Court and the legislature
must be presumed to have in its mind the provision of Section 9 of the Suits
Section 9 of
the Suits Valuation Act is not only an independent section but is also
contained in a different Act.
Govt. -of East Pakistan Vs. Maharaja King Bikram (1968) 20 DLR 77.
S. 9—Section 8C
Court Fees Act, gives the Court power to revise the valuation of any suit. But
that does not improve matters as regards cases dealt with in section 7(iv)(c)
inasmuch as it does not indicate any method or principle by which the court can
revise the plaintiff’s valuation in cases where there is no objective standard.
Vs. Sargam Pictures (1954) 6 DLR 466.
for recovery of money or land, there is obviously an objective basis for
valuation, namely, the amount of the money to be recovered or the market value
of the land.
Welfare Trust Vs. Pakistan (1959)11 DLR 57.
of suit. It is the duty of the Court to enquire into the proper valuation of a
suit when it has grounds to consider that the valuation given by the party is
not correct. AIR 1925 (Pal) 392 (FB)+AIR 1930 (Cal) 65 (DB).
11—Objection to jurisdiction.
to trial courts jurisdiction to try a suit on the ground that it was
undervalued was raised in the trial Court but that Court-while disposing of
this objection fell in an error by repeating undervaluation.
the lower appellate Court found that on a proper valuation suit was beyond the
pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court and on that finding remanded the case
with a direction that the plaint is returned to the plaintiff for presentation
to the proper court.
to jurisdiction having been raised in the court of first instance, the court of
the Appeal below rightly held that the judgment and the decree of the trial
Court were hit by the want of jurisdiction.
the trial Court regarding valuation made not only for the purpose of court fees
but for the purpose of ascertaining the jurisdiction as well is open to
correction in appeal.
objection as to valuation was for the first time raised in the second appeal,
then in view of the provision of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act,
objection to the jurisdiction of a court based on over-valuation or
under-valuation should not be entertained by an appellate Court unless there
was prejudice on merits. If the objection as to jurisdiction is taken in the
court of the first instance, there is hardly any scope for the application of
Sen Roy Vs. Saiyad Ali Jamadar. (1956)8 DLR 100.
underlying sections 21 and 99 CPC and section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is
same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a court on the merits and
judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed .purely on technical
grounds, unless it had resulted in a failure of justice, and the policy of the
legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and
pecuniary as technical unless there has been a prejudice on the merits.
Sen Ray Vs. Saiyad Ali Jamadar (1956) 8 DLR 100.
(Per Cornelius, CJ)—As the point of valuation for purpose of
jurisdiction was not taken in the Court of first instance, under s. 11 of the
SV Act no omission on the ground of over-valuation or under valuation should
have been entertained by the appellate Court, i.e. the High Court, even if that
Court were of the opinion that ‘the over-valuation or under-valuation thereof
has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits”.
Vs. Rahman Fakir. (1961) 13 DLR (SC) 191.
objection as to valuation of a suit is taken either in the trial or appellate
court—No further objection will be allowed, especially if the party concerned
has not been prejudiced in any mater.
Das Vs. Abdul Kadr Mia (1983) 35 DLR 14 (15).
the Supreme Court competent, being an order against the Collector even though a
departmental appeals, against the Collector’s order, has already been preferred
and disposed of by the Board of Revenue.
A. Haroon Vs. Collector of Customs, Karachi (1967) 19 DLR (SC) 472.
appearing before the Supreme Court being an advocate has to make submission in
Ahmed Vs. Registrar, High Court of E. Pak. (1967) 19 DLR (SC) 483.
fact—Interference by the Supreme Court on question of fact is permissible not
only when apparent blunder or error committed by lower Court but also when the
finding is patently absurd and also it is physically impossible.
Council itself recognized that it would not hesitate to review the evidence in
spite of a concurrent finding of the Courts below if “it be shown with absolute
clearness that some blunder or error is apparent in the way in which the
learned Judges below have dealt with the facts” or “if there had been any
principle of evidence not properly applied.” But this at best is a rule of
practice only which has gradually developed as a result of the decisions of the
Board which are merely illustrative and by no means exhaustive.
of Pakistan Vs. Ali Ihsan (1967) 19 DLR (SC) 251.
Court—State duty to comply with the order of the Supreme Court— Unseemly hurry
in passing the order under review deprecated.
it is indeed
unfortunate that there was an unseemly hurry on the part of the State to pass
the second order of forfeiture without first having fully complied with the
order of the Supreme Court in letter and in spirit. It was desirable for the
State to act in such a manner as to avoid giving any impression whatsoever that
it might have acted on a consideration other than purely in the interest of the
State and its people.
Hossain Vs. Province of East Pak. (1967)19 DLR 529.
Court’s ruling—Executive Government’s duty to obey the same in letter and
AM Sayem, J—
I have been greatly distressed at the manner of implementation, a mere feigning
as it is, of the interim order passed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court
directing restoration of the press to the petitioner, and the stage at which
the impugned order was passed, though the learned Attorney-General insisted
that these did not at all concern us and were matters solely between the
Supreme Court and some of the respondents.
Hossain Vs. Province of East Pak. (1967)19 DLR 529.
the Supreme Court—Any observation by the Supreme Court even obiter is binding on
the High Court.
and Sons Vs. Trans Oceanic Steamship Co. Ltd. (1965) 17 DLR 269.
the Supreme Court— Point involving inquiry into facts cannot generally be
allowed to be raised for the 1st time.
involving inquiry into facts or as to which there could have been an answer on
facts, if they were raised in the trial Court, cannot in the absence of strong
reasons justifying such a course, be allowed to be raised for the first time in
parties were ignorant of the law on a particular date is a question of fact
which could only be decided after an investigation and there was no good ground
for its being allowed to be raised as an additional ground of appeal.
Abdullah Khaiz Vs. Niso Mohammad Khan (1965) 17 DLR (SC) 481.
special leave to Supreme Court— Maintainability of objection—Objection not
mentioned in the concise statement cannot be raised for the first time at the
time of argument.
Taj Din Vs.
Mrs. Razia Begum (1973) 25 DLR (SC) 13
finding of fact—When it does and when does not interfere.
Court does not interfere with concurrent findings of fact in civil matters,
unless that finding is shown to be based on no evidence or upon mis-reading of
the evidence. No such error has been pointed out to us. It cannot, therefore,
be accepted that the finding as to the incomplete nature of the gift was open
to any challenge at this stage.
Abdul Karim (1968) 20 DLR (SC) 205.
findings of fact. Supreme Court sets aside findings of fact arrived at by the
Court in setting aside the finding with regard to collusion arrived at by the
taken into account the following circumstances: It has not considered the
finding by the Trial Court that it could not be believed that the defendant No.
1 would allow a property worth Rs. 15,000/- to be sold for Rs. 3,700/- for his
failure to pay the paltry sum of Rs. 300/-which was due on account of municipal
Lax. The Trial Court observed that “the PWs appeared to be more reliable than
the DWs and I accept the evidence of PWs that the defendant No. 1 is still in
possession and the defendant No. 4 has no possession”. This finding has also
been reversed without giving any cogent reasons thereof. Regard being had to
these facts we are unable to sustain the finding of the High Court.
Modern Bank Ltd. Vs. Khan Bahadur Khalilur Rahman (1973) 25 DLR (SC) 34.
Court’s decision—Binding on all courts, including the High Courts.
necessary to point out to the learned Judges of the High Court the
constitutional duty that any decision of the Supreme Court shall to the extent
that it decides a question of law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of
law is binding on all other Courts in Pakistan and that all judicial
authorities throughout Pakistan shall act in aid of the Supreme Court.
Muhammad Khan Vs. Sanaullah, (1973) 25 DLR (SC) 45.
Court’s power of superintendence—Dictum of the Supreme Court of India recalled.
interesting to note that though the power of superintendence has been cornered
on the High Court, the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of
Baldeo Singh, AIR 1957 SC) 612, is an authority for the proposition that the
Supreme Court (in our country the Appellate Division) can also exercise the
power of superintendence in the appropriate circumstances.
Vs. State (1973) 25 DLR 335.
for special leave to appeal— Objection that the appeal did not lie before the
High Court was not taken before the High Court—This fact was not brought to the
notice of the Supreme Court dealing with the application for special leave to
appeal—Had it been so brought to its notice special leave would not have been
Shirkag-i-Ahbab Vs. National Bank of Pakistan (1969) 21 DLR (SC) 275.
which lie within the jurisdiction of the Appellate Division of Supreme Court
cannot under a misapprehension be usurped by a High Court Divisions.
matter ultimately came before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
regarding the question of attachment of four Trawlers (belonging to the
defendant) the Appellate Division passed an order to the effect that three
Trawlers should be released from attachment order and only one will remain
under attachment under Or. 38, r. 5, CP Code. It however appears that certain
officer of the Government. allowed the 4th Trawler to go. Thereupon when the
matter came before the High Court Division is proceeded to take certain penal
action against the offending officer for violation of the Court order regarding
the Trawler which has been allowed to go. The matter again came up before the
Appellate Division on being moved by the officer concerned. Held: The High
Court Division was under a clear misapprehension. If the party concerned
violated the order regarding the attachment of the Trawler concerned it is the
order of the Appellate Division which has been violated and therefore the High
Court Division acted without jurisdiction in proceeding to take action against
the offending officer. In these circumstances High Court Division’s order is
Hossain Vs. King Fishers Industries Ltd. (1984) 36DLR (AD) 102.
subordinate authority is authorized to dispose of a matter it is legally seized
of, any opinion by a higher authority in the performance of its duty is illegal
and vitiated the legality of the order.
Industries Vs. Dy. Registrar (1968) 20 DLR 787.
involving investigation into facts disallowed in appeal
that appointment in Class I post by the Postmaster-General without the approval
of the President was itself bad, was not raised before the High Court. This
point when raised before the Supreme Court was disallowed since investigation
into facts may be necessary to find out whether approval of the President was
or was not obtained.
The Postmaster-General, Eastern
Circle (EP) Vs. Muhammad Hashim (1971) 23 DLR (SC) 49.
Court’s power of superintendence. The Supreme Court (in our country the
Appellate Division) can exercise the power of superintendence in the
Vs. The State (1973) 25 DLR 335.