Tenancy Act, 1930
S. I, Clause
(V) (Explanation)—Lands within Tea Estate not governed by the Act. Clauses (V)
of section 1 of this Act extend the Act to the district of Sythet except “Lands
used for special cultivation or for purposes ancillary thereto so long as such
use continues”. The provisions in Explanation to clause CV) provide that the
words “purposes ancillary thereto shall include the letting out of portion of
such land for the maintenance of the coolies working on such cultivation”.
Tea Estate Limited Vs. Arjun Kurmi (1983) 35 DLR (AD) 155 (157).
Secs. 22 and
33—Holding at fixed rate—application for pre-emption.
rent of a holding having been held under a uniform rate for long over twenty
years and having regard to the provisions in section 23(2) of the Act it cannot
be legitimately presumed that the holding has been held at the same rate from
the time of the “Permanent Settlement”. The holding thus being one at fixed
rate of rent, the landlord in view of section 22 had no locus standi to file an
application for pre-emption under section 33 of the Act.
Bhattacharya Vs. Suraj Mia (1951) 3 DLR 358.
33—Right of pre-emption to the landlord.
The right of
pre-emption to the landlord in a case of transfer of an ordinary occupancy
holding accrued to the landlord as soon as the transfer is effected by a registered
instrument and the right vests as soon as the instrument is registered. The
statute nowhere provides that the right of the landlord vests only on the
service of the notice either under section 30 or section 33 of the Syihet
Bhattacharya Vs. Suraj Mia. (1951) 3 DLR 358
33—Benefit of section 18 of the Limitation Act.
notice of transfer under section 33 of the Act has been served on the landlord,
the latter will have 3 years under Art. 81 of the Limitation Act to make an
application from the date of registration of the instrument of transfer and in
a proper case the applicant will be entitled to the benefit of section 18 of
the Limitation Act also if a case of fraud is established.
Bhattacharya Vs. Suraj Mia. (1951) 3 DLR 358
147(1)(c)—Application for pre-emption not a proceeding under section 147(1)(c).
application for pre-emption under section 33 of the Act cannot be treated as a
proceeding under section 147(I)(c) of the Act simply because in deciding the
matter the nature of the tenancy has been forgone into incidentally.
Chandra K Bhattacharya
Vs. Suraj Mia. (1951) 3 DLR 358
under the section not appealable
contemplated by section 96 of the C.P. Code is a decree made in a suit. A
proceeding under section 34(b) of the Sylhet Tenancy Act is started by an
application and not by a plaint, and consequently the order under section 34(b)
of the Act is not an order in a suit. The order complained against therefrom is
not appealable before the District Judge.
& ors Vs. Mafiz Ali & ors. (1956)8 DLR 80.
passed under, if appealable.
application under sub-section 7 of Section 34 of the Sylhet Tenancy Act was
allowed in part by the Munsif but the appeal preferred against the same was
dismissed by the District Judge as incompetent.
(7) of Section 34 of the Sylhet Tenancy Act lays down that an order passed
under section (b) of this section will have the effect of a decree of a civil
Court. There is no provision in the Sylhet Tenancy Act or in the Civil
Procedure Code providing that there shall be no appeal from such an order.
Clearly, therefore, an appeal lies. (1952) 2 PLR (Dac) 37.
usufructuary mortgage (kot-mortgagc) does not require to be attested by two
witnesses and is a valid document if it is registered in accordance with the
Talukdar Vs. Md. Noaz Ali Talukdar (2967) 19 DLR 786.
defendants were holding over as under raiyats after the expiry of the written
Held: That being so, the case is covered by clause (d) of section 65,
Sylhet Tenancy Act.
Vs. Manai Ullah (1962) 14 DLR 141.
S. 162— A suit
under section 162 of the Sylhet Tenancy Act is, notionally at least, a Suit for
the entire rent and the intention of the Legislature is that the suit is to
deal with the whole of the rent for the period so that the tenant is not
subject to a multiplicity of suits in respect of the same period.
Kumar Susansu Kanca Acharja Vs. Moyna Sundari (1954)6 DLR 66.
“dispossession” in Art. 3 of Schedule (I) of the Sylhet Tenancy Act implies the
coming in of a person and driving out of another from possession.
Sukia Boibaidhya Vs. Md. Eklash (1952) 4 DLR 392.
that a case may come within the mischief of the said Article, there must be
actual dispossession of a raiyat or under-raiyat by the landlord or somebody on
therefore, the plaintiffs sued for possession after two years but before 12
years from the date of obtaining symbolical possesion through court pursuant to
the sale of suit land in money execution:
Held: The case did not come within the meaning of Art 3 of Sch. (vi) of
the Syihet Tenancy Act as there was no dispossession within the meaning of the
Sukia Baibaidhya Vs. Md. Eklash (7952)4 DLR 392.
governed by the Transfer of Property Act.
In the case
of tenancies which are governed by the Transfer of Property Act, interest or
damages by way of interest can only be claimed if there is an express
stipulation in the coutract creating the tenancy, or, at least, the rent is
made a charge upon the land itself. In no other crcumstances compensations or
damages can be claimed for non-payment of arrears of rent.
Alauddin Mia Vs. Abdul Latif (1957) 9 DLR 357.