Town Improvement Act
(XIII of 1953)
Ss. 26 and
27—Dacca Improvement Trust cannot enter into a contract without sanction of the
Board of Trustees.
No. 2, Dacca Improvement Trust is a statutory body and under the provisions of
sections 26 and 27 of the Town Improvement Act of 1953 any agreement or
contract between respondent No. 2 and another must be entered into by the Board
of Trustees of respondent No. 2 and certain contracts cannot be effective and
cannot even be entered into by respondent No. 2 unless previous sanction for
that has been obtained from the Provincial Government.
Lufunnessa Ibrahim Vs. Province of East Pak. (1968)20 DLR 174.
Ss. 34 &
35(c)—Order imposing penalties by way of censuring, fining, etc.— Does not
require previous sanction of Government—Suspension refers to punishment after
suspension or drawing up proceedings against an employee illegal unless rules
have been framed relating to service conditions—though the authority can
suspend an employee pending departmental enquiry—But such suspension cannot
endure for an indefinite time.
M Noman Vs.
DIT (1964) 16 DLR 537.
42—Re-housing person displaced not a necessary precondition (or
requisition—Compliance with the provision of section 42 is not a condition
precedent to the exercise of the power of requisition available under sub
section (I) of section 93A.
Vs. Prov. of East Pak. (1964)16 DLR 613.
Improvement Act and Construction Act stand together—T.I. Act authorities give
final shape to the Master Plan and constructional details of proposed building
and its conformity to the Master Plan are done by an Authorised Officer under
the Construction Act—He cannot question any plan sanctioned by T.I.
the sanctioned plan by the Authorised Officer on the direction of the
Provincial Government unauthorized—Government could vest itself with power for
such refusal by resort to the provisions of Section 74(2) of the T.I. Act.
Officer, D.I.T. Vs. A.W. Malik (1968) 20 DLR (SC) 229.
obtained under section 75(2) of the TI Act for erection of the cinema—
Authorised Officer cannot refuse it—Use of any land in variation of the Master
Plan has to be approved by the Chairman, and in case of refusal by him by the
Board of Trustees.
respondent’s case was that sanction of the competent authority having been
obtained to the erection of the cinema, under section 75(2) of the Town
Improvement Act, it was not for the Authorised Officer to object, on the
assumption that the erection of a cinema would interfere with the approved
Master Plan. This contention was rightly upheld by the High Court and
sub-section (1) of section 75 of the Town Improvement Act declares that if any
person desired to use any land for any purpose other than that laid down in the
Master Plan, he may apply in writing to the Chairman for permission so to do,
and in case of refusal by the Chairman, appeal can be taken under sub-section
(2) of the section, to the Board of Trustees, whose decision would be final. If
resort has been made to this Section, ii is obvious that the Master Plan must
be deemed to have been altered, to the extent permitted by the sanction
accorded under this section.
Officer DIT Vs. AW Mallik (1968) 20 DLR (SC) 229.
Sees. 78, 79
& 93A(4)(a)—Three modes of acquisition under the Act.
terms of the Town Improvement Act, 1953 land can be acquired in three ways
under three different sections: One is by purchase on agreement under section
78, the other is by compulsory acquisition under the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 under section 79 and third is acquisition on requisition
of land under section 93A(4) (a) of the Act.
Vs. Abdur Rashid & ors. (1980) 32 DLR (AD) 92.
Ss. 80 and
88—A glance at
the Town Improvement Act indicates that this Act does not intend to exclude the
function of court under the Land Acquisition Act if no tribunal is set up under
sections 80 and 82.
Vs. Abdul Mannan (1977) 29 DLR (SC) 27.
expression “shall be construed as referring to the Court under the Land
Acquisition Act” in s. 91A explained.
for consideration 8 what upon the true construction is the meaning of ‘be
expression “shall be construed as referring to the court under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894” in sec. 9A of the Town Improvement Act. One way of
interpreting it is to treat the court in this section to mean tribunal under
the Town Improvement Act, if the language of the section could be so construed.
But the language used does not lend support to such a view. We can not apply
the restrictive provisions of the Town Improvement Act to the proceeding or
award of the said court by treating it is a tribunal under the Town Improvement
Act. The expression “shall be construed as referring to” is the well-known
language employed by the legislators in order to attract the provisions of an
analogous enactment into the Act without enacting them over again. We may call
the device the scissors and paste method. This explains the purpose.
Vs. Abdul Mannan (1977) 29 DLR (SC) 27.
Act and the Land Acquisition Act which are in pan materia arc to be treated as
one system and explanatory to each other. Ibid.
where the Town Improvement Act is silent the provision of the Land Acquisition
Act shall be applicable.
lands acquired under the Town Improvement Act its provisions shall apply, but
for cases where the enactment is silent and there is no inconsistency between
the two, the general law provided in Land Acquisition Act will apply to
supplement the first. Ibid.
—S. 91A as stood before
and as now stands as amended in 1963—Difference pointed out. The old section
91A contemplated ad-hoc appointment of an arbitrator in each particular case.
This position was brought to an end by the new section 91A as introduced in
1963 which provides a kind of permanent appointment of an Arbitrator in the
shape of the Land Acquisition Court in the absence of a duly constituted
Ss. 91A and
lies against an award of compensation by the Court acting under section 91A of
There is no
provision for appeal against an award made under section 91A and further
subsection (6) of section 93A has laid down that no appeal would lie.
Therefore, the present appeal is not maintainable.
Legislature having provided for speedy method of requisition and acquisition
under section 93A of the Act it thought that the determination of the
compensation should also be speedily done and accordingly it dispensed even
with a limited provision for appeal as laid down under section 88 of the Act.
East Pakistan Vs. Abdul Mannan, (1969) 21 DLR 478.
Ss. 91A and
will be attracted when a court under this Act deals that matter referred to in
S. 93A of TJ. Act—Appeal lies against the decision of the Land Acquisition Act acting
under section 93A of the Town Improvement Act.
Bangladesh Vs. Abdul Mannan (1977) 29 DLR (SC) 17.
of the section explained. What is meant by section 93 of the Town
Improvement Act is that the correctness or regularity of any order made or
action taken under the said chapter can be called in question only in the
manner as laid down in chapter IC of the Act and it cannot be challenged in a
collateral proceeding in a civil court.
Dacca Improvement Trust Vs. Waliullah (1976) 28 DLR (SC) 150.
hit by the provisions of S. 93C is maintainable in a Civil Court.
Iii view of
the nature of the case as made in the plaint, it cannot be maintained that the
suit is barred under the provision of section 93C of the Act.
Improvement Trust Vs. Waliullah (1976) 28 DLR (SC) 150.
S. 93A—Compensation assessment by Land Acquisition Court acting under
sec. 93A of the Town Improvement Act not appealable—No revision to the High
Court would lie as the Land Acquisition Court acting under sec. 93A of T.I. Act
is not a court subordinate to the High
Vs. Abdul Mannan (1977) 29 DLR (SC) 17.
and 54 of the L.A. Act not being mentioned in s. 93A of the T.1. Act—the
conclusion is appeal is barred against a decision under section 93A in an
assessment matter. Ibid.
determination u/s 93A of T.I. Act is not an award under Part III of the L.A.
Act since such a determination is not an award within the meaning of LA Act. Ibid.
—An order of
assessment of compensation made under section 93A of the Town Improvement Act is
not appealable. Ibid.
Acquisition Court while assessing compensation does not act as a court but the
proceedings before it are arbitration proceedings and as such it is not
amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 Of the CP
—S. 93A —This
section provides special procedure for acquisition of lands Section 93A
purports to be a complete code in itself and in view of sub-section (6) any
assessment by a Land Acquisition Court under the said provision is not open to
Ss. 93A and
would lie in case of compensation assessment u/s. 93A by Tribunal as said in s.
93A(b): so also no appeal lay under the old s. 91A as stated in the old s.
91A(7). Now, 91A is silent about appeal, does not say appeal is barred—It is
not provided that determination of a disputed assessment u/s. 93A by a Land
Acquisition Court is an award within the meaning of sections 26 and 54 of the
Land Acquisition Act. Ibid.
under the L.A. Act. assessed by a L.A. Court not as a court but as an
arbitrator—Therefore procedural rules under C P. Code not attracted to such a
to the claim of compensation money, referred to the Land Acquisition Court, is
not of the kind which is concerned with assessment of compensation money. Ibid.
Improvement Act is a special enactment and the Land Acquisition Act is a
general one—In case of inconsistency the special enactment shall prevail over
the general one. Ibid.
assessing compensation, the relevant law is the law in force on the date of
of properties—When does it take place.
lakes place only when a notification under clause (h) of sub-scction4) of
section 93A is published and till then the period of requisition continues.
Separate compensation for the period of requisition should be assessed as
distinguished from acquisition. Ibid.
constituted u/s 80 read with s.82 to Act.
be moved if
compensation assessed by Dy Commissioner is unaccepted—Where no such Tribunal
is constituted then u/s 93A the matter shall be referred to the court under the
Land Acquisition .Act, 1894.
Bangladesh Vs. Abdur Rashid & Ors.
(1980) 32 DLR (AD) 92.
of property with the future object of acquisition though offers a lesser amount
of compensation is valid.
contended that when the intention of the requisitioning authority from the
inception was to acquire the properties permanently, resort to requisition
under section 93A was unwarranted and the properties should have been
straightaway acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, as required by the
provision of section 79 of the Act. As section 93A provides for payment of
comparatively less compensation, ills further submitted that the requisition is
malafide as it will deprive the petitioners of adequate compensation payable
under the Land Acquisition Act.
Held: It no
doubt, appears from the requisition notices that the ultimate object of the
requisition is to acquire the properties permanently for residential purposes
of the DIT. But there is no prohibition in the Act that if a land is ultimately
required permanently, the same cannot be first requisitioned with the object of
its future acquisition. On the contrary, section 93A itself provides that a land
requisitioned under the said section can be acquired subsequently.
It is true
that acquisition of the properties under Land Acquisition Act in accordance
with the provision of section 79 of the Act might have given the petitioners an
opportunity of getting compensation higher than what is payable under section
93A. But that does not necessity mean that the requisition under section 93A,
instead of having recourse to the provision of section 79 of the Act, is
malafide. Section 93A appeared to have been subsequently incorporated in the
Act with a view to enabling the Government to requisition and acquire
properties expeditiously for the specific purposes mentioned in the sub-section
(I) of that section. The Government or its delegate is, therefore, entitled to
have recourse to the provision of section 93A instead of invoking the powers
available under other provisions of the Act.
Mannaf Vs. Province of East Pakistan
(1964)16 DLR 613.
lies against an order of requisition.
There is no
provision in the Town Improvement Act for an appeal to the Divisional
Commissioner (or the Additional Divisional Commissioner) against an order of
requisition made under section 93A of the Act and any order passed (in this
case by the Additional Divisional Commissioner) interfering with the
requisition under section 93A is without jurisdiction.
Improvement Trust Vs. Additional Commissioner, Dacca Division (1965)17 DLR.
Sec. 93A(5)— In respect
of trees standing on the land acquired under the TI Act under the provision of
sec. 93A (5) of the LA Act which are applicable in such acquisition the owner
thereof shall be entitled to get compensation for their market value at the
Vs. Abdul Mannan (1977) 29 DLR (SC)7 17.
of the Town Improvement Act provides that when a person interested has not
accepted the compensation made by the Deputy Commissioner, he may apply to the
Tribunal for determining the compensation. As there was no such Tribunal all that
time, respondents 2 and 3 made an application to the Land Acquisition Court for
determining the, compensation.
Addi. District Judge (1977) 29 DLR 86.
93A(5)(b)—”All persons interested” means persons who have not accepted the
compensation determined by the Collector and who may ask for reference to the
Land Acquisition Court.
Addi. District Judge (2977)29 DLR 86.
93A(5)(6)—As amended by Ordinance HI of 1965.
Value of the
land acquired shall be determined according to the principle indicated by the
Amending Ordinance 111 of 1965.
Vs. Abdul Khaleque (1975) 27 DLR 617.
93A(5)—Retrospective effect of an Amending Ordinance.
of the retrospective operation of the Amending Ordinance is that the amended
provision is to be deemed to have been on the statute book since the 15th day
of August, 1963, that is to say, the court which has been charged with the duty
of assessing compensation for acquisition of land under section 93A (5) of the
Town Improvement Act should have been guided by the amended proviso since the
said date for determining the market-value of land.
Vs. Abdul Khaleque (1975) 27 DLR 617.
of the value of the acquired land.
value in question is to be worked Out from the prices of lands at which the
lands t similar qualities in the vicinity were sold and bought during the
period of two years which is, roughly speaking from the middle of 1958 to the
middle of 1960. Only one of the two documents proved in this case viz. Ext.
1(a) dated 12.3.59 falls within this period and the other document Ext. I dated
7.9.60 falls outside this period. The documents prior to or subsequent to the
relevant period may certainly be taken into consideration, in the absence of
more dependable materials, for working out an average price of land during that
period, bearing in mind the most important question whether the price-level of
such lands remained constant or it showed distinct signs of rising or falling
trends during this period.
Vs. Abdul Khaleque (1975) 27 DLR 617.
93A(S)(iii)(c)—Requiring body is not entitled to any notice to be issued to iton
the question of determination of compensation—Such requiring body is not a
necessary party to any such proceeding.
Additional District Judge (1977) 29 DLR 87.
to be compensated is a necessary party to the proceeding.
In the case
of the person to be compensated, he is a party to the proceeding because, it is
he who files an application to the Tribunal for determining compensation. Ibid.
body is not a necessary party in proceeding for determination of compensation—It is
neither an aggrieved party within the meaning of Article 102 of the
93A(5)(b)(ii)—Tribunal under the Town Improvement Act in assessing compensation
does not possess the power to grant interest though the power is available when
the acquisition is under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act. The question
is: could this power be exercised by the Court while acting as such under the
provisions of sections 91A of the Town Improvement Act, 1953. (1980) 32 DLR
S. 93A (7)
and 93A(I) (3)—Dy. Commissioner and Mdl. Dy Commissioner duly empowered to
exercise the functions of the provincial Government under section 93A (1) (3)
and form opinion as to the necessity of requisitioning any property.
Improvement Truss Vs. Addi. Commissioner, Dacca (1965) I7DLR 323.
which is primarily for the development of a particular area or commercial
purpose does not lose its main character if incidentally it brings some income.
Bepari Vs. Province of East Pak. (1962) 14 DLR 520.
93A(7)—Notice of acquisition— Notice which does not identify the land to be
acquired is bad to that extent.
of the order of requisition upon the person affected by it is a pre-requisite
condition which must be satisfied for the purpose of obtaining possession of
the requisitioned property. Such service of the order postulates that the order
must convey to the affected per son an i4ea as to what property is sought to be
acquired from him and to what extent. It need not set out in any detail the
particulars which may perhaps be required under sub-section (4) (b) of section
93A of the Act; but sufficient particulars must be set Out which will enable
the person, from whom the property is requisitioned, to identify the property
and in ascertain the extent of such requisition.
difficult to lay down the exact limits as to what those particulars should be
but the order must give sufficient notice to the person affected by it, setting
out such particulars which would enable the person concerned to understand what
has been acquired from him.
In order to
determine whether the order is partly good or totally bad, the test is, whether
the identifiable land can be separated from that which is unidentifiable. If the
identifiable portion can be so separated, the notice is good in so far as it
relates to such portion which is identifiable.
Mansur Ali Bepari Vs.
Province of East Pak. (1962) 14 DLR 520.
of land under these sections must precede an order of requisition—Reading the
relevant provisions of the Act it is found that sections 93A and 93B of the
Town Improvement Act, 1953 are related to the acquisition of land preceded by
an order of requisition and they provide almost a self-contained code for the
specific purpose, the third mode of acquisition under the Act.
Vs. Abdur Rashid (1980) 32 DLR (AD) 92.
101(1)(2)(3)—Ex-proprietors (from whom the land has been acquired by the DIT)
right to have the allotment of the acquired land is not unqualified but
dependant on several factors—Having regard to them Board is under no obligation
to allot the acquired land to ex-proprietors.
Begum Vs. Chairman, Dacca Improvement Trust (1968) 20 DLR 1013.