Town Improvement Act, 1953

 

Town
Improvement Act, 1953

 

Section- 101(1)

Under
Section 101(1) of the Town Improvement Act, 1953 it is the absolute right of
RAJUK to deal with the property acquired for them. The release in favour of the
owners was rightly done. [Para-6]

Court of
Wards Bhawal Raj Estate Vs. RAJUK 7 BLT (AD)-304.

Town Improvement Act, 1953

 

Town
Improvement Act [XIII of 1953]


Violation of
building rules and the sanctioned plan punishable—So also violation of
neighbour’s interest—In the present case the duty of the defendants is to keep
vacant space or to make constructions according to the Building Rules and the
building plan sanctioned by authority. Violation of the Building Rule and the
sanctioned plan are punishable under the Town Improvement Act. Similarly, if
these violations touch the interest of the neighbours, they are also actionable
at the instance of the neighbours.

A Hakim Khan
vs Sufia Khatun 39 DLR 275.

 

—Failure to
comply with the Building Rules as well as with the plan sanctioned, is an infringement
amounting to tort.

A Hakim Khan
vs Sufia Khatun 39 DLR 275.

 

Section 2(t)—

It is an
obligation of the RAJUK to provide parks, open spaces, play grounds or similar
amenities. It cannot deprive the residents of an improvement scheme from such
facilities on the plea of providing residential plots to the growing number of
town dwellers.

Mohsinul
Islam vs Rajdhani Unnayan Kartripakkha and others 52 DLR 12.

 

Section 2(h)—

Conversion
of parks and open spaces enjoyed by allottees of a plan township cannot be
converted as residential plots.

Rajdhani
Unnayan Kartripakhya and another vs Mohsinul Islam and another 53 DLR (AD) 79.

 

Sections 22 & 23 (as amended), 29, 79(2), 93A & 93B—

Non—payment
of compensation within one year from the date of decision of the Government for
acquisition of land as  contemplated
under section 12of1982 Ordinance does not render such land liable to be
released in that section 12 is not applicable to the facts of the instant cases
which were started long before the Ordinance came into force in view of the
provision of amended section 79 of the 1953 Act as no retrospectivity can be
read into section 12 of the 1982 Ordinance.

Jamir Ali
(Md) and others vs Secretary, Ministry of Land & others 52 DLR (AD) 176.

 

Section 23—

Unless a
different intention appears in the repealing Act the repeal of any enactment
shall not affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy as if the
repealing Act had not been passed.

Jamir Ali
(Md) and others vs Secretary, Ministry of Land and others 52 DLR 125.

 

Section 93A & 93A (repealed)—

In spite of
repeal of sections 93A and 93B of the Act the pending acquisition of the
disputed land shall be continued under the aforesaid provisions as if those
have not been repealed and the provision of section 12 or other provisions of
Acquisition and Requisition of Immoveable Property Ordinance shall not apply to
the acquisition proceedings started under section 93A of the Act.

Jamir Ali
(Md) and others vs Secretary, Ministry of Land and others 52 DLR 125.

 

Sections 52 & 74—

The writ
petitioner allottee of the adjacent plot has no legal right to resist creation
of new plot or sub—plots and alloting those to others. The writ petition is bad
for defect of parties as the allottees have not been made parties to the
petition.

Syed Abdur
Rahim vs Secretary, Ministry of Works, Government of Bangladesh and others 53
DLR (AD) 106.

 

Section 93A(3)—

The land
being still under requisition there cannot be a valid ground for declaring the
proposed allotment illegal only because the land has been kept unutilized for a
long time without issuing acquisition process.

Sadeque
uddin Ahmed vs RAJUK 46 DLR 205.

 

Section 93A(3)—

The land in
question having been requisitioned for the purpose of acquisition and
possession delivered to the requiring body, in spite of the fact that no
Gazette Notification has yet been published vesting title in the land, may use
the property as may appear to it to be expedient.

Jamir Ali
(Md) and others vs Secretary, Ministry of Land 52 DLR I 25.

 

Section 100(1)—

Under
section 101(1) of the Town Improvement Act, 1953 it is the absolute right of
the RAJUK to deal with the property acquired and they have sufficient authority
to release the land to the owners.

Bhawal Raj
Estate Court of Wards vs Rajdhani Unnayan Kartri­pakkha and another 51 DLR 462.

 

Town Improvement Act, 1953

 

Town Improvement Act

(XIII of 1953)

 

Ss. 26 and
27—Dacca Improvement Trust cannot enter into a contract without sanction of the
Board of Trustees.

Respondent
No. 2, Dacca Improvement Trust is a statutory body and under the provisions of
sections 26 and 27 of the Town Improvement Act of 1953 any agreement or
contract between respondent No. 2 and another must be entered into by the Board
of Trustees of respondent No. 2 and certain contracts cannot be effective and
cannot even be entered into by respondent No. 2 unless previous sanction for
that has been obtained from the Provincial Government.

Begum
Lufunnessa Ibrahim Vs. Province of East
Pak. (1968)20 DLR 174.

 

Ss. 34 &
35(c)—Order imposing penalties by way of censuring, fining, etc.— Does not
require previous sanction of Government—Suspension refers to punishment after
enquiry.

Order of
suspension or drawing up proceedings against an employee illegal unless rules
have been framed relating to service conditions—though the authority can
suspend an employee pending departmental enquiry—But such suspension cannot
endure for an indefinite time.

M Noman Vs.
DIT (1964) 16 DLR 537.

 

S.
42—Re-housing person displaced not a necessary precondition
(or
requisition—Compliance with the provision of section 42 is not a condition
precedent to the exercise of the power of requisition available under sub
section (I) of section 93A.

Md. Manaf
Vs. Prov. of East Pak. (1964)16 DLR 613.

 

S. 74(2)—Town
Improvement Act and Construction Act stand together—T.I. Act authorities give
final shape to the Master Plan and constructional details of proposed building
and its conformity to the Master Plan are done by an Authorised Officer under
the Construction Act—He cannot question any plan sanctioned by T.I.
authorities.

Refusal of
the sanctioned plan by the Authorised Officer on the direction of the
Provincial Government unauthorized—Government could vest itself with power for
such refusal by resort to the provisions of Section 74(2) of the T.I. Act.

Authorized
Officer, D.I.T. Vs. A.W. Malik (1968) 20 DLR (SC) 229.

 

S. 75(1)(2)—Sanction
obtained under section 75(2) of the TI Act for erection of the cinema—
Authorised Officer cannot refuse it—Use of any land in variation of the Master
Plan has to be approved by the Chairman, and in case of refusal by him by the
Board of Trustees.

The
respondent’s case was that sanction of the competent authority having been
obtained to the erection of the cinema, under section 75(2) of the Town
Improvement Act, it was not for the Authorised Officer to object, on the
assumption that the erection of a cinema would interfere with the approved
Master Plan. This contention was rightly upheld by the High Court and
sub-section (1) of section 75 of the Town Improvement Act declares that if any
person desired to use any land for any purpose other than that laid down in the
Master Plan, he may apply in writing to the Chairman for permission so to do,
and in case of refusal by the Chairman, appeal can be taken under sub-section
(2) of the section, to the Board of Trustees, whose decision would be final. If
resort has been made to this Section, ii is obvious that the Master Plan must
be deemed to have been altered, to the extent permitted by the sanction
accorded under this section.

Authorised
Officer DIT Vs. AW Mallik (1968) 20 DLR (SC) 229.

 

Sees. 78, 79
& 93A(4)(a)—Three modes of acquisition under the Act.

Under the
terms of the Town Improvement Act, 1953 land can be acquired in three ways
under three different sections: One is by purchase on agreement under section
78, the other is by compulsory acquisition under the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 under section 79 and third is acquisition on requisition
of land under section 93A(4) (a) of the Act.

Bangladesh
Vs. Abdur Rashid & ors. (1980) 32 DLR (AD) 92.

 

Ss. 80 and
88—
A glance at
the Town Improvement Act indicates that this Act does not intend to exclude the
function of court under the Land Acquisition Act if no tribunal is set up under
sections 80 and 82.

Bangladesh
Vs. Abdul Mannan (1977) 29 DLR (SC) 27.

 

S. 91A—The
expression “shall be construed as referring to the Court under the Land
Acquisition Act” in s. 91A explained.

The point
for consideration 8 what upon the true construction is the meaning of ‘be
expression “shall be construed as referring to the court under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894” in sec. 9A of the Town Improvement Act. One way of
interpreting it is to treat the court in this section to mean tribunal under
the Town Improvement Act, if the language of the section could be so construed.
But the language used does not lend support to such a view. We can not apply
the restrictive provisions of the Town Improvement Act to the proceeding or
award of the said court by treating it is a tribunal under the Town Improvement
Act. The expression “shall be construed as referring to” is the well-known
language employed by the legislators in order to attract the provisions of an
analogous enactment into the Act without enacting them over again. We may call
the device the scissors and paste method. This explains the purpose.

Bangladesh
Vs. Abdul Mannan (1977) 29 DLR (SC) 27.

—Town Improvement
Act and the Land Acquisition Act which are in pan materia arc to be treated as
one system and explanatory to each other.   Ibid.

—In case
where the Town Improvement Act is silent the provision of the Land Acquisition
Act shall be applicable.

For the
lands acquired under the Town Improvement Act its provisions shall apply, but
for cases where the enactment is silent and there is no inconsistency between
the two, the general law provided in Land Acquisition Act will apply to
supplement the first.   Ibid.

—S. 91A as stood before
and as now stands as amended in 1963—Difference pointed out. The old section
91A contemplated ad-hoc appointment of an arbitrator in each particular case.
This position was brought to an end by the new section 91A as introduced in
1963 which provides a kind of permanent appointment of an Arbitrator in the
shape of the Land Acquisition Court in the absence of a duly constituted
Tribunal. Ibid.

Ss. 91A and
93A—
No appeal
lies against an award of compensation by the Court acting under section 91A of
the Act.

There is no
provision for appeal against an award made under section 91A and further
subsection (6) of section 93A has laid down that no appeal would lie.
Therefore, the present appeal is not maintainable.

The
Legislature having provided for speedy method of requisition and acquisition
under section 93A of the Act it thought that the determination of the
compensation should also be speedily done and accordingly it dispensed even
with a limited provision for appeal as laid down under section 88 of the Act.

Province of
East Pakistan Vs. Abdul Mannan, (1969) 21 DLR 478.

 

Ss. 91A and
93A
—L.A. Act
will be attracted when a court under this Act deals that matter referred to in
S. 93A of TJ. Act—Appeal lies against the decision of the Land Acquisition Act acting
under section 93A of the Town Improvement Act.

Bangladesh Vs. Abdul Mannan (1977) 29 DLR (SC) 17.

 

S.93Provisions
of the section explained.
What is meant by section 93 of the Town
Improvement Act is that the correctness or regularity of any order made or
action taken under the said chapter can be called in question only in the
manner as laid down in chapter IC of the Act and it cannot be challenged in a
collateral proceeding in a civil court.

Dacca Improvement Trust Vs. Waliullah (1976) 28 DLR (SC) 150.

 

—Suit not
hit by the provisions of S. 93C is maintainable in a Civil Court.

Iii view of
the nature of the case as made in the plaint, it cannot be maintained that the
suit is barred under the provision of section 93C of the Act.

Dacca
Improvement Trust Vs. Waliullah (1976) 28 DLR (SC) 150.

 

S. 93A—Compensation assessment by Land Acquisition Court acting under
sec. 93A of the Town Improvement Act not appealable—No revision to the High
Court would lie as the Land Acquisition Court acting under sec. 93A of T.I. Act
is not a court subordinate to the High
Court.

Bangladesh
Vs. Abdul Mannan (1977) 29 DLR (SC) 17.

 

—Sections 26
and 54 of the L.A. Act not being mentioned in s. 93A of the T.1. Act—the
conclusion is appeal is barred against a decision under section 93A in an
assessment matter.   Ibid.

—Assessment
determination u/s 93A of T.I. Act is not an award under Part III of the L.A.
Act since such a determination is not an award within the meaning of LA Act. Ibid.

An order of
assessment of compensation made under section 93A of the Town Improvement Act is
not appealable. Ibid.

—Land
Acquisition Court while assessing compensation does not act as a court but the
proceedings before it are arbitration proceedings and as such it is not
amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 Of the CP
Code. Ibid.

 

—S. 93A —This
section provides special procedure for acquisition of lands Section 93A
purports to be a complete code in itself and in view of sub-section (6) any
assessment by a Land Acquisition Court under the said provision is not open to
appeal. Ibid.

Ss. 93A and
91A
—No appeal
would lie in case of compensation assessment u/s. 93A by Tribunal as said in s.
93A(b): so also no appeal lay under the old s. 91A as stated in the old s.
91A(7). Now, 91A is silent about appeal, does not say appeal is barred—It is
not provided that determination of a disputed assessment u/s. 93A by a Land
Acquisition Court is an award within the meaning of sections 26 and 54 of the
Land Acquisition Act. Ibid.

S.93A—Compensation
under the L.A. Act. assessed by a L.A. Court not as a court but as an
arbitrator—Therefore procedural rules under C P. Code not attracted to such a
case. Ibid.

—Dispute as
to the claim of compensation money, referred to the Land Acquisition Court, is
not of the kind which is concerned with assessment of compensation money. Ibid.

—The Town
Improvement Act is a special enactment and the Land Acquisition Act is a
general one—In case of inconsistency the special enactment shall prevail over
the general one.   Ibid.

—For
assessing compensation, the relevant law is the law in force on the date of
acquisition.

—Acquisition
of properties—When does it take place.

Acquisition
lakes place only when a notification under clause (h) of sub-scction4) of
section 93A is published and till then the period of requisition continues.
Separate compensation for the period of requisition should be assessed as
distinguished from acquisition. Ibid.

—Tribunal
constituted u/s 80 read with s.82 to Act.

be moved if
compensation assessed by Dy Commissioner is unaccepted—Where no such Tribunal
is constituted then u/s 93A the matter shall be referred to the court under the
Land Acquisition .Act, 1894.

Bangladesh Vs. Abdur Rashid & Ors.
(1980) 32 DLR (AD) 92.

 

—Requisition
of property with the future object of acquisition though offers a lesser amount
of compensation is valid.

It was
contended that when the intention of the requisitioning authority from the
inception was to acquire the properties permanently, resort to requisition
under section 93A was unwarranted and the properties should have been
straightaway acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, as required by the
provision of section 79 of the Act. As section 93A provides for payment of
comparatively less compensation, ills further submitted that the requisition is
malafide as it will deprive the petitioners of adequate compensation payable
under the Land Acquisition Act.

Held: It no
doubt, appears from the requisition notices that the ultimate object of the
requisition is to acquire the properties permanently for residential purposes
of the DIT. But there is no prohibition in the Act that if a land is ultimately
required permanently, the same cannot be first requisitioned with the object of
its future acquisition. On the contrary, section 93A itself provides that a land
requisitioned under the said section can be acquired subsequently.

It is true
that acquisition of the properties under Land Acquisition Act in accordance
with the provision of section 79 of the Act might have given the petitioners an
opportunity of getting compensation higher than what is payable under section
93A. But that does not necessity mean that the requisition under section 93A,
instead of having recourse to the provision of section 79 of the Act, is
malafide. Section 93A appeared to have been subsequently incorporated in the
Act with a view to enabling the Government to requisition and acquire
properties expeditiously for the specific purposes mentioned in the sub-section
(I) of that section. The Government or its delegate is, therefore, entitled to
have recourse to the provision of section 93A instead of invoking the powers
available under other provisions of the Act.

Md.
Mannaf  Vs. Province of East Pakistan
(1964)16 DLR 613.

 

—No appeal
lies against an order of requisition
.

There is no
provision in the Town Improvement Act for an appeal to the Divisional
Commissioner (or the Additional Divisional Commissioner) against an order of
requisition made under section 93A of the Act and any order passed (in this
case by the Additional Divisional Commissioner) interfering with the
requisition under section 93A is without jurisdiction.

Dacca
Improvement Trust Vs. Additional Commissioner, Dacca Division (1965)17 DLR.
323.

 

Sec. 93A(5)— In respect
of trees standing on the land acquired under the TI Act under the provision of
sec. 93A (5) of the LA Act which are applicable in such acquisition the owner
thereof shall be entitled to get compensation for their market value at the
relevant time.

Bangladesh
Vs. Abdul Mannan (1977) 29 DLR (SC)7 17.

 

Section
93A(5)(ii)

of the Town Improvement Act provides that when a person interested has not
accepted the compensation made by the Deputy Commissioner, he may apply to the
Tribunal for determining the compensation. As there was no such Tribunal all that
time, respondents 2 and 3 made an application to the Land Acquisition Court for
determining the, compensation.

DIT Vs.
Addi. District Judge (1977) 29 DLR 86.

 

S.
93A(5)(b)—”
All persons interested” means persons who have not accepted the
compensation determined by the Collector and who may ask for reference to the
Land Acquisition Court.

DIT Vs.
Addi. District Judge (2977)29 DLR 86.

 

S.
93A(5)(6)—As amended by Ordinance HI of 1965.

Value of the
land acquired shall be determined according to the principle indicated by the
Amending Ordinance 111 of 1965.

Bangladesh
Vs. Abdul Khaleque (1975) 27 DLR 617
.

 

S.
93A(5)—Retrospective effect of an Amending Ordinance.

The effect
of the retrospective operation of the Amending Ordinance is that the amended
provision is to be deemed to have been on the statute book since the 15th day
of August, 1963, that is to say, the court which has been charged with the duty
of assessing compensation for acquisition of land under section 93A (5) of the
Town Improvement Act should have been guided by the amended proviso since the
said date for determining the market-value of land.

Bangladesh
Vs. Abdul Khaleque (1975) 27 DLR 617.

 

—Assessment
of the value of the acquired land.

The average
value in question is to be worked Out from the prices of lands at which the
lands t similar qualities in the vicinity were sold and bought during the
period of two years which is, roughly speaking from the middle of 1958 to the
middle of 1960. Only one of the two documents proved in this case viz. Ext.
1(a) dated 12.3.59 falls within this period and the other document Ext. I dated
7.9.60 falls outside this period. The documents prior to or subsequent to the
relevant period may certainly be taken into consideration, in the absence of
more dependable materials, for working out an average price of land during that
period, bearing in mind the most important question whether the price-level of
such lands remained constant or it showed distinct signs of rising or falling
trends during this period.

Bangladesh
Vs. Abdul Khaleque (1975) 27 DLR 617.

 

S.
93A(S)(iii)(c)
—Requiring body is not entitled to any notice to be issued to iton
the question of determination of compensation—Such requiring body is not a
necessary party to any such proceeding.

DIT Vs.
Additional District Judge (1977) 29 DLR 87.

 

Person
to be compensated is a necessary party to the proceeding.

In the case
of the person to be compensated, he is a party to the proceeding because, it is
he who files an application to the Tribunal for determining compensation. Ibid.

—Requiring
body is not a necessary party in proceeding for determination of compensation—
It is
neither an aggrieved party within the meaning of Article 102 of the
Constitution.   Ibid.

S.
93A(5)(b)(ii)—
Tribunal under the Town Improvement Act in assessing compensation
does not possess the power to grant interest though the power is available when
the acquisition is under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act. The question
is: could this power be exercised by the Court while acting as such under the
provisions of sections 91A of the Town Improvement Act, 1953. (1980) 32 DLR
(AD) 92.

 

S. 93A (7)
and 93A(I) (3)—
Dy. Commissioner and Mdl. Dy Commissioner duly empowered to
exercise the functions of the provincial Government under section 93A (1) (3)
and form opinion as to the necessity of requisitioning any property.

Dacca
Improvement Truss Vs. Addi. Commissioner, Dacca (1965) I7DLR 323.

 

—A scheme
which is primarily for the development of a particular area or commercial
purpose does not lose its main character if incidentally it brings some income.

Mansur Ali
Bepari Vs. Province of East Pak. (1962) 14 DLR 520.

 

S.
93A(7)—Notice of acquisition— Notice which does not identify the land to be
acquired is bad to that extent.

The service
of the order of requisition upon the person affected by it is a pre-requisite
condition which must be satisfied for the purpose of obtaining possession of
the requisitioned property. Such service of the order postulates that the order
must convey to the affected per son an i4ea as to what property is sought to be
acquired from him and to what extent. It need not set out in any detail the
particulars which may perhaps be required under sub-section (4) (b) of section
93A of the Act; but sufficient particulars must be set Out which will enable
the person, from whom the property is requisitioned, to identify the property
and in ascertain the extent of such requisition.

It is
difficult to lay down the exact limits as to what those particulars should be
but the order must give sufficient notice to the person affected by it, setting
out such particulars which would enable the person concerned to understand what
has been acquired from him.

In order to
determine whether the order is partly good or totally bad, the test is, whether
the identifiable land can be separated from that which is unidentifiable. If the
identifiable portion can be so separated, the notice is good in so far as it
relates to such portion which is identifiable.

Mansur Ali Bepari Vs.
Province of East Pak. (1962) 14 DLR 520.

 

Secs. 93A
and 93B
—Acquisition
of land under these sections must precede an order of requisition—Reading the
relevant provisions of the Act it is found that sections 93A and 93B of the
Town Improvement Act, 1953 are related to the acquisition of land preceded by
an order of requisition and they provide almost a self-contained code for the
specific purpose, the third mode of acquisition under the Act.

Bangladesh
Vs. Abdur Rashid (1980) 32 DLR (AD) 92.

 

S.
101(1)(2)(3)—
Ex-proprietors (from whom the land has been acquired by the DIT)
right to have the allotment of the acquired land is not unqualified but
dependant on several factors—Having regard to them Board is under no obligation
to allot the acquired land to ex-proprietors.

Jahanara
Begum Vs. Chairman, Dacca Improvement Trust (1968) 20 DLR 1013.

 

Town Improvement Act, 1953

 

Town
Improvement Act, 1953

 

Sections—22,
29(1), 79(2), 93A and 93B

Acquisition
and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance, 1982 (II of 1982)

Section—12

Sub-section
(1) of Section 29 of the Town Improvement Act as amended by section 22 of the
Town Improvement (Amendment) Act, 1953 empowers RAJTJK to dispose the acquired
land by a sell, lease, exchange or otherwise and sub-section (2) of section 79
provides that acquisition of any land or interest in land for any scheme shall
be deemed to be acquisitioned for public purpose within the meaning of the
Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance, 1982 and
provisions of the Ordinance shall apply to all proceedings relating to
acquisition of property for such purpose. Inspite of repeal of section 93A and
93B of the 1953 Act the proceeding taken under these sections shall not affect
such proceeding although section 12 of 1982 Ordinance provides that where
compensation has not been paid or deposited within one year from the date of
the decision of the Government the proceeding of acquisition shall stands
abated. Claim for release of unutilized acquired land is not a vested right and
nor failure of the requiring body to utilize the land acquired within 3 years
from the date of acquisition in view of the decision of the Government creates
no constitutional or legal right in the petitioners who claim for release of
such land. Non-payment of compensation within one year from the date of
decision of the Government for acquisition of land as contemplated under
section 12 of the Ordinance does not render such land liable to be released.
Section 12 is not applicable to the facts of the instant cases which was
started long before the Ordinance came into force in view of the provision of
amended section 79 of the 1953 Act as no retrospectively can be read into
section 12 of the Ordinance of 1982.

Md. Jamir
Ali and others Vs The Secretary, Ministry of Land & ors., 20 BLD (AD) 245.

 

TOWN IMPROVEMENT ACT, 1953

 

TOWN IMPROVEMENT ACT, 1953

(XIII OF 1953)

 

Employees of DIT—Dacca
Improvement Trust is not a commercial or industrial establishment and its
employees are not workers within the meaning of Employment of Labour (Standing
Orders) Act, 1965—Such employees cannot enforce the provisions of section 18 of
that Act relating to sub-sistence allowance pending inquiry into misconduct in
a proceeding under section 34 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969—Terms and
conditions of such employees are regulated by Town Improvement Act and rules
framed thereunder.

Chairman, DI. T. and another Vs. Chairman, 2nd Labour Court and
another, 1BLD (AD) 462

 

Sectious—38, 39 and 40

Jurisdiction—No
exclusive jurisdiction of Dacca Improvement Trust or Dacca Municipal
Corporation for land reclamation, land development and housing etc—There powers
are permissive in nature subject to approval of the Government—Paurashava
Ordinance, 1977 (XXVI of 1977), Ss. 95 and 96.

Md. Ismail and others
Vs. Bangladesh and others, 1 BLD (HCD) 407.

 

Town Improvement Act, 1953

Town Improvement Act, 1953

 

Writ Petitioner has
acquired title in the case land

Since
the land of Azizul Huq, the vendor of the writ petitioner has already been
released by the Notification published in the Bangladesh Gazette on 11th
November, 1999 and consequent thereupon as RAJUK in no way competent to lay any
claim over the land of Azizul Huq, the vendor of the writ petitioner.

Rajdhani Unnayan
Kartipakhya Vs. Nurul Haque Bhuiyan & Ors 12 BLT (AD)-47

Section-(f) and 2(h)

Question of
estoppels

We have
seen that the preamble of the Town Improvement Act, 1953 provides for
development, improvement and expansion of the capital of the Republic.
Therefore we are in agreement with the view of the High Court Division that
although under section 2(h) of the Town Improvement Act the RAJUK may alter the
lay out plan this power must be exercised for the purposes of improvement. Conversion
of parks and open spaces enjoyed by allotters of a plan township cannot be
converted as residential plots. Conversion of such open spaces and parks into
residential plots is not an improvement by any means and therefore exercise of
such power is contrary to the purpose for which it is conferred under the Town
Improvement Act, 1953.

RAJUK & Anr. Vs.
Mohsinul Islam & Anr. (AD)-56

Section —93A(4) (h)

In that
view of the matter there is absolutely no scope for any release of the
requisitioned property by the Government. Even assuming that there may be some
decision of the Board but that was not acted upon in accordance with law so as
to release the property in favour of the original owners thereof.

Abdul Huq & Ors.
Vs Government of Bangladesh & Ors 13 BLT (AD)194

Section- 93A(I), 93A(3) and 93A(4)(h)

Acquiring
Authority Government on asking of Requiring body D.I.T. acquired property for
requiring body D.I.T. —When Suit Property absolutely vested with Government
free from all encumbrances as mandated by section 93A(4)(h) of The Town
Improvement Act of 1953, The property which vested with the Government i.e.
Dhaka Improvement Trust free from all encumbrances cannot at all vest
subsequently with any other organ of the Government either Ministry of Works or
Ministry of Industries under grab of abandoned property. —Suit property is
acquired property of Government and it was legally leased out to Plaintiff
Bank. Plaintiff Bank’s right, title, interest and possession on suit property
had not been at all affected by Defendants-Respondent’s sale deeds, mutations
and payment of rents.

Bangladesh Bank Vs.
Saiyed Shohidul Haque & Ors 15
BLT (HCD)239

Section-101(1)

Under
Section 101(1) of the Town Improvement Act, 1953 it is the absolute right of
RAJUK to deal with the property acquired for them. The release in favour of the
owners was rightly done.

Court of Wards
Bhawal Raj Estate Vs. RAJUK 7BLT (AD)-304.