Trade Mark Act, 1940
It appears that the registered mark No.31509 is ‘PUDLO’ with a decorative device of coat of arms in the lebel whereas the marks applied for by the appellant are ‘POWERER’ and “POWERER-Q” with a device of coat of arms in the lebels. Thus, it appears that prima facie there is no phonetical or visual resembleness between the marks applied for and the registered mark. It further appears that at the hearing stage before the Registrar the appellant expressed their desire to delete the device of coat of arms from their lebel and in that view of the matter it appears to as that the Registrar ought to have proceed with the applications for registration after allowing the appellant to delete the device
of coat of arms from their lebel.
Sudhir Kanti Shil Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks 9 BLT(HCD)-74.
Section-14(1) read with Trade Marks Rules, 1963 Rule-24(1)
In the present case the elements of rule 25(1) are missing and as such the instant appeal is maintainable without any grounds of decision. In the instant case in response to the notice served upon him under Section 14(1) of the Act the appellant did not take any steps whatsoever till the impugned order was passed by the Registrar and in that view of the matter it appears that the Registrar out stepped his authority in disposing the same on merits on the,ground that the mark offends the provision of Section 10(1) and 8(a) of the Act. In the facts and circumstances of the case the Registrar ought to have resorted to rule 24(1) and treat the application as abandoned.
Md. Sekander Ali Vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks & Ors. 9BLT(HCD)-355
Sections- 15 and 73
Section 15 of the Act has empowered the Registrar to exercise certain powers in respect of registration of Trade Marks whereas Section 73 of the Act has given the rights to sue for infringement of a Trade Mark. None of the provisioins is alternative to each other, nor resort to the Section 73 of the Act is made suabject to Section 15 of the Act.
M/S Hamja Robber Industries Vs. Golam Dostogir Gazi 9BLT(HCD)-280
Expunging the trade mark In deciding the question of similarity between the two marks the test is whether a member of the public is at risk to be confused or deceived Actual confusion or deception is not necessary, mere likelihood of confusion or deception will be enough even if the product is in the market for some time—relied on 1927 AC 632.
Jamal Uddin Ahmed Vs. Abdul Haque & Anr. 10 BLT(HCD)-418.
Miscarriage of Justice-it appears that on review the rectification case was restored to its original file and number and the appellant was given an opportunity to tile the necessary documents within two months, that is, by 26.4.97, but the appellant failed to procure the necessary documents and as such they filed T.M. 55 on 15.4.97 praying for further three months’ time but that application for extension of time was disposed of by the Registrar on 30.4.97 after expiry of the time limit on 26.4.97 and as such it appears that the appellant have been deprived of the opportunity of filing the documents within time allowed as the application has not been disposed of prior to 26.4.97. It, thus, appears that
miscarriage of justice has been occasioned as the application praying for further time was disposed of on 30.4.97 after the expiry of the granted time and as such in the interest of justice the appellant should be given a chance
to file the necessary documents.
Industro Chemic B.V Vs. Saman & Mishu Traders. 9BLT(HCD)-76
Trade Marks Rules, 1963 [As Revised]
A notice to the concernedapplicants by the Registrar should be impliedly read in the relevant section of the Act and Rule 23 of the Revised Trade Marks Rules, 1963 framed thereunder to avoid abuse of power and for the sake of public interest. The words “…but shall not be bound to do so”, used in the last part of Rule 23 in may opinion refers to “renewed search” by the Registrar Trade Mark but not to the initial search as required under the Rule. Consequently, the duty with which the Registrar is entrusted with under the Rule 23 of the Trade Marks Rules, 1963, to search all the pending application is binding upon him for public interest so that no confusion can be created in the minds of the publie by not doing so and then give notice if other applications are pending.
Aarman Soap Factory Vs. Munni Soap & Anr. 10 BLT (HCD)-269.