ACQUISITION AND REQUISITION OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY ORDINANCE, 1982
Public Purpose
The term public purpose’ as used in the Ordinance means a purpose in which the interest of the public is directly and primarily concerned. But action taken for serving a public purpose must be shown to be not merely that this specific result will be reached as a final end, but that the public has itself a direct interest in it.
Md. Masudul Hussain Vs The Deputy Commissioner, Dhaka & ors, 15 BLD (HCD) 493.
Section—3
Conclusion of an agreement between the requisitioning authority and the requiring body is a sine quo non for the exercise of power under section 3 of the Ordinance for publication of the preliminary notice of acquisition of property. When there is no material to show that the person or the body for whom the property was sought to be acquired has already entered into an agreement with the Government before issuing notice of acquisition under section 3 of the Ordinance, the purported order of acquisition is not legal.
Md. Masudul Hussain Vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Dhaka and others, 15 BLD (HCD) 493.
Ref: Sankar Gopal Chatterjee and others Vs. The Additional Commissioner, Dhaka Division and others, 41 DLR 326; Sk. Aminuddin and another Vs. Deputy Commissioner and others, 15DLR 442; Abdus Sobhan Sowdagor and another Vs. Province of East Pakistan and others, 14DLR 496; Province of East Pakistan Vs. Dr. Azizul Islam, PJ.D 1963 (SC) 296; 8 DLR (1965) 210; Md. Mansur Rahman and others Vs. Province of East Pakistan, 14 DLR 604; A.I.R. 1961(SC) 342—Cited.
Section—4(b) and 5
Whether the requiring body had paid the amount within one year of the said date is a matter between the Government and the requiring body. It is not the case of the petitioner that he was not paid compensation or that his compensation money was not deposited within one year from the date of decision to acquire under section 5 or the proviso to section 4(3)(b) of the Ordinance. As such he has no business to enquire when the requiring body paid the amount of compensation to the Government.
Md. Alauddin Khandker Vs Government of Bangladesh, 20 BLD (AD) 147.
Ref: Bangladesh vs. Subash Chandra Das, 46 DLR (AD) 63; Subash Chandra Das vs. Bangladesh, 5ODLR (AD) 106—Cited.
Section—5
The decision of the Government about the acquisition of any property for a public purpose or in the public interest shall be final and such decision of the Government shall be conclusive evidence that the property is needed for a public purpose or in the public interest.
There is no provision in the Ordinance for withdrawal from acquisition after the property has been acquired for a public purpose or in the public interest after the process of acquisition has reached its finality. If after meeting the requirement of the specified purpose, for which acquisition was made, there remains any excess land, it is open to the Government to decide as to whether the requiring body will be allowed to use the same for any public purpose other than from the one for which it was acquired.
M. A. Salam alias Abdus Salam Vs. Government of the Bangladesh and others, 15 BLD (HCD) 578.
Ref: Mamtaz Begum Vs. The Province of East Pakistan, 14 DLR 608; Province of East Pakistan and ors. Vs Jogesh Chandra Lodh and ors, 1 LDLR (SC) 411; Sufla Khatun Vs. Secretary, Revenue Department and ors, 20 DLR (SC) 18; Amiruddin Ahmed Chowdhury Vs. The Land Acquisition and ors, 15 DLR 51; Writ Petition No. 72 of 1988 (Unreported)—Cited.
Sections—10 and 12
Payment of compensation and abatement or revocation of the acquisition proceeding for non-payment or non-deposit of compensation.
Section 10 of the Ordinance provides for payment of compensation after an award is made under section 7 and it stipulates that the Deputy Commissioner shall, before taking possession of the property, tender payment of compensation awarded by him to the persons entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay to them unless prevented by one or more of the contingencies mentioned in subsection (2) of section 10 of the Ordinance.
The provision of section 12 will come into play when the compensation is not paid to the persons interested or not kept in a deposit account in the Public Account of the Republic under sub-section (1) of section 10. Under this section no obligation has been placed on the requiring body to deposit compensation within six months from the date of decision for acquisition.
The expression “compensation has not been paid or deposited within 6 (six) months from the date of decision” for acquisition in sub-section (1) of section 12 is to be understood with reference to section 10 of the Ordinance.
In the absence of any material or averment to show that no compensation was paid under sub- section (1) of section 10 and there being no occasion for deposit of compensation in the Public Account under sub-section (2) of Section 10, the question of abatement does not arise. It is only in case of noncompliance of the provisions of Section 10 the question of abatement or revocation of the acquisition proceeding arises.
Reading Sections 8,9,10,12 and 15 of the Ordinance together, it is clear that abatement will take place if the acquiring authority fails to “pay” or “deposit” compensation in terms of section 10 within one year from the date of decision of the Government made under section 5 of the Ordinance. The requiring body is, therefore, required to deposit the compensation money before the expiry of one year from the date of decision of the Government.
Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Land Administration Vs. Subash Chandra Das and others, 15 BLD (AD) 17.
Section—12
Abatement of an acquisition proceeding
Under section 12 of the Ordinance an acquisition proceeding shall stand abated if compensation has not been paid or deposited within 6 months (now one year) from the date of the decision of the authority concerned for acquisition of the property notwithstanding anything contained in the Ordinance. But in the instant case the question of abatement under section 12 of the Ordinance is not relevant in as much as there was no averment in the Writ Petition that no compensation was paid under subsection (1) of section 10 or deposit made in the Public Account of the Republic as per provision of sub-section (2) of section 10.
Subash Chandra Das and others Vs Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Land Administration and Land Reforms, Government of the People s Republic of Bangladesh and others, 16 BLD (AD) 119.
Section—17 Sub-Section 1
Sub-Section I of Section 17 of the Ordinance provides that no property acquired by the Government shall, without prior approval of the Government, be used for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was acquired. The Ordinance coming into force on 13.4.82 and having not being given retrospective operation, cannot hit the contract earlier concluded with the Plaintiff.
Pronab Kumar Chakraborty and Others Vs. The Govt. of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh and others, 14 BLD (HCD) 2.
Section—34
It prescribes no special period of limitation for preferring an appeal before the Arbitration Appellate Tribunal. In the absence of any special period of limitation prescribed in the Ordinance for preferring an appeal before the Arbitration Appellate Tribunal, the general law of limitation comes into play and as such section 5 of the Limitation Act may be restored to in such cases.
Govt. of Bangladesh Vs District Judge, Dhaka and Arbitration Appellate Tribunal, Dhaka and others, 17 BLD (HCD) 448.
Ref: 43 DLR (AD) 28; 6 BLD (AD) 180— Cited.
Sections—34(1) (4)
An award made by the Arbitrator is appealable under Section 34(1) of the Ordinance: Sub-section 4 of Section 34 of the Ordinance gives finality to the decision of the Arbitration Appellate Tribunal as in such cases it acts as a Court deciding the rights of the parties to receive compensation.
Bangladesh vs. Md. Mazibur Rahman, 14 BLD (HCD) 362.
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ACT, 1980 (VII OF 1981)
Section—4
Jurisdiction of Administrative Tribunals
Under section 4 of the Act the Administrative Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine an application filed by any person in the service of the Republic in respect of the terms and conditions of his service, including pension rights, or in respect of any action taken in relation to him as a person in the service of the Republic. The expression action taken in relation to him as a person in the service of Republic” includes the order of transfer. Thus, the remedy against the order of his transfer lies before the Administrative Tribunal. The application under Article 102 of the Constitution is not maintainable in law.
Md. Shamsul Hoque Vs. The Government of Bangladesh, 16 BLD (HCD) 557
It does not provide for any period of limitation for filing departmental appeals from departmental orders. These are provided for in the relevant Service Regulations of various Statutory Authorities.
Md. Nurul Huq Vs. Governor, Bangladesh Bank Head office, Dhaka and others, 14 BLD (AD) 5.
Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972
Articles—102 and 117
Question of payment of subsistence to the government servant during suspension, relates to terms and conditions of service within the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal.
Sheikh Abdul Hakim Vs Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and others, 20 BLD (HCD) 306.
Section—4
Jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal
An Administrative Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made by any person in the service of the Republic or of any statutory auth6rity in respect of the terms and conditions of his service or in respect of any action taken in relation to him as a person in the service of the Republic or of any statutory public authority. But such an application shall have to be made within 6 months from the date of making or taking of the order, decision or action impugned.
Sonali Bank vs. Ruhul Amin Khan, 14BLD (AD) 171.
Section— 4(2)
First and Second Proviso
Notification by the Government can be challenged straightway by an aggrieved party before the Administrative Tribunal.
The First proviso of Section 4(2) of the Act is attracted when there is a higher administrative authority “under any law for the time being in force” to take a decision in respect of any order or action to be impugned before the tribunal. The impugned notification being made by the Government the appellants’ representation to the Inspector General of Police cannot be conceived to have been made to any higher administrative authority and as such the appellants are entitled to file application against the impugned notification straightway to the Administrative Tribunal within 6 months under Second proviso to Section 4(2) of the act.
Md. Abdul Mannan and ors Vs. Mr. Hasan Mahmud Khondker and others, 16 BLD (AD) 147.
Section—4(2)
Section 4(2) of the Act provides that after making of decision by a higher administrative authority under any law for the time being in force a case may be filed by an aggrieved person in the ‘Service of the Republic’ before the Administrative Tribunal within 6 months there from.
In the instant case, the petitioner preferred appeal under Rule 17 of the Rules and as such he was required to file the case before the Administrative Tribunal within 6 months of the dismissal of his appeal. The case filed beyond the period of 6 months is thus barred by limitation.
Md. Osman Gani Vs. The Secretary 17 BLD (AD) 306.
Limitation Act, 1908
Sections—5, 14 and 29(2)
When any special statute prescribes specific limitation by express term, sections 5 and 14 of the Act are not applicable. Administrative Tribunal Act, 1980 in the Second proviso to sub-section (2) of section 4 of the Administrative Tribunal Act contains clear provision prescribing special limitation for filing application before tribunal and as such the law is being special law with clear legislative intent. No benefit under section 14 of the Limitation Act for enlargement of limitation can thus be claimed in respect of filing application before the tribunal.
It is clear from the wording of the second proviso to sub-section (2) of section 4 of the Administrative Tribunal Act that the legislative intendment behind this provision is to exclude the proceedings governed by the Administrative Tribunal Act from the operation of the benefit conferred by sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act.
The petitioner cannot, therefore, have the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act while computing the period of limitation in filing his application before the Administrative Tribunal.
Abul Bashar Vs Investment Corporation of Bangladesh and another, 20 BLD (AD) 294.
Ref: Md. Abdus Sukkur Vs. Chairman, National Board of Revenue and ors, 17 BLD(AD)43; Bangladesh Bank Vs. Mohammad Abdul Mannan, 46 DLR(AD)1; Government of Bangladesh Vs. Md. Abdul Karim, 47DLR(AD)146; Jahnagir Kabir Vs. Bangladesh, 48 DLR (AD) 156— distinguishable on facts.
Section—4(3)
The employees under the Ordinance Factories Board Ordinance, 1961 (Since repealed) are not civilian employees in any of the defence services but are pure and simple Government Servants (i.e. persons holding civil posts in service of the Republic) serving under the said Board under the said Ordinance of 1961 and that the Ordinance Factories Board apparently under section 7 of the Ordinance Factories Board Ordinance, 1961, has merely for convenience, adopted the civilian employees in Defence Services(Classification, Control, Appeal) Rules,1961, which are similar to the Government Servants(Discipline and Appeal) Rules,1985, for regulating the terms, conditions, disciplinary matters etc. of the employees of the Ordinance Factories Board. Merely because of the adaptation of the said Civilian Employees in Defence Services (Classification, Control, Appeal) Rules, 1961, by the Board, for the disciplinary matters of the employees of the said Board, the said employees do not become members of the defence services or members of services in connection with the defence.
The expression “person in the Defence Service of Bangladesh” as mentioned in subsection (-) of Section 4 of the Administrative Tribunal Act does not include the petitioners who were employees of the Ordinance Factories Board (that is government servants serving under the Ordinance Factories Board).
Serajul Islam Thakur and ors. Vs. The Government of Bangladesh and another, 13 BLD (HCD) 53.
Ref: Abdul Latif vs. Bangladesh, 43 D.L.R. (HCD) 446; A.I.R. 1964 SC600; L.R. Khurana vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 1971 (SC) 2111; Union of India vs. K.S. Subramanian, A.I.R.1976 (SC) 2433; Bangladesh Vs. A.K.M. Zahangir Hossain, 34 D.L.R. (AD) 173; Rear Admiral A.A. Mustafa (W.P. No. 64/92); Brigadier Abul Hasanat Md. Abdullah (W.P.No. 15/87); Jamil Huq and 11 others Vs. Bangladesh, 34 D.L.R. (AD) 125—Cited.
Section—6(2)
Aggrieved person and necessary parties
There appears to be no guidance either in the Act or in the Rules framed thereunder to determine the question of necessary parties. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, including those of Order 1. Except as referred to in the Act and the Rules do not seem to. apply to the Tribunal. But still then as a general rule it cannot be disputed that all necessary parties must be impleaded in a case so that a tribunal may effectually adjudicate on all matters before it.
As the appellants are claiming their confirmation in the post of A.S.Ps. and they are seeking relief against the Government alone it is for the Government to refute the same and to protect the interest of other employees and as such it cannot be said that the case is bad for defect of parties for not impleading respondent Nos. 1 — 15. Respondent Nos. 1—15 nevertheless are aggrieved’ person within the meaning of section 6(2) of the Act in that the order of the Tribunal was likely to be prejudicial to them in the matter of seniority. Their right of appeal cannot, therefore, be denied.
Md. Abdul Mannan and ors Vs. Mr. Hasan Mahmud Khondker and others, 16 BLD (AD) 147.
Section—7
Powers and Procedure of Tribunals
Although the Administrative Tribunal has all the trappings of a Court and the Code of Civil Procedure has been made applicable for specified purposes to the proceedings before it, yet it is not a Court proper and it does not possess all the powers of a court provided under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Administrative Tribunal has no power to grant interim relief in respect of a case pending before it for final adjudication.
Kamrul Hasan vs. Bangladesh and others, 16 BLD (AD) 35.
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908)
The word ‘rehearing’, meaning of
A rehearing is a new proceeding and it implies the hearing by the same tribunal which heard the matter before. It is an accepted principle of procedure that prior notice for rehearing is to be given to the parties who were present at the time of the hearing of the matter earlier. This principle is in consonance with justice and is to be extended to the constitution of the adjudicating body when it comprises of more than one person.
Ref: Project-in-Charge Vs. Abdur Rahman, 3IDLR(HCD)124; General Manager, Jamuna Oil Company Vs. Golap Rahman and another, 34DLR(AD)166; Beni Madho Prasad Singh Vs. Adit and others, A.I.R. 1953 (All)416; Surendra Singh Vs. State of UttarPradesh, A.I.R.1954(SC)194 at P. 197; Faulad and another Vs. State, A.I.R. 196 1(All)326; Rukun-Din.Vs. Hafiz-ud-Din. PLD (1961 (Lah) 161; Sangam Lal vs. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, AIR 1966(All) (FB) 221; Jai Karan vs. Panchaiti Akhara, Choto Nayan undasi NanakShahi, A.I.R.1933 (All) 49(J); Mohd. Fazlur Rahman vs. Custodian of Evacuee property, A.I.R. 1956 (FB) Hyderabad, 91—cited.
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1982
Rule—3(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Under the Administrative Tribunals Rules, 1982 a Tribunal before rejecting an application on the ground that the application is not in accordance with sub-rules (1)(2)(3)(4)(5) of Rule 3, should give the applicant an opportunity for making the application in accordance with those provisions. If the necessary party was not impleaded or has not been properly described, the applicant should get an opportunity to correct the application and he should not be taken by surprise at a later stage.
Md. Ali Emdad Vs Labour Director and others, 18 BLD (AD) 137.
Ref: 1 BLC (AD) 80; 3 BLC (AD) 1— discussed, AIR 1985 (SC) 931—Cited.
ADMIRALTY COURT ACT, 1840
Section—6
The High Court of Admiralty exercised jurisdiction over claims for towage on the high seas and not within the body of county and this jurisdiction was extended by section 6 of the Admiralty Court Act, 1840 to claims within the body of a county. ‘Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice’ by Meeson; Roscos’s ‘Admiralty Practice’, 5th Edition at page 2-3–referred.
Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Corporation Vs Al-Falah Shipping Lines Ltd. and others, 17 BLD (AD) 136.
ADMIRALTY COURT ACT, 1861
Section—6
Jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court
The cargo in question has been allegedly delivered to a person who is not entitled to it under the bill of lading and as such it is case of total non-delivery of goods.
“Damages done to the goods” as appearing in Section 6 of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861 is to be construed liberally so as to include constructive damages. It is thus evident that it shall apply to non-delivery or short- delivery of goods as in the present case.
The instant the suit readily comes within the ambit of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861 and consequently it is maintainable.
Doon Valley Rice Limited vs. M. V. YUE YANG, 16 BLD (HCD) 469.
Section—6
Conditions of the charter party and the warranty as to delivery
The terms and conditions of the charter- party incorporated in the Bill of Lading are binding between the carrier and the consignee. The warrantee as to date of delivery of goods given in the charter party forms part of the Bill of Lading and is therefore binding between the parties.
It is now well-settled that damages suffered by the consignee on account of delay in delivery arising out of breach of contract of carriage comes within the purview of section 6 of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861. But all sorts of damages are not recoverable, in case of any breach of contract resulting in damages, the quantum of damages can only be decided at the time of trial on taking evidence.
Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation Vs M.T. SARABAND EXSUNRISE-1, Kutubdia, Chittagong & ors., 17BLD (HCD) 169.
Ref: 34 DLR (AD) 110; (1854) 9 EX 341 —Cited.
Section—6
The High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction over any claim by the owner, or consignee, or assignee of any bill of lading of any goods carried into any port in England or Wales in any ship, for damage done to the goods or any part thereof by the negligence or misconduct of or for any breach of duty or breach of contract on the part of the owner, master, or crew of the ship, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that at the time of the institution of the cause any owner or part owner of the ship is domiciled in England or Wales: Provided always, that if in any such cause the plaintiff do not recover Twenty Pounds he shall not be entitled to any costs, charges or expenses incurred by him therein, unless the Judge shall certify the cause was a fit one to be tried in the said court.
It appears that in order to attract section 6 of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861 “goods have to be carried into any port of England or Wales” And as far we are concerned for the words “England or Wales” obviously we are to read “Bangladesh”.
In the instant case the cargo in question had never been brought to any port in Bangladesh by the defendant No. 1 vessel. Unless the goods in question are carried into any port of Bangladesh, section 6 of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861 cannot be made applicable and as such the plaint is liable to be returned.
National Steel Industries Limited Vs M. V. Ritz and others, 19 BLD (HCD) 240.
Ref: The pieve Superiore’-Aspinalls Reports of Maritime cases Volume 2 Page 319; Pieve Superiore’-Aspinall’s Report of Maritime Case, Vol. 2 page 162; ‘The cap Blanco’—Aspinall Reports of Maritime Law cases Volume—12 page 399—Cited.
Section—6
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908)
Sections—117 and 141, Order 1 Rule 10(2)
Admiralty Rule, 1912
Rules—3, 12 and 51
An insurer of the cargo can be added as a Co-plaintiff
There is no dispute and it is a settled position of law that an insurer does not acquire any independent right to invoke admiralty jurisdiction within the meaning of section 6 of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861 as it is neither an owner nor a consignee or assignee of the bill of lading of the cargo.
Rule 12 of the Admiralty Rules should also be construed to permit addition of an insurer to be added as a co-plaintiff in a pending admiralty suit after the admiralty jurisdiction is already invoked by a competent person under section 6 of the Act if it requires interest in the vessel on the basis of subrogation.
Rules 3 and 51 of the Admiralty Rules read with sections 117 and 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, will show that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the proceedings before the Admiralty Court unless it is excluded any rule. There appears to be no rule making the provision of Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure inapplicable to the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court Division, namely its admiralty jurisdiction.
Order I Rule’ 10(2) of the Code permits addition of a third party nature of its claim, if its presence is necessary in order to dispose of the suit completely and for adjudication of all the questions involved in the suit between the parties in order to avoiding multiplicity of proceedings and conflict of decisions. Questions involved in the suit means not merely the questions involved in the suit as originally framed. Similarly the Court has power to add not only those persons who were necessary parties on the date of the suit but also persons who subsequently become necessary parties.
Doon Valley Rice Ltd. vs. MV YUE YANG and others, 19BLD (HCD) 471
Ref: 43DLR322; 46 DLR (AD) 185; Yusuf Miah vs. Barbar Milhelinsen Agencies pte. Ltd. and ors. (Un-reported); 35DLR (AD) 188; 45DLR 502;—Cited.
Section—6
Section 6 of the Act vests jurisdiction in the Admiralty Court to try a suit wherein the plaintiff seeks relief for damage done to the goods or any part thereof by the negligences or misconduct or for breach of duty or contract by the ship owner, master and crew of the ship.
In the instant case the declaration sought for in the plaint relates to declaration of general average arising out of jettison of cargo in order to save the ship and her merchandise. Declaration of general average arising out of jettison of cargo cannot be said to be damage to goods caused due to negligence or misconduct or breach of duty or breach of contract by ship owner, master or crew within the meaning of section 6 of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861. Under section 6 of the Act, a suit for declaration is not maintainable and that a suit for declaration that declaration of general average arising out of jettison is not amenable to the jurisdiction of an Admiralty Court under section 6 of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861.
Sadharan Bima Corporation Vs M V BIRBA and others, 20 BLD (AD) 184.
Ref: M/s. Saleh Steel Industries Ltd. vs. TSS “Pacific Abetto” and ors. 35DLR (AD) 188—relied.
Section—6
The language of Section 6 of the Admiralty Court Act which confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Admiralty is very specific and definite as to the persons who can raise a claim in the said Court. The insurer is not included among the persons entitled to raise a claim in the said court. The insurer has, of course, got right to raise his claim, before an appropriate court.
Eastern Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. D.B. Deniz Nakliyati T.A.B and others, 14 BLD (AD) 38.
Section—7
Section 7 of Admiralty Court Act, 1861 lays down that the High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction over any claim for damages by any ship.
Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Corporation Vs Al-Falah Shipping Lines Ltd. and others, 17 BLD (AD) 136.
Ref: Al-Falha Shipping Lines Ltd. and another Vs. Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Corporation and others, 42 DLR (HCD) 289—relied upon.
Section—34
Admittedly no cross cause has been filed shortly after the filing of the principal cause. But written statement was promptly filed in the principal cause along with a counter claim for an amount for which the cross causes was subsequently filed. The application under section 34 of the Admiralty Court Act for obtaining security from the owner of the other vessel collided with each other, though filed belatedly; it has not prejudiced the plaintiff, of the principal cause. The plaintiff of the principal cause is required to furnish a Bank Guarantee of the equal amount which the defendant of the principal cause has furnished.
G.D. ALESIO, LIVORNO, Italy, owner of M.V. MAURO D’ALESIO Vs M.V. HAWAI SPLENDOUR and others, 17 BLD (HCD) 324.
Section—34
Jurisdiction
If damages are sustained by ships involved in a collision and cause and cross cause are filed by both of them and in the principal cause the ship of the defendants has been arrested or security obtained to answer judgment and in the cross cause the ship of the plaintiff has not been arrested and no security has been given to answer the judgment therein, the Court has the jurisdiction under the provision of section 34 of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861 to suspend the proceedings in the principal cause until security has been given to answer the judgment in the cross cause.
G.D. ALESIO, LIVORNO, Italy, owner of M.V. MAURO D’ ALESIO Vs M.V. HAWAI SPLENDOUR and others, 17BLD (HCD) 324.
ADMIRALTY RULES, 1912
Rules—23 and 31
Rules 23 and 31 of the Admiralty Rules are enabling provisions and do not in any way circumscribe the discretionary jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court to either reduce or enhance the amount of Bank Guarantee for release of the arrested vessel.
S.M. Monirul Islam, Proprietor of Viva Trade international Vs MV You Bang now berthed at Mongla Port, Khulna and ors, 19 BLD (AD) 91.