Evidence Act, 1872

Section 3—
Statements in FIR which do not come in evidence cannot be used in finding the accused guilty of charge. Self—exculpatory confession of an accused cannot be legally used in finding co—accused guilty as it is no evidence as defined in section 3 of Evidence Act.
Moniruddin Sana Vs. State 40 DLR 402.

Section 3—
PWs though relations they are natural and competent witnesses. Their evidence cannot be discarded only because they are relations.
Shadat Ali Vs. State 44 DLR 217.

Section 3—
The fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence is that circumstantial evidence should inevitably be to the conclusion that the accuseds and the accused only were the perpetrators of the offence and such evidence should be incompatible with the innocence of the accused.
Taslimuddin Vs. State 44 DLR 136.

Section 3—
Murder of wife—explanation of the accused—Ordinarily an accused has no obligation to account for the death for which he is placed on trial The murder having taken place while the condemned prisoner was living with his wife in the same house he was under an obligation to explain how his wife had met with her death. In. the absence of any explanation coming from his side it seems none other than the husband was responsible for causing death in question.
State Vs. Kalu Bepari 43 DLR 249.

Section 3—
Mere relationship cannot be a ground for discarding the evidence of a witness unless he is found to be biased and resorting to any falsehood.
Siraj Mai & ors. Vs. State 45 DLR 688.

Section 3—
Circumstantial evidence—The rule as regards sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to be the basis for conviction is that the facts proved must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation by any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt.
State Vs. AW Kibria 43 DLR 512.

Section 3—
The evidence by trap party is tainted in nature and as such corroboration from independent and neutral witnesses is very much necessary.
AKM Mukhlesur Rahman Vs. State 45 DLR 626.

Section 3—
Material consistent with innocence—When some material is brought b& record consistent with innocence of the accused, which may reasonably be true, even though it is not positively proved to be true, the accused is entitled to acquittal.
State Vs. Ali Kibria 43 DLR 512.

Section 3—
Circumstantial evidence—Its sufficiency to prove guilt—In the instant case circumstantial evidence on which trial Court relied do not conclusively point to guilt of the— accused—Mere movement of the accused near the place of occurrence may raise a suspicion against the accused but this cannot be the basis for their conviction.
Ali Ahmed Malaker Vs. State 43 DLR 401.

Section 3—
’Document’ occurring in section3(16) of the General Clauses Act an4 in section 3 of the Evidence Act—Meaning of—Whether kabalas are documents as referred to in those Acts.
Abdus Sattar Bhuiyan Vs Deputy Commissioner Dhaka 42 DLR 151.

Section3—
Circumstantial evidence—Circumstances forming evidence in proof o( the crime must be conclusively established—They must form such a complete chain that it was not only inconsistent with the guilt of the accused but was inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
State Vs. Sree Ranjit Kumar Pramanik 45 DLR 660.

Section 3—
As the wife was murdered while in custody of her husband the natural presumption is that he is responsible for her death. Ordinarily, an accused has no obligation to account for the death for which he is placed on trial. But the murder having taken place while this appellant was living with his deceased wife in the same house he was under an obligation to explain how his wife had met with her death and in the present case the appellant tried to explain that she committed suicide which was found to be a travesty of truth. In the absence of any satisfactory explanation and the explanation given found to be false we are of the view that none other than this appellant is responsible.
Shamsuddin Vs. State 45 DLR 587.

Section 3—
Conviction on circumstantial evidence—if it is proved beyond doubt that the deceased is seen last alive in the company of the accused, he is liable to offer satisfactory explanation as to the cause of death of the deceased or at least as to his company with the deceased. If circumstantial evidence leading to the irresistible conclusion that the accused alone caused the death of the victim is not considered sufficient for his conviction then there can never be any conviction on circumstantial evidence. In other words, the prosecution cannot prove its case by circumstantial evidence. Such a concept is contrary to time honoured principle of law regarding circumstantial evidence.
Rezaul Huq Vs. State 42 DLR 440.

Section 3—
A statement under section 342 CrPC is not evidence within the meaning of section 3 of the Evidence Act.
Shah Alam Vs. State 42 DLR (AD) 31.

Sections 3 and 5—
Circumstantial evidence—Its conclusiveness—assessment of evidence—This is a case in which a minor boy, the victim of murder, was called away by and seen in the company of the two young accused for the last time before disappearance and then some time thereafter the body of the victim was found out. The fact of calling away of victim Khairul by accused Khasru was satisfactorily established as the first circumstance in support of the prosecution and witnesses have also satisfactorily proved that the victim travelled with the two accused from their village Noapara to a distant place called Takerhat by bus and got down there at 4—00/4—30 PM oh 4.1.79. This is the second circumstance proved against the accused. From this point onward up to the time of recovery of the body of Khairul at about 3—00/3—30 PM on the following day the accused were alleged to have been seen along with the deceased, the third circumstance in the absence of ocular evidence of murder, by PWs 11 and 12. The High Court Division rejected their evidence due to apparent contradiction between their evidence and the statement made by them before the police and also for the reason that their identification of the accused in the TI Parade had lost all significance in view of the fact that they had chance to see the accused. There has been no violation of any norm or procedure in assessing the evidence of the said two witnesses for which the finding of fact made by the High Court Division could be disturbed. The position, therefore, tomes to this that the third circumstance, that of, seeing the three boys together near the bank of the river where the victim’s body was found was not satisfactorily established. The circumstances of the case can never be said to be conclusive as to the guilt of accused Khasru and his brother Nowab. The High Court Division has correctly applied the rule as to circumstantial evidence in the facts of the present case.
State Vs. Khasru @ Syed Mostcja Hossain 43 DLR (AD) 182.

Sections 3 and 5—
Glaring inconsistencies between the existence of injuries on the body of the deceased as found by the Post-mortem doctor and the evidence of prosecution witnesses about injuries caused by the appellants lead to the conclusion that the occurrence did not take place in the manner as alleged by the prosecution.
Kadu Vs. State 43 DLR 163.

Sections 3 and 30—
Confession—Question of credibility when part of the occurrence is omitted or suppressed—It cannot ‘be found nor it could be suggested by either the prosecution or the defence why throttling part of the occurrence was omitted or suppressed. Even if it be taken that accused Rina had deliberately suppressed the throttling part of the occurrence in her judicial confession that cannot mean that the confession was not true.
Shahjahan Manik Vs. State 42 DLR 465.

Section 5—
The —evidence of an injured person carries much weight since the injured person does not usually allow the real culprit to escape and falsely implicate an innocent person.
Ataur Rahman Vs. State 43 DLR 87.

Section 5—
Defence version—Manner of occurrence—prosecution having failed to prove their version of the manner of occurrence, the defence version became probable and the appellants were acquitted at the charges.
Gopal Rajgor Vs. State 42 DLR 446.

Section 5—
Assessment of evidence by the Appellate Division—In the matter of assessment of evidence trial Court’s view is given great weight and when its finding is accepted as correct on reassessment by the Appellate Court, then the Appellate Division does not like to interfere. But when in accepting the evidence it is found that established principles of assessment of evidence have not been followed, then the Appellante Court’s finding cannot claim sanctity (per Shahabuddin Ahmed CJ concurred by MH Rahman and ATM Afzal J).
Abu Taher Chowdhury Vs. State 42 DLR (AD) 253.

Section 5—
Appreciation of evidence—if there is contradiction of a substantial kind or a big difference as to time as given by witnesses and proved by other circumstances, then the time as to the occurrence may become doubtful and the court can disbelieve the prosecution case. The opinion of the doctor has been so narrowly construed as would betray even ordinary common sense. Considering all aspects of the matter, there has been a manifest disregard of the accepted principles of appreciation of evidence and consequently a miscarriage of justice.
State Vs. Abdus Sattar 43 DLR (AD) 44.

Section 5—
In the matter of observation, perception and memorisation, different witnesses, differ from each other. So weight is to be given to those which are of consensus as to the substance of their evidence. The standard of rural witness should not be comparable to that of urban witness in the matter of exactitude and consistency. Consideration in narration cannot militate against the veracity of the core of testimony provided that there is an impression of truth and conformity in substantial fabric of the testimony so delivered.
Ataur Rahman Vs. State 43 DLR 87.

Section 5—
It is settled principle that when injured witness marked assailants it cannot be said that he would give up real assailant and falsely implicate person with whom there was no enmity.
Ataur Rahman Vs. State 43 DLR 87.

Section 5—
Chance witness—He is found to be at the place of occurrence by chance or coincidence at the time the offence was committed. His evidence need not be rejected outright, but it is to be weighed with caution and may be viewed with suspicion if witnesses are partisan or inimically disposed towards the accused.
State Vs. Md. Shafiqul Islam 43 DLR (AD) 92.

Section 5—
Wife—killing case—in such a case, there could be no eye—witness of the occurrence, ‘apart from inmates of the house who may refuse to tell the truth. The neighbors may not also come —forward to depose. The prosecution is, therefore, necessarily to rely on circumstantial evidence.
State Vs. Md. Shafiqul Islam 43 DLR (AD) 92.

Section 5—
Evidence of persons falling in the category of interested witnesses must be closely scrutinized. They should— not be accepted on their face value. Their evidence cannot be rejected outright simply because they are interested witnesses.
Nowabul Alam and others Vs. State 45 DLR (AD) 140.

Section 5—
It is well—settled that the prosecution case is never proved by suggestions made by the defence to prosecution witnesses. The court cannot accept what is favorable to the prosecution and ignore the true purpose of suggestion Per Mustafa Kamal J writing the majority Judgment.
Nowabul Alam and others Vs. State 45 DLR (AD) 140.

Section 5—
When discrepancies in testimony were mere discrepancies, and not contradictions, they did not affect the truth of what was stated in Court.
State Vs. Sree Ranjit Kumar Pramanik 45 DLR 660.

Section 5—
Demeanour of witnesses— The observation of the demeanour of witness by the trial Court is not dismissed lightly by the Appellate Court, unless there are intrinsic weaknesses and blatant contradictions in his evidence.
Abdul Hai Sikder Vs. State 43 DLR (AD) 95.

Section 5—
Credibility of witness— Judges of the High Court Division have not considered the material discrepancies, contradictions and omissions of eye—witnesses for which an error has crept in the judgment resulting in the conviction of the appellants. On consideration of the evidence particularly of the eye—witnesses, the appellants are held to be entitled to the benefit of doubt and acquitted.
Nurul Islam Vs. State 43 DLR (AD) 6.

Section 5—
Interested witness—Conviction cannot be based on the uncorroborated testimony of the informant who is a police officer and is vitally interested in the result of the case.
Mati Miah Vs. State 44 DLR 554.

section 5—
Demeanour, of witness, appreciation of—when a finding of fact is based upon the credibility of evidence involving appreciation of the demeanour of witnesses, the view of the trial Court is entitled to great weight.
State Vs. MM Rafiqul Hyder 45 DLR (AD) 13.

Section 6—
Statement made by the victim of an offence, when it can have evidentiary value—In the absence of examination of the alleged victim, her statements allegedly made to the police or to the Magistrate cannot be treated as evidence against the accused. As neither the victim girl nor the Magistrate was examined, the statement recorded by the latter is not even a secondary evidence and in the view it is no legal evidence to prove the prosecution case.
Abul Kashem Vs. State 43 DLR 420.

Sections 7 and 8—
Conduct—The accused— husband was not a docile person but a very arrogant and assertive person. This part of his character and conduct is relevant to be considered as to who is capable of doing what. The husband of the victim girl had complete dominion and control over the wife. This fact of having an unfettered opportunity in causing an occurrence by the accused only, would also be a corroborative and relevant fact under the law (Ref: AIR 1977 (SC) 1116) and also the fact that after the commission of the alleged crime, the accused had absconded without any explanation or reasonable cause (Ref 126 IC 689, 62 IC 545) All these are relevant corroborative facts leading to the inference of guilt of the accused. 172 IC 374 and 39 CrLJ 129 relied.
State Vs. Nurul Hoque 45 DLR.306.

Section 8—
Motive—If the prosecution assigns a particular motive in proof of its case, then the motive has to be established by the prosecution falling which the prosecution must suffer on that account, not the defence.
Khelu Mia Vs. State 43 DLR 573.

Section 8—
Motive—Prosecution is not obliged to suggest any motive where there is direct evidence but in a case which depends on circumstantial evidence motive is an important factor. If motive is suggested in any case by the prosecution, it accepts the burden to discharge for making the suggested motive plausible one.
Farid Karim Vs. State 45 DLR 171.

Section 8—
Motive is not always necessary to prove murder, but if it was established, it would be a corroborative circumstance leading to complicity of the accused in the offence,
State Vs. Nurul Hoque 45 DLR 306.

Section 8—
Murder charge resting on circumstantial evidence—Accused’s motive in calling out and accompanying the victim boy—There is absolutely no material on record to show that anybody had at any stage expressed any suspicion that the accused might have had any evil motive in calling out the victim. All that the father said at the trial was that the motive for murder was to give him pain. This is no motive. He did not say why the young accused would cause him pain, There is also no material to suggest even’ that there might have been some immediate and on—the—spot reason for the accused to cause violence to the victim or that they were acting at some others’ behest—Per ATM Afzal J with whom Shahabuddin Ahined CJ and MH Rahman J concurred.
State Vs. Khasru @ Syed Mostafa Hossain 43 DLR (AD) 182.

Section 8—
Abscondence—guilty mind—it is true mere abscondence is not sufficient to hold the accused guilty. But in this case his wife was in his house and her body was recovered from the nearby jute field. He neither informed her parents nor brought the matter to the notice of the police—he simply vanished from his house and remained absconding for months. From these circumstances there can be no other hypothesis, except that of his guilt.
Abdul Khaleque Vs State 45 DLR 75.

Section 8—
Motive—Failure to prove motive does not always affect prosecution case.
State Vs. Sree Ranjit Kumar Pramanik 45 DLR 660.

Section 8—
Abscondence—Abscondence by itself was not conclusive either of guilt or of guilty conscience.
State Vs. Sree Ranjit Kumar Pramanik 45 DLR 660.

Section 8—
Abscondence—Corroboratlon of evidence—Abscondence of an accused though can be treated as corroboration of the direct evidence of eye—witnesses connecting the accused with the crime but the abscondence  cannot be treated to be corroboration of the confessional statement of another accused so as to base thereon the conviction of the absconding accused.
Sanwar Hossain Vs. State 45 DLR 489.

Section 8—
Prosecution is not generally required to prove any motive behind a crime. But if some motive is assigned, the prosecution needs to prove it.
Gadu Mia Vs. State 44 DLR 246.

Section 8—
Motive for murder—Though motive is one of the important factors for a murder, prosecution is not always bound to allege motive, and if alleged, need not prove it and for the absence of motive or proof thereof the prosecution will not fail, if the guilt of the accused is otherwise proved by reliable and cogent evidence.
Taslimuddin Vs. State 44 DLR 136.

Section 8—
Motive (by majority) : Evidence of motive, when necessary—there is no reference at all in the dying declaration to any fact or circumstances for which it can be even remotely inferred that there was any reason whatever for which the appellant was likely to make an attempt on the life of the deceased nor is there any reason for the deceased to suspect the appellant as his possible killer. In a case of this nature based only upon the dying declaration there should have been some evidence of motive although motive may not be proved in case of direct evidence or as an ingredient of the offence.
Sk. Shamsur Rahman Vs. State 42 DLR (AD) 200.

Section 8(j)—
Prosecution for rape— Question of corroboration. It has long been a rule of practice for insisting on corroboration of the statement of the prosecutrix. If the Judge feels that without corroboration in a particular case the conviction can be sustained then he should give indication that he had the rule of caution in his mind and then should proceed to give reasons for considering it unnecessary to require corroboration and for considering that it was safe to convict the accused without corroboration.
Saidur Rahman Neuton Vs. State 45 DLR (AD) 66.

Sections 8 & 9—
Nowhere the accused mentioned anything why he avoided trial and remained in abscondence in spite of execution of Proclamation and Attachment and Warrant of Arrest for securing his attendance. This conduct of the accused is a relevant fact which should be taken into consideration as a circumstance in determining his guilt.
Rajab Ali Zulfiqar Vs. State 45 DLR 705.

Section 24—
It is only when the statement of the accused can be read as a plenary admission of guilt in clear terms that it can be taken as a confession of the crime.
State Vs. M M Rafiqul Hyder 45 DLR (AD) 13.

Section 24—
Confession should not only be voluntary but it also must be true—For the purpose of establishing its truth examination of the confession and its comparison with remaining evidence of the prosecution and probability of the case would be relevant.
State Vs. Ali Kibria 43DLR 5I2.

Section 24—
Retracted confession—It is a rule of prudence that a retracted confession needs corroboration inasmuch as it is always open to suspicion and cannot be acted upon unless corroborated by independent credible evidence.
State Vs. Ali Kibira 43 DLR 512.

Section 24—
The statement admittedly made by the appellant while in custody of the customs officials cannot be considered as evidence and it is barred under section 24 of the Evidence Act.
M M Rafiqul Hyder Vs. State 41 DLR 274.

Section 24—
Confessional statement— There being no corroboration on any material particular of the confessional statement, it is unsafe to maintain conviction of the respondents under sections 302/34. Penal Code thereon, though respondent Abid Ali implicated himself in the statement to be an offender.
State Vs. Shafique 43 DLR (AD) 203.

Sections 25 and 27—
An information even by way of confession made in police custody which relates to the fact discovered is admissible in evidence against the accused.
Police Officer may be allowed to say that he went to the place and found the knife, but any statement as to confession of murder is inadmissible. Secondly, a fact already known to the police cannot be re—discovered on the statement of an accused so as to make the accused’s conduct of pointing out a place admissible in evidence. Thirdly, when a discovery is made in consequence of information received from more than one person, but it cannot be determined who first made the crucial statement, it is no discovery and the joint information or joint production is not admissible against any one. Joint information, however, should not be confused with similar information given simultaneously leading to discovery.
Bashir Ali Vs. State 45 DLR 63.

Section 27—
Discovery of the dead bodies in pursuance of the confessional statement— Effect of. The statements of the two condemned prisoners not only corroborated each other, the discovery of dead bodies in pursuance of the statement having been corroborated evidence lead us to believe that confessional statements of the condemned prisoners are voluntary and true as well.
Hazrat Ali and Abdur Rahman Vs. State 42 DLR 177.

Section 27—
Statement of condemned prisoner leading to the discovery of dead bodies—Effect of.
Hazrat Ali and Abdul Rahman Vs. State 42 DLR 177.

Section 27—
Information received from accused—its language—It may not be incumbent on the part of the police officer to record the statement of the accused in custody giving information leading to discovery of certain fact but if such information is recorded it must be done in the language of the accused.
Farid Karim Vs. State 45 DLR 171.

Section 30—
Confession by co—accused— Its worth in the absence of corroboration—A confession made by a co—accused in a joint trial for the same offence affecting himself and others may be taken into consideration. The confession, of such an accused may lend assurance to the other evidence on record.
Babor Ali Molla and others Vs. State 44 DLR (AD) 10

Section 30—
Confession—Joint trial— Where more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, a confession made by anyone of them affecting himself and any one of his co-accused can be taken into consideration by the Court not only against the maker of the confession but also against the co—accused. It may not be an evidence within the strict meaning of the term, but it lends assurance to other evidence on record.
State Vs. Abul Khair 44 DLR 284.

Section 30—
Evidence adduced by prosecution—For appreciation of its quality and worth—Broad facts of the case recounted. Appreciation of oral evidence—so called confession by a co—accused (appellant Daud) relied upon by the trial Court—that confession is no confession in the eye of law as it was a testimony against the other accused without the maker having involved himself.
Ibrahim Mollah Vs. State 40 DLR (AD) 216.

Section 30—
If the principal evidence in the case namely direct oral evidence does not qualify to be trustworthy the alleged confession is of no avail to the prosecution for sustaining the order of conviction.
Ibrahim Mollah Vs. State 40 DLR (AD) 216.

Section 30—
Examination and analysis of oral evidence—High Court Division failed to give due and proper consideration to the well established principles governing appreciation of evidence in a case where there is possibility of false implication because, of existing dispute and enmity between the parties—Where the witnesses are related and partisan and have a strong motive to depose falsely, their evidence must be put to the strictest scrutiny having regard to the attendant circumstances.
Ibrahim Mollah Vs. State 40 DLR (AD) 216.

Section 30—
Neither the trial Cowl nor the High Court Division scanned the evidence in an analytical manner. After all these infirmities on the side of the prosecution the trial court and the High Court Division should have entertained reasonable doubt as to the alleged participation of the appellants in the throwing of bombs.
Ibrahim Mollah Vs. State 40 DLR (AD) 216.

Section 30—
Consideration of confession —Confession affecting person making it and others—When confessional statement of an accused is found to be voluntary and partly exculpatory and partly inculpatory, the exculpatory part being improbable, contrary to reason and ordinary human conduct is liable to be rejected and the inculpatory part can be relied on even if the confession is subsequently retracted. Inculpatory part of the confession can also be used against the other accused.
Abdul Kashem Vs. State 42 DLR 378.

Section 30—
The confession is sufficient to find accused Rina guilty of the charge under sections 302/34 Penal Code inasmuch as she participated in the murder starting from hatching of conspiracy for killing her husband in order to marry accused Manik to allowing the latter to bring in poison and mix it with thee drinking water of her husband’s jug and then to see the husband drinking that water, then after his death to hang the body and raising a feigned cry. Besides, the circumstances showed there was no scope for anyone to enter the room to kill her husband without her co—operation.
Shahjahan Manik Vs. State 42 DLR 465.

Section 30—
Confession of a co—accused cannot be the sole basis for conviction.
State Vs. Nurul Haque 45 DLR 306.

Section 30—
Confession—retraction—an order of conviction can be passed solely on the basis of a confession, whether retracted or not, if it is considered and found to be true and voluntary. Though there is no compulsion that a confession need be materially corroborated 1 yet it is prudent that a court should look for it. We are t examine the confessional — statement in the light of the circumstances 1 under which it is made and the other evidence on record corroborating the chain of circumstances as narrated by the accused before the Magistrate. In his confessional statement and this corroborating need not always be in material particular as even a general corroboration or corroboration by medical evidence would be considered to be enough.
Abdur Rahman Syed Vs. State 44 DLR 556

Section 30—
Confession—When not voluntary and true—The condemned prisoner was in police custody for 2 days with no explanation. This coupled with allegation of police torture shows the confession to be not voluntary, Confession containing exculpatory materials outweigh the inculpatory materials and then the statements having not been corroborated, the confession cannot be said td’ be true as well.
Farid Karim Vs. State 45 DLR 171.

Section 30—
In a joint trial of several persons the court may take into consideration confessional statement of an accused against himself and other accused.
Md. Azad Sheik Vs. State 41 DLR 62

Section 30—
The extra—judicial confession made in Police Station in presence of constables who had arrested the confessing accused and the police officer who had investigated the case is inadmissible in evidence.
Mofazzal Hossain Mollah & ors. Vs. State 45 DLR (AD) 175.

Section 30—
Extra—judicial confession—If at all made appears to be wholly untrue—No reliable evidence of corroboration of the alleged extra—judicial confession and it is not at all safe to rely and act upon such extra judicial confession. The alleged extra—judicial confession if at all made by the said accused also appears to be wholly untrue. So, in the whole analysis of the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on record and the alleged extra—judicial confession of the condemned— prisoner, we find that there is no reliable evidence of corroboration of the so—called alleged extra—judicial confession and it is not at all safe to rely and act upon such extra—judicial confession and convict the accused on that basis. Hence the conviction of the condemned prisoner Badsha Mollah on the basis of alleged extra—judicial confession cannot be sustained in law.
State Vs. Badshah Mollah 41 DLR 11.

Section 30—
Mere absconding cannot always be a circumstance to lead to an inference of guilt of the accused. Mere abscondance cannot always be circumstance which should lead to an inference of guilt of the accused. Sometimes out of fear and self—respect and to avoid unnecessary harassment even an innocent person remains absconding for some time.
State Vs. Badshah Mollah41 DLR11.

Section 30—
Abscondance was not with any guilty mind. Existence of enmity is not disputed. Accused has been falsely implicated in this case out of grudge and enmity.
State Vs.Badshah Mollah 4l DLR 11.

Section 30—
In this case the condemned— prisoner Badsha remained absent or absconding for some time but subsequently he surrendered himself in court before the commencement of the trial. It appears, this abscondance was not with any guilty mind. So, this circumstance cannot be treated as a discriminating one.
State Vs. Badshah Mollah 41 DLR 11.

Sections 30 and 114(b)—
Court may take into consideration the confessional statement of a co—accused under section 30 of the Act against the one who did not confess but an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars.
Nazrul Islam Vs. State 45 DLR 142.

Section 32—
There appears some vagueness in the alleged verbal dying declaration and that is why before relying upon such dying declaration it is the rule of prudence that necessitates the corroboration of the same by reliable evidence.
Gadu MiahVs. State 44 DLR 246.

Section 32—
Expectation of imminent death is not a requirement for treating the declaration as a dying declaration. What is relevant is whether the declaration is voluntary or under pressure from any outside quarter. Conviction can be based on such declaration.
Nurjahan Begum Vs. State 40 DLR 321.

Section 32—
Dying declaration—If it stands the normal test for judging its veracity it becomes a wholly reliable piece of evidence, but if it does not, it is far ‘worse than an ordinary statement of a witness. The value of dying declaration depends in a case on its own facts and the circumstances in which it is made.
If a dying declaration is found to be false in material particulars it must re—act on its genuineness as a whole because in the case of dying declaration the veracity of the contents is presumed on the basis that it happens to be the words of a dying man, who on normal human behavior would not at the close of his life like to tell a lie. Therefore, if a single matter is introduced in the dying statement which has a bearing on the result of the case and is found to be false, it will hit the whole dying declaration. It cannot then be said that it is the statement of a truthful person who has made the statement in realisation of his obligations to adhere to the truth while he is quitting his worldly existence to join his Creator, to whom he is answerable for his deeds.
Babu Vs. State 45 DLR 7.

Section 32—
Hearsay evidence—The witness stated that he had heard from the deceased that the accused hired his van and were taking him to Jessore This part of the evidence, though hearsay, is admissible in evidence being circumstances of the transaction resulting in the death of the deceased.
Abul Kashem Vs. State 42 DLR 378. 

Section 32—
Dying declaration—Conditions to act upon such declaration—The court is to see whether the victim had the physical capability of making such a declaration, whether witnesses who had heard the deceased making such statement heard it correctly, whether they reproduced names of assailants correctly and whether the maker of the declaration had an opportunity to recognize the assailants.
Hafizuddin Vs. State 42 DLR

Section 32—
Dying declaration—A dying man incapable of making any statement may by some gesture, sign or symbol express something which may be interpreted as his statements admissible under the law. But it is to be seen whether his expressions intrinsically ring tree or not.
Dying declaration may be judged from several standpoints, whether the victim had physical capacity to recognize the assailant or whether he had the opportunity to recognize the assailant or whether there is any chance of mistake as to the identity of the assailant or whether it was free from outside prompting and lastly, if the evidence could be relied upon under the given facts and circumstances of the case.
A Alim Vs State 45 DLR 43

Section 32(1)—
Dying declaration—Its probative value (by majonty) A dying declaration although a piece of substantive evidence has always been viewed with some degree of caution as the matter is not liable to cross—examination It stands on the same footing as any other piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and common human experience. When there is a record of such statement of the deceased the court has to satisfy itself, in the first place, as to the genuineness of the same keeping in view all the evidence and circumstances in which the statement of the deceased was said to have been recorded. The alleged dying declaration, the only piece of evidence against the appellant, having not been free from reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt.
Sk Shamsur Rahman Vs. State 42 DLR (AD) 200.

Section 32(1)—
Dying declaration— Statement of a person about the cause of his death or circumstances leading to his death is substantive evidence under section 32(1) of the Evidence Act—If found reliable, it may by itself be basis for conviction even without corroboration.
Statement falling under section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is called a “dying declaration” in ordinary parlance—A dying declaration may be recorded by any person who is available and it may be written or it may be verbal or it may be indicated by signs and gestures in answer to questions even—There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration should be recorded by a Magistrate as in the case of the confessional Statement of an accused under section 164(3) CrPC.
Nurjahan Begum Vs. State 42 DLR (AD) 130.

Section 32(1)—
Legislature in its wisdom has put a dying declaration at par with evidence on oath for the simple reason that a man under the apprehension of death is not likely to speak falsehood and involve innocent persons in preference to his assailant. When a Probationer Officer actually recorded the statement in presence of, and under the observation of the Superior Officer (PW 9), there was hardly any wrong in his Evidence that he recorded it in presence of the witnesses.
Nurjahan Begum Vs. State 42 DLR (AD) 130.

Section 33—
Relevancy of evidence— Right and opportunity to cross—examine—It is the right to cross—examine and not the exercise of such right that is material for the purpose of application of the provision under section 33 Evidence Act.
Shaikh Baharul Islam Vs. State 43 DLR 336.

Section 33—
Evidence of the recording Magistrate was not placed before the trial Court under section 33 of the Evidence Act—Hence this cannot be used as evidence.
But that statement of the Magistrate recorded in the earlier case cannot be taken into consideration in this case as it was not recorded in the presence of accused appellant and also because he did not have the opportunity to cross—examine the said Magistrate. This appellant was then a witness. So the evidence of the recording Magistrate cannot be considered in this case and the confessional statement cannot also be used against the appellant.
Angur Vs. State 41 DLR 66.

Section 33—
Burden of proof— Prosecution to discharge its burden by producing unimpeachable evidence of reliable witnesses—Benefit of doubt goes to the accused if doubt arises.
State Vs. Manik Bala 41 DLR 435.

Section 34—
Circumstantial evidence— When such evidence can be relied upon— Circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution must be cogent, succinct and reliable. The circumstances must be of an incriminating nature or character. All the proved circumstances must unequivocally in to the guilt of the accused and exclude any hypothesis consistent with his innocence.
Mostain Mollah Vs. State 44 DLR 295.

Section 45—
Medical evidence is only corroborative in nature—Ocular evidence of the eyewitness which substantially corroborates the major injuries on the person of the deceased must be accepted.
Abdul Quddus Vs. State 43 DLR (AD) 234.

Section 45—
Deposition of a doctor giving certain opinion formed by examining certain facts is not an absolute truth.
Abdur Rahman Syed Vs. State 44 DLR 556.

Section 45—
The opinion of a doctor, unless supported by reliable evidence, does not carry any value.
Siraj Mal & ors. Vs. Stare 45 DLR 688.

Section 45—
Opinion of expert—evidence and opinion of expert deserve consideration like any other evidence but such evidence has to be received with great caution.
Sheikh Salimuddin Vs. Ataur Rahman 43 DLR 18.

Section 60—
Hearsay evidence—In the absence of examination of Abdus Sattar, the Evidence of PW 1 narrating the story as was told by the former is inadmissible in evidence.
Akhtar Hossain Vs. State 44 DLR 83.

Section 80—
Presumption as to confession —Even though provision is there for making certain presumption in respect of a confession by an accused person produced before a court taken in accordance with law and purporting to be signed by a Magistrate, having regard to the facts of the case it was injudicious to rely upon such confession without calling the Magistrate as a witness. In respect of a confession the court is required to see not only that the forms under sections 164 and 364 CrPC were complied with but the substance underneath the law was equally adhered to—There must not be any reason for doubt as to the truth of the statements, be it circumstantial or proved otherwise. In this particular case it is difficult’ to deny accused appellants an opportunity to cross—examine the Magistrate who allegedly recorded their statements.
Babul Vs. State 42 DLR (AD) 186.

Section 101—
Even if the defence fails to establish its case that will not make the prosecution case proved as the burden of proof on the prosecution never shifts.
Shadat Ali Vs. State 44 DLR 217.

Section 102—
There is no further burden of proof when the assertion of PW 1 remains unchallenged.
Ratan Kha Vs. State 40 DLR 186.

Section 102—
Burden of proof—Wrong allocation of burden of proof on the accused appellants to prove their innocence Is a dangerous proposition—Conviction cannot be based on materials produced by prosecution.
Abdul Khaleque Vs. State 41 DLR 349.

Section 103—
Burden of proof—Act of sodomy is not done in presence of others who might be eye—witness—But prosecution is not absolved of the burden of proving the offence.
Nur Mohammed Vs. State 41 DLR 301.

Section 103—
Burden of proof heavily lies on the prosecution to prove the alleged act by reliable and convincing evidence.
Nur Mohammed Vs. State 41 DLR 301.

Section 103—
Burden of establishing the guilt of the accused—Prosecution to prove every link in the chain of evidence to connect the appellant with the crime.
Md. Nasir Ahmed Vs. State 42 DLR 89.

Sections 103 & 106—
Burden of proving alibi in wife—killing case—It is true that the burden of proving a plea of alibi or any other plea specifically set up by an accused—husband for absolving him of criminal liability lies on him. But this burden is somewhat lighter than that of the prosecution. The accused could be considered to have discharged his burden if he succeeds in creating a reasonable belief in the existence of circumstances that would absolve him of criminal liability, but the prosecution is to discharge its burden by establishing the guilt of the accused. An accused’s burden is lighter, because the court is to consider his plea only after, and not before, the prosecution leads evidence for sustaining a conviction. When the prosecution failed to prove that the husband was in his house where his wife was murdered, he cannot be saddled with any onus to prove his innocence.
State Vs. Mofazzal Hossain Pramanik 43 DLR (AD) 64A.

Section 105—
In a criminal case the accuseds are not required to set up their case in writing, such as a written statement of the defendant of a civil suit, nor are they required to give evidence to prove their innocence, or even to establish their pleas, except a special plea within the meaning of s. 105, Evidence Act, and it is entirely for the prosecution tD establish the guilt of the accused—The cardinal principle of criminal justice that the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved shall be followed at all stages of the trial.
Shah Alam Vs. State 42 DLR (AD) 31.

Section 105—
Section 105, Evidence Act casts a burden upon the accused to prove the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any special exception or proviso contained in any other part of the Penal Code. There has been complete failure on the part of the defence to prove those circumstances.
Md. AbdulMajid Sarkar Vs. State 40 DLR (AD) 83.

Section 106—
Burden of proof—Section 106 fixes the liability of proving the facts on the accused when the same is especially within his knowledge.
Shaikh Baharul Islam Vs. State 43 DLR 336.

Section 114(g)—
The prosecution ought to have examined the investigating officer as a witness to dispel the mystery around the two charge—sheets on the self—same occurrence, although for non—examination of investigating officer prosecution case will not fail in every case.
Abdus Sobahan Howlader Vs. State 45 DLR (AD) 134.

Section 118—
Even a child witness can be relied on if he/she is capable of understanding and replying to the question intelligently.
Abdul Quddus Vs. State 43 DLR (AD) 234.

Section 118—
Child witness, competency of—PWs 12 and 13 though of tender age gave intelligent answers to questions and were found to be natural and normal witnesses. Person who can understand questions and can give rational answers to them is a competent witness.
Abul Kashem Vs. State 42 DLR 378.

Section 118—
The competence of a child as witness is beyond question. The only thing that requires to be done is to scrutinize his evidence with care and caution to see whether it suffers from any inconsistency. To base conviction upon his evidence it is prudent to seek corroboration.
Gadu Mia Vs. State 44 DLR 246.

Sections 133 & 144—
Testimony of accomplice—It is dangerous to base a conviction on such evidence alone. The Court almost invariably starts with the presumption against the trustworthiness of the accomplice and unless circumstances are quite exceptional the Court refuses to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice.
Ator Ali Vs. State 44 DLR 478.

Section 134—
Even if one prosecution witness is fully reliable then conviction of an accused can be based upon his evidence.
Shadat Ali Vs. State 44 DLR 217.

Section 134—
Number of witnesses for proof of fact—It is true in view of section 134 conviction of an accused can be based even upon the evidence of a single witness. But that witness must be wholly reliable. PW 2, the only eye—witness In the present case, in the facts thereof, is not wholly reliable, If not wholly unreliable, and as such sufficient corroboration of her evidence is necessary to base conviction.
Ashrafuddin Vs. State 42 DLR 511

Section 134—
Number of witnesses— Conviction of the appellants can safely be based on the solitary evidence of the eye—witness PW 1. His evidence is full, complete and self—contained. It may not have received corroboration from other witnesses, but it stands fully corroborated by the circumstances of the case and the medical evidence on record. Its fullness and completeness are enough to justify the: conviction.
Abdul Hai Sikder Vs. State 43. DLR (AD) 95.

Section 134—
the testimony of the solitary eye—witness could not be shaken in any manner by the defence in cross—examination for which it is difficult to disbelieve her testimony as she narrated the prosecution case in details.
Abdul Quddus Vs. State 43 DLR (AD) 234.

Section 134—
Solitary witness—True it is that conviction can be based on a solitary witness and it is not necessary to seek corroboration always from independent sources but in the instant case PWs 1—3 being close relations and their evidence being Inconsistent, It is not safe to maintain the conviction.
Butts Vs. State 45 DLR 79.

Section 134—
Recovery of arms and ammunition after hot pursuit of the accused moving with the same—Whether evidence of a single witness without corroboration 18 sufficient to convict the accused—Victim PW 2 Is a disinterested witness and can be relied upon and he has been corroborated in material particulars by the evidence of PWs 1 & 4.
Mahbubur Rahman Khan Vs. State 45 DLR 117.

Section 134—
It is not enjoined that the prosecution is to examine certain definite number of witness.
Kazi Motiur Rahman Vs. Din Islam 43 DLR 128.

Section 134—
In a case of sexual offence, when the victim girl is a minor, her evidence, if otherwise found to be reliable, may be sufficient for conviction of the accused even without independent corroboration.
Siraj Mal Vs. State 45 DLR 688.

Section 134—
Quality and not quantity of evidence is acceptable. There is no impediment in law in conviction being based on the testimony of single witness if it is honest and trustworthy, veracity of eye—witness cannot be doubted unless reason for false implication is given.
Ataur Rahman Vs. State 43 DLR 87.

Section 137—
Statements elicited from a witness in cross—examination is a very important part of evidence before a Court. Before drawing any inference from the testimony of a witness, the Court must consider the statements made in the examination—in—chief and those made in cross—examination by putting them in juxtaposition and see whether that witness has stood the test.
Wajear Rahman Moral Vs. State 43 DLR (AD) 25.

Section 137—
Contention as to facts—The defence cannot make an ingenuous argument that the prosecution story cannot be believed as they did not mention about the connecting doors in between the rooms as the defence did not put any suggestion as to non—existence of the same.
Abdul Quddus Vs. State 43 DLR (AD) 234.

Section 137—
Objection to the manner of cross—examination put to PWs 2 and 3 in a lump and similarly to the 10 PW 9—Objection rightly taken when there was no such statement in the examination—in—chief of the witness.
Taleb Ali & ors. Vs. State 40 DLR (AD) 240.

Section 154—
Hostile witness (by minority): The evidence of the two hostile witnesses cannot be rejected in whole or in part but the whole of the evidence so far as it affects both sides must be taken into consideration.
Sk. Shamsur Rahman Vs. State 42 DLR (AD) 200.

Section 154—
Hostile witness—A witness is not necessarily hostile if he reveals the truth. Established practice, now forming a rule of law, regarding the evidence of a hostile witness is that the whole of his evidence so far as it affects both the parties, favourably or unfavourably, must be considered and the Court which gets the opportunity to observe his demeanor is at liberty to make assessment of the evidence. If corroboration from other sources is available to the evidence of hostile witness, there is no reason why his evidence shall be rejected outright. If the evidence of the hostile witness fits in with the attending circumstances, then it may be accepted and considered along with other evidence.
Siddique Munshi Vs. State 44 DLR (AD) 169.

Sections 154 & 155—
Evidence by eyewitness—Vital omission in FIR and statement to the Investigation Officer make their substantive evidence unreliable.
Babor Ali Molla & others Vs. State 44 DLR (AD) 10

Section 155—
The prosecution witnesses having not been declared hostile their evidence cannot be discarded only because they are favourable to the accused.
State Vs. MM Rafiqul Hyder 45 DLR (AD) 13.

Section 157—
Previous statement, use of— The statement of a witness made under section 164 CrPC is meant for binding him down to the statement made during investigation. The defence may use it to contradict the witness, whereas the prosecution may use it to corroborate him when he gives evidence in court (Per Shahabuddin Ahmed CJ concurred by MH Rahman & ATM Afzal J).
Abu Taher Chowdhury Vs. State 42 DLR (AD) 253.